On Robust Key Agreement Based on Public Key Authentication

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  2. Dr Feng Hao
Author(s)Hao F
Publication type Report
Series TitleSchool of Computing Science Technical Report Series
Year2011
Legacy DateJuly 2011
Report Number1266
Pages26
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This paper discusses public-key authenticated key agreement protocols.First, we critically analyze several authenticated key agreement protocols and uncover various theoretical and practical flaws. In particular, we present two new attacks on the HMQV protocol, which is currently being standardized by IEEE P1363. These attacks suggest the caution one should take when interpreting theoretical results from a formal model.We further point out that many of the protocol failures in the past are caused by sidestepping an important engineering principle, namely "Do not assume that a message you receive has a particular form (such as g^{r} for known r) unless you can check this". Constructions in the past generally resisted this principle on the grounds of efficiency:checking the knowledge of the exponent is commonly seen as too expensive.In a concrete example, we demonstrate how to effectively integrate the zero-knowledge proof primitive into the protocol design and meanwhile achieve good efficiency. Our new key agreement protocol, YAK, has comparable computational efficiency to the MQV and HMQV protocols with clear advantages on security. Among all the related techniques, our protocol appears to be the simplest so far. We believe simplicity is also an important engineering principle.
InstitutionSchool of Computing Science, University of Newcastle upon Tyne
Place PublishedNewcastle upon Tyne
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