Cost, competition and information in communication between relatives

  1. Lookup NU author(s)
  2. Dr Ben Brilot
Author(s)Brilot BO; Johnstone RA
Publication type Article
JournalJournal of Theoretical Biology
Year2002
Volume217
Issue3
Pages331-340
ISSN (print)0022-5193
ISSN (electronic)1095-8541
Full text for this publication is not currently held within this repository. Alternative links are provided below where available.
Recent signalling models have shown that honest, cost-free communication between relatives can be stable. Moreover, cost-free signalling equilibria are in some cases more efficient than costly equilibria. However, we show that they are also relatively uninformative, particularly when relatedness between signaller and receiver is low. We explore the trade-off between signal cost and information, and further demonstrate that incorporating competition among signallers into a model of communication between relatives can reduce the propensity of any one signaller to display. As a result, there is a general increase in the amount of broadcast information in a non-costly signal with increasing competitor number.
PublisherAcademic Press
URLhttp://dx.doi.org/10.1006/jtbi.2002.3035
DOI10.1006/jtbi.2002.3035
Actions    Link to this publication
Share