La L3-37 Continue: Droid rights and the problem of legal personhood

Jowitt, J

doi:10.1002/9781119841463.ch16

La L3-37 Continue: Droid rights and the problem of legal personhood

Downloads

Full text for this publication is not currently held within this repository. Alternative links are provided below where available.

Abstract

Droids seem an invaluable part of the numerous societies we see in the Star Wars galaxy, fulfilling a range of functions that are too numerable to mention. They are bought and sold; used as cheap and disposable armies; denied access to bars and routinely seen being assembled, dissembled and scavenged for parts. For the most part, this instrumentalization is something most inhabitants of the galaxy take for granted and do not appear to question. Yet in ‘Solo: A Star Wars Story’, we meet L3 37 – and she forces us to consider an alternative view. In all our visits to the Star Wars universe we are presented with droids that appear to be of moral concern. They communicate not just functionally, but convey emotions, disagreement and demonstrate an ability to amend their behaviour in response to external stimuli. They appear to respond to physical sensations such as pain and are frequently seen having their ability to act freely limited through the application of coercion, punishment or restraining bolts. L3 37 is the first droid we meet who seems aware that these social facts may constitute an injustice against a moral person, and her activism on behalf of droid rights is the first time this moral issue is brought to the front of the narrative arc. But the moral claim in isolation is not at the heart of L3 37’s activism. This chapter aims to show that the problem faced by droids is not only one of moral personhood, but of legal personhood. Their continued oppression and instrumentalization is entirely connected to their legal status as property, and a thorough engagement with the philosophy of law is needed in order to fully understand the struggle for droid rights. The first issue to be presented will be the long standing debate between legal positivists and natural lawyers as to the extent to which moral norms need to be reflected in rules for them to be considered valid legal norms. The chapter will then move on to apply these theories to the droid rights struggle highlighted by L3 37 and the relevant legal rules contained in the Galactic Constitution that govern the use of droids. The piece will close by highlighting problems that might arise in the struggle for legal rights for droids in a society that, by and large, does not see the issue as a pressing concern. Analogies will be drawn with contemporary litigation in the US concerning rights for nonhuman animals in order to show that, for L3 37 and her successors, la lutte continue.