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Chief Executive Officer Regulatory Focus and Competitive Action Frequency

Lookup NU author(s): Dr Saurabh BhattacharyaORCiD

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This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International License (CC BY-NC-ND).


Abstract

Using regulatory focus, the Chief Executive Officer-Top Management Team (CEO-TMT) interface, and upper echelons theories, the present study casts additional light on the competitive action frequency of firms, as determined by their chief executive officers (CEOs) regulatory focus under the contingent effect of the CEO–TMT dissimilarity of informational demographics. Applying regulatory focus and upper echelons theories, this study first hypothesizes how CEO regulatory focus influences competitive action frequency. Next, leveraging CEO–TMT interface research, this study suggests moderating effects on the part of CEO–TMT dissimilarity, across functional background and tenure, and on the relationship between CEO regulatory focus and competitive action frequency. Drawing on a sample of 218 firms from India for a 5-year period (2010–2015), we find that a CEO promotion focus enhances a firm’s competitive action frequency and that a prevention focus diminishes the same. Furthermore, dissimilarities in terms of both CEO–TMT functional background orientation and tenure in the organization moderate this relationship. This study concludes with a discussion of the article’s theoretical and practical implications.


Publication metadata

Author(s): Agnihotri A, Bhattacharya S

Publication type: Article

Publication status: Published

Journal: Group & Organization Management

Year: 2021

Volume: 46

Issue: 5

Pages: 931-962

Print publication date: 01/10/2021

Online publication date: 20/12/2020

Acceptance date: 18/12/2020

Date deposited: 13/02/2021

ISSN (print): 1059-6011

ISSN (electronic): 1552-3993

Publisher: Sage Publications, Inc.

URL: https://doi.org/10.1177/1059601120981411

DOI: 10.1177/1059601120981411


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