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THE CULTURAL POLITICS OF JUSTICE: BAKHTIN, STAND-UP COMEDY AND POST 9-11 SECURITIZATION


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THE CULTURAL POLITICS OF JUSTICE: BAKHTIN DOES STAND-UP

ABSTRACT
For Rabelais, ‘folk humour’ and its boundless forms are far from frivolous, inconsequential aspects of the human condition, but are central to modes of critique and the formation of discourses which seek radical cultural transformation by evading, exposing, resisting, scandalizing and mocking ‘official culture’. This paper explores the abstract notion of ‘justice’ through the lens of ‘folk humour’ – specifically, stand-up comedy - taking its cue from Bakhtin’s exposition of the grotesque realism of the Rabelaisian novel. In so doing, the paper calls into question Habermasian discourse ethics, and proposes a model of ‘doing justice’ predicated on Bakhtinian dialogism.

Keywords: dialogized justice; securitisation; counterpublic sphere; comedy; Bakhtin

INTRODUCTION
The contestability of ‘justice’ is not only the stuff of philosophical treatises and political theories, but is also the inspirational catalyst of social movements of all kinds. Protest marches, hunger strikes, petitions, boycotts and media campaigns constitute a familiar imagery of the contestation of ‘justice’ in the public sphere. What tends to be omitted, however, from this conventional repertoire of ‘justice activism’ is any reference to ‘folk humour’ and the ways in which it works to destabilise and scrutinise what we mean by ‘justice’, both politically and ethically. Using the humorous form of stand-up comedy, this paper will consider the subversive
possibilities of a televisual carnival of laughter, and how far it constitutes an important *counterpublic* sphere which promotes critical deliberation and engagement with questions of `justice’ in a liberal democratic society.

Recent developments in public sphere theory have called into question Habermasian notions of the nature of public debate and mediated dialogue. Habermas’s insistence on such dialogue as constituting a rule-based, ‘ideal speech situation’, as informed by communicative rationality, and as seeking consensus based on universal norms and principles, has exposed him to the charge of failing to recognise the exclusivity of his particular version of discourse ethics (Benhabib, 1986; Calhoun, 1992; Outhwaite, 1994; Crossley and Roberts, 2004). Discursive media and practices which do not fit the Habermasian mould of ‘ideal speech’ are discredited and delegitimised as deliberative modalities of political engagement; or are silenced, marginalised and excluded as instances of public dialogue. Such discursive spaces have been theorised as counterpublic spheres (Asen, 2000; Asen and Brouwer, 2001; Warner, 2002), and this is a concept which acknowledges that public debate is mobilised discursively within and through a heterogeneity of cultural media. On this view, Hollywood cinema, reality TV, video-gaming, cartoons and stand-up comedy, for example, are as crucial for democratic deliberation and participatory engagement as are government pamphlets, citizens’ juries, town hall meetings, public inquiries, e-petitions and consensus conferences. As Asen and Brouwer put it, such media function as discursive spaces of ‘critical publicity’ (2001: 6), a notion which denotes not only the reflexive interaction of resistance and power, but also how political relationships between margin and centre are discursively and culturally accomplished.
A counterpublic sphere perspective connects with the theoretical and epistemological work of contemporary cultural criminological scholarship and the political legacy of the Birmingham Centre for Contemporary Cultural Studies which runs through it (Hall et al, 1978; Gilroy, 1987; Hall and Jefferson, 1993; Gray et al, 2007). Through the innovative lens of the cultural criminological project, we not only come to understand and celebrate the seductive, existential pleasures of transgressive, liminal and resistive practices, but we have come to value _inter alia_ humour, artworks, ‘true crime’ fiction, fashion, extreme sports, urban leisure, roadside shrines and billboards as important sites and forms of alternative critical discourse – as media of _critical publicity_. Moreover, a cultural criminological outlook encourages us to _read_ culture politically, nurturing an activist orientation suggestive of an interventionist politics of cultural transformation – see, for example, Katz (1988); Ferrell and Sanders (1995); Presdee (2000); _Theoretical Criminology_ (2004: Special Issue on Cultural Criminology, 8(3)); Hayward (2004); Valier (2004); Ferrell, Hayward and Young (2008).

However, it is one thing to assert that cultural media - in this context stand-up comedy – promotes a critical dialogue on the issues of the day, and thereby constitutes an important counterpublic sphere of resistive politics, but it is quite another to _theorise_ its value, function and meaning within philosophical debates of the kind of ‘justice’ and the kind of ‘just society’ we might aspire to. In other words, in a post-9/11 era where intensified securitisation reconfigures the meaning(s) of ‘justice’, the multiplicity of ways in which such meaning(s) may be discursively constructed and communicated, is not only a pressing political issue but is also of particular theoretical concern. What model of justice permits and sustains the inclusion of discursive
modes which do not conform to Habermasian notions of ideality, universality and rationality? This, then, is where the paper makes a significant contribution to theoretical work which seeks to link the politics of the cultural criminological imagination to broader philosophical questions about ‘justice’. While ‘folk humour’ provides the empirical ground for making such a link, it is achieved analytically through the critical juxtaposition of Habermasian discourse ethics with Bakhtinian dialogism, using Hudson’s (2003) model of ‘justice’ - premised on principles of relationality, discursivity, plurivocality and reflectivity – as a template for theoretical comparison.

**JUSTICE AND SECURITISATION**

‘Justice’, like ‘community’, ‘culture’ and ‘identity’, constitutes one of life’s ‘essentially contested’ (Gallie, 1956) and ‘essentially contestable’ (Clarke, 1979) concepts. Its contestability is not only the stuff of philosophical treatises and political theories, but it often serves as the inspirational catalyst of social movements and forms of resistance of all kinds. In her eloquent monograph on the nature of *Justice in the Risk Society* (2003), Barbara Hudson draws from a wide number of divergent Western philosophical traditions, including liberalism, communitarian, feminist and poststructuralist critiques, to suggest a number of conditions of possibility for achieving ‘justice’ in late modernity; she writes:

Justice must be: *relational* – it must take account of relationships between individuals, groups and communities; *discursive* – it must allow claims and counter-claims, critiques and defences of existing values to be weighed against each other in undominated discourse; *plurivocal* – it must recognise and hear the different voices of the plurality of identities and social groups that must have their claims met and find
ways of living together, in radically pluralist contemporary societies; …… reflective
– justice must flow from consideration of the particulars of the individual case rather
than subsuming unique circumstances under general categories (Hudson 2003: 206:
*Emphasis added*).

Whilst it may be easy to see the accommodative potential of Hudson’s criteria for
‘justice’, they still amount to a set of normative ideals which are difficult, if not
impossible, to either realise or live up to – and this is especially so when our need for
‘justice’ is combined with demands for other states of existence. In other words, even
if we agree with Hudson’s model of ‘doing justice in the risk society’, how we square
any version of ‘justice’ with other fundamental tenets of liberal democratic societies -
limited government, individual responsibility, freedom, equality, respect, human
rights, security - is a moot point.

In the post-9/11 era, the coupling of ‘justice’ and ‘security’ has become an especially
pressing concern with many arguing that fears of terrorism, and of other threats posed
by, for example, paedophilia, cybercrime, violent, predatory crime, organised crime
and anti-social behaviour, has encouraged a preference for forms of justice which
prioritise security over freedom, or which sacrifice the latter for the former (Benhabib,
2002; Bigo, 2002; Jayasuriya, 2002; Meyers, 2002; Sparks, 2003). Within the terms
of social contract theory, if the security of persons and properties is the precondition
of freedom, there will always be a trade-off between the two. Against a prevailing
meta-narrative of ontological insecurity, disembeddedness, suspicion, uncertainty and
risk – see, for example, Giddens (1991), Beck (1992) – the preservation of a just
society premised on individual freedom is no longer an abstract, philosophical matter
but is increasingly the stuff of intensive and heated political debate. Indeed, Benhabib
(2002: 1) talks of the advent of an `unholy politics’, a new form of struggle in the post-9/11 period which threatens `to dissolve the boundaries of the political in liberal democracies’ – boundaries which mark out conventional moral and political distinctions between, for example, enemies and allies, the guilty and the innocent, peace and war, civilian and military. Meyers (2002) also seeks to `defend politics’ from a contemporary ethic of retribution which, he argues, responds to terrorism only by jettisoning communication and dialogue in favour of force and violence – as he puts it `(f)reedom depends on politics and politics depends on speech’ (2002: 3). Jayasurika makes a similar argument; in a persuasive account of the `(anti-)politics of security’ in the aftermath of 9/11, he warns that:

The most serious danger these events pose is their ability to usher in, under the appealing cloak of `security’, a debilitating form of `anti-politics’ that marginalises the constructive conflicts – the debate and the discussion – that animate the public sphere in liberal polities (2002: 1).

In each of these accounts, there is not only an assumption of a sea-change in the nature of political deliberation about security in insecure times, but it is further inferred that the policy response to risk, danger, threat and uncertainty is primarily one based on the resurgence of sovereign and authoritarian forms of rule. Meyers (2002) claims that public debate on these matters has been reduced to a kind of `speechless shock’, and that the imagery of violent excess, whether instigated by `the bestial’ (terrorists) or `the god-like’ (democratic governments), undermines the capacities and dispositions of the citizenry to engage in meaningful dialogue in the public sphere. There is certainly no shortage of claims which suggest that an excessive concern with security has overwhelmed any preference for a just society
based on equality of freedom, but how far this is illustrative of an orientation to what Dean refers to as `authoritarian liberalism' (2002a, 2002b)\(^2\), or is indicative of a `new punitiveness' (Bottoms, 1995; Garland, 2001a, 2001b; Pratt et al., 2005; Pratt, 2007) is not at all clear. Perrin (2005), for example, using the occasion of the 9/11 attacks, identifies the co-presence of authoritarian and anti-authoritarian sentiments within political culture; while Hutton (2005) questions the notion of a monolithic public disposition and presents empirical data to demonstrate that punitive, reactionary views co-exist with less visceral and more `rational', reflective attitudes to security and protection – see also Roberts, Stalans, Indermaur and Hough (2003). The idea of a populist bandwagon driving forward an illiberal agenda of authoritarian justice may have a \textit{prima facie} appeal, but it relies on a selective and partial reading of contemporary discourses and practices of securitisation, and also rests on a limited understanding of the nature of and scope for deliberative dialogue about matters of security and governance.

Not only is there good ground to support the view of a mixed economy of security practices (O’Malley, 1999, 2008; Matthews, 2005), but demands for the proliferation of (ever)more intrusive modes of security and protection rarely go unchallenged, and are as fiercely contested as they are made. There is more than ample evidence to show that counterdiscourses not only circulate but also effectively subvert and disrupt an assumed hegemony of authoritarian sensibilities. Civil liberties groups and human rights campaigners are at the forefront of this kind of oppositional dialogue. Third sector organisations such as Liberty, Amnesty International, Justice and Inquest are prolific in their confrontation of illiberalism in all its guises, and mobilise effective challenge through many different kinds of activism ranging from protest, test case
litigation, lobbying, research, fund-raising, confidential advice services, petitioning, training and publication. This vital work not only restates, but also reframes our thinking about ‘justice’ in exceptional times. Furthermore, while the courtroom has become a key locus for the determination of what counts as ‘justice’ in a ‘war on terror’, the judiciary increasingly emerge as important interlocutors in public articulations of ‘justice’. In a press release, and referring to the High Court ruling which rejected the UK government’s ‘secret evidence’ clause (ie. Prevention of Terrorism Act, 2005, S2), Director of Liberty, Shami Chakrabarti, said of the Law Lords:

Yet again it takes a senior judge to point out what most people already know – if the Government is going to lock you up, it needs to tell you why. Thanks to this historic judgement, the shadowy secret court system that has mushroomed under the War on Terror will now be exposed to the light of day. The hard lesson of recent years is that diluting Britain’s core values and abandoning justice makes us both less safe and free (Liberty, 1 December, 2009).

Effective as these contributions may be, campaigners and judges nonetheless participate in the public sphere without fundamentally reconfiguring the terms and conditions of speech. In other words, even as (or especially as) counterdiscourses, their successful articulation still seems to (need to) adhere to Habermasian rules of engagement - communicative rationality, for example - in order to be taken seriously. What concerns me here, then, are the conditions of inclusion of counterdiscourses which are expressive, emotional, visual, performative and, perhaps, sensual. For example, under what criteria might Vivienne Westwood’s T-shirt designs, ‘I am not a terrorist: please don’t arrest me’, and ‘Liberty – throw away the key’, be incorporated
into a model of ‘justice’? Or, consider 12-year old Johina Aamer’s impassioned, handwritten letter to the Prime Minister, Gordon Brown, beseeching the UK government to petition for her father’s release from Guantánamo Bay; she writes:

My mother is very patient but sometimes when she missed him too much she gets depressed …. I really hate it when she gets depressed. At school when it is time to go home most of the children have their fathers pick them up which makes me miss him even more ….. you understand this as a father and husband. It is not nowhere near fun to be without a father, we’ve missed so much (Aamer, 2010).

Whether Johina’s letter will, as she hopes, ‘make a difference’ is yet to be seen but, in any event, will depend on the kind of ‘justice’ which acknowledges, understands and permits different modes of expression and varied ways of presenting a case. It also rests on what we mean by ‘making a difference’. There is little doubt that T-shirts and personal letters, or concerts, music festivals, poetry, plays, sponsored walks and comedy shows will generate publicity, awareness and debate. The question here, though, is whether such cultural practices and events can meaningfully contribute to the realisation of ‘justice’. In other words, what ‘theory of justice’ incorporates and facilitates a counterpublic sphere which is not only open to a plurivocality of voices and a heterogeneity of discursive/performative media and forms, but which also nurtures and sustains processes of critical publicity which politicises those who are (and that which is) conventionally silenced and excluded. In the remainder of this paper, I want to explore the possibilities for thinking about stand-up comedy as a modality of ‘justice’, as a particular discursive form and performative style which deliberates the varied ways in which we might do ‘justice’ and manage the precarious relationship between security and freedom. I develop a series of arguments which
critically unpack Habermasian ideas on the public sphere, discourse ethics and ‘justice’ through the lens of Bakhtinian notions of the ‘dialogic’, ‘heteroglossia’, ‘polyphony’ and the ‘carnivalesque’ – and this conceptual frame of reference returns repeatedly to the tenets of Hudson’s model of ‘justice’ set out above. Foregrounded, and used here as illustrative data, are a range of stand-up routines performed by an international cast of contemporary comedians from the UK, US, Canada, Australia and Ireland. All performances are integral to themed events, festivals or tours which specifically respond to the problematic of securitisation (and its effects) in the contemporary ‘war on terror’. These include, but are not restricted to, the New York Arab-American Comedy Festival (2003 to date); the Axis of Evil Comedy Tour (2005 to date), the Secret Policeman’s Balls (2001 to date) and the annual Stand Up for Freedom comedy events at the Edinburgh Festival Fringe (2007, 2008 and 2009).

HABERMAS AND BAKHTIN ON ‘JUSTICE’

There is now a substantial and influential literature which critically juxtaposes Habermasian theorisations (of the public sphere, communicative rationality, discourse ethics, ideal speech situation, universal pragmatics and deliberative democracy) with the ideas and thinking of his contemporaries – most especially Foucault (Kelly, 1994), Arendt (Benhabib, 1992), Rawls (Lafont, 2003), Gadamer (How, 1985), Levinas (Trey, 1992), and more latterly Derrida (Borradori, 2003). Even so, Nielsen points out that ‘(n)o matter how widely Mikhail Bakhtin and Jürgen Habermas might be recognised as key figures of twentieth century critical theory, they are rarely considered together’ (1995: 803).\(^7\) Nielsen (1995) suggests that the absence of comparative work on Habermas and Bakhtin may be a reflection of their assumed disciplinary affiliations – where the former is primarily associated with philosophy,
political science and sociology, and the latter is located within literary criticism or cultural studies. However, and despite such imposed disciplinary boundaries, both theorists share common ground in a number of important respects. For Garvey (2000: 371) these include firstly, a concern for egalitarian communicative relationships; secondly, a focus on how subjectivities and intersubjectivities are structured and mediated by communicative practice; thirdly, an expectation that communicative action exposes and, therefore, challenges power differentials; and fourthly, a commitment to regarding communicative relationships as a special (demystifying) form of social critique which will help to define an alternative ethics. However, it is equally important not to overstate the case for commonality, not least because this loses sight of Bakhtin’s alternative, and in many ways unique framework for problematizing and exploring notions of the public sphere, discourse and ‘justice’.

Moreover, it may be that the kind of ‘dialogic justice’ informed by Bakthinian concepts yield the more persuasive framework for understanding how discursivity in the public sphere may work to promote the kinds of ‘justice’ and forms of security we endeavour to achieve in liberal democratic societies.

Words with a sideways glance

Jürgen Habermas (inter alia 1984, 1987, 1989[1962], 1992, 1993, 1996) wrote extensively on the concept of the public sphere and his work often serves as the starting point for discussions about the discursive conditions of possibility for engendering a participatory democratic society premised on equality, justice and freedom (Asen and Brouwer, 2001; Roberts and Crossley, 2004). For the most part, tacit references to the Habermasian public sphere remain unproblematic for inclusionary politics if all that is being emphasised is the value of discourse,
communication and critical discussion to citizens’ engagement with policy affairs and decision-making processes. However, this kind of unspoken homage becomes contentious if it also occasions an uncritical acceptance of Habermas’s model of the public sphere and his advocacy of discourse ethics to settle the thorny question of ‘justice’.

Habermas’s commitment to an Enlightenment version of truth informs all aspects of his work, and is especially marked by the privileged place he reserves for the ‘ideal speech situation’ which relies on forms of language which ensure the transparency, clarity, openness, and what Garvey (2000) discusses as the ‘purity’ of speech. Off limits here, then, is the use of ‘folk humour’, its expressivity, such as the use of aesthetic, affective and corporeal gestures; its variegated forms, such as the use of satire, slapstick, stand-up, parody, sketch-based and situation comedy; its lack of formality and its irreverent relationship to language and life. Given the Habermasian belief in the direct correspondence of ‘words’ and their referents, any language which obfuscates this correspondence serves only to contaminate the ‘purity’ of ideal speech. Such an epistemology stands in stark contrast to Bakhtin’s (1981) dialogical model of language which regards utterances as part of an endless chain of significations, and the word as the terrain of an intense ideological struggle (Gardiner, 2004: 36). Gardiner summarises this very succinctly; he writes:

Bakhtin … develop(s) a series of overlapping terms to conceptualize this phenomenon, including ‘double-voicedness’, ‘indirect speech’, ‘multi-accentedness’ or ‘words with a sideways glance’. But all express the same basic idea that utterances are fundamentally ‘impure’ or hybridized constructions, complex amalgams of different points of view, residues of past uses and anticipations of future responses,
diverse idiomatic expressions and the like. They always evince a multiplicity of actual and potential meanings (2004: 37).

Stand-up comedians master a repertoire of linguistic and performative techniques which unsettle and disturb any assumed correspondence between signifier and signified. Through the use of pun, double entendre, one-liners, story-telling, comic timing and vocal impersonations, the ‘good sense’, indeed the ‘justice’ of certain modes of securitisation may be called into question. Airport security, in particular the practice of passenger profiling, is regularly targeted for ridicule and problematisation. In the same way that such techniques rely on stereotyping, some comedians (especially those of middle eastern heritage) use stereotype as a comedic device to challenge and subvert accepted wisdoms concerning the ‘new suspect communit(ies)’ (Pantazis and Pemberton, 2009). In a routine entitled ‘airport paranoia’, Omid Djalili narrates his experience at an airport lounge:

I’m as alarmed as anybody in this room by the sight of Arabs at airports … *audience laughs [nervously] ….. Djalili pauses ….. even family members… *audience laughs enthusiastically. I was flying to Glasgow recently, I saw two thick-set Arabic guys, white three-piece suits, they had gold chains connected to black briefcases. They had one eyebrow between the two of them ….. (*audience laughs)…. And they were sat there going ‘ahrr–ahrr-eh–la-eh–la-la-arhh’ ….. *mimicking a pseudo-Arabic language* and *posturing as though two people were engrossed in a conversation.* And I thought, bloody hell, I’m not getting on the plane, they look so suspicious …. *audience laughing …. you’ve got to be joking …. pause …. We’re sat in the lounge and I thought I’d look at everyone else and see what they were thinking … pause …. And I looked at everyone else ….. *raising voice and getting higher and higher in
… and they’re all looking at me! … audience laughing loudly…. And I said … now shouting, almost screaming … “What are you looking at me for? You’re going to die. Look at them. You’re all going to die. All of you” … now at the top of his voice … audience laughing along …. “You’re going to die”. …..now speaking at a normal volume and pitch …. But things are not what they seem, ‘cos it turns out that those two guys, they were Liam and Noel Gallagher … audience laughs at the punch line, and claps enthusiastically. (The Omid Djalili Show, Series 1, BBC, 2007)⁸.

Nothing is straightforward about this dialogue. The use of stereotypes in comedy invites its own controversies, with some critics pointing out its role in the propagation of racist, sexist and homophobic ideologies (Billig, 2001; Howitt and Owusu-Bempah, 2009; Lockyer and Pickering, 2009). Notwithstanding the potential cruelty of laughter and its possible recruitment ‘in the service of conservatism as well as radicalism’ (Billig, 2005: 131), Djalili succeeds, as do others, in mobilising stereotypes in a way which creates discomfort in the midst of laughter, as audience members (perhaps) confront their preconceived notions of the kinds of ‘risky populations’ who pose a threat. I am not suggesting that this is how this particular stand-up routine was interpreted, nor that it has any singular message to impart - nor even that it is ‘funny’. However, the example exemplifies the Bakhtinian appreciation of the ‘impurity’ and ‘multi-accentedness’ of language. In other words, we can deliberate, contemplate and encounter notions of ‘justice’ in ways which are quite alien to the exclusionary, soberly medium of an ‘ideal speech situation’, and which (possibly) engage us on a much more embodied and visceral level. There is a ‘cryptic rawness’ to the dialogue of stand-up comedy; it is confrontative, sometimes aggressive in its delivery and is invariably articulated through profanities rather than measured prose. Nonetheless, it can make a relatively uncomplicated point about
‘justice’. Take Andrew Maxwell’s closing comments at the *Stand Up For Freedom* (2007) concert:

I’m a loudmouth. Whether I’m sober or drunk, I just say exactly how the fuck I feel. If you don’t like it, fuck you. Now, there’s other countries where you can’t do that, and that’s when people like Amnesty step in. I don’t know what the fuck they do but it’s nice to know that somebody gives a fuck for the loudmouths.9

**Living languages of ‘justice’**

For Habermas, the formulation of rules and institutional frameworks, as well as the delineation of regulatory principles to govern the procedural nature of ethical conduct - such as equal respect and fairness – are the conditions of possibility for the delivery of ‘justice’. Moreover, Habermas’s preference for *communicative* over instrumental forms of rationality alerts us to the means by which such rules come to be decided and agreed; that is, it is only through communicative reason that intersubjective understanding, so necessary to the proper deliberation of ethical life, can be achieved. Furthermore, Habermas contends that communication and interaction through language are crucial to arriving at a valid and legitimate consensus on what counts as ‘justice’. Here we can acknowledge his insistence on consensus as a criterion of truth, accomplished through the articulation of the ‘better argument’ which will win the day over and above strategies of force or domination. By contrast, in the dialogical tradition of Bakhtinian ‘justice’, there is no final closure, or point of mutual understanding to be reached – although Bakhtin does acknowledge the possibility of arriving at a `provisional consensus’ (Gardiner, 2004: 39). Rather, the opacity of language, its undecidability and its value-laden, expressive and aesthetic qualities are intrinsic features of language in use – as Bakhtin puts it, `(l)anguages are
philosophies, not abstract, but concrete, social philosophies, penetrated by a system of values inseparable from living practice and class struggle’ (1984: 471); and in dialogue, ‘a person participates wholly and throughout his whole life with his eyes, lips, hands, soul, spirit, with the whole body and deeds’ (ibid: 293).

Consider, for example, Cole’s and Dempsey’s assertion that the events of 9/11, ‘… sparked a fundamental debate about the tension between liberty and security … (and) about the capability of our (sic) government to keep us secure within the confines of due process, respect for freedoms of speech and association, and a system of government powers subject to checks and balances’ (2002: ix). What stand-up comedy brings to this ‘fundamental debate’ is a refusal to engage with these matters in such philosophical, abstract terms. Thinking about Ahmed Ahmed’s routine at the first Stand Up New York Comedy Festival (2003), a carnivalesque awareness of the everyday experiences of Arab-American communities living within a regime of intensified security, is played out at the level of the body and its expressions. For example:

Looking from side to side across the audience to make eye contact with them … Some of you might know who I am, and some of you might not. For those of you who don’t know who I am, my name really is Ahmed Ahmed and ….. pause ….. I can’t fly anywhere ….. audience erupts with laughter … AA looks into the wings frowning ….. you guys too? … looking back at a still laughing audience ….. It’s a bad time to be named Ahmed, and my name is Ahmed Ahmed, so it’s … pause … really fucking bad …. Audience laugh….. All you white people have it easy; you guys get to the airport like an hour, two hours before your flight …. pause…. It takes me a month and a half … exaggerates gulping; audience laughs … security’s gotten so bad now, I just roll
up to the airport in a G-string … audience still laughing; AA smiles and with arms aloft feigns walking through security wearing a G-string.¹⁰

Throughout the clip, Ahmed raises a number of serious questions concerning stereotyping, mistaken identity, discrimination, suspiciousness, - in short, injustices – but presents them through a series of embodied and humorous gestures, fully capturing the aesthetic, emotional and animated experiences and particularities of everyday Arab-American life. Drawing on the exaggerated ribaldry and spectacle of carnival, its comic, verbal and visual compositions, as well as its profanities, Ahmed creates a range of irreverent images which mock the abstract representations of ‘justice’ and security which surround us. This is nowhere better exemplified than in his assertion that ‘security’s got so bad now, I just roll up to the airport in a G-string’.

The importance which Bakhtin places on the ‘dense particularity of lived experience’ (Gardiner, 2004: 42) lends itself to a reflective model of justice in which the particulars of the case are not ignored, or overlooked by being subsumed within abstract, universal categories. Moreover, this kind of ‘prosaic outlook’ emphasises immersion in everyday language so as to nurture a ‘deliberate feeling for the historical and social concreteness of living discourse, as well as its relativity, a feeling for its participation in historical becoming and in social struggle’ (ibid: 331). Such feeling may be especially nourished by comedic commentary. Consider, for example, Rich Hall’s wry (though caricatured) observations of ‘language in use’; that is, the different ways in which the American and the British publics talk of and perceive the organisation of the terrorist threat:
Americans say there’s this one guy running the entire operation, one Lex Luther, evil
guy pushing all the buttons ….. audience laughs… everyone in Britain knows it’s not
even a movement, it’s beyond that, it’s not a guy in a cave …. it’s a thing with
tentacles …. demonstrating tentacles…… audience laughs ….. That’s not a good
description but you know what I mean …. audience laughs …. Maybe he’s the
evillest guy on the planet, but that’s because we’ve designated him that (Live at the
Apollo, Season 4, BBC, 2005).\textsuperscript{11}

\textbf{Speaking in public}

In her summary of Habermasian discourse ethics, Hudson reminds us of Habermas’s
contempt for ‘the populist politics of a media-saturated culture which has lost sight of
the idealism of liberal democracy’ (2003: 150). In Gardiner’s words, ‘the very
concept of the public sphere, according to Habermas, becomes transformed into
public relations, the manipulation of mass consciousness through the culture
industries à la Adorno and Horkheimer’ (2004: 28). On the other hand, in his later
work, \textit{Between Facts and Norms} (1996), Habermas is a little more open to the
deliberative possibilities of different kinds of popular cultural media. Surprisingly to
some – Hirschkop (2004), for example – Habermas suggests that:

…. the public sphere is differentiated into levels according to the density of
communication, organizational complexity, and range – from the \textit{episodic} publics
found in taverns, coffee houses, or on the streets; through the \textit{occasional} or
“arranged” publics of particular presentations and events, such as theater
performances, rock concerts, party assemblies, or church congresses; up to the
\textit{abstract} public sphere of isolated readers, listeners, and viewers scattered across large
geographic areas, or even around the globe, and brought together only through the mass media (1996: 374: *Original emphasis*).

Nonetheless, and despite a more imaginative spectrum of public spheres, Habermas still insists on a differentiation of spheres based on formal categories and hierarchies (episodic, occasional and abstract).

Conversely, Gardiner draws our attention to what Bakhtin refers to as an ‘ethics of personalism’, an orientation to dialogue in the public sphere which is premised on an acknowledgement ‘of the value of otherness in the context of sociality’ (2004: 32). Part of this acknowledgement is the recognition that the public sphere is not the preserve of certain privileged groups (academics, politicians, experts, professionals, judiciary) but is open to a diversity of socio-cultural constituencies of interest, different worldviews and a diversity of expressive styles – from the most serious to the very humourous, from the modestly polite to the loudly vulgar. In other words, the public sphere is not limited to particular idioms of language use, but is constituted by contested discursive spaces and expressive modes – what Bakhtin refers to as ‘grotesques symposia’ (1984[1965]: 285).

Consider, for example, the provenance of the *Axis of Evil Comedy Tour*. In 2003, two Palestinian-American stand-up comedians, Dean Obeidallah and Maysoon Zayid founded the New York Arab-American Comedy Festival. Initially based on only three shows, by January 2008, the fifth annual festival – described by *Punchline Magazine* as ‘comedy with a purpose’ – ran for six nights and was staged at the largest venue to date, the Zipper Theatre. Moreover, Michael Moore included documentary and live performance footage of Arab-American comedians (shot at the
Stand Up New York Comedy Club) in the Special Features of the DVD version of *Fahrenheit 9/11* (2004). The comedy festival, and *Fahrenheit 9/11* for that matter, pre-date and post-date *The Axis of Evil Comedy Tour* which hit the road in November 2005. Dialogically playing off George W. Bush’s reference to Iran, Iraq and North Korea as constituting an ‘axis of evil’ (State of the Union, 29 January 2002), the tour promised to unsettle and interrogate the terms of reference of the ‘war against terror’. Performing to packed audiences, the tour visited 15 cities across the US and featured four Arab-American comedians - Dean Obeidallah (Palestinian-American), Ahmed Ahmed (Egyptian-American), Aron Kader (Palestinian-American) and Maz Jobrani (Iranian-American). On 10 March 2007, the stand-up comedy group were given their own Comedy Central Special; making headlines everywhere, from CNN to *Newsweek*, a host of media interviews with, *inter alia*, NPR and *Time Magazine*, soon followed. A DVD of the tour was released in 2007, and later that year, amidst considerable media interest, the group took the show on a sell-out tour to several middle eastern countries, re-naming it as *Showtime Arabia* and performing to enthusiastic audiences in Amman, Cairo, Dubai, Kuwait and Beirut. The current popularization of and sustained interest in Arab-American stand-up comedy shows little sign of abating. At the time of writing, YouTube is hosting 436 different videos featuring various aspects of *The Axis of Evil Comedy Tour* with hits ranging from 6,017 to 1,523,697; Google is displaying 84,300 records relating the Tour; and on 12 April, 2008, the Tour travelled north to Canada and premiered in the Panasonic Theatre, Toronto.

What I want to suggest here is that the folk humour of *Axis* and its reproduction across a multiplicity of sites (‘grotesque symposia’) and through a ‘heteroglossia’ (more
about this below) of communicative forms (film, live performance, TV interview, recorded performance, printed interview, documentary, cyber and digital media) constitute a series of ‘counterpublic spheres’ (Asen, 2000) in which the kind of ‘justice’ which puts security first is deliberated, scandalised, resisted, scrutinised, mocked and destabilised within the moment of the carnivalesque.

**Styles of speaking**

A myriad of ‘grotesque symposia’ will also host a ‘heteroglossia’ of parodic and satirical forms, comedic inversions, stylistic degradations, and pluralistic, conflicting modes of address. ‘Heteroglossia’ is a term which Bakhtin introduces in the essay, *Discourse in the Novel* (1981[1935]): whereas dialogism refers to the relational properties of language (Vice, 1997: 50) - and is concerned with questions of inter- and intratextuality, and the interaction between text and context - heteroglossia is descriptive of ‘differentiated speech’ and is ‘Bakhtin’s key term for describing the complex stratification of language into genre, register, sociolect, dialect, and the mutual interanimation of these forms’ (White, 1993: 136). Put another way, if we want to achieve the kind of ‘justice’ which fosters egalitarian relationships between individuals, groups and communities, then the desire for communicative clarity will only create hierarchies of value and legitimacy, ultimately disqualifying informal, marginal, subaltern and subversive discourses, as well as alternative discursive modalities – such as graffiti, blogs, street protests, diaries, jokes and memorialisations. Consider, for example, how the *Secret Policeman’s Balls* and the annual *Stand Up For Freedom* benefit concerts at the *Edinburgh Festival Fringe* exemplify the heteroglossic orientation of Amnesty International’s consciousness-raising and fund-raising work, which does not rest solely on traditional campaigning.
approaches. These prestigious, popular and well-attended events have a reputation for and a strong track record in accommodating different modes of expression, incorporating musical performance, animations, interpretative mime, comedy sketches, comedy songs and comedy impressions. Heteroglossia does not guarantee an inclusionary politics, but in terms of its propensity to engage with those who may be disaffected or disinterested in ‘high political’ debate, the differentiated articulations of ‘justice’ to be found within a variegated cultural life are to be welcomed.

This does not suppose that sensitivity to the diversity of language use will result in ‘peaceful relativity’ or ‘inert co-existence’, but will, rather, produce a ‘clash of discourses’ or ‘dialogized heteroglossia’ (Vice, 1997: 49). Far from excluding minority language forms, ‘dialogized heteroglossia’ is an important means of empowerment, and one ‘that is very different from that granted by the bracketing and testing procedures of Habermasian practical discourse’ (Garvey, 2000: 382). It is only amidst heteroglossia that we are able to situate our own language in relation to others, use this positioning as a resource for resisting homogenizing and authoritative discourses, or conversely ‘use discourses out of context to create ironic distance, and so on’ (ibid: 382). In a number of performances, discursive positionality and the effects/qualities of differentiated speech are themselves ripe for comedic observation. For example, Canadian comedian, Russell Peters questions representations of Arab people in the television news, and is especially critical of the stereotypes which they reproduce; he comments:
Everytime you turn on the news they never show you, like, a ‘normal’ … *gesticulating quotations* … Arab person. If you watch the news everytime they show you an Arab … even when I say any Arabs, in your head immediately you picture … *in a high pitched voice* … ‘Al-la-la-la’ … *audience laughs* … even if it was the wrong sound that I made …. They never show you ‘normal’ Arabs; they never show you the people who come to a comedy show and hang out. That’s the media fuckin’ with your heads (a pre-recorded video of Peter’s performance at Kitchener, Ontario, screened at the *Secret Policeman’s Ball, 2008*).15

Shappi Khorsandi queries and challenges the language of political correctness to make an anti-war statement; introducing herself as a ‘female, Iranian stand-up comedian … a box-ticker’, at the *Secret Policeman’s Ball* (2008) she recalls a (n imagined) telephone conversation with her Iranian grandmother:

> I rang up my granny in Iran, and she’s very worried ‘cos she’s building an extension to her house, and she’s worried she’ll end up with an extension …. *pause* …. and no home …. *audience laughs* …. Possibly not the most powerful anti-war argument you’ve ever heard …. *pause* …. but builders in Tehran are pricey …. *audience laughs* more loudly ….. and there are no Polish people …. *audience now laughing very enthusiastically……* If you’re wondering whether that joke’s politically correct or not, don’t worry, it’s fine, I checked it …. *pause* … with my cleaner …. *audience laughing and clapping the punchline*.16

Similarly, Eddie Izzard, in conversation with Roland Rivron and Richard E. Grant, backstage at the *Secret Policeman’s Ball* (2006) attempts to rebrand *Amnesty International*, and in so doing introduces profanity as a legitimate discursive style. Mulling over potential new names for the human rights organisation, he suggests, ‘Let
those guys go, you fuckers’. Both Grant and Rivron question whether it is possible to swear - ‘Are we allowed to swear?’ they ask; to which Izzard replies:

Yes, I think it’s important … Rivron interrupting … it is the essence of freedom of speech … Izzard continuing ….. it’s freedom of speech. When I was at school they said it showed a lack of vocabulary, and I said, no, I’ve got an excellent vocabulary, look at all those swear words. It shows an increased vocabulary … pause …. like fuckers. 17

Hearing different voices

A public sphere characterised by heteroglossia will also be one which recognises a polyphony of different voices, and ‘voices with equal rights’ at that (Vice, 1997: 112). In a polyphonic deliberation of ‘justice’, each participant voice articulates a recognisable viewpoint and has an equal right to speak. This appears to be indicative of restorative justice where victim/offender deliberation serves as a model of ’justice’ which is both discursive and plurivocal. As Hudson suggests:

Where restorative justice practice approximates to the ideals of its theorists, it incorporates the principles that justice should be discursive; that it should be responsive to the circumstances of the particular case rather than subsuming individual acts and actors under general classes, and that it should allow a plurality of voices within the discourse (2003: 210: Emphasis added).

Despite its promise, however, Hudson is cautious about restorative justice’s propensity to achieve the ‘dense relationism’ required for a model of justice which claims to restore the fractured relationships between offenders, victims and
communities. This is where the Bakhtinian emphasis on the dialogic has clear advantages over a Habermasian discourse ethics. That is, polyphony is also dialogic in form (as is heteroglossia); in polyphonic - rather than (merely) plurivocal - dialogue, heterogeneous voices are not merely acknowledged, articulated and heard but they also enter into dialogical relationships with each other, promoting reflectivity of other participants’ situated and particularised standpoints. Dialogized polyphony (and heteroglossia), then, is crucial to nurturing a ‘just’ society which values egalitarian and democratically organised public spheres; equally, it promotes a ‘dialogized’ kind of ‘justice’ which is both dynamic and relational, and rooted in everyday experiences.

As part of his routine on the *Axis of Evil Comedy Tour*, Dean Obeidallah exploits the comedic potential of polyphony to make an argument about the futility of ‘library surveillance’. In the sequence of his routine entitled, The Patriot Act, Obeidallah laments the simplistic notion of the equitable exchange of freedom for security. He opens with the comment that, ‘… to keep us safe we’ve got a thing called the Patriot Act. The Patriot Act …... pause …... remember when we had a thing called freedom at one point …... pause …... audience laughs gently’. However, Obeidallah’s key focus is Section 215 of the Act, the provision which permits access to records and other items under the terms of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act. Though this was not targeted directly at libraries, the American Library Association (ALA), in particular, opposed this provision. In a resolution passed on 29 June, 2005 the ALA stated that ‘Section 215 … allows the government to secretly request and obtain library records for large numbers of individuals without any reason to believe they are involved in illegal activity’. This stance certainly did not go without criticism, and in an article
for the *New York City Journal*, Heather MacDonald of the Manhattan Institute argued that `(t)he furore over section 215 is a case study in Patriot Act fear-mongering’ (MacDonald, 2003). It was the library scenario which fired Obeidallah’s imagination; but rather than engage directly with the somewhat unproductive and unresolvable debates surrounding the intended targets of Section 215, Obeidallah ridicules the premises of the section, and pours scorn on both sides of the argument. Where Ahmed Ahmed uses visual, corporeal and expressive modes of communication, Obeidallah plays with the idea of what an imagined terrorist would make of Section 215. Introducing the voice of the terrorist into a dialogue about ‘justice’ is at once a rebuke to official discourse which refuses to hear and listen to the voices of those it fears. Using a Middle Eastern accent, Obeidallah recreates a counter exchange at the local library:

Hello, Mr Librarian, how are you? I was looking for a book for me and the guys in “our club” (uses quotations gesture) …. Pause …. Audience laughing …. Do you have a book, how you say, on waging Jihad against the infidel dog? Audience roars with laughter…. Is there a Holy War section in here some place? .. Audience continues to laugh, and camera close up of woman in audience covering her face to conceal her tears of laughter.

He goes on to ask what kind of titles would actually give ‘the guys in Al Qaeda away’, and ponders whether *I’m Al Qaeda, You’re Al Qaeda*, or *Chicken Soup for the Terrorist Home* might fit the bill. Even though this imaginary library scene is sufficient to incite laughter, Obeidallah’s ‘real’ target is the President’s questionable intellectual capacities in relation to foreign policy and security politics: `It scares me’ he says, `the government wants to know what you’re reading. President Bush wants
to know what you’re reading …. pause …. you know why …. pause … he’s jealous.
I’m not saying he can’t read, I’m just saying that he probably prefers others reading to him’. This, it turns out, is the punch-line, and it is this point which closes off the sequence about the Patriot Act amidst thunderous laughter, whistling, whooping and clapping.

A carnival of ‘justice’

Bakhtin’s preoccupation with the particularity and materiality of human existence, and the dialogical focus on the ambivalence and contingency of the everyday, should not be considered in isolation of his concern for the carnivalesque (Gardiner, 2004: 42). Indeed, Kosik points out that ‘(t)he everyday …. has its replicability but also its special occasions, its routine but also its festivity. The everyday is thus not meant as a contrast to the unusual, the festive, the special’ (1976: 43 cited in Gardiner, 2004: 41). In other words, Bakhtin’s ‘prosaic outlook’ is not antithetical to ‘the carnivalesque’; rather, the celebratory forms of the carnivalesque draw our attention to the subversive, transgressive and scandalising aspects of socio-cultural life - those aspects which challenge received wisdoms, ‘commonsensical notions and habitualized viewpoints … to encourage a renewed awareness of the hidden and all-too-often suppressed potentialities that lie within the (everyday)’ (Gardiner, 2004: 42). Vice (1997: 151-153) sets out several key features of the Bakhtinian carnivalesque which are worthy of reporting at length here:

1) Ritual spectacles ….; 2) comic verbal compositions ….; 3) various genres of billingsgate ….; 4) (carnival’s) …. suspension of ’hierarchical structure and all the forms of terror, reverence, piety, and etiquette connected with it’ (Bakhtin, 1984: 122); 5) carnival allows ’free and familiar contact between people … and allows for
mass action’ (ibid: 123); 6) … unusual combinations ‘the sacred with the profane, the lofty with the low, the great with the insignificant, the wise with the stupid’ (ibid: 123); 7) … profanation … to the level of the body, particularly in the case of parodies of sacred texts; 8) death and renewal are central to carnival … ; 9) carnival laughter is directed at exalted objects … ; 10) ‘everything has its parody, that is, its laughing aspect’ (ibid, p 128).

Consider, for example, the way in which each comedian enters into the performance of *Axis*. Walking on stage via an airport security-screen, staffed by an African-American woman, Obeidallah is questioned about his name, but let through because ‘he don’t look like no Arabic’. Ahmed is subjected to a sexual assault masquerading as a body search - his bottom is smacked as he walks away. Jobrani is identified as needing a cavity search but he offers a bribe and is cleared to continue. Kader arrives carrying a rucksack and sets off the security alarms; but the woman is gossiping on her mobile and, failing to see/hear this, she allows Kader to walk through unchallenged. These mini-scenarios encourage us to question how far security-conscious justice can protect civil liberties. In the security check sequences, we confront a form of justice in which Otherness resides in a name (Obeidallah); is a basis for sexual harassment (Ahmed); and is disregarded for a fee (Jobrani). What makes this scandalous and mocking of official culture is its stark portrayal of what an everyday lived experience of heightened security for some communities might look like. Lewis notes that ‘public opinion about civil liberties in the context of terrorism is often formulated in terms of a trade-off, that is, the extent to which civil liberties must be or should be sacrificed for security’ (2005: 23); she goes on to demonstrate how, faced with an *abstract* trade-off, the American public (except for a few months in the immediate aftermath of September 11) reject the need to sacrifice personal
freedoms for the sake of enhanced protection against terrorism. By contrast, when concrete trade-offs are proposed – for example, implementing random searches, detaining people at airports on the basis of religion, ID checks at all workplaces and public buildings (Lewis, 2005: Tables 6 and 7) – surveys suggest that the public tend to endorse the exercise of enhanced government anti-terrorist powers (Yalof and Dautrich, 2002: 57-62). It is one thing to deliberate this issue through academic argument or reasoned debate, but here the impact of a concrete trade-off is overtly scandalised and is undermined by the immediacy of its impact on individual Others. Moreover, as far as Kader’s entrance is concerned, this mocks and challenges the very idea of achieving a balance between protection and freedom in a liberal democratic society. That is, any preference for a security-led model of ‘justice’ supposes a simple trade-off between risk and danger as potential threats to freedom, and the immediate returns of protective measures. In other words, the inference in the question of balance is that the security gain is ‘real’. Despite the rhetoric of ‘uniting and strengthening America’ and the pledge to ‘provide (the) appropriate tools required to intercept and obstruct terrorism’ (USA PATRIOT ACT, 2001), and notwithstanding the appeal of a trade-off, or what Waldron refers to as ‘the image of balance’, security measures need to be seen as effective otherwise ‘we cannot know whether it is worth giving up this liberty’ (Waldron, 2003: 209: Original emphasis).

The joke of the less than vigilant security operative poses a pragmatic, and yet politically loaded question which asks whether new methods, more legislation, an extension of statutory powers are either necessary or desirable. Would efficient, conscientious personnel or, as Wade suggests, ‘more personnel working within more traditional structures, more or less technologically advanced, do?’ (2007: 9: Emphasis added).
If ‘everything has its parody’, then there is no reprieve for ‘justice’ as object of the carnivalesque. Indeed, a Bakhtinian model of ‘justice’ offers an innovative framework for thinking about contemporary (over-)reactions to presumed ‘clear and present dangers’. Although it is fashionable to characterise public dialogue about matters of security and protection as populist, and supportive of the return of a punitive, authoritarian regime of criminal justice and penalty, this often relies on a narrowly conceived notion of the public sphere. Re-read through the lens of key Bakhtinian concepts – dialogism; heteroglossia; polyphony; and the carnivalesque - a public sphere is not limited to the soberly realm of an Habermasian ideal speech situation, but has multiple forms and manifold possibilities.

**TOWARDS ‘DIALOGIZED JUSTICE’**

Hudson’s (2003) suggested framework for achieving ‘justice’ in a risk society is highly commendable, and is indicative of her intellectual commitment to a critical criminological project. Indeed, her distillation of a series of normative ideals for the realisation of a ‘just society’ contributes substantially to what van Swaanning describes as the formation of a ‘replacement discourse’ and the generation of a ‘language of possibilities’ (1999: 20). However, Hudson’s model of ‘discursive justice’ does not fully engage with the *cultural* dynamics of public deliberations and everyday communicative practices about ‘justice’ - what Bakhtin refers to as the ‘eventness of being’ (1993: 78). In this sense, despite its promise, Habermasian discourse ethics, predicated on consensus, universality, formality, rationality and a purity of speech, remain unchallenged and there is no scope to acknowledge the contributions of the kinds of unruly, communicative forms which pervade cultural
life. Given Holquist’s view of dialogism (rather than discourse) as the `characteristic epistemological mode’ of our world (Bakhtin, 1981: 426 cited in Vice, 1997: 49), I want to propose the notion of ‘dialogized justice’ which takes its cue from the Bakhtinian celebration of the particular, the personal and the prosaic. ‘Dialogized justice’ permits (indeed promotes) a re-imagination of the public sphere as inherent within the affective, corporeal, expressive and experiential dimensions of social and cultural life. It takes account of others’ culturally specific and highly localised experiences, narratives and practices so often overlooked and/or excluded from a universalist, theoreticist perspective. Moreover, ‘dialogized justice’ furnishes a conceptual language for deliberating the political purchase, the critical publicity of cultural forms and practices such that stand-up comedy – or, for that matter, cartoonography, fashion, street performances, video-gaming, artworks or any other sphere of cultural activity – should be an integral focus of a critical criminology which has political transformation in its sights.

NOTES

1. An earlier version of this paper was presented at the ??????? Conference, held at ?????? on ??????????. I am grateful to the conference participants for their helpful comments and feedback on the paper.

2. For further discussions on the compatibility of authoritarianism and liberalism see, for example, Valverde 1996; King 1999; Hansen and King 2000; Hindess 2001; Stears 2001; du Gay 2002.

3. For example, in January 2010, Liberty, acting on behalf of Pennie Quinton and Kevin Gillan, brought and won a landmark case in the European Court of Human Rights. The Court ruled that Section 44 of the UK’s Terrorism Act,
2000 – the broad police power to stop and search without reasonable grounds of suspicion – violates the right to privacy as protected in Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights. See *Gillan and another v United Kingdom* [2010] ECHR 4158/05. Similarly, Amnesty International has been at the forefront of campaigns which *inter alia* expose European complicity in the US-initiated system of extraordinary renditions and secret detentions; which unremittingly call for a cessation of the use of all forms of torture, cruel, degrading and inhumane treatment undertaken in the name of the ‘war on terror’; and which put pressure on western governments to accept Guantánamo’s remaining detainees – those who cannot be returned to their countries of origin for fear of torture or other human rights violations.

4. *Secretary of State for the Home Department v AF, AN and AE* [2009] 3 All ER 643.


7. The analytical work of Gardiner (2004), in particular, is an important exception here. In addition, Garvey (2000), Nielsen (1995) and Hirschkop (2004) are amongst the few scholars to critically and comparatively engage with the work of both theorists.

8. Found at: [http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wPEmfh3hOXc&feature=PlayList&p=4E1A12C9C5A8D7D3&index=0&playnext=1](http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wPEmfh3hOXc&feature=PlayList&p=4E1A12C9C5A8D7D3&index=0&playnext=1) Accessed 27 March 2010
9. Found at: [http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=sPsbDdaZz0c&feature=channel](http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=sPsbDdaZz0c&feature=channel)
   Accessed 28 March 2010

10. Found at: [http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=HuAgHsAP8dE&feature=related](http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=HuAgHsAP8dE&feature=related)
    Accessed 28 March 2010

11. Found at: [http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=90pA2oGhPU0&NR=1](http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=90pA2oGhPU0&NR=1)
    Accessed 27 March 2010

    Accessed 23 June 2009

13. Similarly, the *Secret Policeman’s Balls* have produced a variety of spin-off media including CD, DVD and video, television screenings of edited highlights of the events, simultaneous cinecasts (of the 2006 and 2008 concerts), publication of books containing transcripts of skits and monologues, song lyrics, photographs, production notes and comedic observations.

    Accessed 27 March 2010. Similarly, Sting, Peter Gabriel and Bob Geldof have credited the *Secret Policeman’s Balls* as galvanising them into activism in relation to Amnesty and other social and political causes. Found at:
    Accessed 29 March 2010 (via subscription).

16. Found at: [http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=UoL_tR5nARg&NR=1](http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=UoL_tR5nARg&NR=1) Accessed 26 March 2010


18. *Axis of Evil Comedy Tour* (2007, DVD, Dir: Michael Simon, USA)


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