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An Architecture for Negotiation and Enforcement of Resource Usage Policies

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Abstract

Advances in Cloud computing are making it possible for service providers to offer computational resources such as storage and compute power (infrastructure as a service, IaaS) to sophisticated enterprise application services (software as a service SaaS) to remote clients for a fee on a highly dynamic basis. As in any business transaction, client access to a service is regulated by a legal Service Agreement (SA). A service agreement needs to be negotiated and agreed between the provider and the client before the latter can use the service. Then on, both the client and the provider will need assurances that service interactions are in accordance with the SA, and any violations are detected and their causes identified. There is thus a need for automated support for negotiation and enforcement of service agreements. This paper discusses key design issues for such a system, of which the main one is to ensure that the policies (termed also clauses) contained in an SA are logically sound and that they work in harmony with any private policies of the client and the provider. The paper presents an architecture and a proof of concept implementation.
Advances in Cloud computing are making it possible for service providers to offer computational resources such as storage and compute power (infrastructure as a service, IaaS) to sophisticated enterprise application services (software as a service SaaS) to remote clients for a fee on a highly dynamic basis. As in any business transaction, client access to a service is regulated by a legal Service Agreement (SA). A service agreement needs to be negotiated and agreed between the provider and the client before the latter can use the service. Then on, both the client and the provider will need assurances that service interactions are in accordance with the SA, and any violations are detected and their causes identified. There is thus a need for automated support for negotiation and enforcement of service agreements. This paper discusses key design issues for such a system, of which the main one is to ensure that the policies (termed also clauses) contained in an SA are logically sound and that they work in harmony with any private policies of the client and the provider. The paper presents an architecture and a proof of concept implementation.

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Carlos Molina-Jimenez received his PhD in the School of Computing Science at the University of Newcastle upon Tyne in 2000 for work on anonymous interactions in the Internet. He is currently a Research Associate in the School of Computing Science at the University of Newcastle upon Tyne where he is a member of the Distributed Systems Research Group. He is working on the EPSRC funded research project on Information Coordination and Sharing in Virtual Enterprises where he has been responsible for developing the Architectural Concepts of Virtual Organisations, Trust Management and Electronic Contracting.

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Suggested keywords

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An Architecture for Negotiation and Enforcement of Resource Usage Policies

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Abstract—Advances in Cloud computing are making it possible for service providers to offer computational resources such as storage and compute power (infrastructure as a service, IaaS) to sophisticated enterprise application services (software as a service SaaS) to remote clients for a fee on a highly dynamic basis. As in any business transaction, client access to a service is regulated by a legal Service Agreement (SA). A service agreement needs to be negotiated and agreed between the provider and the client before the latter can use the service. Then on, both the client and the provider will need assurances that service interactions are in accordance with the SA, and any violations are detected and their causes identified. There is thus a need for automated support for negotiation and enforcement of service agreements. This paper discusses key design issues for such a system, of which the main one is to ensure that the policies (termed also clauses) contained in an SA are logically sound and that they work in harmony with any private policies of the client and the provider. The paper presents an architecture and a proof of concept implementation.

Keywords—service oriented computing; service agreement negotiation, updating, termination and enforcement; policy consistency.

I. INTRODUCTION

We consider a cloud computing environment that enables service providers to provision, in a rapid manner, on-demand network access to shared pool of compute resources (that can range from storage, compute power to applications and services) to consumers for a fee. As in any business transaction, consumer (client) access to a service will be underpinned by a contract, that we will refer to here as a Service Agreement (SA). A service agreement needs to be negotiated and agreed between the provider and the client before the latter can use the service. Then on, both the client and the provider will need assurances that service interactions are in accordance with the SA, and any violations are detected and their causes identified. There is thus a need for automated support for negotiation and enforcement of service agreements.

Electronic representation of the relevant parts of an SA is a pre-requisite for any such automation. Here we are most interested in service description part of an SA that specifies resource usage in terms of service delivery (dealing with quality of service) and consumption (dealing with usage pattern). For example, the SA might stipulate that a client is permitted to submit 100 requests per second and that the provider is obliged to respond within three seconds. Ideally, it should be possible to encode an SA as a set of executable business policies that can be evaluated by either party for controlling service interactions.

Fig. 1–a) shows a simple scheme where the provider uses a Policy Manager (PM) module (loaded with an executable version of the SA) for controlling access to the service by the client. The gateway acts as a policy enforcement point that either allows or prohibits access to the service as directed by the PM which is in essence a policy decision point. For example, let us consider the following policies from a simple SA about a service provided on a pre-paid basis:

1) Clients can open an account by purchasing a single unit of prepaid time at the price of 10 euros.
2) A unit of prepaid time is considered consumed when the client consumes 100 minutes of connection time.
3) An open account can be topped up by the client by purchasing additional units of prepaid time.
4) Accounts with no prepaid time left will be declared closed by the service.

a) The service is entitled to evict calls in progress that run out of prepaid time.

Typically, a provider will have a set of local (private) business policies (LP) for customising an SA for different classes of clients. For example, the provider could be a bit...
lenient whilst dealing with valued customers (‘gold clients’) who exceed the prepaid time limit. Here is a sample clause of such a policy:

1) Calls from gold clients that overrun their prepaid credits are granted up to ten minutes of discretionary time that can be used only by the call in progress.
2) Ignore the cost incurred by the use of discretionary time after evicting a call.

In Fig. 1–a) we show that the PM uses both the SA and LP for controlling the gateway. The PM is the key component needed for automating negotiation and enforcement of service agreements and is the subject of discussion of this paper. Below we discuss the main requirements of a PM, and in the rest of the paper we describe the approach we have adopted and present a proof of concept implementation.

To begin with, we observe that policy managers and gateways can be deployed in several configuration alternatives, and not just as shown in Fig. 1–a). In Fig. 1–a), the decision whether the client’s service access is compliant with respect to the SA is taken by the PM of the provider; however, there may be situations where the client’s organization independently wants to perform such a compliance check, in which case, the symmetric deployment scheme of Fig. 1–b) is relevant. The client’s organization might have its own local policies that put additional constraints on who/when service access is permitted (e.g., a local policy might be that only a senior manager is permitted access). Another deployment possibility is depicted in Fig. 1–c): here an independent third party is responsible for checking SA compliance, whereas the parties only check for their local policy compliance. The configuration depicted in Fig. 1–b) opens up the possibility of the two PMs being able to interact and negotiate to install a new SA on the fly. For example, a customer of a service might wish to upgrade to become a premier customer, in which case a new SA will come in force. This possibility is hinted at in Fig. 1–d) where SA is under negotiation. In summary, the PM should be modular in structure and capable of being deployed in various configurations.

The machine interpretable language used for encoding SA and LP should be expressive and usable. By usability we mean that a technical person who understands SAs and LPs written in a natural language should be able to translate them into executable versions with relative ease. By expressiveness we mean that the language should be widely applicable. Finally, we require that the encoded versions of SAs and LPs be amenable to formal analysis, meaning there should be tools available for validating the logical consistency of an SA and LP taken individually and together. This is important as the intended meaning of clauses expressed in a natural language can be remarkably hard to capture and represent in a rigorous and concise manner for computer processing.

Our PM is based on the concept of contract compliance checking that we have developed earlier, and described in [1]. The concepts discussed in [1] also underpin the rule based contract specification language called EROP (for Events, Rights, Obligations and Prohibitions) and a contract compliance checking service (CCC) for contracts/service agreements written in EROP [1], [2]. The CCC essentially acts as the PM. The CCC is modular, as it has been developed for use as a third party service, so it can be deployed in any of the settings shown in Fig. 1. Using a number of examples, we show that the EROP language provides a uniform way of encoding SA and LP, satisfying the requirement of expressiveness and usability. The CCC is amenable to model checking, thereby providing a way for validation; we have indeed developed a high-level model checking tool for this purpose [3]. We have incorporated the CCC within the cloud management platform called Agility [4]. Agility is intended to assist two or more independently administered parties in sharing their IT resources in peer-to-peer or consumer–provider interaction. Agility provides basic support for negotiation. In Future Work section of the paper we describe how our work can be extended to support automated negotiation between PMs.

II. Compliance Checking

Clauses included in SAs and LP (Fig.1) stipulate the rights (something that a party is allowed to do), obligations (something that a party is expected to do) and prohibitions (something that a party is not expected to do unless it is prepared to be penalised) of the parties. The clauses also stipulate when, in what order and by whom the operations are to be executed. Business partners exercise their rights, obligations and prohibitions by executing their corresponding business operations. As operations are executed, rights, obligations and prohibitions are granted to and revoked from business partners. At a given moment, each business partner can have several rights, obligations and prohibitions, in force. This idea is at the heart of the functionality of the CCC that we have implemented [2]: the CCC is an observer of execution of operations that determines and declares whether the operation is or is not contract compliant.

With each participant (role player), we associate a ROP set: the set of Rights, Obligations and Prohibitions currently in force. We use the set $B = \{bo_1, \ldots, bo_n\}$ to specify all the primitive business operations stipulated in a SA or LP. The CCC declares the execution of $bo_i$ to be contract compliant if it satisfies the following three requirements and declares it non-contract-compliant if it does not:

- **C1** $bo_i \in B$;
- **C2** it matches the ROP set of its role player (meaning, the role player has a right/obligation/prohibition to execute that operation);
- **C3** it satisfies the constraints stipulated in the contractual clauses.

The significance of the ROP sets in our model is that they allow to abstract the behaviour of the CCC as that
of a conventional reactive system [5] with \( m + 1 \) states
\( S = \{s_0, \ldots, s_m\} \) where each state \( s_i \) represents the current
state of the ROP sets. As a reactive system, the CCC remains
in a given state \( s_i \) awaiting the arrival of events, when
a contract–compliant event arrives, the CCC executes an
action and progresses to state \( s_j \). No state changes occur
or actions are executed when the event is non-contract–
compliant. The main action executed consists in updating
the ROP sets: rights, obligations and prohibitions from state
\( s_i \) are disabled and those that determine state \( s_j \) are enabled.
The salient feature of this state–centric model is that it
is intellectually manageable as there are well understood
formal methods and software tools that can help reason about
the correctness of both the model and its implementation.
For instance, the CCC can be directly implemented as a
conventional Event Condition Action (ECA) system.

In Fig. 2 we show how the CCC can be used as a
PM to determine if the operations executed by a client are
compliant with the policies specified in a client–provider
SA. Only a single policy is shown in the figure. The event \( e_i \)
represents the execution of an operation such as call. Upon
evaluating the event against the ECA rules, the PM declares
either \( e_i \) is SA compliant or \( e_i \) is not SA compliant.

Our current implementation of the CCC is based on JBoss
Drools [6]. The rules that encode the SA clauses can be
written either in EROP or Jboss drool language. Supportive
functions such as event queues and time management, and
examination of event logs are implemented as Java classes.

III. EXPRESSIVENESS AND USABILITY

To support our claims about the expressiveness and usability
of the EROP notation, we will show how it can be used
to encode typical and realistic examples of both SAs and
LP. It should become apparent that modelling current rights,
obligations and prohibitions explicitly—the core concept of
ROP— makes our notation clear and intuitive.

We show examples of policies that regulate the execution
of operations related to resource consumption (CPU, storage, etc.). In addition, to emphasis usability, we include
examples of policies that regulate the execution of high level
business operations such as submission of purchase orders
and payments. In the latter, the execution of operations
can be abstracted as the occurrence of events that indicates
the initiator and responder of the operation, time stamp,
and other parameters. However, in resource consumption
policies, the execution of operations alone cannot determine
the observance of a right, obligation or prohibition, equally
important is the impact (e.g., amount of storage space
consumed) of the operation. This information can be mapped
to the occurrence of events, as well, for example, a storage
monitor can be deployed to produce an event when a storage
quota is exhausted.

We show the policies written in English and next we
show their corresponding ECA rules in EROP notation. The
rules are in pseudo-code; they abstract away several details,
yet they include enough parameters to help appreciate the
expressiveness of EROP. In the rules, lines that begin with #
are commentaries. \( R, p \) and \( e \) stand for rule, policy and event,
respectively. \( p1 \rightarrow > p2 \) means rule 1 is related to policy 2.
The operator \( \text{in} \) verifies if the event is currently in the party’s
rights, obligations (obligs) or prohibitions. For example,
\( \text{exeJob in math.obligs} \) will return true if the operation \( \text{exeJob} \)
is currently in math’s obligations, otherwise it returns false.
The operators + and – grant and remove, respectively rights,
obligations and prohibitions; thus \( \text{math.right} + = \text{evictJob} \)
grants the right to execute operation \( \text{evictJob} \) to a party (role
player) called math. The outcome of the evaluation of the
event \( e \) is shown as \( PCo \) (Policy Compliant) This outcome
should be regarded as a message sent by the PM to its
gateway to instruct it to permit the operation under question.
The assumption is that the gateway takes the absence of the
PCo message as an instruction to deny the operation, but
these are implementation details that we do not discuss here
due to space constraints.

A. Condor example

The following policies are representative of Condor—a
load managing system that allows a party (e.g, a university
department) to share its idle resources [7]. Imagine they are
deployed by the Math department’s administrator willing to
share his PC cluster with users from external departments.
Each PC in the cluster works within these policies.

\begin{itemize}
  \item Math’s local policies
    \begin{enumerate}
      \item This PC is willing to execute jobs submitted by external users Mon–Sat from 8 pm to 9 am.
      \item Jobs that exceed this time frame will be evicted immediately and without further notice.
      \item External users are prohibited to submit jobs to this PC if its current average CPU usage is above 10%.
      \item External users are prohibited from instantiating the the execution of more than three copies of a job, simultaneously.
      \item This PC runs Linux and has 4 Gbytes of RAM and 850 GB of disk available for temporal files.
    \end{enumerate}
\end{itemize}

To enforce its LP, Math can express them as EROP rules
as shown by the next two examples and load them into its
policy manager, for example, like in Fig. 1–a) and c).

```plaintext
#R1->p1: accept job
when e==exeJob && exeJob in math.obligs
  && e.user==external && e.ts==[Mon--Sat; 20--09 hrs]
  && Load<10%
  then PCo; math.rights+=evictJob;
end

#R2->p2 evict jobs violating time frame
when e==evictJob; e.timeFrameViolation==TRUE
  then PCo; math.rights+=evictJob;
end

The second line of R1 verifies if the event is exeJob (a request to execute a job) and that exeJob is currently in Math’s obligations. The third and fourth lines verify conditions. The fifth line produces a PCo message and grants Math’s the right to evict, if necessary, the job. R2 triggers to evict jobs violating the time frame, as stipulated by policy 2.

Imagine now that the Math and Biology administrators agree on the following SA.

**Math–Biology SA policies**

1) Biography users have the right to execute jobs from 8 pm to 9 am.
2) Owners of jobs that threaten to extend their execution beyond 9 pm will be notified by 8:30 and asked to remove their jobs.
3) If the owner takes no action by 8:45 am, his job will be evicted and queued into a dedicated cluster where its is likely to experience long delays.
4) Biology users are prohibited to submit jobs to a PC if its current CPU usage is above 10%.
5) Math is obliged to provide Linux and Windows machines with 4 Gbytes of RAM and 160 GB of disk available for temporal files.

These SA policies can also be expressed in EROP and enforced by a policy manager, for example like in Fig. 1–a, b) or c). Here is the example for policy 1. Notice that the conditions in the third line restrict the submission time but not the day; this conflicts with the third line of Math’s R1 which accepts submissions only on Mon–Sat.

```plaintext
#R1->p1: submit job
when e==exeJob && exeJob in math.obligs
  && e.user==external && e.ts==[20--09 hrs]
  && Load<10%
  then PCo; math.rights+=evictJob;
end

B. Buyer–Seller example

The following policies are extracts from a SA between a buyer (inspired by [8]).

**Buyer–Seller SA policies**

1) *The buyer has the right to submit purchase orders (PO) to the seller, that shall include itemName, the desired delivery time (dt) and the payment (pay).*
2) *Buyer has the right to cancel his PO before dt.*
3) *A successful cancellation obliges the seller to reimburse 90% pay to the buyer.*
4) *The seller shall claim full payment when he delivers by dt and the buyer has not cancelled the PO.*

The ECA rules in EROP are shown next. Fig. 1–a, b and c show three possible alternatives to deploy them.

```plaintext
#R1->p1,p2,p4: accepts PO, grants buyer right to
#cancelPO and impose obliger to deliver on seller.
when e==POsub && POsub in buyer.rights
  then PCo; buyer.rights+=cancelPO;
  seller.obligs+=(deliver,dt)
end

#R2->p3:cancelPO imposes obliger on seller to refund 90%
when e==DlvFail && e.orig==seller && refund in buyer.rights
  then PCo, ChargeBudget; buyer.rights+=refund
end

The fourth line of R1 declares the event PO policy compliant and grants the buyer the right to cancel the PO and the obligation to deliver by dt to the seller. The right to submit another PO is not removed from the seller. The third line of R2 checks if the buyers has the right to cancel a PO and the time stamp in the event. The fourth line produces an PCo message, removes the buyer’s right to cancel and imposes the obligates the seller to refund 90%.

Imagine that the buyer operates under the following LP.

**Buyer’s private policies**

1) *The issuer of the PO must have a budget assigned to it by a designated budgetOfficer.*
2) *A PO is allowed only if the balance in the issuer’s budget exceeds the payment amount in the PO.*
3) *The issuer’s budget will be charged upon the submission of the PO.*
4) *If the item is not delivered for whatever reason, the issuer’s budget will be refunded.*

These LP can be expressed in EROP as shown below and deployed, for example in the client’s policy manager of Fig. 1–b) or c).

```plaintext
#R1->p1,p2,p3: right to submit PO (POsub)
when e==POsub && e.orig==buyer && POsub in buyer.rights
  && e.pay<=BudgetBalance
  then PCo, ChargeBudget; buyer.rights+=refund
  if BudgetBalance<=0 then buyer.rights-=POsub
end

#R2->p4: right to be refunded is delivery fails
when e=DlvFail && e.orig==seller && refund in buyer.rights
  then PCo, refundBudget; buyer.rights+=refund
end

We do not discuss the seller’s LP, but they can be treated in a similar manner.

IV. AMENABILITY TO FORMAL ANALYSIS

A policy is usually i) written in a natural language (e.g., in English) ii) converted into computer–amenable notation (e.g., ECA rule) and iii) deployed into an existing policy base. The maintenance of the logical consistency of the policy base is crucial and challenging. Careless addition, withdraw and edition of policies might result in syntactic
and more subtle logical errors like redundancy, subsumption, incompleteness, unreachability, circularity and conflicts [9]. To prevent these problems, it is advisable to evaluate the logical impact of adding, editing or removing a policy, on a policy base, before altering it. With large policy bases (hundreds of policies), this is only possible, when policies are expressed in notations that are amenable to logical examination with automatic tools.

A close examination of the policies of the Condor example will reveal that there are several conflicts between Math’s LP and Math–Biology SA policies. There is a conflict about submission days (policies 1 and 1): SA allows submission of jobs on Sun whereas Math’s LP prohibits that. Secondly, there is a conflict about the time window: The second SA policy specifies notification and re–allocation allowances, whereas Math’s second policy specifies immediate eviction. Third, the omission of a clause in the SA to constrain the number of copies that can be instantiated conflicts with the constrain (no more than 3 copies) stipulated by Math’s fourth policy. Finally, there is a conflict between policies number 5: SA specifies both Linux and Window machines, whereas the Math’s LP offer only Linux.

As a second example, take an SA policy from Amazon Cloud drive [10] (a prepaid disk storage service) that stipulates that Amazon will renew the client’s plan automatically at the end of the prepaid period unless the client sends a cancellation message before the renewal date. This policy could conflict with the LP of a company stipulating that Employees need authorization from their managers to renew their Cloud drive accounts. Conflicts like this are subtle and hard to detect without the assistance of mechanical tools. Thus numerous policy languages with their respective verification tools have been suggested that range from special purpose tools (see for example [11], [12]) implemented from scratch to existing general purpose logical verifiers such as conventional model checkers. In our research, we have taken the second alternative. In particular, we have explored the suitability of Spin [13] in the verification and testing of policies and have produced encouraging results [9], [14]. We have used Spin with both standard Promela and an extended version of Promela [3] to verify the logical consistency of SA policies before conversion into EROP rules [9]. In addition, we have used Spin as test case generator to validate the execution of EROP rules against errors introduced at conversion from English to EROP rules and by the execution environment [14]. As pointed out in [15], model–checking of large systems (say contracts with 50 or more clauses) can quickly result in state explosion; we argue that this issue can be prevented by means of abstraction techniques.

It is worth emphasising that we are interested here in offline detection of logical errors. That is, the goal is to identify the situations (occurrences of an event or event patterns) that will, or are likely to drive the policy base out of consistency at run–time. Once the error, precisely the potential threat, has been identified several measures can be taken by the policy administrator to address the issue. For instance, trivial syntactic errors are immediately corrected after detection. Redundancy can be ignored in applications where it impacts efficiency but without logical implications. Likewise, the administrator might decide to introduce preventive measures against potential conflicts that are likely to happen frequently or have catastrophic impacts; alternatively, he or she might decide to live with the threat of a conflict and take corrective measures only when it actually materializes. Metapolicies (policies about policies) is a widely used technique to deal with conflicts. In the simplest case, a metapolicy can specify precedence between two or more potentially conflicting policies.

V. PROOF OF CONCEPT IMPLEMENTATION

As a proof of concept that demonstrates how the PM operates, we have implemented the client’s application, the service interface, the gateway and its integration to the PM as shown in Fig. 3. Notice that if we exclude the provider’s LP from the policy manager, this implementation corresponds to the right side of Fig. 1–a).

Our implementation is RESTful based, thus communication between the components is realised as RESTful request and replies.

![Figure 3. Proof of concept implementation.](image)

The client’s application is a HTML form that the client fills in with relevant personal information (name, account number, etc.) and submits to access the service. Client’s request leaves the client as RESTful GET requests (req) to be intercepted by the gateway. The gateway extracts the client’s personal information from the requests (precisely, from the query parameters), uses them to compose a GET request, sends it (callRq) to the PM for evaluation and waits for a reply. The PM extracts the personal information from the callReq and uses it for composing the event (event e_1 in Fig. 2) that the drool engine needs to trigger the ECA rules that perform the evaluation of the callReq.

When the gateway receives a rej reply from the PM, it inserts a ref parameter in a RESTful reply and sends it (rep) to the client’s app. More interestingly, when the gateway receives an acc from the PM, the gateway, composes a
RESTful request (Req) with the URL of the resource requested and forwards it to the service interface. Eventually, the service interface replies with a Rep to the gateway, who extracts the parameters of interest (for instance, the requested resource or a reference to it) to compose rep and sends it to the client’s app.

We use the following SA in our experiment:

Client–Provider SA

1. The client can purchase call cards from the provider.
2. A card entitles the client to place 10 calls (requests) against the provider, at any time.
3. A card is considered consumed when its 10th call terminates.

We admit that this SA is far from being complete; for instance, it does not specifies constraints on the length of the calls. Yet it is good enough to illustrate this discussion. Moreover, in this preliminary implementation, we converted the SA policies manually from English into standard drools instead of EROP rules.

We deployed two clients called Romeo and Juliette, thus the PM is responsible for operating the gateway to permit or deny call requests related to Romeo–Provider and Juliette–Provider SAs. As shown in the figure, we use a conventional JDBC database to store the clients’ accounts (clients’ acct) which contain two parameters: client’s name and its number of prepaid calls (PrepaidCalls).

p1 can be regarded as the signing of the agreements between the two parties. In a full implementation, the purchase of the call card would be taken by the provider as an indication to automatically update the PM (update drools) with policies p2 and p3 so that it can operate the gateway.

In this experiment we update the PM manually, that is, we manually typed the following drools into a drools file.

```drools
01: rule "Accept callRq"
02: when
03: $e: drools.Event(type=="callRq", cli: originator)
04: eval(clientPC.getPrepaidCalls(cli)>0)
05: then
06: $e.setStatus("acc");
07: clientPC.updatePrepaidCalls(cli);
08: end
09: rule "Reject callRq"
10: when
11: $e: drools.Event(type=="callRq", cli: originator)
12: eval(clientPC.getPrepaidCalls(cli) <= 0)
13: then
14: $e.setStatus("rej");
15: end
```

The code contains two rules: Accept callRq and Reject callRq. Accept callRq triggers when a call request is to be accepted, whereas Reject callRq triggers when a call request is to be rejected. Both rules react to the event drools.Event (lines 03 and 11, respectively). As defined in our Java classes, the event contains several fields; three of them are of interest here: Firstly, type identifies the type of event, for example, callRq; secondly, originator contains the name of the client that originated the event, for example, Romeo, Juliette; thirdly, status is used by the rules to store their decisions to accept or reject (acc or rej) the request expressed in the event under analysis. Upon receiving an event of type callRq (line 03) originated by a client (cli), rule Accept callRq evaluates its condition (a JDBC query in line 04) which verifies whether the client has prepaid calls in his or her account. If the condition is satisfied, the rule writes (line 06) acc in the status field of the event and access the JDBC database (line 07) to update (decrement by one) the number of calls consumed by the client.

Rule Reject callRq work similarly, except that it triggers when the client has no prepaid calls (line 12) in his account and writes (line 14) rej in the status field of the event.

The status of drools.Event is extracted by ancillary Java classes of the PM (a Servlet in current implementation) to compose the RESTful reply that the gateway is waiting for. The reply contains either acc or rej to instruct the gateway to accept or reject the client’s request, respectively.

VI. Future Work

In Section I, we mentioned that the PM of two parties can interact with each other to negotiate the creation, updating and termination of SAs (Fig. 1–d)). We are currently in the process of integrating the monitoring facilities of the CCC with the negotiation facilities of Agility. Agility is a Cloud Management product developed by Arjuna Technologies Limited [4] to assist two or more independently administered parties in sharing their IT resources. It automates the creation, negotiation, updating and termination of SAs.

An abstract view of the negotiation components of agility’s is shown in Fig. 4. The agility servers (AS_{C} and AS_{P}) are the core components of Agility and are responsible for establishing, storing, updating and terminating SAs negotiated through the negotiation protocol.

To understand how the negotiation protocol works, imagine that the initiator and responder are, respectively, the
client and provider. 1) The initiator wishing to create or update an SA uses its portal to edit an SA template. 2) The initiator consults its policy modules \((PM_1, PM_2)\) for approval of the SA proposal. 3) If the SA proposal is locally approved the initiator sends it to the responder. 4) The approval of the SA proposal. 5) If the SA proposal is approved, the responder sends an acceptance message to the initiator; otherwise, it sends a rejection message.

Notice that each policy module contains one or more local policies and that decision to accept or reject a SA proposal is based on an implementation specific algorithm, expressed perhaps as a metapolicy on the policies in the policy modules.

Implementation issues aside, the challenge of this endeavour is the alignment of the LP of the parties and SA policies under negotiation. It seems that the techniques that we used in the analysis of the logical consistency of the SA policies can be applied in the analysis of LP. In the same way, these techniques can be used to reason about potential logical conflicts between the policies of the SA under negotiation (or already agreed upon) and the LP of the parties; namely conflicts between SA and client’s LP and conflicts between SA and provider’s LP.

We are aware that some conflicts are hard to detect offline. Yet we believe that some (or most) potential conflictive situations can be predicted by means of offline analysis. We speculate that Linear Temporal Logic (LTL) formulae can be used to reason about the temporal constraints—crucial information to predict run–time conflicts—on the clauses. For example, the requirement that \(\text{there should be no simultaneous permission and prohibition to submit a job for execution,}\) can be written in LTL as:

\[
\neg (\text{IS\_permit(execute)} \land \text{IS\_prohibit(execute)})
\]

This LTL reads that, \textit{always it is not possible to be permitted and prohibited to execute}, and can be used for example to uncover conflicting situations where SA policies permit something that LP prohibit.

We feel that, this is a research direction worth exploring; good insights into this issue can be found in [16].

VII. RELATED WORK

Research on contract regulated inter–enterprise interactions between parties subject to local and shared policies was pioneered by Minsky [17]. The notion of current right, obligations and prohibitions was introduced in [18]. A compact summary about the issues involved in contract management is provided in [19]. The author includes a list of 13 features that contract languages should provide. Within this context, we believe that our approach is particularly strong in capturing the dynamic of rights, obligations and prohibitions and contrary to duty obligations (contingency clauses) as our notation does this explicitly. Another salient feature is that it enables formal reasoning using existing general purpose tools like model–checkers both at design and implementation (testing) time. Intuitive mapping from notation used at verification time to actual implementation (not mentioned in [19]) is another salient feature of our approach. The need for automatic mechanisms for renegotiation (anticipated and exceptional updates) of legal agreements is recognised in [20], however, they focus on the protocol for the digital signatures and overlook the potential logical impact on the policies. Negotiation, deployment and monitoring of SAs is discussed in [21] but without accounting for logical conflicts. In [22] the authors discusses a policy management system called \textit{MyPolMan} that can be used by administrators of Grid environments for editing (creating and updating) and disseminating policies (XML files). Though it is not explicitly discussed, the authors assume that the policy decision point is provided with a single XML document with logically consistent policies that satisfies both the policies of the Grid community and the administrator’s local policies. They do not account for potential inconsistencies in the policies or clashes between Grid and local policies. A mechanism for granting access to Grid resources with the help of gateways controlled by policy decision points is discussed in [23]. Policy management here is centralised— in contrast, we deal with a multipolicy domain. A conceptual discussion on the use of metapolicies as a means of resolving policy conflicts that emerge in applications that involve several policy domains can be found in [24]. Though the focus is on security policies, her observations are applicable to other fields. This discussion is extended in [25] where it is suggested that metapolicies can be used to specify invariants, that is, to guard policies that cannot be overwritten by other policies, even in the event of conflicts. Policy conflicts are discussed in–depth in [26]. Special purpose tools for reasoning about policies (conflicts for instance) are suggested in [27], [11], [16], [28]. In contrast, in [9], [14] we suggest the use of existing model–checkers.

VIII. CONCLUSION

We have argued that service agreements (contracts) used in cloud computing are complex documents with a dynamic life–cycle that includes negotiation, conversion of policies (clauses) from English to executable code, deployment, enforcement, updates and normal or early termination. As a contribution, we discussed an architecture that includes automatic tools to help the designer at different stages. We raised the question about the desirable features that SA managing systems should provide. We focused our attention to the notation used to encode policies. We argued that it should be expressive enough to cover practical policies, clear, intuitive and implementable. We pointed out that the maintenance of the logical consistency of policies is not trivial and suggested that SA notations should be amenable to logical analysis with automatic tools to uncover potential
problems. We discussed a proof of concept implementation based on RESTful and Jboss drools.

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