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Lookup NU author(s): Dr Johannes KniessORCiD
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License (CC BY 4.0).
People often fail to make the choices that best satisfy their preferences. The design of the social environment inevitably makes some choices easier than others. According to Libertarian Paternalists, these facts justify governments nudging people towards better choices through changes to the so-called choice architecture. This is a form of means paternalism. However, the social environment affects not only people's choices or means, but also the preferences they adopt in the first place. Call this the problem of ‘preference architecture’. This article argues that preference architecture constitutes a fundamental challenge to the justificatory basis of Libertarian Paternalism. More generally, it explores when, if ever, government paternalism that influences preference formation can be justified. While Libertarian Paternalism cannot provide a satisfactory answer, the author defends a contractualist account of paternalism based on a notion of primary goods and democratic deliberation.
Author(s): Kniess J
Publication type: Article
Publication status: Published
Journal: British Journal of Political Science
Year: 2022
Volume: 52
Issue: 2
Pages: 921-933
Print publication date: 01/04/2022
Online publication date: 25/01/2021
Acceptance date: 04/09/2020
Date deposited: 15/06/2021
ISSN (print): 0007-1234
ISSN (electronic): 1469-2112
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
URL: https://doi.org/10.1017/S0007123420000630
DOI: 10.1017/S0007123420000630
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