Zygmunt Bauman is of course an extraordinary theorist,¹ but I shall discuss here some of the ways in which he may be seen to exemplify a number of typical sites or predicaments. First, and most parochially, he is one of the cluster of immigrants who fundamentally shaped British sociology and social theory in the second half of the twentieth century. They include Stanislaw Andreski, Gi Baldamus, Zevedei Barbu, Julius Carlebach, Percy Cohen, Ralf Dahrendorf, Norbert Elias, Ernest Gellner, Stuart Hall, Karl Mannheim, Ilya Neustadt, Karl Popper, John Rex, Teodor Shanin, Alfred Sohn-Rethel, Peter Worsley and Sami Zubaida. Bauman’s age puts him among the younger members of this list, but he settled in the UK much later than most of the others and his rise to prominence also came later, in the late 1970s and 1980s, at a time when a more ‘continental’ style of social theory was becoming more dominant.²

Secondly, he is part of a specifically Polish cohort which includes the sociologist Maria Hirszowicz, the philosopher Leszek Kołakowski and the economist Włodzimierz Brus, who were driven out of Poland at the same time and on the same counter-Socratic grounds that they had corrupted students and encouraged their oppositional activity. To this cohort one could add, from an earlier wave of emigration, Czesław Miłosz (1911-2004), who lived in France and the US but whose work was very influential in the UK as well, and Stanisław Andreski (1919-2007), who founded Sociology at Reading, where Hirszowicz also taught. Thirdly, like Brus, Hirszowicz(?) and Kołakowski, though unlike Andreski, Bauman is part of an ex-communist cohort, joining in Britain an ex-communist left which has been exceptionally important in the country’s intellectual life.³

Reception of B’s work

Of the contemporary European social theorists with whom Bauman might be compared, the most obvious are perhaps Bourdieu, Derrida, Eco, Foucault, Giddens, Habermas and Žižek.
Despite the untimely death of three of them, all continue to be central to social and cultural theory in the early twenty-first century, as well as holding or having held significant roles as public intellectuals. Each is or was firmly grounded in their native or, in Bauman’s case, adopted country, while having a major presence in the rest of Europe.

Bauman has probably been the most reluctant to embrace the role of public intellectual, which accrued largely as a result of his accelerating output of stunningly original and stimulating work in social theory and partly also because of the transformation of Eastern Europe and Russia from the late 1980s onwards. He received the Amalfi European Prize in 1990 and the Adorno Prize in 1998. He is emeritus professor both at Leeds and at Warsaw, and to date has honorary degrees from Vilnius, Prague and .

The comprehensive bibliography in Varcoe and Kilminster (1995) illustrates, at least from the supply side, some main lines of the reception of his work. Initially he writes, not surprisingly, mostly in Polish for a Polish audience (with the exception of some short publications in Israel and the US), though focusing substantially on the US and on Britain, where he studied working-class history in the second half of the 1950s. A brief flurry of publications in Czechoslovakia coincide with the Prague Spring, after which (apart from an article in Yugoslavia) the scene shifts to the West (where the 1989 revolutions and their aftermath later inspire a similar flow of occasional publications).

An earlier Polish work appears in 1971 in Italian translation, setting a pattern for more or less simultaneous publication of his work which may say as much about the openness of Italian publishing as about Bauman’s reputation in that country, high though of course it is. Italy certainly makes a sharp contrast with France, where there appears to be no book in the period covered and only articles in 1967 and 1970 in the marxist L’Homme et la Société, followed by another only in 1992, in Michel Maffesoli’s cosmopolitanly oriented journal Sociétés. A German translation of Modernity and the Holocaust appeared with a three-year
lag in 1992 (embellished with the supratitle *Dialektik der Ordnung*), followed by regular translations of subsequent works. In Sweden, *Modernity and the Holocaust* was translated immediately and this also initiated regular translations there and in Denmark. *Towards a Critical Sociology* had been published in Brazil in 1977, and *Culture as Praxis* in Serbian in 1984. The first Polish translation, of *Modernity and Ambivalence*, was in 1991, the year of its British and US publication.

France was, then, until recently the exception to this rising trend, although Bauman follows the French scene closely, engages substantially with French social thought and is as comfortable in French as in any of his other languages. For some reason, then, Bauman did not benefit from the *ouverture* of French publishers to translations of foreign works which seems to have begun some time in the mid-1980s. Catherine Portevin, in her introduction to an interview with Bauman in *Télérama.fr* no. 2039, following the French publication of *Legislators and Interpreters* as *La Décadence des intellectuels*, wrote that ‘his thought is still little known in France, where it is often badly translated and published in scraps without any chronological logic’. It is apparently only in the middle of the present decade that Bauman’s intellectual presence in France began to catch up with that elsewhere in Europe.

Turning to the sociological and related journals, the *Polish Sociological Review* (formerly *Bulletin*) and *Czech Sociological Review* have each produced special issues on Bauman (in 2006), as have *Theory, Culture and Society* in the UK (1998) and *Revista Anthropos* in Barcelona (2005). In France, there have been shorter discussions and an interview in *L’Esprit* (Chardel, 2005; Desaunay, Foessel and Padis, 2005) and *La Pensée* (Tosel, 2006). His principal interpreters are in the UK (Dennis Smith and Keith Tester, more recently Anthony Elliott, Tony Blackshaw and Mark Davis), Australia (Peter Beilharz) and Denmark (Michael Hviid Jacobsen). In Germany, Jens Kastner and Thomas Kron wrote their doctoral theses on Bauman (Kastner, 2000; Kron, 2001). Kron edited a book on him
with Matthias Junge, now in its second edition and including contributions from a wide range of German authors as well as some of the usual suspects from the English-language literature (Junge and Kron, 2002; 2007); Junge has since published a monograph on him (2006). Tmore on reception

So much for Europe’s Bauman. Bauman’s Europe was shaped, then, in a much sharper way than for a Western European, by its partition after World War II. What he wrote of the Bulgarian-French theorist Tzvetan Todorov, that he was ‘well placed [to address the question of European values] thanks to a biography that spanned both sides of what some people see as Europe’s outer frontier’ is also true, mutatis mutandis, of himself. A duality which for Western sociologists was a resource for theory-construction, whether of industrial society (with or without convergence) or totalitarianism, was a permanent lived reality in the East, between, as Yevtushenko ironically put it, ‘the city of no and the city of yes’. Bauman’s early work in English has been well discussed by Dennis Smith (1999: chapter 5), and James Satterwhite (1992) puts it and related Polish-language work in its regional context. After he left Poland, as Smith (1999: 71) again notes, the tone is rather of someone showing you round a house where they previously lived, pointing out its drawbacks but also its strengths. Bauman’s article of 1971 was printed along with a friendly critique from Kolakowski, arguing that he was too pessimistic about the prospects for radical change.

Is the demand for freedom the affair of a handful of intellectuals and are these societies insensitive to political slavery or at least ready to accept it? If we tried to answer this question by asking what percentage of the population is for the time being committed to the active struggle for political freedom, the figures would not be
impressive, to be sure. But this way of inquiry would be unreliable, to put it mildly, as an attempt to discover historical trends. (Kolakowski, 1971: 56)

And contrary to Bauman’s developmentalist assumption that the consolidation of the economic and social transformation in postwar Poland conduces to stability, Kolakowski argues that ‘…the less this population feels to be violently torn out its “natural” condition, the more adapted to industrial life, the more educated, the more open to the variety of life, the greater its ability to develop a class consciousness and to resist exploitation’ (Kolakowski, 1971: 58). A decade later, of course, the rise of Solidarity gave Kolakowski the last laugh – which is not of course to say that Bauman was wrong in his account, which he substantially modified in the 1980s (Smith, 1999: chapter 7).

1989 led, not surprisingly, to a number of retrospective pieces on the causes of the revolutions. After this, Bauman’s work turned more to themes which were less geographically focussed – the axis of differentiation, where there was one, being sometimes between Europe and North America and sometimes between the global North and South. His book on the Holocaust, which I discuss below, does of course have a precise geographical referent, though here again he is concerned with general implications as much as the specifics of what happened in central and eastern Europe.

When he turned specifically to the theme of Europe, in a short book which grew out of an invited lecture, he offers a fairly familiar narrative of the integration process before focussing on the more worrying dynamic of exclusion which increasingly accompanies it. There is also however a darker theme, again linking Stalinist rule by terror with capitalist insecurity, Unsicherheit or ‘précarité’. The capitalist version has been a major concern of Bauman,’s recent work, notably in Society Under Siege. It is easy to see why it would. It is a dominant feature of much social analysis, notably by Beck and Sennett, as well as several of
the French theorists on whom Bauman draws substantially. But it also points, perhaps, to an
theory of domination which can be traced perhaps to some of his earlier analysis, of Stalinism
and of the Holocaust, as well as to his personal experience as a cog in the repressive apparatus
and, for a much longer period, as its victim.

This theme can be found in his early work, rounded off in 1982 by *Memories of Class.*
Ian Varcoe and Richard Kilminster, in their superb ‘Addendum’ to the Festschrift which
they edited in 1996, note this aspect of factory regulations documented by the Hammonds.
Bauman is struck by the Foucauldian implications of these pointless regulations: ‘full
domination over workers’ bodies (Bauman, 1982:63).
Varcoe and Kilminster (1982: 220-221) go on to relate this to Bauman’s analysis of the ‘means testing’ of welfare claimants
(Bauman. 1987, ch. 11) and of course his book on the Holocaust. Without going into the
details of their discussion here, or of the massive debates around Bauman’s analysis of the
Holocaust, it is perhaps worth pointing to a feature of pre-Holocaust antisemitic policy which
jumps out from memoirs such as those by Karl Löwith and Viktor Klemperer: the fine
distinctions the Nazis drew not just between ‘full’ and fractional Jews but between the partial
and temporary immunities from persecution conferred by military service in World War One
and even certain types of resulting disablement. Specialists may disagree on how far such
processes of classification and exclusion contributed to making the Holocaust possible, but no
one would deny that they played some role, as did the underlying alleged distinction between
Jew and non-Jew (Bauman, 1998).

Hans Joas, in his discussion of *Modernity and the Holocaust* and its German reception,
also points to this theme and situates it in the context of Bauman’s work as a whole. ‘When
we read what he has to say about postmodernity we may be seduced into characterizing him
as an optimist. But when we study his analysis of modernity we may actually be frightened to
see how much he describes it as a narration of terror.’ (Joas, 1998: 51) Joas goes on to refer
to a significant contribution by Bauman to a conference on ‘modernity and barbarism’. Bauman has of course since moved on from the simple antithesis of modern and postmodern, and he would probably accept something more like Peter Wagner’s more nuanced account of the duality of modernity, but the underlying theme remains potent. In Society Under Siege he focuses on contemporary management strategies as he had done earlier on Victorian factory regulations. The uncertain life expectancy of contemporary institutions is not a mere by-product of capitalist concentration or globalization. As Richard Sennett, Daniel Cohen and others have shown, it is explicitly pursued as a management strategy of control, and fuelled by incentives. In Sennett’s analysis, writes Bauman, „perfectly viable businesses are gutted or abandoned, capable employees are set adrift rather than rewarded, simply because the organization must prove to the market that it is capable of change”. At an individual level, what is required is a kind of entrepreneurship, flexibility and networking, rather than the traditional white-collar employee’s bureaucratically and hierarchically framed loyalty. Employees, as Cohen puts it, have to “demonstrate to the company that they have done their job well.” In practice, this will tend to mean meeting artificially set targets both for “performance” and for more tenuous interpersonal qualities of cooperativeness: “it is now the subjectivity of the worker which is at issue.” Something like this is now seen also in education: school and university students are increasingly graded not only on their performance on more and more denatured assessment exercises but on qualities such as ‘co-operativeness’ or ‘ability to work in a group’ - even when the task in view is something as solitary as the writing of a PhD thesis in the humanities. Such generalization of a compulsory Sittlichkeit of politeness is, as Bauman would no doubt agree, the death of any genuine morality of the kind for which he has argued at length.
This degradation of working life is of course mirrored and sometimes replaced, in Bauman’s analysis, by the alienation of consumption. An early version of this critique, in *Memories of Class*, brings out this parallelism: deprived young people belong to the first generation about to be squeezed finally out of the role of producers and goaded into a status determined by consumption alone; the first generation not to undergo the body-and-mind drill administered by the factory-located disciplining powers, but trained solely in the new consumer discipline, aimed at eliciting proper responses to proper offers. The consumer orientation, first developed as a by-product, and an outlet, of the industrial pattern of control, has been finally prised from the original stem and transformed into a self-sustained and self-perpetuating form of life. This transformation certainly calls for a new type of power, in many respects sharply different from the disciplining power, specializing in the bodily drill, which made possible the advent of industrial society. (p.179)

The centrality of the theme of suffering, and particularly what Lévinas calls ‘useless suffering’ to Bauman’s work has recently been well brought out by Michael Hviid Jacobsen and Sophia Marshman (2008). As they note (p.15), his focus is on the suffering of social collectivities rather than of individuals. It is also arguably more on the production than on the experience of suffering: the structural conditions which generate it, often via the disabling of human sympathy in the minds of the perpetrators of suffering. In his very illuminating *Conversations* with Keith Tester, he refers to this process as ‘disempowering the moral sense’ (Bauman and Tester 2001: 132).

The theme of suffering, of course, goes along with those of fear and insecurity in an unholy trinity. We have largely got rid of the sort of pervasive state terror which
characterized Stalinism and to some extent the post-Stalinist regimes. In return we have *précarité* in employment and in our personal lives, the final apotheosis of Beck’s ‘risk society’ in its environmental dimension as well as others, and now a financial catastrophe affecting or likely to affect pretty much the entire globe.\(^{14}\) The mismatch between what we ought to worry about (climate change, starvation etc.) and what we do worry about (the off-chance of a terrorist getting on a plane with a concealed weapon)\(^ {15}\) is probably as great as it had been since we ceased to worry about the fate of our immortal souls (as of course some people still do). Bauman (2004: 82) puts it very well:

> The security we fear for, about which we are told and encouraged and groomed to be fearful, while being promised by the powers-that-be that it will be granted, is no longer the kind of security Roosevelt or Beveridge had in mind. It is not the security of our place in society, of personal dignity, of honour of workmanship, self-respect, human understanding and humane treatment, but instead a security of the body and personal belongings. It is not security from those who refuse us jobs or deny our humanity when we are in a job, from those who take away our self-respect, and humiliate or dishonour us – but a security against trespassers on our property and strangers at the doorway, prowlers and beggars in the streets, sexual offenders at home and outside, poisoners of wells and hijackers of planes.

How might an analysis of this kind be brought more specifically to bear on Europe as a region of globality? The answer must be in part historical. It was in Europe, though soon afterwards in North America, that factory production became common, and it was Europe which gave the world totalitarianism in its Stalinist and fascist forms. The normalization of
bodies and minds has been pushed further in modern Europe than elsewhere. And yet Europe still displays a diversity of belief and a degree of secularization which stand out on a world scale. France, where the term ‘pensée unique’ was coined, is one of the main sites of intellectual resistance to neoliberal orthodoxy, even if the French managers studied by Cohen are not so different from Sennett’s North Americans. In a rather up-beat passage in his first ‘conversation’ with Keith Tester (Bauman and Tester, 201: 31), Bauman says:

Europe is the pluralist culture avant la lettre. In that lay its strength, and perhaps even its uniqueness…we may say that that Europe could be seen as a greenhouse of universal humanity because of its amazing aptitude for communicating across the cultural (or any other) divides.

Here, as elsewhere, Bauman’s focus is properly on European modernity, or now, in his terms, liquid modernity, rather than on regional specificities. There is however a sense in which Europe does stand out for the particular way in which European cosmopolitanism (a term which he says he dislikes, presumably for its overtones of self-congratulation), coexists with an inward-looking attitude for which the outside world is some sort of threat. Bauman, like Balibar, Kristeva, Todorov and many other theorists, is particularly concerned with Europe’s treatment of residents of non-European origin or descent. Another source of anxiety would be Europe’s long-standing indifference to the harmful effects of the Common Agricultural Policy on producers in less developed countries. A third might be the well-meaning bumbling of some of the European Union’s poorly coordinated diplomatic initiatives. To say that the EU’s record is better in these areas than that of the USA (especially under the Bush II administration) may be true but is beside the point, since the EU sets itself, and is measured against, higher standards than a mere national state. For the EU, the
standards themselves are permanently up for question, along with so much else of its 
operations. The erosion of social policy too, to which Bauman has rightly directed much of 
his attention and which is illustrated by the quotation above, is more dramatic in a region 
which since the time of Bismarck (!) has prided itself on its achievements in this area.

It is clear that Bauman roams intellectually, and to substantial extent also physically, 
around Europe. An hour or two on the internet yields a whole raft of interviews with Europe- 
wide and in some cases pan-European media in which he surveys its political and social 
condition with acute observations. On the whole though, he is interested in commonalities 
and examples which illustrate general developmental trends, rather than detailed and 
systematic differences between its component states and regions. As he writes of corporatism 
in Memories of Class, in a chapter which ranges back to Walras as well as across the capitalist 
Europe of the 1980s, the diversity of policies and institutions conceal the general corporatist 
trend. ‘It is all too easy to overlook the forest behind the trees and to take policy 
proclamations for reversals of history.’ (p.159) Earlier, as he established himself in the West, 
he refused the role of ‘area specialist’ or ‘sovietologist’ (Bauman and Tester, 2006: 273) and 
commented on affairs in the communist world only in relation to specific events such as the 
rise of Solidarity (Bauman, 1981; 1992).18

As he notes in another interview (Jacobsen and Tester, 2005, reprinted in Tester and 
Jacobsen, 2006: 269) many of his earlier criticisms of Poland and communism turned out to 
apply to the West as well:

When working on [an essay on the sociological profession – Bauman, 1957] I 
thought…that I was trying to resolve a thoroughly local and hopefully temporary, 
Polish (or the ‘socialist camp’s’) dilemma, which arose from the authoritarian nature 
of the political regime and from its bid to manage everything and eliminate the un-
manageable...I just did not realise at the time that the local Polish experience was but an extreme and particularly festering specimen of a contention that in the plight of sociology was neither incidental nor local.

Europe, which has clutched to its bosom the slogan of soft power, for reasons which are all too obvious, is centrally concerned by the way in which political power has fragmented under modern conditions. In an interview of 2005 with German Radio, reprinted in the magazine Freitag, Bauman suggests that power has migrated
- upwards, to a global space dominated by multinational enterprises, leaving governments the choice between ‘the destruction of the economy and the destruction of the society’
- sideways, through ‘deregulation’ which deprives national states of many of the powers they previously enjoyed
- downwards, as cost-cutting governments demand that citizens take more action to guard themselves against risks.

There is, again, nothing specifically European about these processes except that the legitimacy of European states has substantially relied on the provision of economic security and the idea that this is a legitimate focus of politics. ‘The budding European federation is now facing the task of repeating the feat accomplished by the nation-state of early modernity: the task of bringing together power and politics presently separated and navigating in different directions.’ (Bauman, 2004: 131)

This process of political alienation, as analysed by a host of thinkers from Marx (1844) to Régis Debray (1981) leads, not surprisingly, to estrangement from politics. As Vivien Schmidt (2006) and others have shown, the European Union is stuck in what I have elsewhere
called a non-decision trap (Outhwaite, 2009), in which the democratic deficit at the Union
level reinforces that in the national states. An exception, if there is one, might be found in
Western countries like Italy and in a number of new members from the East, where the
European level is seen as a counter to local problems, but the evidence in the latter case is
rather disappointing so far.

The passage quoted above is one of rather few in which Bauman comments specifically on the
evolution of the European Union. His reflections on Europe fall rather into the genre of more
philosophically and culturally oriented essays.\textsuperscript{19} The closest parallel is perhaps with Étienne
Balibar, who, like Bauman, combines relatively abstract reflections on Europe with a focus on
the processes of ethnic exclusion which constitute the greatest threat to its cohesion, as well as
to the welfare of many of its inhabitants (Balibar, 2004; Bojadžijev and Saint-saëns, 2006;
Outhwaite, 2006\textsuperscript{a}). Their work reflects a peculiarity of the current state of Europe, in which
long-standing Eurocentric delusions of grandeur (Bhambra, 2007) are reconfigured at the
micro level in judgements about who is (more) ‘European’ than whom.\textsuperscript{20} The European
Union is of course itself poised between essentially legal constructions and broader processes
of cultural and political identity-formation. Bauman’s focus is essentially on the latter,
whereas the former remain dominant in the emergent European polity – illustrated by its
failure to produce a document which any normal person would recognize as a constitution
and the subsequent failure to secure ratification of the absurdly overblown constitutional
treaty.\textsuperscript{21} In other areas of course, the European Union displays a happier mixture of the two
elements, as in the success of the common currency.

Bauman’s sociology, like his public interventions, is not, as Spiegel once wrote of
Luhmann, ‘above the clouds’. It is grounded, not so much in empirical \textit{data}, as in striking
\textit{examples} selected with a keen eye to the telling illustration of a theme which might otherwise
seem abstract and speculative. He is not so much a sociologist of Europe as a cosmopolitan European sociologist with a worldwide reputation. And, as he would no doubt say, to paraphrase Kipling, what do they know of Europe, who only Europe know?
References


1 Peter Wagner puts it well in his endorsement to Peter Beilharz’s *Bauman Reader* (2001): ‘a European intellectual of the old style who is entirely up to the exigencies of our time’.

2 Dennis Smith (1998) perceptively discusses this aspect of Bauman’s career.

3 Not of course without some uncomfortable moments, such as E.P. Thompson’s savage critique discussed by Keith Tester (2006).

4 Such roles may be sought out deliberately or, more usually, the result of invitations. These may be nationally based, as when the BBC invites Giddens to deliver a lecture series, international, as when the German Book Trade invites the Polish/British Bauman to receive its Prize or the Polish paper *Polityka* invites Michnik and Habermas to a debate published there and in *Die Zeit* (Habermas and Michnik 1993), or transnational/European as in the case of the Charlemagne Prize or contributions to pan-European media such as *Eurozine*. Interventions will most often be national but may be transnational in their origin and/or destination, as in the joint declaration by Habermas and Derrida (2003). For a tentative discussion of the internationalisation or Europeanisation of such activities see Outhwaite, 2008.

5 Hans Joas (1998: 49) discusses the enormous impact of this book in Germany, which had only recently been through the *Historikerstreit*: ‘…you might imagine what it meant to Germans when a Jewish sociologist from Poland and Britain was understood to say that the Holocaust is not absolutely incomparable and not due to the particularities of German history. Such a voice could not be ignored – it truly had to be taken seriously because it is not possible in this case to derive the ideas from ideological intentions to whitewash the guilt and responsibility of the German people.’


7 Richard Kilminster and Ian Varcoe also deserve a mention for their superb Festschrift and their own very substantial contributions in it.

8 Although no-one could seriously deny that Bulgaria and, a fortiori Poland, are part of Europe, the important point is the fact of division. On Bauman’s ‘generation’ of Polish Jewish commuists, see Schatz, 1991.

9 Yevgeny Yevtushenko, ‘Между городом нет и городом да’. As Bauman says of the Western discussion of the carnevalesque 1968, ‘It struck me right away that when Warsaw students took to the streets, no one laughed’ (Tester and Jacobsen, 2006: 274).

10 In an autobiographical memoir, another Polish sociologist, Piotr Sztompka (2007; 191-2), recalls that the two books of the 1960s which most influenced him as a student were Ossowski’s on the peculiarities of the social sciences (Ossowski, 1962) and one by Bauman. ‘An Outline of the Marxist theory of Society’ (1964) was the title, and that was where the Marxism ended. Instead, the astute student could find a quite adept discussion of the works of Parsons, Merton, Lundberg, Lazarsfeld, Lasswell, and Mills. All this was adorned with some lip service to given to a number of Soviet thinkers, the required dosage of “political correctness” at the time.’

11 The German and French terms are not added just for decoration. The former, as Bauman points out, has multiple senses shading into Angst, while the latter has formed a major focus of public debate in France, linked to the earlier theme of the nouveaux pauvres, a term which has not caught on in Britain to quite the same extent, though it probably will now in the aftermath of the credit crash and recession. See also Bauman 1999: 5.

12 This ties in, of course, with his general tendency to focus on social order as ‘the common denominator of other modern undertakings: industrialism, capitalism, democracy…The longing for human-made order lubricated the wheels of the three ‘society-centred’ modern pursuits.’ (Bauman and Tester, 2001: 78; see also Beilharz, 2006)
13 In an earlier conversation (p.25) he speaks of learning from Marx his ‘disgust for all forms of socially produced injustice, the urge to debunk the lies in which the social responsibility for human misery tends to be wrapped and thus removed from view, and the urge to smell a rat whenever a clamp on human freedom is contemplated or justified’.

14 It was not surprising that the most recent congress of the German Sociological Association (2008) took as its theme ‘unsichere Zeiten’.

15 See for example Bauman, 2005.

16 As I write these lines, the news is that some London buses will carry for a time the message: ‘God probably doesn’t exist, so why not stop worrying and enjoy your life’. And as Bauman notes (Bauman and Tester, 2001: 29), ‘Europe never invented a concept of anti-European activity’.

17 Not to mention, of course, the large number of specialists in this area, such as Yasemin Soysal and Tariq Modood in the UK.

18 Interestingly, Agnes Heller (1978: 157-8) took a similar line on leaving Hungary for Australia, in an interview with Telos. ‘My persistent advocacy of leftist radicalism and radical Marxist philosophy necessitated a relativization of Eastern Europe, insofar as I identify more with the concerns and endeavors of leftist radicals of the Western world. For them, Eastern Europe is an inevitable warning. Leszek Kolakowski has made a different choice; he remains deeply committed to Eastern Europe… The greatest concern of Eastern Europe was and remains the liberation of civil society and the guaranteeing of civil liberties. I never intended to cast doubt on the justification of those goals, although they had already been superseded by new theoretical considerations. To identify with Eastern Europe would have meant either the acceptance of a liberal or even conservative way of thought, or the complete renunciation of philosophy’. (cf. Satterwhite (1992: 118 and n.121).

19 See the excellent discussion by Jiří Přibáň (2007a).

20 Poland, like the other post-communist members of the European Union, has suffered from such prejudices; see Outhwaite, 2006b; 2009b).

21 In Bauman’s devastating remark, ‘If the Maastricht Treaty, or the Accession Treaty that followed it, is the contemporary equivalent of the Declaration of the Rights of Man and the Citizen, the American Declaration of Independence or the Communist Manifesto, then there seems little hope left for the next instalment of the European adventure.’ (Bauman, 2004: 24). As Přibáň (2007: 139) points out, however, ‘Criticisms of European legalism formulated by Bauman, Havel and others run the risk of overstating the political role and power of culture at the expense of everyday democratic politics and technical decision-making processes.’ See also Outhwaite, 2009a.