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Monopolizing Sanctioning Power under Noise Eliminates Perverse Punishment But Does Not Increase Cooperation

Lookup NU author(s): Dr Sven Fischer

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Abstract

We run several experiments which allow us to compare cooperation under perfect and imperfect information in a centralized and decentralized punishment regime. Under perfect and extremely noisy information, aggregate behavior does not differ between institutions. Under intermediate noise, punishment escalates in the decentralized peer-to-peer punishment regime which badly affects efficiency while sustaining cooperation for longer. Only decentralized punishment is often directed at cooperators (perverse punishment). We report several, sometimes subtle, differences in punishment behavior, and how contributions react.

Publication metadata

Author(s): Fischer S, Grechenig K, Meier N

Publication type: Article

Publication status: Published

Journal: Frontiers in Behavioral Neuroscience

Year: 2016

Volume: 10

Pages: 1-11

Online publication date: 29/09/2016

Acceptance date: 09/09/2016

Date deposited: 30/09/2016

ISSN (electronic): 1662-5153

Publisher: Frontiers Research Foundation

URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.3389/fnbeh.2016.00180

DOI: 10.3389/fnbeh.2016.00180

Notes: revise & resubmit

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