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Lookup NU author(s): Dr Sven Fischer
This is the authors' accepted manuscript of an article that has been published in its final definitive form by Sage Publications, Inc., 2018.
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We test experimentally whether dynamic interaction is crucial for concession bargaining. In our complete information bargaining experiments, two parties with asymmetric conflict payoffs try to agree how to share a commonly known pie by bargaining over a finite number of successive trials (agreement attempts). We compare the fully dynamic interaction to one less dynamic and one static protocol. In the quasi-dynamic protocol, later trials merely reveal that so far no agreement has been reached, and in the static protocol no feedback information is given about earlier trials. We find that neither conflict rate nor efficiency or inequality of agreements differ across protocols. Comparing different numbers of maximal trials shows that more trials render conflict more likely due to less concessions.
Author(s): Alberti F, Fischer S, Güth W, Tsutsui K
Publication type: Article
Publication status: Published
Journal: Journal of Conflict Resolution
Year: 2018
Volume: 62
Issue: 9
Pages: 2017-2039
Print publication date: 01/10/2018
Online publication date: 31/07/2017
Acceptance date: 03/04/2017
Date deposited: 28/04/2017
ISSN (print): 0022-0027
ISSN (electronic): 1552-8766
Publisher: Sage Publications, Inc.
URL: https://doi.org/10.1177/0022002717720753
DOI: 10.1177/0022002717720753
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