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That the writing of history is conditioned both by the place from which it is written and by the time in which it is written is illustrated in the writing of American history in Europe. European specialists in American history do not produce scholarship identical to that of U.S. historians. Like historians everywhere their scholarship has been informed by their backgrounds and training, by the career structures they inhabit and the publishing opportunities afforded them, by local contemporary issues and public expectations, even by the language they speak, as the following essays suggest. Thus European writing about American history has always betrayed characteristics and followed trajectories of its own.

A major characteristic is its novelty. While there were rare excursions into American history before the Second World War, inspired by the story of Europe in America, it was the unprecedented presence of the United States in Europe (and the world) from 1945 that jump-started the serious study of the subject among Europeans. Shaping its development were that formidable presence on the one hand and the particular circumstances of the European academies on the other. Yet another tension was that imposed by multiple audiences. In the early years European scholars were primarily addressing their own countrymen, but eventually many sought also to reach the American academy, though this could mean offering somewhat different texts to different readers. Further, they were often expected to offer broad surveys of the whole of American history (as taught courses or books) in their own languages, while also engaging in specialized archival research. There were political influences too, whether in the form of liberal agendas that emerged in some western European countries in the early post-war era or the Marxist orthodoxy of eastern Europe, though these were to be shed with the passage of time. And there were also other competing
demands, such as the centrifugal forces arising from the variegated nature of European geography and culture and the countervailing political and intellectual pressures looking to a common purpose. These various tensions, creative or otherwise, guided the course of this scholarship.

The bare handful of American history specialists in Europe at the end of World War II grew to over 300 within a half-century, particularly in its later decades, constituting what the compilers of a 1994 survey called “a critical mass.” A third of them were in the United Kingdom, over 60 in Russia and about 50 apiece in Germany and France. In Norway nine were identified, in Switzerland and Hungary three each, and in Bulgaria one.  

The figures can only be suggestive, reflecting the willingness of individual scholars to identify themselves, but American history had become an undoubted if small presence in the European academy. (It was also dwarfed by the academic battalion studying American literature).  

The distinctiveness of the very varied writings of these authors has tended to reside more in the issues and themes considered salient than in profoundly different methodological approaches (though the unrepentant empiricism of the British may be contrasted with, say, the methodological and theoretical rigor expected in Sweden). Traditional disciplinary boundaries – the organization of academic departments – seem to be less firm in Europe than the United States, which may allow greater receptivity to a range of disciplinary influences, but European writing about American history has broadly operated within the western historiographical tradition. Nonetheless, some visions of American history prevail over others.

Political history came to have a higher profile than it did in the American academy – the United States offered the model of “a more perfect union” both after 1945 and again towards the end of the century when many European countries had to rebuild their systems of government. Similarly prominent was cultural history, in part because on the Continent
departments of English proved hospitable to the American Studies movement. Geographical distance from the United States also served to encourage a measure of selectivity. The American experience with race was of perennial interest to European scholars, bemused by the presence of slavery and racial discrimination in a country ideologically identified with freedom.\(^5\) Further, American history took off in Europe at a time when influential U.S. scholars were advancing notions of American exceptionalism, an approach that intrigued but for the most part did not convince European practitioners.

Historiographical traditions in Europe in the 19\(^{th}\) and early 20\(^{th}\) centuries had done little to make space for American history. In an age of nationalism, academic historians had focused overwhelmingly on the histories of their own countries, and shrugged off American history as the somewhat wayward by-product of European history. The United States represented the future, not the past, and while an impressive array of European intellectuals brilliantly dissected the American scene, historians were rare among them. There were lone individuals who explored American history, though not without hazard. The Russian constitutional historian Maksim M. Kovaleskij was expelled from the University of Moscow in 1887 for his sympathy for American liberal constitutionalism.\(^6\) In the United Kingdom during the 1930s there was just one chair in American history tenable by a Briton, and its incumbent almost despaired of his colleagues who “in their heart of hearts have believed that history stops, let us say, in 1815,” which did not leave much purchase for American history.\(^7\)

The succumbing of a large part of the continent to totalitarian regimes in the interwar years hardly furthered the serious study of a country dedicated to individual rights. As an academic subject American history in Europe in 1945 had yet to be constructed.

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THE ERUPTION OF THE UNITED STATES into Europe after the war meant that academic establishments could no longer ignore its history, though it would be years before it was
accorded a secure place in universities. A Eurocentric and snobbish academic conservatism doubted that much could be learned from a country that scarcely had a history, but there were other barriers too. As the Cold War took hold Americans promoted the idea of a common past as the basis of a joint “Atlantic civilization” and launched a massive exercise in cultural diplomacy, including generous lubrication by both governmental and private bodies for American Studies programs. But many Europeans proved unresponsive. West Germans, for example, recently released from one state-sponsored political ideology, were wary of submitting to another. In some countries, such as Italy and France, there were large Communist parties suspicious of American designs, and even in the Netherlands and Denmark there were those who recoiled from the Manichean images emanating from the U.S. State Department. Europeans might welcome the Americans as liberators, but they also remembered Stalingrad and the huge human sacrifices made by the Soviet Union during the war. In some countries too, such as Italy and Spain, a strong Roman Catholic sub-culture resisted American modernity. In contrast, Cold War imperatives promoted the study of the United States in the Soviet Union.

The English Channel also represented a divide. Language as well as water separates the United Kingdom from the continent, and there was an exceptional takeoff of American history in Britain in the immediate post-war decades. Academic liberals were attracted by the apparent openness of American society and intrigued by the New Deal’s attempt to reconcile democracy with capitalism, which could offer a model for their own society, while the advent of the Cold War sharpened an appreciation of the importance of the United States in maintaining global order. Welsh professor Brinley Thomas accompanied his formidable study of the 19th century Atlantic economy with a plea that Britain cleave to an Atlantic rather than a Commonwealth alliance: “Whether or not atomic bombs are going to rain down
on Britain depends on the deterrent effect of that alliance and not on any narrow scheme of Commonwealth defence.”

While other western European countries were much slower to embrace American history, the appeal of a liberal narrative was not confined to the United Kingdom. Ingrid Semmingsen, a prodigious historian of Norwegian immigration, wrote warmly of Franklin Roosevelt and American liberalism, and in France Raymond Aron asserted a distinctive liberal sensibility and was one of the few public intellectuals to give some sympathetic attention to the United States. But perhaps most significant was the example afforded to European liberals by American political forms. In countries experimenting with new governing structures, there were scholarly examinations of American constitutionalism. Aldo Garosci's *Il pensiero politico degli autori del “Federalist”* (1954) was just one of a rash of Italian studies of the ideas of the American Founders, and a little later the revolutionary period attracted the attention of German doctoral students, some of whom were to publish distinguished works, such as Willi Paul Adams’s *The First American Constitutions* (1973).

But western Europe’s liberal intellectuals made slow headway in societies in which both conservatives and radicals for different reasons were often strongly anti-American. While a few won U.S. publication, these scholars naturally enough were talking mainly to their own national audiences. So were historians in the eastern bloc. By the 1950s and 1960s Soviet historians were publishing extensively on American history, in studies of American imperialism, labor, African Americans, the Civil War and other topics that advanced a Marxist-Leninist perspective.

The American liberal tradition may have given comfort to some western European scholars, though they were not overly disposed to endorse the consensus school that then held a prominent place in U.S. historiography. Labor historians, intrigued by U.S. claims to exceptionalism, quite regularly inspected American labor conditions, and such practitioners
as Henry Pelling in Britain, Daniel Guérin in France, and Alfredo Gradilone in Italy, saw no reason to minimize class issues. But much the most expansive area in American history scholarship in the 1950s and 1960s consisted of studies of European-American connections. European scholars exploited their own archives in explorations of migration or economic or diplomatic relationships. They were, after all, studying aspects of their own history. At the same time this trajectory did little to bring European scholars together. The “European idea” may have been animating some European statesmen, but studies of bilateral connections remained discrete exercises, running along parallel rather than converging lines.

Studies of connections often pointed up the variations in the American experience but did not render the United States unique. Other European scholarship also tended to resist notions of American exceptionalism; regular publications on American race relations and the Civil War hardly suggested a consensual past. European Americanists could admire American liberal traditions, though they were drawn more to the conflicts than the continuities in American history. Even the influential Sigmund Skard, noted for his untiring support of American Studies in European curricula, was ready to point to the dehumanizing aspects of capitalism in the United States and the presence of racial inequality.

By the late 1960s, with the Cold War assuming new configurations, fresh American influences and socioeconomic changes in Europe were again interacting to affect the course of this scholarship. Facilitating the academic growth of American history through much of Europe was the expansion of higher education, creating at least some jobs for American specialists. The convulsions of the Sixties on both sides of the Atlantic and the emergence of the New Left meant that European scholars who had not seen much to commend in the United States began to find its history more interesting. Anti-Americanism, once an obstacle, now provided a route into American history. The various protest movements engaged the attention of younger scholars who themselves had grown up imbibing American popular
culture. Often seeing themselves as radicals, their suspicions of American power structures were balanced by their appreciation of the individualist or anarchist thrust present in American political culture. New Left history also reinforced the European disposition to be skeptical about American exceptionalism, as illustrated, for example, by Élise Marienstras’s study of the roots of the American political tradition, with its exposure of the myths associated with consensus history.\textsuperscript{20}

U.S. historians may have taken the initiative in generating new histories of race, class and gender, but in the United States they were competing with resilient traditional narratives sustained by a large part of the profession. In many countries of Europe there was little or no such traditional U.S. history, and studies of the elements of the “other America” assumed center stage (occasionally abetted by American expatriates appointed to develop U.S. history!). This was reinforced by the tendency on the continent (as opposed to Britain) for American history to evolve in language and then area studies departments. Literary history and cultural studies expanded, and students of culture readily found their way into the fields opened up by New Left history. As the new history was being eagerly embraced by younger (and some older) European scholars in the 1970s, the American model that had excited some Europeans in the immediate post-war era was fading. U.S. credibility was savaged by the Vietnam experience and the troubled economic times called into question the virtues of capitalism. American dissent, past and present, was among the areas being probed in the European academies, as was the nature of American capitalism.\textsuperscript{21}

While American history was becoming visible in Britain, West Germany, France, Italy and the Netherlands in particular, the political changes of the 1970s also advanced the subject elsewhere. Détente helped to open up the study of American history in eastern Europe, where it was less obliged to serve the state. From 1974 annual conferences on American literature and culture were held at Moscow State University, and in 1976 the
American Studies Center was established at Warsaw University. The collapse of the right-wing regimes in the Iberian peninsula opened space for American history there, from a distinctive perspective that embraced Latin America.\(^{22}\)

The expansion of higher education continued, sometimes fitfully, through the rest of the century, though the very diversity of topics being embraced by American specialists soon defied generalization.\(^{23}\) Studies of trans-Atlantic connections and U.S. foreign policy remained dominant, but in the 1980s European scholars could be found examining such varied subjects as American populism, white-collar workers, Native Americans, McCarthyism, and the civil rights movement.\(^{24}\) Detente had not lasted long, and Russian publications remained heavily devoted to international relations, though among other domestic topics were studies of Daniel DeLeon, John Dos Passos, Henry Clay’s American System, and the connections between American business and politics.\(^{25}\)

By the 1990s the number of European publications was multiplying rapidly, and, with the fall of the Berlin Wall, new influences came into play, among them a greater willingness in eastern Europe countries to address American history as the specter of censorship was disappearing. Russian scholars were soon distancing themselves from Soviet-style history.\(^{26}\) Globalization had replaced the Cold War, with major implications for scholarship throughout Europe.

With transatlantic travel a commonplace by the late 20\(^{\text{th}}\) century, European scholarship was in some danger of being drawn into the American academic orbit. While British historians were most vulnerable in this respect, even continental scholars occasionally acknowledged the degree to which they felt absorbed by the American academy. What is significant about this perspective is that European scholars were no longer necessarily focusing primarily on their domestic audiences. Some, at least, are trying to make contributions to U.S. historiographical discussions.
But where history was written continued to matter. Forms of cultural and intellectual history have flourished on both sides of the Atlantic, but they have occupied a larger part of the agenda in Europe than in the United States, partly because of institutional homes in “studies” departments. The book series *European Contributions to American Studies*, launched by Rob Kroes, in 1979, was flourishing by the 1990s, its titles addressing such topics as post-war cultural change, the American West, American film and photography, and European anti-Americanism. Perhaps predictably, geography and culture came together in generating a lively scholarship on the theme of Americanization, of which Kroes’s *If You’ve Seen One, You’ve Seen the Mall* (1996) is one of the better known examples. In recent years several European countries have experienced a rise in racial and ethnic tensions as they too have experienced substantial immigration. This helps to explain a recent explosion of writing on American racial issues. Britta Walschmitt-Nelson’s study of black women and the civil rights movement and Alessandra Lorini’s exploration of the public rituals of black activists in New York are but two of many examples. Native American history has attracted increasing attention, not least in Scandinavia. Within the broad category of race, there has been a preoccupation with the South. The Middelburg Conference of Historians of the United States in April 2011, on “The U.S. South and Europe,” featured papers by historians from Spain, Germany, Italy, Poland, Turkey and Britain. In the 1950s and 1960s Europeans were told by Americans that the South was “not really America,” which perhaps deterred all but a few from examining it; with the “southernization of American politics,” as delineated by Dan Carter and other modern American authors, its study has burgeoned.

Their location in Europe has also made contemporary European Americanists receptive to transnational history, which they could claim they had long been practicing. Certainly Frank Thistlethwaite’s seminal essay in 1960, calling for a global perspective in migration research, better integrating immigrant reception with places of origin, could be
seen as an early example of the genre. At any rate, they were ready to respond to the invitations of American scholars to participate in “internationalizing” ventures, and what has remained a minority interest within the American historical profession has been a major one for Europeans. Francesca Lidia Viano’s recent global history of the Statue of Liberty provides one illustration of this genre, and another is Paul Quigley’s demonstration that evaluating the South in a trans-national context can shed new light on the origins of the American Civil War. The trans-national and cultural turns have been important too in giving a powerful boost to Atlantic history, dramatically reviving what had once seemed a fading interest in the colonial and early national eras. American women’s history had begun to appear in European academies in the 1980s, but it has burgeoned in recent years as it has been powerfully boosted by the vigor of trans-national feminism.

European circumstances have also sustained political history. Towards the end of the 20th century some U.S. historians, reeling before the pervasive thrust of a range of new historical fashions, were lamenting the eclipse of American political history. They wanted “to bring the state back in,” a call bemusing to Europeans for whom the state had never gone away, conscious as they were of the welfare state and the so-called “European social model.” Notwithstanding the nurturing role of area studies, in some continental countries historians had often remained close to the political and social sciences to which some U.S. historians were again turning for inspiration. The upheavals in European governance underlined the importance of political institutions, as a number of eastern Europe countries rebuilt their political systems after 1989. The uneasy evolution of the European Community, not to mention the unification of Germany and the fragile nature of political parties in such countries as Italy, also served to raise the profile of the political. American models, perhaps, had not altogether lost their utility. Major studies have included Sweden’s Max Edling on the creation of the republic as a process of state formation also found in early modern Europe,
Italy’s Raffaella Baritono on a later political and institutional crisis of American government, and Russia’s Vladimir O. Pechatnov on the Democratic party’s approach to the electorate.\textsuperscript{35} 

As some of these examples suggest, it is possible for European writing not only to favor certain topics but also to betray distinctive approaches. The role of the United States in the world has ensured that European scholars have given ample attention to foreign affairs, leading some, such as Michael Cox and Odd Arne Westad, to question US-centered analyses of international relations.\textsuperscript{36} In Germany the “cultural turn” has taken a different form to that in the United States, where it was conditioned by identity politics and culture wars; instead, the rather theoretical discussions among German scholars emerged out of a strongly historicist historiographical tradition.\textsuperscript{37} It is possible for European scholars to take some advantage of their distance from the prevailing discourse in the United States, as illustrated in studies of the American Civil War, when over a generation ago Raimondo Luraghi’s Gramscian approach did attract the attention of U.S. scholars, while more recently John Ashworth’s distinctive interpretation has also been subject to debate.\textsuperscript{38}

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WHILE EUROPEAN HISTORIANS HAVE INCREASINGLY replaced an interest in Atlantic connections with topics in American domestic history, their geographical locus has remained pertinent if less visible. As the varied Cold War passions have faded, American history need no longer be pressed so urgently into a European cause. And there is detachment of a different kind too. Since European scholars usually do not have an ancestor who sailed on the Mayflower or an elder brother who served in Vietnam, the personal does not inform their perspectives. They can be well versed in U.S. historiography while remaining detached from American life itself.

Two concurrent trends have impacted on their scholarship over the last two decades: increasing contact among its practitioners within Europe and the internationalization of
American history. The former has been somewhat belated, for European specialists in American history have been less interested in the idea of a “European identity” than many of their political and intellectual leaders. The European Union (which contains only 27 of the 50 European sovereign states) has provided funding for certain kinds of research, such as into migration patterns, though mostly research projects are pursued within national and local institutional structures. The Bologna Process has promoted the harmonization of European higher education (making it easier, for example, for students to move between different countries in the course of their degrees). But such unifying measures have so far sat lightly on Americanist academics, who are more likely to devote their limited resources to visits to the United States than to other European countries. Nonetheless European practitioners of American history have been improving mutual contacts. The Middelburg Conference of European Historians of the United States has met biennially since 1993; the European Journal of American Studies has been online since 2006, promoting awareness of work done across the continent. The co-authorship of this Forum represents a confluence of time and place.

But if some scholars in Europe have now begun to think of themselves as “European,” the technological conquest of distance has also exposed them to globalizing influences. European scholars are well positioned to pursue the opportunities afforded by trans-national and global history, and some have begun to contextualize American events and processes in supranational trends. They may see the need increasingly to interact not only with colleagues in the United States but also with those in Latin America, Asia and Oceania. Their local roots will remain relevant, for in integrating elements of American history into broader studies of issues and themes they will select those that resonate within their own institutional and situational contexts.
Willi Paul Adams and Wolfgang J. Helbich, eds., *Directory of European Historians of North America* (Berlin, 1994). The figures refer to scholars in academic posts, a few of whom had Canadian interests, and include international relations and other specialists whose research contained significant American elements. There is currently no comprehensive contemporary record, but a survey of eleven countries in 2010-11 found close to 200 American history posts in the United Kingdom, about 60 each in Germany and France, and eight in Hungary (survey in the possession of the authors, compiled by Eleanor Thompson now of Leicester University). The recent proliferation of books on U.S. domestic history by Europeans suggests that the number of full-time posts has increased significantly, and European scholars for whom the United States is only part of their interests may now be less inclined to identify themselves as American specialists.


Strictly, there is no single western historiographical tradition, but primarily the scholarship examined here is in the secular, source-based Rankean mode. For discussions of western historiography see, e.g. Jörn Rüsen, ed., *Western Historical Thinking* (New York, 2002), and Patrick O’Brien, “Historiographical traditions and modern imperatives for the restoration of global history,” *Journal of Global History* 1, (2006): 3-39.

This is not to suggest that political history was always dominant – at times economic and social history have been important – rather that it has been a recurring theme of European Americanists from the beginning.


7 H. Hale Bellot, *The Study of American History: An Inaugural Lecture ... 5 February 1931* (Oxford, 1932), 6. Bellot held the Commonwealth Fund Chair in London, established in 1930. There were occasional visiting Americans, and the Harmsworth Chair of American History, established at Oxford in 1922, for some years was held by Samuel Eliot Morison and then by Robert McElroy; it became an annual appointment in 1939. The Visiting Pitt Professorship in American History and Institutions at Cambridge, established 1944, was also an annual appointment.

8 The European Association for American Studies (EAAS) was founded at the American Seminar in Schloss Leopoldskron, Salzburg, Austria, in 1954, preceding the creation of most national associations of American Studies. (The British Association appeared in 1955 following a number of Fulbright conferences at Oxford and Cambridge).

9 Philip Gassert, “Between Political Reconnaissance Work and Democratizing Science: American Studies in Germany, 1917-1953,” *GHI Bulletin*, 32 (Spring, 2003): 33-50. As noted in “The Weight of Words” essay, German historians in the immediate post-war period, conscious of the Nazi past, were also reluctant to address the topic of American race relations, an inhibition that no longer obtains given the huge outpouring of publications in this field in recent years; see Simon Wendt, “Transnational Perspectives on the History of Racism in North America,” *Amerikastudien/American Studies* 54, no.3 (2009): 473-98.


There were perhaps half-a-dozen academics engaged in U.S. history in the U.K. immediately after the war, rising to 74 by 1967: Harry C. Allen, “United States History in Great Britain and the European Association for American Studies,” in Lewis Hanke, ed., *Guide to the Study of United States History Outside the U.S. 1945-1980* (White Plains NY, 1985), 1: 57. There was also significant expansion in the Soviet Union from the mid-1950s, though figures are elusive.


See the many entries in Hanke, ed., *Guide to the Study of United States History Outside the U.S.*


The percentage of college-age western Europeans at university rose from about 7 per cent in the 1960s, to 15 per cent in the 1980s, and to between 30 and 50 per cent in the mid-1990s: Pells, *Not Like Us*, 124.


See e.g. publications of Mark Lapitsky, Sophia Nicolaeva, Marina Vlasova and Nikolai Sakharov and other Russian scholars cited in Adams and Helbich, eds., *Directory of European Historians*, 115-45.


Britta Walschmitt-Nelson, *From Protest to Politics: Schwarze Frauen in der Bürgerrechtsbewegung und im Kongress der Vereinigten Staaten* (Frankfurt, 1998); Alessandra
28 Scandinavian scholars interested in Native Americans include Gunlög Fur (Sweden), Sami Lakomäki (Finland), Rani-Henrik Andersson (Finland), and Lars Elenius (Sweden). See also the programs of the biennial Maple Leaf and Eagle Conference in American Studies at the University of Helsinki: [http://www.helsinki.fi/areaculturalstudies/mle/index.html](http://www.helsinki.fi/areaculturalstudies/mle/index.html) and the website of the American Indian Workshop, [http://www.american-indian-workshop.org/index.html](http://www.american-indian-workshop.org/index.html).


34 William E. Leuchtenburg, “The Pertinence of Political History: Reflections on the Significance of the State in America,” *Journal of American History* 73, no.3 (1986): 585-600. Some U.S. scholars consciously promoted a “new” political history, whether via “American Political Development” owing much to political sociology and political science, or through policy history or what is
sometimes called the new institutionalism. Some Europeans have been associated with this approach; e.g. Gareth Davies, *See Government Grow: Education Politics from Johnson to Reagan* (Lawrence, KS, 2007).


