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Cost, competition and information in communication between relatives

Lookup NU author(s): Dr Ben Brilot

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Abstract

Recent signalling models have shown that honest, cost-free communication between relatives can be stable. Moreover, cost-free signalling equilibria are in some cases more efficient than costly equilibria. However, we show that they are also relatively uninformative, particularly when relatedness between signaller and receiver is low. We explore the trade-off between signal cost and information, and further demonstrate that incorporating competition among signallers into a model of communication between relatives can reduce the propensity of any one signaller to display. As a result, there is a general increase in the amount of broadcast information in a non-costly signal with increasing competitor number.

Publication metadata

Author(s): Brilot BO; Johnstone RA

Publication type: Article

Publication status: Published

Journal: Journal of Theoretical Biology

Year: 2002

Volume: 217

Issue: 3

Pages: 331-340

ISSN (print): 0022-5193

ISSN (electronic): 1095-8541

Publisher: Academic Press

URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1006/jtbi.2002.3035

DOI: 10.1006/jtbi.2002.3035

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