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Concession bargaining: An experimental comparison of protocols and time horizons

Lookup NU author(s): Dr Sven Fischer

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This is the authors' accepted manuscript of an article that has been published in its final definitive form by Sage Publications, Inc., 2018.

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Abstract

We test experimentally whether dynamic interaction is crucial for concession bargaining. In our complete information bargaining experiments, two parties with asymmetric conflict payoffs try to agree how to share a commonly known pie by bargaining over a finite number of successive trials (agreement attempts). We compare the fully dynamic interaction to one less dynamic and one static protocol. In the quasi-dynamic protocol, later trials merely reveal that so far no agreement has been reached, and in the static protocol no feedback information is given about earlier trials. We find that neither conflict rate nor efficiency or inequality of agreements differ across protocols. Comparing different numbers of maximal trials shows that more trials render conflict more likely due to less concessions.

Publication metadata

Author(s): Alberti F, Fischer S, Güth W, Tsutsui K

Publication type: Article

Publication status: Published

Journal: Journal of Conflict Resolution

Year: 2018

Volume: 62

Issue: 9

Pages: 2017-2039

Print publication date: 01/10/2018

Online publication date: 31/07/2017

Acceptance date: 03/04/2017

Date deposited: 28/04/2017

ISSN (print): 0022-0027

ISSN (electronic): 1552-8766

Publisher: Sage Publications, Inc.

URL: https://doi.org/10.1177/0022002717720753

DOI: 10.1177/0022002717720753

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