Asymmetric Regulation and Airport Dominance in International Aviation: Evidence from London – New York Market
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- Dr Volodymyr Bilotkach
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| Author(s) | | Bilotkach V |
| Publication type | | Article |
| Journal | | Southern Economic Journal |
| Year | | 2007 |
| Volume | | 74 |
| Issue | | 2 |
| Pages | | 505-523 |
| ISSN (print) | | 0038-4038 |
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| Full text for this publication is not currently held within this repository. Alternative links are provided below where available. |
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| International airline markets have the rather unusual feature of partial deregulation with asymmetric regulatory constraints: Some carriers face entry restrictions different from others for a given route. Like domestic air travel, international travel also features hubs, where a single carrier may dominate a given airport. This article examines the effects of asymmetric regulation and airport dominance on airlines' fares in the London-New York market, a market uniquely suited for identifying the effects of both of these issues. Comparison data from the symmetrically regulated Frankfurt-New York and Paris-New York markets enable a difference-in-differences identification strategy. Regulatory restrictions are found to decrease an affected carrier's fares, whereas airport dominance increases a dominant airline's fares. |
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| Publisher | | Southern Economic Association |
| URL | | http://www.jstor.org/stable/20111979 |
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