Asymmetric Regulation and Airport Dominance in International Aviation: Evidence from London – New York Market

  1. Lookup NU author(s)
  2. Dr Volodymyr Bilotkach
Author(s)Bilotkach V
Publication type Article
JournalSouthern Economic Journal
Year2007
Volume74
Issue2
Pages505-523
ISSN (print)0038-4038
Full text for this publication is not currently held within this repository. Alternative links are provided below where available.
International airline markets have the rather unusual feature of partial deregulation with asymmetric regulatory constraints: Some carriers face entry restrictions different from others for a given route. Like domestic air travel, international travel also features hubs, where a single carrier may dominate a given airport. This article examines the effects of asymmetric regulation and airport dominance on airlines' fares in the London-New York market, a market uniquely suited for identifying the effects of both of these issues. Comparison data from the symmetrically regulated Frankfurt-New York and Paris-New York markets enable a difference-in-differences identification strategy. Regulatory restrictions are found to decrease an affected carrier's fares, whereas airport dominance increases a dominant airline's fares.
PublisherSouthern Economic Association
URLhttp://www.jstor.org/stable/20111979
Actions    Link to this publication
Share