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A Brief Sketch of the Possibility of a Hegelian Cosmopolitanism

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The immediate reaction to using both "Hegelian" and "cosmopolitanism" in the same sentence without a disjunctive may rightly be one of scepticism, born of the suspicion that much subtle interpretative work will be required. Two aspects of Hegelian thought are explicitly at odds with cosmopolitanism. First, any commitment to equality between communities jars with his view of international relations: he describes states as distinct entities coexisting in a state of nature, asserts the paternal right of more developed nations over less developed ones and denies the possibility of global citizenship. It is possible to defend him by arguing that the section entitled “International Law” in his lectures is inconsistent, brief and probably hurriedly written. There are, for example, enough hints at the “recognition” of states and the aim of violence as recognition to allow the possibility of an alternative formulation.

However, a second aspect of his thought is more problematic: Hegel’s thoroughgoing critical stance towards formal universalism seemingly undermines the Kantian commitment to the norm of publicity central to cosmopolitan thinking. To make the interpretative labour of a Hegelian cosmopolitanism worthwhile, then, one needs to demonstrate that his thought brings something to cosmopolitanism that is not found in its standard formal variants. In this essay I will argue that this is indeed the case: Hegel’s system offers reasons to adopt a robust, participatory and institutional cosmopolitan position over and above more formal cosmopolitanism.

Conflict and Cosmopolitan Strategies

A Hegelian approach to cosmopolitanism will be primarily concerned with conflict. Conflicts occur at different political levels and each has an appropriate court of appeal: an argument between siblings should be resolved within the family and an
argument about garden hedges within the local community; disagreements about educational policy should be resolved at the national level and those about trade restrictions in talks between states. The variety of legitimate assertions could include "ask your father", or "my territory is decided by the fence", and, through the procedure of legitimization, reconciliation of the particular individual with the social, rational self is achieved. Participants either admit error ("I didn't realize the tree's roots were attacking the foundations of your house") or they re-evaluate the content of their subjective sets of motivations ("I see the rightness of the law which says I can cut your branches off, but I am also aware of the good of peaceful neighbourhoods"). The principles and compromises which resolve such conflicts will necessarily affect the behaviour of participants, and the efficacy of the resolution is a consequence of the structured institutions which frame the conflicts (the family, local councils and so on). These institutions are the media through which resolution occurs when participants recognize the authority of the legislating body and the rationality of the resolution itself, identifying themselves as an abstract individual "person" (family member, local resident).

The legitimacy of these principles and edicts thus rests on the Kantian demand for publicity: "All actions affecting the rights of other human beings are wrong if their maxim is not compatible with their being made public". Resolutions cannot be accepted by individuals as their own maxims unless they express the subject's own right to self-determination. For a law governing the will to be non-coercive, I must be able to act upon its ground as though it were my own reason for action. In that way, I remain free. Publicity establishes, expresses and protects individual autonomy since a legitimate law is grounded in reasons that an individual would, if he or she were to deliberate impartially, acknowledge as his or her own. To take a simple example, I am not coerced by the state into wearing a seatbelt if on reflection I would freely constrain myself given the rational ground of the dictate. A law (in a broad sense) is a rational shortcut, a reminder or a prompt, but ideally not an imposition.

Cosmopolitanism concerns specific, global conflicts. Not all global issues are cosmopolitan, though; certain international conflicts are well-suited to a legal, contractual model of relations since there exists a recognizably national will which a sovereign government can represent. I can be represented as a citizen of the United Kingdom in trade talks by my government and recognize that compromises and treaties made between states are in my interest as such a citizen. What distinguishes a properly cosmopolitan issue is not only this subsidiarity, but the nature of the agents involved: the "person" affected is to be identified as supra-national, representing subjects which cannot be reduced to national citizens. Problems such as poverty, climate change and the rights of minority cultures, for example, are inadequately dealt with by nation state politics because, firstly, the consequences of a national state's policy may affect non-citizens (for instance, the burning of fossil fuels in the USA may have damaging consequences for the sub-continent); and, secondly, certain issues transcend a strict state-to-state multilateralism and necessitate a hyper-communal standpoint that will often divide the citizens of nations into different interest groups incapable of representation in the unified "person" of the state (for example, the industrialist might see environmentally inspired sanctions as punitive, while the resident on the coast of East Anglia sees them as necessary). Cosmopolitan issues differ because they concern issues where a representation of the agent, an institutional authority and a shared agreement on what is of import and how to reason about it are all absent.

Two loose constellations of strategies have developed in order to overcome the identity deficit and meet the requirement of publicity in cosmopolitan thinking. On the one hand, formal universalist cosmopolitan strategies seek to reconcile the particular wants of the individual with the requirements of the global community through the normative commitments of universality: consensus over desires or values that all human beings share. Policies and laws cannot appeal to me as a particular individual, to my class or my social role, or as a citizen of a specific nation. Rather, formal universalist cosmopolitans seek to identify universal human duties, whether derived from pure practical reason or grounded in universal needs and desires. The advantages of such an approach are that it is inclusive and non-perspectival.

On the other hand, particularist cosmopolitan strategies are suspicious of what is seen as the universalist’s coercive strategy of identifying a “person” with a rational construct. Instead, one ought to rely on the substantial identity of the individual and, from this perspective, in order to fully comprehend what a reason might be for a participant in a dialogue, one needs to comprehend his or her tradition, history and situation through the faculty of imagination to make a creative "leap" into an alien form of life. The difference of others is respected through a real attempt to understand them from the inside out.\(^8\)

Hegel’s objections to formal universalism are that formal duties are not related in any universal hierarchy and attempts to prioritize specific formal duties remain arbitrary from the point of view of practical reason.\(^9\) Furthermore, he objects that my "rational" duties cannot contradict commitments to myself, my family or any of the elements of my substantial identity and still appear as "mine". Excluding such elements will undermine reconciliation: it is schizophrenic to divide a "me" as Muslim from a "me" as participant at the debating table. In other words, the supposed “person” of universal reason is metaphysically puzzling and a distortion of my individuality: to act on principles consistent with this representation is to violate my self-determination as an individual.\(^10\) For Hegel, the individual can only be truly self-determining in an objective, moral order which expresses his intelligibility and informs his intentions; that is, in a moral fabric which makes the satisfaction of his rational desires and aspirations possible. Hegel’s point about the nature of universal moral imperatives which are derived from reason, then, is not that they are wrong, but simply that they need to be substantial and content comes from social practices.\(^11\) Reasons for all, according to Hegel, can be formal values or substantial desires, but only when these are ordered within a social and moral fabric which the participants share.

Hegel’s criticisms raise a challenge for formally universal cosmopolitanism. For while at the national level, where a shared tradition exists, the moral fabric serves as a standard and a hierarchy of conceptions of the good, at the global level there is no single, homogeneous or historically dominant conception of the good which determines values, positive obligations and substantive norms. At the global level, there is a felt absence of affirmative institutions which would constitute the self as a global citizen immanently ordering reasons and values by a shared social substance.

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\(^9\) Hegel, *Philosophy of Mind*, §508.


\(^11\) Hegel, *Philosophy of Right*, §261A.
One might assume that, given his rejection of the empty formalism of the universalist strategy, Hegel’s thought is most convincingly worked up into communitarian suspicions of cosmopolitanism: formal cosmopolitanism is empty and unable to supply positive obligations unless accompanied by a substantive account of the good, or at least a guide to how to interpret the universal rights of liberty, equality, respect, and dignity, and its division between a formal and a concrete self distorts our moral experience and privileges a particular way of life.¹² And these criticisms are, of course, part of a Hegelian tradition in moral philosophy aimed not just at Kant, but at “subjective moralities” in general.

However, to overstress the communitarian strain in Hegel is to make him sound like a relativist. He is not. He argues that certain ways of life are “better” or “more advanced” than others. More significantly, the sort of interpretative exercise required by particularism undermines the normative or prescriptive judgements that would bring about the individual and social reconciliation Hegel seeks. The faculty of imagination can offer only conditional prescriptions of the form, “if I were a member of your way of life, I would be required to do θ”. But there is no necessity for me to be a member of your way of life and, in fact, in conflict situations I will not be. That is to say, those values and statements which are to play the role of legitimation must be not only intelligible to all, but also possible motivations for all. The celebration of difference and openness to other ways of life is bought at the cost of comprehension and agreement.¹³ Rational values dissolve into particular, relative expressions of interests and worldviews seemingly incapable of convergence. To be normatively bound by such prescriptions once more violates the publicity constraint and the subject’s autonomy.

Thus Hegel’s challenges to formal universalism and to particularism present a dilemma for cosmopolitanism: on the one hand, universalist approaches result in either vacuous or non-existent agreement, while, on the other, if difference is respected in dialogue, legitimate agreement seems to be impossible. Policies of resolution resulting from either strategy violate the condition of publicity so central to the notion of a legitimate law.

**Action, Recognition and Publicity**

Hegel’s thought on recognition may offer a convincing “third way” to maintain the advantages while overcoming the inadequacies of the two strategies outlined above. On Hegel’s account, humans demonstrate their status as rational agents by acting on principles of action, rather than immediate desires or preferences, and motivations are rational when the subject is able to intelligibly justify the course of action and to do so publicly. Thus Hegel’s theory of action embodies the familiar idea that an action is an event causally brought about by the self-willed intention of the agent.¹⁴ In order to rule out cases of coercion and acting in spite of oneself, he also incorporates the modern idea of a subject as the agent who is “at home” with his intentions and

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¹⁴ Hegel, *Philosophy of Mind*, §504.
motivations, over and above the mere "person" of given dispositions and beliefs. Yet, he interestingly adds another condition: other agents have to be capable of reconstructing the intention from the action itself. When it comes to describing intentions, the first-person privilege has to be tempered with an objective, intersubjective constraint requiring that others concur with the agent and his self-description; otherwise they will continue to treat him under the category of personhood or, worse, as an animal, slave, child, or other such sub-personal agent. Intention, therefore, requires recognition by others; in Hegel's words, it "has this identity of my will and the will of others within it -- it has a positive reference to the will of others".

To be certain that one's intentions are "appropriate", "good" or "rational" requires that one's actual action-event -- independently of the protestations and affirmations of the agent him or herself -- "stand in for" or "represent" the will of the agent in the "outer" world, just as the word uttered in language is (in ordinary circumstances) assumed to be a sincere representation of the thought of the speaker. If the subject's acts are to be the expression of inwardness, then the subject must be certain that the other can reconstruct them faithfully. Both actor and interpreter must, therefore, share a common understanding (a medium) of the way in which acts are to be rendered intelligible. The agent's justification of his reason for action is thus social through and through. Affirming what is substantially right and good is not a matter of external, transcendental standards independent of one's peers, or just of one's own "inner" convictions, but rests on the recognition of the content of one's will in terms of shared categories of behaviour. Reasons for action have a degree of objectivity derived from the expectations and meanings of all agents who share my way of life. So, contrary to Kantian formal universalism, one's role, situation and circumstances all constitute reasons for behaviour. In offering reasons, the agent knows good reasons are those which should convince others.

Hegel distinguishes the objective freedom of institutional identities, social roles, traditional values and material existence from the subjective freedom of acting in accordance with or against the principles and requirements of one's objective freedom in order to satisfy one's own personal projects, desires and interests. He understands the objective determinations of one's identity as a liberation because these roles and values make possible the agent's rational action; they define what is intelligible and what is to be admired and admonished. However, not only does the agent ask whether his action is appropriate to the expectations of his peers, but also whether the expectations of his peers are appropriate to him. Subjective freedom is the subject's right to decide his good -- in which values he feels "at home" -- and is a necessary condition of the rational state since, without it, rational, free action would be impossible. The roles demanded and the values imposed by one's participation in social institutions must be evaluated by the standards of personal freedom in order for the agent to properly feel "at home". And this is the Hegelian reformulation of the

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16 Hegel, Philosophy of Right, §113.
18 Hegel, Philosophy of Right, §120.
requirement of publicity. One cannot appeal to an incoherent transcendental realm to dictate right action, but one can interrogate one’s social roles and meanings for a way to express one’s particularity through a universal medium. The individual agent thus asks if he or she feels at home in such a culture; that is, whether his or her individuality can be adequately respected in such a culture with all its traditions and values.

In a rational social order, the agent knows the good in question because it is made immediately available to him through his roles in the family (parent), civil society (worker) and the state (citizen), institutions which he participates in, maintains and modifies and, thus, recognizes as appropriate. If I wish to be known as a good father, then my acts must accord with those judgements which distinguish a good parent (love, generosity, discipline) and not those which are generally frowned upon (indifference, prodigality, severity). Through being a parent, I question whether traditional models of fatherhood are appropriate given the actual demands of contemporary social life. The institutions of the agent’s community imbue human action with meaning and ensure that the agent is certain of recognition in the eyes of others and, consequently, certain of the goodness or rightness (or, conversely, the wrongness) of his action. The objective freedom of an agent is the institutions, values, roles, civil, economic, and political structures that make possible his identification as a moral subject. So, for example, capitalism, the family and the Christian tradition are all forms of objective freedom: they assign roles and duties that determine how we behave in certain situations and in behaving in accordance with their dictates (or, at times, violating them) we are able to be, and be understood by others as, self-determining agents.

Hegel progressively develops the institutional structures required for the recognition of individuals as self-determining agents in his lectures on moral and political philosophy. The individual’s self-understanding develops from abstract will to full blown citizenship as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Subjective freedom</th>
<th>Corresponding objective freedom</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>1A</strong>: Will: I understand myself as an abstract individual who can act on or relinquish immediate motivations and drives.</td>
<td><strong>2A</strong>: Member of a family: I understand myself as a member of a family whose goods are my goods</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>1B</strong>: Person: I understand myself as a rights-bearer whose territory can be violated and who can be wronged</td>
<td><strong>2B</strong>: Economic unit of civil society: I understand myself as an agent with an economic interest in shared, communal resources on which the success of my goals depends</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>1C</strong>: Moral subject: I understand myself as a moral subject whose intentions and projects are expressions of freely endorsed values</td>
<td><strong>2C</strong>: Citizen of political society: I understand myself as participating in the political community which determines the institutions through which I understand myself</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The agent’s self-understanding is formally consistent with a philosophical understanding of the abstract will: one is aware of oneself as having desires and motivations, and as having desires which one would rather not have and of being able to relinquish these desires. Given that the desires and actions which they necessitate are mine, then when they are frustrated I suffer a wrong and when I frustrate those of others, I recognize that I have wronged them. As a moral subject I am aware that I am responsible for the consequences of my actions and begin to

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19 Hegel, *Philosophy of Mind*, §503.
20 Hegel, *Philosophy of Right*; Hegel, *Philosophy of Mind*, section II.
understand my self as a self-willed entity dependent upon myself and prepared to affirm what I pursue or achieve as valuable (I feel “at home” with it).

The institutions of society (family, civil society and the political state) are the forms of objective freedom which ground and maintain these kinds of subjective self-understanding. Corresponding to the immediate, desiring will is the family, an identity one is given and thrown into, but can relinquish at the cost of intelligibility. The motivations of one’s identity largely come from one’s membership of a particular family; it determines to a large extent what one values, desires, has a taste for, and believes is worthwhile. Similarly, with the idea of an abstract will determined in its relations with others by the concepts of property and rights, one understands oneself as an atom in civil society bound by law. Civil society is constituted by organs (the economic market, the administration of justice and the agents of civil society) and the political state proper (domestic law and international law) which determine how I understand myself in relation to others.

What is most pertinent to the present discussion is the correspondence between the agent’s self-understanding as a moral subject and his institutional role as a political citizen: I recognize myself as part of a society of equals and thus as a participant in discourse with my equals; that is, a particular individual determined by and reciprocally constructing and maintaining these institutions. One’s identity as a member of a family or a class is justified if the agent participates in the institutional creation and maintenance that determines those identities. In other words, objective institutions structure the relationship between values, concepts and desires, and the modern subject participates in political society to ensure that these institutions are ones in which he or she can feel “at home”. When we evaluate the actions of others, we immediately recognize them as selves pursuing ends and recognition is made possible by the structures and determinations of the will which, historically, we can trust. And this trust requires the participation of the political subject within the institutions of society, so that it is grounded and maintained in a political culture which expresses individual liberty and equality through the robust institutional roles belonging to the modern state.

Hegel's theory of immanent ethics is thus based on a theory of reciprocal recognition between free beings grounded in rational institutions. It implies that to meet the demand of publicity, cosmopolitanism requires the rationalization of spheres of action at a higher level. However, this requires a substantial social fabric, with its embedded roles, values and meanings that is lacking at the global level.

**Hegelian Cosmopolitanism**

If one is to conceive a specifically Hegelian cosmopolitanism, it ought to be understood in terms consistent with his historical perfectionism – that is, as a historical, and not a rational, moment. Hegel's dialectic of recognition can be read as an alternative to a state of nature – indeed, he describes the encounter between states and wars as "struggles for recognition" and he briefly refers the encounter between states back to his own dialectic of recognition. One can extrapolate Hegel’s thought in a cosmopolitan direction, then, by acknowledging that individual violence can be an expression of a desire to be recognized as an equal, because only by putting myself at risk can I be sure that you will engage with me differently.

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23 Hegel, *Philosophy of Mind*, §547.
from objects, animals, children, and slaves. Following the same line of thought, the failure of war to annihilate the other leads to formally recognizing one’s enemies as deserving of the right of expression of their own desires and wants in discourse. Just as the encounter between individuals is resolved through recognition, so too the encounter between communities initiates a dialectic that results in recognition: the other is immediately an object receptive to reasons and that already means we share something.\(^{24}\)

This is historical progress towards a global community, through which all participants come to share a common identity that will rationalize conflicts through future, shared resources and social mediations.\(^{25}\) Just as society progresses through different institutions to rationally ground the appropriate self-understanding of the fully free agent, so one can speculate that in a global community, the subjective freedom of the fully free agent requires proper maintenance and support. For the Hegelian, the common feature must be the capacity for subjects to be self-determining, made possible through the objective freedom of the rational society.\(^{26}\) Freedom is common humanity and, for Hegel, it requires the recognition of one's equals. Where participants in a discourse do not share a social fabric, the attempt to engage in dialogue is the beginning of a dialectic that should lead to recognition.

In a global world where it is possible for a moral agent to identity with communities that are transnational or interest-constituted, it may be the case that the subjective freedom (the "highest right") can only be realized if he can trust the global institutional order of human interaction as the political citizen trusts the nation state.\(^{27}\) The progress of history is a commitment to full and substantial equality between all rational agents, and so it must be a commitment to a universal social fabric shared by all. If cosmopolitanism requires an individual to reason as a member of the human race and to feel at home in the dictates which apply to those affected by such laws, then it is not enough to formally require it – it must also be lived, and it can only exist through dialectical feedback from institutional demands such that the institutions and the individual mature together. Just as the national state requires institutions to be fully free, so too does the international community. Formal structures need to be substantiated for an objectivity to be granted to claims made in intercultural conflict, such that the subject can feel "at home" in the duties and requirements of his substantial identity and in global resolutions.

The moral subject’s trust in the institutions and social mediations of its culture is grounded, at the national level, through his role as an equal political citizen in the state. The global individual requires the same “homeliness” in the edicts of cosmopolitan law – otherwise, the requirement of publicity is violated. As a political citizen, the moral subject is able to create, participate and maintain the very institutions which guarantee his or her personal, subjective freedom, such that he or she can recognize the law as self-willed and self-imposed and trust these institutions. Hegelian cosmopolitanism, thus, demands more than the existence of robust, global institutions and a sentiment of solidarity between individuals and groups, it also proposes a requirement of “homeliness” to replace the formal publicity principle. Hegel's picture must therefore be supplemented with another level where the objective freedom of one's identity is not determined by the luck of one's territory but becomes truly universal:

\(^{24}\) In the introduction to Political Liberalism (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993), John Rawls offers a similar story about the birth of European liberalism.

\(^{25}\) Hegel, Philosophy of Right, §342.

\(^{26}\) Hegel, Philosophy of Right, §338.

\(^{27}\) Hegel, Philosophy of Right, §132R.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Subjective freedom</th>
<th>Territorial objective freedom</th>
<th>Non-territorial objective freedom</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1A: Will</td>
<td>2A: Member of a family</td>
<td>3A: Communal identity: I understand myself as a member of a community whose goods are my goods</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1B: Person</td>
<td>2B: Economic unit</td>
<td>3B: Global economic unit: I understand myself as an agent with an economic interest in shared, global resources on which our goals depend</td>
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<td>1C: Moral subject</td>
<td>2C: Citizen</td>
<td>3C: Global citizen: I understand myself as participating in the global community which determines the institutions through which I understand myself</td>
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The global level requires objective institutions to structure the relationship between values, concepts and desires in the same way as the will is determined at the level of society. Just as the family is my immediate identity and structures goods other than my particular goods, so my immediate obligations in inter-cultural conflict are to my culture, whether this be a nationality, group or a community (the Greens, Islam, Serbian Kosovars). The goals and goods of these communities are to be achieved through shared, global resources, and so agents must recognize the obligations and rights of exchange. However, there must be a mode of reflection that distances me from the immediate claims of my culture, for otherwise dialogue with an other is impossible and I cannot question the dictates of my community rationally. The individual must have a self-understanding of himself as a global agent (human being) recognizing the equality of all before cosmopolitan law, and he must realize that his own goals and projects are protected and maintained through institutions the creation and support of which, as a global citizen, he has an obligation to participate in. Only if such a self-understanding is present can he feel at home in the requirements and duties of such citizenship and not perceive it as an imposition.

To use an odd analogy, when one votes for a contestant on the television programme, *The X-Factor*, one feels responsible for the eventual winner, but one must have trust in the fairness and transparency of the show itself. The trust is generated by the institutions of the media that investigate the day to day running of the show, the policies of the television channel towards both its viewers and its sponsors, the participants’ right to speak freely, and the viewers’ continued support. For if their trust disappears, the viewers will simply stop watching. Similarly, the global institutions of the market of resources, the administration of justice and their various agents are, for the most part, in place. However, there must be a role for me as a political agent in these global institutions such that resolutions, dictates and determinations can be recognized as right and not just as the expression of a mightier will. Generally, at the moment, no individual votes or participates in global institutions besides large, unrepresentative agents. One can identify a formal level of community or shared fabric for all human beings and a structure of institutions that regulate communication between participants, but any universal obligations transcending the boundaries of our cultural identities remain distant and alien because we, as individuals or individual cultures, do not play a role in creating and

28 Hegel, *Philosophy of Mind*, §552.
maintaining them. Even if a Hegelian cosmopolitanism, like all cosmopolitanisms, is committed to a community of human beings, its nature alerts us to both the utopianism of moral cosmopolitanism and the distortion of political cosmopolitanism. By transforming publicity into homeliness, the theory offers one of the few robust cultural cosmopolitanisms, since it insist on the agent's self-understanding as involved in a global project which is not an ideal representation nor an alienated identity. Just as my father did not understand or identify himself as European, whereas I, in some sense, do, so one day an agent may feel truly global in a cosmopolitan sense once both the institutions and the relevant participatory practices are in place.

Hegelian cosmopolitanism thus reveals why any cosmopolitanism has to be an avowed and robust political project and not a merely moral, regulative ideal or an abstract institutionalism expecting solidarity merely to arise through the processes of some putative hidden hand. Just as with the moral sphere, it is not enough that one recognizes oneself as a practical agent responsible for those actions which emanate from one's intentions. Such recognition also requires the language, axiology and identity of culture to know what those intentions are. The political institutions of the global order should make homeliness and the publicity constraint possible for the individual. Here there remains a deficit. Political cosmopolitanism already offers an institutional solution to conflict-resolution. Institutions, though, are not enough unless the agent recognizes himself as a participant in them, as one does in one's family, class and community. At the global level, there are institutions of the market and resources and for the administration of justice to manage and "police" the system of needs, but there is no representation of individuals or their voices. Until democracy and hence identification enter the system, institutions remain formal and not substantial.

Modern moral identity was constructed by the institutions of the modern state determining individuals to think about themselves as intentional, independent entities with individual wants and projects and, thus, behaving as such. Equally, an identity needs to be constructed by global institutions and structures of objective freedom which determine the individual to understand himself as a world citizen acting in a global community. What these institutions will be and who the individual will be remains presently inchoate. It seems we must await history to see what shared form of social fabric and what institutions will arise.

References


