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Lookup NU author(s): Dr Farhad Merchant
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Logic locking is one of the most promising design-for-trust techniques for protecting intellectual property from reverse engineering, IP piracy, and modification throughout the electronic supply chain. However, oracle-less deobfuscation attacks that do not require an activated chip have been successful in obtaining the secret key of locked designs. This requires a detailed determination of the extent of vulnerability available in obfuscated circuitry. In this paper, we propose the oracle-less DeepAttack; an attack on logic locking that is capable of extracting the activation key of the locked netlist using a deep learning model. Based on the evaluation on ISCAS-85 and EPFL benchmarks, DeepAttack achieves an average key prediction accuracy of 93.39%, outperforming the oracle-less state-of-the-art attacks SAIL, Snapshot, and OMLA by 21.28, 10.73, and 3.84 percentage points, respectively.
Author(s): Raj Anand, Das Pabitra, Sisejkovic Dominik, Avula Nikhitha, Merchant Farhad, Acharyya Amit
Publication type: Conference Proceedings (inc. Abstract)
Publication status: Published
Conference Name: IEEE ISCAS 2023
Year of Conference: 2023
Acceptance date: 20/01/2023
Publisher: Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers
Sponsor(s): IEEE
