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Lookup NU author(s): Dr Farhad Merchant
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The enormous amount of code required to design modern hardware implementations often leads to critical vulnerabilities being overlooked. Especially vulnerabilities that compromise the confidentiality of sensitive data, such as cryptographic keys, have a major impact on the trustworthiness of an entire system. Information flow analysis can elaborate whether information from sensitive signals flows towards outputs or untrusted components of the system. But most of these analytical strategies rely on the non-interference property, stating that the untrusted targets must not be influenced by the source’s data, which is shown to be too inflexible for many applications. To address this issue, there are approaches to quantify the information flow between components such that insignificant leakage can be neglected. Due to the high computational complexity of this quantification, approximations are needed, which introduce mispredictions. To tackle those limitations, we reformulate the approximations. Further, we propose a tool QFlow with a higher detection rate than previous tools. It can be used by non-experienced users to identify data leakages in hardware designs, thus facilitating a security-aware design process.
Author(s): Reimann L, Hanel L, Sisejkovic D, Merchant F, Leupers R
Publication type: Conference Proceedings (inc. Abstract)
Publication status: Published
Conference Name: 2021 IEEE 39th International Conference on Computer Design (ICCD)
Year of Conference: 2021
Pages: 603-607
Online publication date: 20/12/2021
Acceptance date: 02/04/2018
ISSN: 1063-6404
Publisher: IEEE
URL: https://doi.org/10.1109/ICCD53106.2021.00097
DOI: 10.1109/ICCD53106.2021.00097
Library holdings: Search Newcastle University Library for this item
ISBN: 9781665432207