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Lookup NU author(s): Professor Thomas GrossORCiD
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Digital signature schemes are a foundational cryptographic building block in certification and the projection of trust. Based on a signature scheme on committed graphs, we propose a framework of certification and proof methods to sign topology graphs and to prove properties of their certificates in zero-knowledge. This framework allows an issuer, such as an auditing system, to sign the topology representation of an infrastructure. The prover, such as an infrastructure provider, can then convince a verifier of topology properties including connectivity and isolation without disclosing the blueprint of the topology itself. By that, we can certify the structure of critical systems while still maintaining confidentiality. We offer zero-knowledge proofs of knowledge for a general specification language of security goals for virtualized infrastructures such that high-level security goals can be proven over topology certificates. We offer an efficient and practical construction, built upon the Camenisch-Lysyanskaya (CL)signature scheme, honest-verifier proofs and the strong RSA assumption.
Author(s): Gross T
Publication type: Conference Proceedings (inc. Abstract)
Publication status: Published
Conference Name: 6th ACM Workshop at 21st ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security (CCSW'14)
Year of Conference: 2014
Pages: 69-80
Acceptance date: 20/09/2014
Publisher: ACM
URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1145/2664168.2664175
DOI: 10.1145/2664168.2664175
Library holdings: Search Newcastle University Library for this item
ISBN: 9781450332392
