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Sensemaking, Sense-censoring and Strategic Inaction: The Discursive Enactment of Power and Politics in a Multinational Corporation

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Abstract

In this paper we contribute to knowledge of power and politics in international business by developing the understanding of the role of discourse and sensemaking in the subsidiary-headquarters relationship, based on an ethnographic action research study in a British subsidiary of an American Multinational Corporation. First, we conduct a discourse analysis of the accounts, stories and metaphors through which power and politics in the subsidiary-headquarters relationship were created as social facts. Next, we trace longitudinally how these facts led the subsidiary managers to hide, dilute or restrict their ‘local sense’ from the headquarters, including their knowledge of the local market and their preferred strategic direction for the firm: a process we term sense-censoring. We reveal how the subsidiary managers used power and politics as reasoning procedures to decide against pursuing a preferred course of action, despite a strongly held belief to the contrary, due to anticipated reactions or counter-actions. In so doing, potential strategic action was transformed into inaction. We conclude by outlining the implications of systems of sense-censoring and strategic inaction for the management of global-local relations in multinational corporations.

Keywords: Discourse, Multinational corporations, Politics, Power, Sensemaking, Sense-censoring, Strategic inaction.
INTRODUCTION

Why do subsidiaries in Multinational Corporations (MNCs) fail to voice their opinions, fail to resist seemingly misplaced central policies and fail to share their local knowledge with headquarters? Answering these questions can help us to understand some of the central issues in international business, such as how resources are allocated, how information is shared, and how control can be exerted over subsidiary operations spanning geographical, product or market boundaries (Prahalad and Doz, 1981; Doz and Prahalad, 1984; Mudambi and Navarra, 2004; Andersson et al., 2007; Mudambi, 2011; Meyer et al., 2011). Following Dörrenbächer and Geppert (2006) and Clark and Geppert (2011), our focus is on intra-organizational sensemaking about power and politics within the MNC rather than the effects of the macro-political sphere on the MNC, such as the effects of the political hostility of host country regimes on Foreign Direct Investment (as for example in Hymer, 1979: Part III). The paper presents findings from a longitudinal ethnographic action research study of a change initiative within the British subsidiary of an American-owned MNC. Our study provides two main contributions. First, we develop a discursive enactment perspective that reveals the role of discourse – in particular accounts, stories and metaphors – in the reproduction and/or transformation of subsidiary managers’ ‘framing’ (Creed, Langstraat and Scully, 2002; Fiss and Hirsch, 2005; Fairhurst, 2010) of global-local power and politics. Second, we show how this dominant framing led the subsidiary to hide, dilute or restrict their local sensemaking from the global headquarters – a process we call ‘sense-censoring’ – thereby transforming potential strategic change into strategic inaction.

Adding to the existing body of sensemaking-related constructs (see Maitlis and Christianson, 2014: 68), we define sense-censoring as the process through which actors consciously ‘censor’ their sensemaking accounts, with or without the presence of any official attempts to edit or silence them, due to anticipated reactions or counter-actions. This concept is therefore different from the term “sense-hiding”, which is defined as the actions of those in authority in “hiding particular ideas” (Vaara and Monin, 2010: 6), “silencing alternative senses” and the “marginalization of particular voices” (Monin et al., 2013: 262) – a term closer to the notion of authority-imposed censorship. It is also related to but distinct from Weber’s notion of ‘legitimate authority’

1 "Under bureaucratic domination the enacted norm establishes that the person in power has legitimate authority to issue a specific ruling.” (Weber, 1978: 1006)
which the ‘lower rungs’ prospectively anticipate the ‘rulings’ of the upper echelons – even where they disagree with those rulings themselves.

The paper is structured as follows. First, we review existing work on power and politics in MNCs. In the next two sections, we outline the discursive enactment perspective on power and politics we adopt in this paper, with its emphasis on the role of discourse in sensemaking. After outlining the methodology of the study upon which we draw, we present the empirical data in two sections: a detailed analysis of team meeting interaction followed by a longitudinal analysis of a series of global-local issues. Finally, we conclude by discussing the contribution of the notions of discursive enactment and sense-censoring to the wider understanding of power and politics in MNCs.

POWER AND POLITICS IN MNCS

Traditionally, power has been something of a ‘taboo’ subject in business and management studies, a kind of “éminence grise” (Krause-Jensen, 2010: 69). More recently, however, scholars have shifted towards “a notion of power that does not automatically identify power with something oppressive and noxious” (Krause-Jensen, 2010: 70), by viewing power and politics more as a potentially productive element of organizational life (Buchanan and Badham, 1999; Kacmar et al., 1999; Butcher and Clarke 2003; Gunn and Chen, 2006; Pfeffer, 2010; Dörrenbächer and Geppert, 2011). A similar trend has been seen in the international business literature. In their study of HQ-subsidiary relations, Schotter and Beamish (2011: 254) emphasised “that power and political game playing are unavoidable components of organizational life”.

By the mid-1990s, from an HRM/IR perspective, the headquarters-subsidiary relationship was analysed in political, reward-and-punish terms (Ferner and Edwards, 1995; Mueller, 1996). In the 2000s, this was taken further into a more clearly defined ‘power and politics’ school of thought, which conceived of the MNC as constituted by a “set of relations between a range of actors with their own powers and interests” (Morgan, 2001: 9-10). Mudambi (2011) and Blazejewski and Becker-Ritterspach (2011: 142-4) both distinguish a number of different theoretical approaches to the study of headquarter-subsidiary relations in MNCs. Specifically, Mudambi (2011) distinguishes the headquarters-subsidiary dyad; the evolution of subsidiary mandates; and the multiple embeddedness of the MNC perspectives. In terms of the broader theoretical traditions, research into MNCs has been dominated by
transaction cost economics, resource dependency and institutional schools of thought (Ghoshal and Westney, 2003; Rugman, 2005), with an additional perspective provided by radical neo-Marxian scholarship (e.g. Hymer, 1979) and critical management perspectives (e.g. Willmott, 2013).

The MNC is thus seen as involving “often lively and dynamic political activities of actors, making the MNC a ‘contested terrain’” (Geppert and Dörrenbächer, 2011: 22; Edwards and Bélanger, 2009), where “problems of nationalism and problems of authoritarianism intertwine” (Hymer, 1979: 48). Power can be exerted in decisive and dramatic ways, for example, when a subsidiary is sold, liquidated or its major operations outsourced. However, such options can be threatened or anticipated rather than actually exercised. Indeed, the power/politics perspective deviated more mainstream strategy and economics-based approaches by showing that rules and relationships are continuously contested (Hymer, 1979: 48-50; Hardy and Clegg, 1996: 334; Ferner, 2000; Geppert and Dörrenbächer, 2011: 26).

Factors influencing the power balance and political dynamics are numerous, and include: the combination of market size, planning experience and revenue-generating potential (Jarzabkowski and Balogun, 2009), strategic centrality, control over administrative systems and the maintenance of a dominant coalition (Jarzabkowski and Wilson, 2002), size or prestige (Bousseba et al., 2012), and the distribution of resources, organizational culture and the centralization or decentralization of control (Balogun and Johnson, 2004). Mudambi (2011: Figure 2) characterizes the headquarters – subsidiary relationship in terms of two dimensions, ‘headquarters control’ and ‘subsidiary response to headquarters control’, whereby the latter can either be ‘acquiescence’ or ‘resistance’.

As Schotter and Beamish (2011: 247) show, “subsidiary resistance is a far more common phenomenon than previously acknowledged” and, in some circumstances, rejection of HQ initiatives can have positive outcomes for the subsidiary, depending on the nature of its boundary-spanning function with HQ. Yamin and Ghauri (2010: 134) distinguish ‘invisible networks’ around subsidiaries from ‘visible networks’ controlled by the centre, showing that a shift towards the latter as part of a planned outsourcing strategy can shift “the balance of power in favour of control and planning by the MNC centre”. Hence, work has begun to examine power and politics as an outcome of the ongoing sensemaking, interactions and negotiations between social actors. In the next section, we elaborate in more detail the sensemaking perspective on MNCs we draw upon and seek to contribute to.
SENSEMAKING AND MNC POWER AND POLITICS

In the field of international business, power is no longer understood as a ‘one way street’ – something possessed by the global headquarters and exercised over subsidiaries – but rather as a dynamic and situational achievement mediated by processes of sensemaking and discourse (see e.g. Clark and Geppert, 2011, Balogun et al., 2011). This means that we must view “macro structures such as the global market, the national business system or local work practices [as] socially constructed in micro situations, often in the form of commitments and justifications” (Geppert, 2003: 314). It is through the stories, texts and conversations that circulate within MNCs that actors make sense of the resources, knowledge, capabilities, alliances and bargaining power that subsidiaries have, or may lay claim to. Kristensen and Zeitlin (2005: 175) describe the way in which a reorganization exercise led by the parent headquarters affected the distribution of power in the MNC they studied. Bouquet and Birkinshaw (2008a,b) outline the various tactics used by subsidiaries to gain attention from global headquarters, including how subsidiaries with apparently ‘low power’ gain influence despite their lack of control of formal resources. As Williams (2011: 287) shows, “politics can be used by subsidiary managers within the MNC as a way to provide impetus for initiative and competence development, attract resources and new mandates”. Indeed, Balogun et al. (2011) show how voice and resistance is enacted by subsidiaries in order to actively reconfigure their role within the MNC.

Processes of sensemaking and sensegiving are important for how ‘power’ is understood and how ‘political’ agendas or motives are established. Actors have to make sense of who has power, how it is produced and how best to enact it. They also have to make sense of ‘political’ action by negotiating distinctions between who is acting in the interests of the organization or in their own sectional political interests to advance their agenda or protect their “turf”. For example, HQ managers must establish whether a particular subsidiary action – such as a request for resources or a decision to withhold certain information – is motivated by a ‘legitimate’ or ‘illegitimate’ agenda. Sensemaking must also be directed toward establishing whether they have sufficient power and influence to enforce control over a ‘rebellious’ or ‘resistant’ subsidiary, and also through what methods to exert such control (Dörrenbächer and Geppert, 2006; Meyer et al., 2011; Mudambi, 2011; Clark and Geppert, 2011; Schotter & Beamish, 2011).

Becker-Ritterspach and Dörrenbächer (2011) propose that understanding the behavioural rationales that underpin subsidiary behaviour is important for understanding MNC
behaviour, such as intra-firm competition between SBUs. Their study reveals the existence of distinct ‘actor rationales’ within MNCs, as different subsidiaries attempt to make sense of when competition is preferred over cooperation, for instance. Recent studies have also highlighted how actors within both the headquarters and subsidiary make sense of factors such as control systems, resource allocation and information sharing (Birkinshaw et al., 2000; Chini, Ambos and Wehle, 2005). For example, both Birkinshaw et al. (2000) and Clark and Geppert (2011: 411) uncovered significant perception gaps between the subsidiary managers and headquarters in terms of how the former estimated aspects such as their strategic value and role, leading to significant ‘disjunctures’ in their thinking and behaviour. For us, what matters, then, is not what ‘power bases’ or ‘political bargaining tools’ (resources, markets, innovations, knowledge, etc.) subsidiaries technically have, or what power plays or political threats actually emanate from the global headquarters. Rather, what counts is how the subsidiary makes sense of what they have, and what actions they might take, and what they perceive are the likely consequences of any such actions by the global company they are part of. Importantly, this can occur even before any reactions and counter-actions have actually taken place. In fact, as we will go on to show in this paper, sense-censoring can operate prospectively to make sense of why an action should not be undertaken and why sensemaking needs to be ‘censored’ in the absence of any official organizational attempts to censor subsidiary activities.

Clark and Geppert (2011: 405) also contribute to the MNC sensemaking approach by distinguishing four types of identity sensemaking: dominated, oppositional, defensive, and consensual. How headquarters and subsidiary respectively make sense of their identity is interactive in that “(l)ocal managers’ responses are likely to be tempered by the head office managers’ political stance. When sensegiving acts are perceived as coercive or dominating, for example, local managers may adopt defensive tactics that vary from opposition to ceremonial acceptance …” (Clark and Geppert, 2011: 405). This ceremonial acceptance can hide a deeper disquiet which might live as ‘silent dissatisfaction’, but – as we seek to show - can also find expression in what we call ‘sense-censoring’. Mudambi and Navarra (2004: 386) posit that “an important subsidiary objective is its bargaining power within the firm.” From a ‘political sensemaking’ perspective, “the MNE is conceptualized as the ongoing social construction of dispersed social actors applying different ‘contextual rationalities’ to influence the strategic meaning of the subsidiary” (Clark and Geppert, 2011: 397). This leads us to examine how and
why different forms of ‘rationality’ – or different ‘thought worlds’ to use Baunsgaard and Clegg’s (2013) terminology – exist within various global divisions of international businesses.

Whilst existing studies have contributed greatly to our understanding of power and politics in MNCs, what these studies have paid less attention to is how these social facts about power and politics are discursively constructed through the production of accounts in real-life work situations (Paroutis and Heracleous, 2013) and how these accounts are used by members in real-time encounters to base their decision-making and action on (Balogun, et al., 2011). For instance, we do not know if the accounts of power and politics produced in the diaries and interviews collected by Balogun and Johnson (2004, 2005), Kristensen and Zeitlin (2005) or Bousseba et al. (2012) were also used in their daily working lives, and if so, how they were responded or reacted to in specific interactional contexts. In short, what is missing is an understanding of how organizational members in MNCs use power and politics in their everyday working lives as they go about their practical tasks. Studying these everyday situations where ‘power’ and ‘politics’ get created as social facts and used as practical reasoning procedures is important, in our view, because it is these situations that have material consequences for ‘what happens next’, as “only members’ accounts are implicated in the constitution of actual courses of action” (Llewellyn and Spence, 2009: 1434). The question remaining, therefore, is precisely how organizational members go about “negotiating and constructing the organization as a reality independent of its particular members but with determining power over their activities” (Gephart, 1978: 560).

DISCOURSE AND MNC POWER AND POLITICS

What, then, is the role of discourse in MNC sensemaking processes? We draw on, and further develop, Balogun et al.’s (2011) discursive perspective that emphasises the “constitutive role of language” by elucidating the “complex ways in which discourse is used to socially construct the MNE and the role of the subsidiary” (p. 766). It is through the production, circulation and interpretation of accounts (Maitlis, 2005) that members learn to make sense of their internal and external environment, as people share, compare, and negotiate their accounts of ‘what is going on here’ and ‘what should we do next’ (Maitlis, 2005; Maitlis and Lawrence, 2007; Balogun et al., 2011). Hence, we focus primarily on sensegiving rather than sensemaking per

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2 The emphasis on different forms or “modes” of rationality is also advanced by Baunsgaard and Clegg (2013), who examine the different ideological modes of rationality arising from systems of professional training and socialisation.
Sensemaking, Sense-censoring and Strategic Inaction

se, the former defined by Gioia and Chittipedi (1991: 442) as “attempting to influence the sensemaking and meaning construction of others toward a preferred redefinition of organizational reality”.

In order to analyse the multiple relationships involved in MNCs, Meyer et al. (2011: 236) suggest the term “increasing interfaces” and argue that “subsidiaries must be ‘externally embedded’ within each local context while also being sufficiently ‘internally embedded’ within the MNE network”, and as a result we should think of subsidiaries as being multiply embedded. In this paper, we seek to advance understanding of these ‘contextual rationalities’ (Clark and Geppert, 2011) or ‘thought worlds’ (Baunsgaard and Clegg, 2013) in multiply embedded subsidiary relationships by examining how the discursive construction of particular ‘facts’ about power and politics led to forms of ‘reasoning’ that made apparently ‘irrational’ decisions – strategic inaction and sense-censoring – seem ‘rational’. What is needed, we suggest, is a framework for understanding the role of discourse in creating the ‘social facts’ upon which managerial reasoning, decision-making and action is founded. To this end, we seek to develop a discursive enactment perspective, which provides a framework for understanding how the power environment and political terrain in MNCs are constructed as social facts and used to conduct practical business in ‘live’ situations.

We build on Balogun et al.’s (2011) discursive perspective on subsidiary-headquarters relationships by examining how making sense of an actor, say global HQ, as ‘powerful’ or ‘political’ makes a difference to the practical decisions and actions of members. In so doing, we are able to address two important questions about subsidiary behaviour in MNCs, namely: How does discourse shape sensemaking about MNC power and politics? And most importantly, what outcomes flow from specific instances of such sensemaking?

**METHODOLOGY**

According to Dörrenbächer and Gammelgaard (2011: 235), recent research has made only limited progress in “mapping the detailed inner working of MNCs”. Research on organizational and strategic change in an MNC context typically relies on interviews (Rouleau and Balogun, 2011; Bousseba et al., 2012; Jarzabkowski and Balogun, 2009; Kristensen and Zeitlin, 2005; Balogun and Johnson, 2004), giving rise to problems of hindsight, post-hoc and retrospective rationalisation (see Schotter & Beamish, 2011: 247). Part of the methodological challenge facing the field is the need for methodologies which enable research to study at a micro-level detail of situated (inter-)action, while also being able to capture the more meso- and macro-
level processes which unfold over time over a larger scale and scope (Pettigrew et al., 2001: 697). For Blazejewski and Becker-Ritterspach (2011: 180), a process perspective is necessary to capture the dynamics of headquarters-subsidiary relations in MNCs. Ethnography enables us to capture the ‘temporal flow of practice’ as it happens in ‘real time’ and in situ (Maitlis and Lawrence, 2003; Moeran, 2009; Sandberg and Tsoukas, 2011). We respond to Dörrenbächer and Gammelgaard’s (2011: 249) call for more “in-depth ethnographic and socio-political studies” as ethnography in MNCs can draw on insights garnered by related disciplines such as anthropology (e.g. Mazzarella, 2003; Wright, 1994).

**The case study setting**

The study upon which this paper draws comprised 30 months of participant observation, conducted by two action researchers, of a change initiative in a UK subsidiary of ‘FitCo’ (all names are pseudonyms), a US-headquartered MNC. FitCo is a major player in the worldwide branded apparel market, operating in more than 25 countries, with a global turnover of more than $3bn³. The firm sells a wide range of branded goods to consumers, predominantly through major retail chains rather than its own outlets. Most of the local national operations were wholly owned subsidiary companies managed by national managing directors reporting directly to headquarters, with very few joint ventures and licensed distribution operations.

FitCo[UK] had a turnover of over $300m and was FitCo's largest profit centre outside of the US. Moreover, because the company was originally founded in Britain, the UK subsidiary was also of great cultural importance to the strategic narrative and ‘rhetorical history’ of the firm (Suddaby, et al., 2010). On paper, FitCo[UK] had the strategic position, economic performance and local country embeddedness that should have rendered them a powerful player within the framework of Geppert and Williams (2006). FitCo’s British founders grew the firm rapidly in its early years, exploiting a combination of product innovation, elegant branding and fast adaptation to changing market trends. Exports grew fast and so did the company's visibility; leading a major US concern to buy the business and build the now well-known major multinational multi-brand corporation. Under the new American owners, product lines, design, marketing advertising, sales targets and budgets were set centrally by the US headquarters. Strategy, R&D, product design and marketing were all centralized, leading most subsidiaries – the UK included – to have a limited claim to a “competence-creating mandate” (Cantwell and Mudambi, 2005: 1109). The emphasis on

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³ Figures correct at the time of the study.
centralized control and short-term financial performance criteria was akin to the “strategic dependant” view of subsidiaries described by Clark and Geppert (2011).

Data collection

The study was conducted by two academic researchers, who were invited into the company to act as ‘action researchers’ to provide their (unremunerated) assistance in a FitCo[UK] strategic change initiative, in return for being permitted to collect data for academic purposes. The inevitable corollary to in-depth immersion in one site, of course, is that the researchers were unable to be simultaneously present in other locations. Hence, the study does not have access to the inner workings of the global headquarters or other subsidiaries. However, the study does illuminate how the subsidiary managers anticipated how global headquarters would respond, hence our focus on “sensemaking about the likely sensemaking of others” (see also Clark and Geppert, 2011). The data-set was later shared with a wider team of scholars to enable new insights to be generated, subject to the same confidentiality agreement. The research was conducted in three phases, outlined in Table 1.

--- Insert Table 1 about here ---

In Phase 1, Researcher 1 was invited into the UK subsidiary to act as an unpaid Management Consultant (MC) to lead a strategic change initiative concerning key account management (KAM). Phase 1 involved six months of semi-structured interviews with senior management and other relevant parties, work shadowing, the collection of relevant documents and information, and participant observation of formal and informal settings. The aim of Phase 1 was to produce a ‘diagnosis’ of the subsidiary’s KAM problems, along with a set of recommendations about how they should be addressed. This ‘diagnosis’ and ‘action plan’ was subsequently accepted and ratified by the UK Board of Directors.

In Phase 2, Researcher 1 began implementing his recommendations. He assembled a project team of senior managers (hereafter the ‘project team’) and hired another ‘action researcher’ (Researcher 2) – a doctoral researcher jointly funded by the company, also with significant industry experience – to assist with the implementation work. Researchers 1 and 2 worked jointly with the project team for several months, before Researcher 1 exited the field, having been in the field for a total of 18 months. Data collection during Phase 2 comprised of field-notes recorded by the two researchers of all their interactions, along with tape-recordings of all the project team meetings. Finally, Phase 3 consisted of further field-notes, tape
recordings and document capture by Researcher 2 for a subsequent 12 months, as the implementation of the new KAM strategy unfolded. Repeat interviews were also conducted with all members of the project team throughout the change implementation.

The data is presented in this paper in two inter-related parts. In the first part, excerpts from the tape-recording of the first project team meeting from Phase 2 are subjected to a detailed ethnomethodologically-informed discourse analysis (Bolander and Sandberg, 2013; Whittle et al, 2014). The analysis focused in particular on how the accounts, stories and metaphors produced during a dialogue between Researcher 1 and a senior manager discursively enacted power and politics as social facts. The second part broadens the analytic scope to provide a longitudinal analysis of a series of issues – and associated organizational outcomes - in the subsequent months of the subsidiary change initiative traced by the study. This second section draws on three main data sources from Phases 2 and 3: ethnographic field-notes, tape-recorded meetings and semi-structured interviews. Our approach therefore follows both the classic early work of Moerman (1988) and more recent contributions to organization studies of Samra-Fredericks (2003) and Hughes et al (2012) in seeking to combine detailed analysis of the interactional features of talk-in-interaction, along with broader ethnographic observations of unfolding courses of action over time and space.

**Data analysis**

Data analysis proceeded in two stages. First, transcripts were created of the ten project team meetings and a detailed discourse analysis was conducted of these transcripts. The basic unit of analysis was an individual ‘account’, which can take many forms, such as ‘factual descriptions’ or ‘stories’ (Antaki, 1994; Edwards and Potter, 1992; Potter, 1996). Accounts typically involve the use of particular descriptions, narrative sequences of events, phrases, terms, figures of speech and metaphors (Potter and Wetherell, 1987). Two of these elements – stories and metaphors – were particularly prominent in the data analysis of the transcripts and hence comprise a central focus of this paper.

The data excerpt analysed in this paper was one of the relatively rare moments where the relationship between parent and subsidiary was explicitly ‘topicalized’ (Edwards and Potter, 1992), i.e. became a ‘topic’ of conversation. As our analysis will show, most of the time the sense of ‘power imbalance’ and ‘political tension’ between the subsidiary and headquarters was not explicitly discussed. The extract we analyse is therefore not presented as a ‘typical’ or ‘representative’ excerpt designed to illustrate a wider set of such instances. Rather, the aim was to focus on a particularly rare and ‘pivotal’ moment where a working ‘definition of the
situation’ (Goffman, 1959/71: 246; Thomas, 2002) of the internal MNC parent-subsidiary relationship was explicitly discussed in a meeting.

Having identified the ‘pivotal moment’ of discursive enactment in the first team meeting, the second stage of data analysis involved a broader analysis of the whole ethnographic study to examine how this enactment shaped the team’s decision-making and action over time and across different contexts. The seven issues presented in this paper are what the participants in their first-order sensemaking, not us as analysts, saw as being affected by (or affecting) their relationship to the global HQ. We present the ethnographic findings in three formats to aid conceptualisation: not only as a narrative but also diagrammatically as a timeline (see Figure 1 below) and with a table detailing the issues (see Table 4 below).

THE DISCURSIVE ENACTMENT OF POWER AND POLITICS

The first meeting of the project team began with the management consultant ‘MC’ (Researcher 1) presenting his ‘diagnosis’ of the problems the company faced - both locally and globally - and the changes he thought were required to ‘fix’ them. Within the first hour of the meeting, the group established that they needed a new key account strategy and a more cross-functional way of working. Their retail customers were hugely important: the company did not have its own stores and therefore relied exclusively on these retailers to sell their products to consumers. For FitCo at least, their new way of managing key accounts was certainly an “innovation” and involved a different strategic direction that focused on a “concept-led” sales and marketing strategy. The conversation soon shifted to a discussion of the relationship between the UK office and US headquarters in general, and how working within an MNC might affect their strategic change initiative at subsidiary level. The team discussed how politically ‘risky’ their change initiative was. Not only could the highly ambitious short-term sales targets set by headquarters be adversely affected by their new brand repositioning strategy, it also deviated from established global policy, which demanded high volume sales at all costs, where retailers could ‘pick and choose’ stock and even knock down prices to secure high-volume agreements and where no ‘exclusivity’ agreements were permitted.

We join the meeting in Extract 1 at this pivotal moment where the Marketing Manager (MM) provides his account of their position within the global organizational structure. A list of participants and other pseudonyms are provided in Table 2.
What is significant about this opening account is that MM “frames” (Fairhurst, 2010) the relationship between the US headquarters and UK subsidiary as one characterised by power and politics, in the form of power inequities and political conflict and tension. MM views their change initiative as constrained by the headquarters, which – in his view – has become more powerful and controlling over the last few years. The US headquarters, he states, are getting bigger and more powerful (L. 5-6), attempting to exert influence and control by sending staff to subsidiaries (L. 7-8), and constitute a force that is difficult to ‘fight against’ (L. 13-14). The use of terms such as ‘fight’ characterises the relationship in adversarial terms, which frames the headquarters as an ‘enemy’ of their own strategic plans. In short, MM introduced power and politics as categories relevant to the participants (members) themselves, which furnish the team with forms of practical reasoning about what kinds of barriers they may need to take into consideration in the parent-subsidiary relationship. His account acts as a kind of ‘warning tale’ to be careful about what obstacles may lie ahead.

Through their accounts, stories and descriptions, “people descriptively construct events as following, or as departing from, some normative or expected order” (Edwards, 1997: 144). In terms of the ‘moral’ of the story, global headquarters are implicitly framed as the ‘bad guys’ who are likely to stand in the way of their attempts to do ‘good things’ at subsidiary level. The team, having already earlier framed their proposal as the ‘right’ thing to do to ‘rescue’ the business, position the headquarters as the adversary to be ‘fought’ and overcome: using a kind of ‘hero’ and ‘quest’ emplotment (Czarniawska, 2004: 21). By discursively enacting the relationship with global headquarters as one in which the latter is a ‘powerful adversary’ to their ‘good’ local initiatives, MM furnishes the team with a particular ‘logic’ for prospective sensemaking. Following this ‘logic’, the team are invited to think through whether, in light of their awareness of these powerful adversaries and political dangers, they should either (a) abandon their proposals because they anticipate it would be blocked by headquarters or be too foolhardy and dangerous to consider, or else (b) work ‘under the radar’ and attempt to implement their proposals ‘out of view’ of the parent headquarters.

What did the team decide to do? At this point, perhaps anticipating these two options, MC interjects (line numbers are continuous) with a story of his own from his consultancy experience in another major Multinational corporation, a High Tech company ‘TechCo’:
MC tells a story of his experience at TechCo – a large multinational software firm – where the UK subsidiary did influence global strategy and ‘push back’ on the dictates of the headquarters. The metaphor of a ‘steamroller’ (L. 20) is used to frame the TechCo parent as a kind of crushing force that flattens all in its path. MC emphasises that the subsidiary did succeed in ‘stand(ing) in front of’ and ‘turning’ this ‘steamroller’ (L. 20-21) around – no doubt a difficult task given the association of steamrollers with being unidirectional and hard to turn. Here, a second set of warfare metaphors come into play: the team, MC advises, can succeed if they choose which ‘battles’ to fight (L. 22) and ‘pick the winning ground’ (L. 23) and ‘stand their ground’ (L. 25).

MC here attempts to ‘re-frame’ (Fairhurst, 2010) MM’s characterisation of the unequal power relationship between headquarters and subsidiary. Power relationships are not set in stone, he suggests, they can be changed, especially if they learn from his story about how TechCo’s headquarters started to listen to, and adopt, suggestions from its UK subsidiary (L. 26-30).

However, perhaps recognising the need for ‘balance’ (L. 33, 34) in his consultancy advice to the team, MC balances his ‘success story’ with a kind of ‘warning tale’ (Zipes, 2012: 39, 44) of the consequences of losing these ‘battles’: through reference to an existing story of the former Marketing Director (FMD) (L. 34). Here, an existing story – already well-known to the whole team – is repeated as a story ‘fragment’ (Boje, 1991) and it functions like the archetypical warning tale of Icarus (Booker, 2004: 154): become too confident and fly too close to the sun and you will perish. What is this story? A few months earlier, the former Marketing Director (FMD) had unexpectedly left the business. Speculation was rife about the cause of his sudden departure. FMD was known to have had a major ‘spat’ with global management over their marketing strategy and his attempts to challenge global policy – also repeated again here (L. 35-36). The fragmented gossip quickly settled into an established story that he had not left of his own volition (a potential “frame”), or been headhunted by a competitor (another potential “frame”), but had been “sacked” because of his political battle for control with the headquarters – meaning a political frame had been chosen to make sense of the event.

The important point in our analysis is the motives and reasons contained within the story itself (Boje, 1991), which shape how this team made sense of it: namely, as an act of “political retaliation” for resisting global policy. We ask, what social and organizational actions does this story fragment perform (Boden, 1994) here? We suggest that it performs the act of sense censoring, whereby a story is told with the performative effect of making a considered course of action much less likely to be taken. In this case, it makes a subsidiary team, with their
own “sense” of the future strategy of the firm, likely to ‘censor’ their views when interacting with the global headquarters, for fear of suffering the same fate as FMD. It also serves to transform some of their planned strategic action – in this case the marketing innovation they are planning – into strategic inaction.

Kristensen and Morgan (2006: 1478) remind us that ‘locally shared systems’ in MNCs exist “where people are narrating the biographies of individual managers and creating stories as to their performance.” Here, the story goes that the FMD picked a political fight with the Head Office, lost the battle, and retribution followed: lest we ‘learn this lesson’, this can (and will) happen again. The overall ‘lesson’ of MC’s two stories is thus: you should proceed to try to influence the practices of global headquarters, but you should proceed with caution, lest you end up losing your jobs too. Here, we see how discourse – in the form of accounts, stories and key metaphors – constructed their shared understandings and ‘enacted’ the structural relationship between parent and subsidiary in ways which informed their reasoning and shaped their proposals for action (Zbaracki, 1998).

How did the team react to MC’s ‘success story’ of the ‘battles’ won by TechCo, and his ‘warning tale’ of the political retaliation experienced by the former Marketing Director? MM then stepped back in (line numbers are continuous) to provide an account of his own experience of ‘fighting battles’ with the US headquarters:

--- Insert Excerpt 3 here ---

MM discursively enacts the nature of the parent-subsidiary relationship as one in which there exists a balance of power, something of a ‘tug of war’ ranging between headquarters dictating subsidiary policy and practice (“they will steamroller it”, L. 48-49), to the possibility of considerable scope for influence in the other direction (“we have significant influence” L. 47). MC then interjects with an addition to his previous story about TechCo (L. 55-69). In TechCo, he explains, the UK subsidiary gained additional power from forming an “alliance” with another regional head office to ‘fight the battle’ jointly (L. 57-63). Metaphors from politics, business and social movements are combined, with references to ‘alliances’ (L. 57) and ‘rebellions’ (L. 57). This ‘update’ to the story of TechCo is not a trivial tale or piece of gossip but rather is crucial for their decision-making as a team. If, as MC acknowledges, the UK subsidiary of FitCo does not have other power-base (i.e. another subsidiary) it could form alliances with (“but in FitCo there aren’t bigger powerbases”, L. 68-69), then his ‘success story’ might not be easy for them to replicate. MM agrees: they cannot form an alliance with the other
largest regional office to fight the battle jointly, because that office is the global headquarters: and hence their only potential ‘ally’ is actually their ‘enemy’.

Having been previously encouraged by MC to adopt a ‘fighting spirit’ and be ‘brave’ in their approach to global headquarters - copying the tactics from his experience as a consultant at TechCo - the team are now left with the original framing of the situation put forward by MM at the start of the conversation. Whilst Denning (2006: 43) discussed the notion of ‘springboard stories’, i.e. stories told in order to get people to do something, both the stories here end up doing precisely the opposite, encouraging the team to ‘say nothing’ (sense censoring) and ‘do nothing’ (strategic inaction) about certain issues.

In the final exchange on the topic, MC seems to resign himself to agreeing with MM’s original formulation. Another set of metaphors – this time from the animal kingdom – are now invoked: MC states that the ‘elephant’ (read: headquarters) ‘standing on’ (read: dominating/imposing) ‘the ant’ (read: subsidiaries) is “the wrong thing to do” (L. 77), thereby framing headquarters’ domination of global subsidiary operations as an organizationally dysfunctional state of affairs. An overview of the analysis of these accounts, stories and metaphors is given in Table 3.

---Insert Table 3 here---

What pattern of sensemaking did these various accounts, stories and metaphors produce? With MC’s ‘success story’ from TechCo looking unlikely to be replicated, and with their knowledge of the ‘dangers’ of losing these battles with headquarters from FMD’s experience, their pre-existing sensemaking patterns – as a relatively powerless and politically vulnerable subsidiary – were thereby reproduced and reinforced. The interviews conducted during the study (see Appendix) show that this “sense” arose from a widespread and deep-rooted discourse shared by senior management within the UK subsidiary: part of their collective “sensemaking history” (Mantere, Schildt and Sillince, 2012).

FROM DISCURSIVE ENACTMENT TO STRATEGIC INACTION AND SENSE-CENSORING

What happened next? Here we will trace seven key issues (Maitlis, 2005) over the months that followed which were informed by the now ‘settled’ and ‘sedimented’ framing of the parent-
subsidiary relationship. The seven issues are ethnographically narrated below and are also presented visually as a timeline in Figure 1 and detailed further with reference to the empirical data sources in Table 4. Table 4 shows that in each case where a major event occurred or a major decision had to be made, the team used their established pattern of sensemaking – namely that headquarters represented a powerful source of opposition and political adversary to their change initiative – to inform their actions (or more precisely inactions).

--- Insert Figure 1 here ---
--- Insert Table 4 here ---

**Issue 1**
The project team had made a radical decision to “tell the truth” to the UK board about what they saw as the flawed strategic direction of the firm in the form of a one page document and presentation. However, while a document was sent to senior management, key parts which the team thought would be perceived as ‘blaming’ the global headquarters were deliberately omitted. They reasoned that it would be a ‘dangerous’ move to be openly critical of global policy. Hence, they engaged in sense-censoring by consciously censoring the information they presented to their superiors. To the subsidiary managers, this was not simply a self-interested move, designed to protect their own jobs, but it was also a cunning organizational move, designed to avoid unnecessary hurdles to their ‘good’ initiative.

**Issue 2**
The project team received news from HQ of the marketing budget for the UK launch of a new sub-brand called ‘Street Cool’. In their opinion, the budget was simply not enough to generate the sales demanded by the targets set by the global headquarters. Nonetheless, the team backtracked. There was no team request to the UK board to ask for increased budget to support the launch, despite their clear conviction that such additional resources were necessary. Sensemaking about power and politics thereby led to both sense-censoring (saying nothing) and strategic inaction (doing nothing).

**Issue 3**
The team was dismayed to learn of another increase in their sales targets set by the global headquarters. For them, pressure to sell ‘at any cost’ further denigrated the firm’s ability to gain long-term brand strength and ‘prestige’ status by forcing them into a short-term focus on
‘hitting the number’: that is, shifting stock in large volumes, often at knock-down prices through less prestigious ‘discount’ retailers. Whilst they were fiercely opposed to this short-termism, and the targets themselves, the team “gave in” and didn’t pass on their concerns to the relevant UK board members – yet another instance of sense-censoring. The US HQ, they reasoned, were just ‘too powerful’ to challenge.

**Issue 4**
The US HQ announced the ‘Street Cool’ marketing campaign, designed by the US marketing department for the UK market. Staff from the UK office were invited to a special pre-launch screening of the new national television commercial in a local cinema. The reaction was a mixture of disbelief and disillusionment. Staff from the UK office viewed the advert as ‘appalling’, even ‘laughable’: out of touch with the target niche market of British youth. The American sport and music “celebrities” featuring in the advert were not even recognisable to most British people. The advert was seen as a classic case of the pitfalls of centralization. In their view, marketing needed a more ‘decentralized’ and locally tailored approach. The second action researcher, also present at the screening, asked what they planned to do about their concerns. Puzzled faces responded that there was obviously ‘no point’ because any challenge to the global ‘diktat’ was futile. Their “sense” of the commercial as inappropriate for the local market was ‘censored’ and went no further. As a result, the advert went ahead and was screened across the UK. As predicted, the advert was widely regarded as a ‘flop’ and, worse still, potentially damaging to their brand image amongst the fashion-conscious youth market.

**Issue 5**
The US HQ announced a radical new global strategic plan to amalgamate the three existing sub-brands into one single ‘Street Cool’ brand. Unlike the other issues, this issue was not ‘censored’ and did give rise to direct and vocal opposition by the project team, at subsidiary level at least. The team did attempt to “voice” their concerns to the UK Board, arguing that this proposal would damage their ability to appeal across vastly differing consumer segments of the UK market. Middle aged consumers wanting comfortable casual-wear, people looking for high-performance sportswear and teenagers who want to look trendy – these different markets could hardly be treated the same, could they? The centralised branding policy was, in their view, not responsive to the needs of the highly differentiated British market. The UK Board seemed to agree, but were not willing to deviate from global policy. So, rather than raise the issue and ‘fight’ the global headquarters directly, the team instead planned a ‘covert’ strategy...
of secretly continuing their marketing around the original three brands. They ‘feigned’ compliance and simply carried on with the original three sub-brands for a while, with the hope of convincing the UK Board to back their strategy and eventually challenge the US mandate.

This was not a simple case of vested self-interest or protectionism. They felt passionately that they were “doing the right thing” for the firm as a whole. For example, in a small scale act of resistance (but ‘in secret’ to avoid detection), for the latest big sponsorship deal they refused to put the new “Street Cool” logo on the football shirts. This was not a self-interested political rebellion but for business reasons: Street Cool was associated with (often violent) celebrity hip-hop rap stars, while football in the UK at the time was trying desperately to “clean up” its image and avoid associations with violence. Sense-censorship in this case led to local knowledge not being shared within the company and acts of resistance being hidden behind closed doors. Eventually, their resistance was ineffective anyway, as the UK Board gave in and they were forced to comply with global policy, further reinforcing their sense that “resistance is futile” and therefore in future they should “say nothing” (sense-censor) and “do nothing” (strategic inaction).

**Issue 6**

In response to this new global ‘single brand’ strategy, the project team developed a second brand strategy document, again to be presented to the UK Board. The team presented the UK Board with an ‘alternative vision’ for UK brand strategy, one which rejected the US plan. This initial plan was short lived. The Board seemed to agree, but did nothing. The project team made sense of this as a ‘climb-down’, with the dominant ‘discourse of fear’ of US reprisal, and the document was shelved. It went no further. The UK Board, they reasoned, were ‘puppets’ of the headquarters, ‘blindly’ following global diktats and unable to see the sense in taking a stand, perhaps out of fear of retaliation for ‘breaking ranks’. The team therefore decided not to carry on their ‘fight’ and the issue was dropped.

**Issue 7**

A recurrent issue in the parent-subsidiary relationship regarded who maintained control of the design of products for the UK market. Historically, footwear design - seen as the most important brand image driver - was managed centrally by the global headquarters. The team reasoned that their profitability (which was declining rapidly at this time) was damaged by what they saw as ‘irrelevant’ American products being ‘forced’ on them. British teenagers were generally not that interested in basketball or baseball stars, they argued. Despite continual pleas
by the Product Development Manager to his counterparts in the US for more decentralised product design, all were met with deaf ears and the status quo remained. This further reinforced the subsidiary’s beliefs that they should in future ‘censor’ their beliefs, ignore their local knowledge, forget local initiatives and simply comply with global diktats, even against their better judgement.

DISCUSSION

Our analysis of the discourse of subsidiary managers and an external management consultant during a pivotal early strategy meeting of a subsidiary-level change initiative has revealed the importance of discourse in ‘framing’ (Creed, Langstraat and Scully, 2002; Fiss and Hirsch, 2005; Fairhurst, 2010) the subsidiary-headquarters relationship. The accounts produced during the meeting, in particular the framing effects of the metaphors used and the stories (re-)told, served first to establish, and then to sediment, ways of making sense of the subsidiary-headquarters relationship. Metaphors play an active role in framing our understanding of the world (Lakoff and Johnson, 1980), often in subconscious ways based on our embodied experiences (Cornelissen and Kafouros, 2008). Metaphors are also central to how we think of, in and about organizations (Morgan, 1986; Grant and Oswick, 1996). In this study, metaphors from the world of construction (‘steamroller’), warfare (‘battles’), and the animal kingdom (‘elephant’, ‘ant’) served to ‘frame’ the relationship between the subsidiary and parent. The parent headquarters, based in the US, was framed as a large, powerful and virtually unstoppable ‘force’ that would ‘crush’ their attempts to enact strategic change at subsidiary level. The headquarters was also framed as a political ‘enemy’, which constituted the relationship as one of competition rather than cooperation. Interactions with the global headquarters were framed as a ‘battle’ rather than a ‘conversation’. Local knowledge of their market was framed as being ‘steamrollered’ by global policy rather than ‘respected’. Subsidiary innovations were framed as being ‘stood on’ rather than ‘welcomed’. Animal metaphors – of a giant ‘elephant’ standing on a tiny ‘ant’ – conjured up metaphorical images of size to frame their subsidiary as “powerless”. Most importantly, this was not just idle chatter and gossip. The discursive enactment of these social facts resulted in certain actions not being taken, including actions that could be described as initiative-taking, innovation, and raising issues that would affect the long-term strategic success of the firm.
What our study shows is that the discursive enactment of power and politics was not ‘just talk’, but rather, made practical and material differences to what happened within the MNC. On the basis of their enactment of the power and politics as social facts, the project team decided (a) to exclude certain pieces of information from their document of strategic diagnosis and recommendations to the U.K. Board, (b) not to request additional marketing resources relating to the launch of the StreetCool sub-brand, (c) not to question the sales targets they were given, (d) to avoid any visible criticism of the U.S.-designed advertising campaign, (e) to keep hidden any departures from the instructions given by Head Office relating to marketing strategy, and (f) to accept ‘defeat’ in their attempts to secure a U.K.-based product design team (see Table 4). Patterns of sensemaking led to patterns of (in)action, which reinforced these patterns of sensemaking and sedimented them further into the dominant discourse of the global headquarters – namely, as a powerful and political ‘force’ to be treated with scepticism, fear and caution. Significant organizational outcomes for the MNC arose from this process of discursive enactment, including information not being shared, issues being kept off the agenda, resources being allocated without full knowledge of their local consequences, and global decisions being made without adaptation to local contexts.

Our study can also be seen as a failed attempt by an external change agent (MC) to ‘frame break’ by challenging dominant patterns of sensemaking amongst the subsidiary managers. As Zbaracki (1998) and Weber and Glynn (2006: 1652) point out, “not all enacted realities stick”, and MC’s vision of renewed ‘bravery’ and ‘courage’ in ‘battling’ global headquarters certainly did appear to not ‘stick’ for long. What is crucial in terms of framing and sensemaking is that the assumptions about the power plays and lack of political support from the global headquarters discursively enacted by the team, and therefore treated as stable social facts, draw on pre-existing sensemaking patterns, a ‘sensemaking history’ (Mantere, Schildt and Sillince, 2012: 173). Moreover, this shared pattern of sensemaking pre-configures their actions. For example, without even having put forward their proposals to the global headquarters, the latter is already framed as a potential adversary and barrier to the local change initiative of the subsidiary.

The construction of power and politics as ‘immutable facts’ means that proposals, issues and agendas do not even get ‘on the table’ (Lukes, 2005: 40), and can therefore not even receive a hearing. Power and politics were used to engage in prospective sensemaking to anticipate what might happen during events that have not yet happened (Gioia and Chittipeddi, 1991; Gioia and Mehra, 1996; Gioia, Corley and Fabbri, 2002; Pitsis et al, 2003; Gephart, Topal and Zhang, 2010), in this case predicting the reactions of global headquarters to the
subsidary change initiative they were planning. If we apply this theory to the ‘Toyota accelerator crisis’ case, we could argue that the Toyota American subsidiary deliberately suppressed its knowledge of the local context, and failed to provide the HQ with “appropriate information” regarding a potentially significant problem (Greto, Schotter & Teagarden, 2010). This sense-censoring led to strategic inaction that allowed the crisis to mushroom and ultimately ended up costing the firm hundreds of millions of dollars and significant reputational damage.

CONCLUSION

In this paper we have responded to Balogun et al.’s (2011) plea for research that illuminates how discursive methods can advance international business research (see also Vaara, 2002; Hardy et al, 2000; Vaara et al., 2006; Vaara and Tienari, 2008; Tienari and Vaara, 2011; Geppert, 2003). In particular, our study casts light on why subsidiaries behave the way they do. The discourse perspective we have developed in this paper fits with Dörrenbächer and Geppert’s (2006) call for a move away from rationalist, structuralist, deterministic and functionalist models of how organizations should structure and control their various SBUs towards perspectives which can address the question of “how key actors actually bring structures into play” (ibid. p. 262), in particular the structures associated with MNC politics (Clark and Geppert, 2011: 411). Specifically, we have analysed how subsidiary managers use “sensemaking to interpret each others’ political interests and stances” (Clark and Geppert, 2011: 396).

Balogun et al.’s (2011) study of subsidiary role evolution found that discourse was used to “sell” and “give voice” to certain understandings of a new charter, whereas other discourses encouraged forms of resistance to this new charter. Like in Balogun et al.’s (2011: 783) study, the subsidiary managers in our study “genuinely believed that there were differences in local market conditions” that would cause the global policy to fail. They also sought to create a new mandate and charter for their subsidiary and a higher degree of decentralization, where they would be given the right to develop their own local competencies, in areas such as marketing and product design (Cantwell and Mudambi, 2005; Birkinshaw and Hood, 1998). Whereas in Birkinshaw and Hood’s (1998) framework, subsidiaries can “see the opportunity to gain a new or enhanced charter” (p. 784), what our study shows is why subsidiaries may fail to develop the competencies or capabilities that they believe they hold.
Through the concept of sense-censoring, this paper develops an explanation of why certain “issues” felt by subsidiaries never get to the point of “issue selling” (Dutton et al., 2001; Ling et al., 2005), why new mandates and charters for subsidiaries are not developed (Birkinshaw and Hood, 1998; Cantwell and Mudambi, 2005); why ideas emanating from subsidiaries never appear as forms of “voice” (Bouquet and Birkinshaw, 2008a; Balogun et al., 2011), and why potential acts of “resistance” by subsidiaries (Clark and Geppert, 2011; Balogun et al., 2011) are quashed before they even emerge. In terms of the framework put forward by Mudambi (2011), this study shows that lying behind decisions about whether to ‘acquiesce’ or ‘resist’ are types of subsidiary-level ‘reasoning procedures’ (Leiter, 1980) that explain why forms of resistance that could emerge actually fail to emerge. As a result, MNCs may be led to develop global products and policies without input from subsidiaries that are fearful of putting their “heads above the parapet”. MNCs may also fail to be aware of local initiatives and innovations, which are kept “under the radar”.

Despite the fact that the subsidiary managers in our study thought their ideas and plans were both “legitimate and beneficial” (Balogun et al., 2011: 783) for the firm as a whole, not simply a case of self-interested protectionism or defence of turf, they still largely failed to voice their ideas (sense-censoring) and failed to act upon their plans (strategic inaction) because of the way they made sense of MNC power and politics. This is also despite the strategic position, economic performance and local embeddedness – not to mention the cultural history of the firm’s origins – that should theoretically have positioned them as a ‘high power’ subsidiary within the framework of Geppert and Williams (2006). As a result, knowledge flows and knowledge integration in MNCs (Madambi and Navarra, 2004; Becker-Ritterspach, 2006) are affected, as subsidiary managers fail to circulate their ‘locally embedded’ knowledge (Meyer et al., 2011). As such, we add to the understanding of the social systems that underpin knowledge integration developed by Becker-Ritterspach (2006) by revealing the patterns of sensemaking - created and reinforced through the sharing of accounts, stories and metaphors - upon which the local ‘contextual rationality’ (Clark and Geppert, 2011: 397) of knowledge sharing is founded. In particular, the potential of the marketing ‘innovation’ being developed by the project team in this study was never realised on a global scale due to the patterns of sense-censoring and strategic inaction we observed.

Mudambi (2011) and Andersson et al. (2007) have both highlighted the parallel tensions that exist between efforts by headquarters to control their global operations, and the subsidiaries’ responses vis-à-vis such control efforts in the light of their local embeddedness. While we know that subsidiary responses can range from complete acquiescence and support
to outright hostility and rebellion (Schotter & Beamish, 2011), we do not know when or why forms of resistance fail to surface in the first place. Our contribution here is to show not only how subsidiaries make sense of why they should resist the mandates imposed by the global headquarters, but crucially why they decide not to act upon that sensemaking. In this study, forms of strategic action favoured by the subsidiary, such as requests for locally tailored marketing campaigns, bespoke product design and additional resources, were transformed into **strategic inaction**.

The study therefore shows how the discursive enactment of power and politics as ‘social facts’ informed the “prospective preclusion of actions in taken-for-granted situations” (Weber and Glynn, 2006: 1651). The discourse of the subsidiary managers thereby served to “sustain and perpetuate particular meaning-systems and power arrangements” (Paroutis and Heracleous, 2013: 4), for instance by viewing voice and resistance as futile. The findings of the study also develop existing work which has highlighted the difficulties in ‘frame breaking’ and changing existing ways of sensemaking (Clark and Geppert, 2011). Given that global corporations typically expect, or even encourage, subsidiaries to share knowledge and propose innovations, sense-censoring has implications for the study of “perceptual discrepancies” in the global-local relationship (Clark and Geppert, 2011: 411). This paper therefore contributes by developing the understanding of the role of discourse in MNCs’ strategizing, sensemaking and sensegiving processes (Geppert, 2003; Maitlis, 2005), by viewing MNCs as “products of a continuous process of sensemaking, enactment and negotiated interactions” (Kostova et al., 2008: 1002).

Meyer et al. (2011: 236) have argued that understanding action in MNCs requires understanding the many different “interfaces” in which business units operate, as they are simultaneously embedded in the ‘external’ context of their local markets and networks and ‘internally’ embedded in the MNC organization (also Yamin & Ghauri, 2010). In this study, the subsidiary in question chose to limit the extent to which their externally embedded knowledge of their local market, and preferred global strategy, was shared within the internal hierarchy of the MNC in a process of strategic inaction and sense-censoring. The key question we must ask is: why? Was this a case of subsidiary actors rationally recognizing the HQ’s position as legitimate in terms of ‘legal authority’ (Weber, 1978: 952, 1006; Mudambi, 2011)? Or is this a potential elaboration of social processes underlying Hymer’s ‘power retention’ thesis, such that “headquarters retain the power to structure the corporation in suitable ways to reduce its federative character” (Yamin & Forsgren, 2006: 174)?
Neither of these positions fully explains the findings of this study. We have shown that the subsidiary's actions – or more precisely lack of actions - arose from the dominant understanding the managers held about their relatively weak bargaining power and relative vulnerability to political retaliation from the global headquarters. This dominant understanding, as we have shown, arose not only introspectively as a private cognitive process of sensemaking, but crucially also was produced and circulated socially and discursively in the form of accounts, stories and metaphors that served to create and reinforce the dominant patterns of sensemaking within the subsidiary. As such, our work here contributes to the growing body of work analysing power and politics as a “symbolic” and “discursive” phenomenon (Rouleau and Balogun, 2011).

We also build on existing studies of the subsidiary-parent relationship (Dörrenbächer and Geppert, 2006; Taplin, 2006; Dörrenbächer and Gammelgaard, 2006; Clark and Geppert, 2011; Meyer et al., 2011; Mudambi, 2011; Rouleau and Balogun, 2011; Bousseba et al., 2012) by showing how actors create the social facts they rely on to undertake their reasoning about what is a ‘rational’ course of action to take: what Clark and Geppert (2011: 397) refer to as ‘contextual rationalities’. This, we propose, enables us to explain why subsidiaries come to adopt certain courses of action, such as when to say nothing (sense-censoring) or do nothing (strategic inaction). Focusing on the role of discourse, we propose, enables us to get ‘behind the scenes’ to understand how the ‘facts’ about power and politics that actors rely upon to make decisions are produced socially in forms of talk and text. Future research could usefully be directed towards examining the role of sense-censoring in the ideological processes through which actors in MNCs, or affected by the actions of MNCs, become complicit in their own domination and subjugation (Willmott, 2013).
REFERENCES


Sensemaking, Sense-censoring and Strategic Inaction


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