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Monitoring by busy and overlap directors: an examination of executive remuneration and financial reporting qualityCapacidad supervisora de los consejeros ocupadosy solapados: Un análisis de la remuneración ejecutiva yla calidad de la información financiera

Lookup NU author(s): Dr Shams PathanORCiD

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Abstract

© 2016 Asociación Española de Contabilidad y Administración de Empresas (AECA). We examine the influence of multiple board directorships and boards’ committee memberships on three board supervisory outcomes: executive remuneration, external auditor opinion, and earnings management. The study uses a panel of 122 non-financial companies listed on the Spanish Stock Exchange over the period 2004–2011. Our results show that firms with busy directors offer low executive remuneration and present a low probability of a qualified audit opinion. Furthermore, the results indicate that firms with overlap directors exhibit a higher probability of receiving a qualified audit opinion. Additionally, we find evidence that the overcommitment effects of busy and overlap directors are more evident for large firms. Overall, our findings suggest that busy (overlap) directors are beneficial (detrimental) to the monitoring capability of the board in the Spanish context.

Publication metadata

Author(s): Fernandez Mendez C, Arrondo Garcia R, Pathan S

Publication type: Article

Publication status: Published

Journal: Revista Espanola de Financiacion y Contabilidad

Year: 2017

Volume: 46

Issue: 1

Pages: 28-62

Print publication date: 01/01/2017

Online publication date: 30/11/2016

Acceptance date: 13/10/2016

ISSN (print): 0210-2412

ISSN (electronic): 2332-0753

Publisher: Routledge

URL: https://doi.org/10.1080/02102412.2016.1250345

DOI: 10.1080/02102412.2016.1250345

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