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Cicero the Pantheist: a Radical Reading of Ciceronian Scepticism in John Toland’s *Pantheisticon* (1720)

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Towards the end of the philosophical treatise *Pantheisticon*, published from the imaginary state of Cosmopolis in 1720, the author John Toland acknowledged a debt owed by the Pantheists to Cicero for “so many and such distinguished things.”\(^1\) Appearing near the conclusion of a text elucidating and justifying the radical philosophy of Pantheism, a text written by a notorious provocateur and “despicable Knight-Errant in the Cause of Infidelity,” this appeal to one of the most lauded and respected figures of antiquity appears somewhat incongruous.\(^2\) Yet *Pantheisticon* bears Toland out, as throughout the work the Ciceronian text assumes an almost sacred status. This work does not simply articulate a controversial view of the universe, but in fact instructs the reader in how to practice that philosophy, imbuing it with shape and purpose as a Socratic Society, and evoking in the process the rituals and traditions of the Christian Church. The core of the work is the Formula which meetings of this Society will follow; this Formula quite explicitly mimics the form of the Christian liturgy, constructed from a series of exchanges between a *Modiperator* and the Society.\(^3\) In this pseudo-liturgy, it is the Ciceronian text which almost exclusively acts as the source of the ‘Lessons’ and the ‘Prayers’, hence attaining the status of a ‘Scripture’ for the Pantheists. It is the goal of this article to determine both how Toland created this Ciceronian Scripture for his Pantheistic Society, and why he chose the Ciceronian text for this role.

*Pantheisticon* is constituted from three parts, the first of which is a prefatory Diatribe which primarily expresses the understanding of the universe which underpins Pantheism, namely the essential premise that God and the universe are one: “finally the force and energy of the Whole, the creator and guide of everything, and always aiming for the best end, is GOD: whom you call the *Mind*, if it pleases you, and the *Spirit* of the *UNIVERSE*: whence the *SOCRATIC FELLOWSHIP*, as I have said previously, are called *PANTHEISTS*; since this force, following them, cannot be separated from the *UNIVERSE* itself, except by reason alone.”\(^4\) Cicero’s role in this Diatribe is limited, confined to the provision of examples in support of particular facets of the philosophy.\(^5\) Where the Ciceronian Scripture truly came to the fore was in the Formula, in which the emphasis was on what it meant to actually be a Pantheist. In the first section of the Formula, expressing the *Mores* and *Axiomata* of the Society, it is demonstrated that the ideals of toleration and freedom of thought are fundamental to the exchanges within their meetings.\(^6\) This free philosophical discussion allows man’s reason to develop, liberating him from the irrational fears, such as fear of death and fear of divine retribution, which inhibit the tranquillity of the mind.\(^7\) This freedom from fear is endorsed by the second part of the Formula and its recitation of the Pantheistic conception of the universe and the divine, an understanding which confines the divine to the laws of nature, further inhibiting the divine retribution and intervention which men so feared.\(^8\) In the final section of the Formula, the law according the which the Pantheists live is recited: the law of reason.\(^9\) As long as they live according to this law, they will be free, as they will no longer be subject to laws invented by men, contrary to reason, purely to ensure the subjugation of others. In particular, in practicing this rational religion, they will no longer be subject to priestcraft.\(^10\) The work is completed with a short essay, in which the twofold philosophy of the Pantheists is elucidated; Cicero’s presence is maintained, as he is quoted at length to provide a description of the *vir optimus*, to whom the Pantheists are encouraged to aspire.\(^11\) The Ciceronian works employed by Toland in the service of Pantheism are diverse in genre, form, and subject; in determining how Toland forged a coherent Pantheistic ideology from his Ciceronian sources, this article will argue that Ciceronian scepticism played an influential role.

The second question to consider is, why should Toland seek to construct Cicero into a Pantheist at all? As recent scholarship on *Pantheisticon* has demonstrated, there is evidence of Toland utilising several ancient sources for his Pantheistic materialism, from the Epicureans to the Stoics to Anaxagoras.\(^12\) Moreover, the influence of Giordano Bruno and his hermeticism on Toland’s natural

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philosophy has been well-established. With such material readily available, why should Toland undertake the work necessary to fashion a convincing Pantheistic Scripture from Cicero’s works? Toland already had an established relationship with Cicero, invoking the man and his works regularly throughout his writings, most often as the model of the virtuous citizen. From the parallels drawn between the seventeenth century republicans whose lives he produced and Cicero, to the poem Clito’s depiction of the ideal orator statesman, to the conception of civic virtue employed in The Militia Reform’d, to the panegyric heaped on Cicero in the book proposal Cicero Illustratus, Cicero assumes this role for Toland. While the image of the virtuous citizen does not immediately appear to cohere with that of the Pantheist, a purveyor of radical philosophy, the final section of this article will argue that the relationship between Cicero the Pantheist and Cicero as the virtuous citizen was paramount to Toland’s vision of Pantheism, and that this relationship was facilitated once again by Ciceronian scepticism.

In spite of the extensive presence of Cicero throughout Pantheisticon, the role of this tradition in the text has not been subjected to scrutiny. This intellectual influence has been a victim of the efforts made to recruit Pantheisticon as part of the Radical Enlightenment narrative; the radical materialism it professes has been claimed as evidence of a radical ideology galvanising the Enlightenment, whether as a product of the English Civil War of the Spinozist tradition. This inevitably drew focus to the philosophy expressed in the work, and deflected attention from those elements where the influence of Cicero is most apparent. Recent trends in Tolandian scholarship have attempted to reclaim Pantheisticon, emphasising that, like so many of Toland’s works, it was written as a political text, intended to engage with the established Church and the question of its role in the Commonwealth. Moving beyond the radical philosophy expressed in Pantheisticon to the question of how it was expressed and the broader arguments of the work, the contribution of the Ciceronian tradition grows in significance. The recovery of Cicero’s importance in Pantheisticon will not only contribute to efforts to demonstrate that there was a greater depth and purpose to Toland’s thought than the Radical Enlightenment approach allowed, but will also shed light on the long neglected influence of the Ciceronian tradition, in particular Ciceronian scepticism, on early Enlightenment thought.

Early Enlightenment Readings of Cicero’s Academic Scepticism

There was a point of debate in English Enlightenment discourse, long neglected, which needs to be elucidated in order to understand how Toland constructed his Ciceronian Scripture: what was Ciceronian scepticism? The question of what it means to classify Cicero as sceptical is deceptively complex. Cicero numerous times identified himself with the philosophical school of the Academic Sceptics, and while there is some debate as to the consistency with which he maintained that stance, there is little question that at the time of his main philosophical compositions towards the end of his life he was an Academic Sceptic. Within the Academic school there existed deviations concerning the function and character of scepticism in their philosophy: the radical scepticism of Arcesilaus denied the possibility of philosophical knowledge; the mitigated scepticism of Philo of Larissa and Carneades concurred that no philosophical knowledge could be certain, but the closest approximation to truth could be accepted as probabile; and Antiochus’ Old Academy abandoned overt scepticism entirely. Between the variations apparent within the Academic school, and Cicero’s composition of many of his philosophical works as dialogues in which the authorial voice was obscured, a clear understanding of Cicero’s personal scepticism becomes all but impossible. This did not prevent a dispute arising in the early Enlightenment centred on the question of how Ciceronian scepticism should be characterised. Crucial to this debate were Cicero’s theological dialogues, De Natura Deorum and De Divinatione; while not explicit discourses on the question of scepticism, the issue of how Ciceronian scepticism should be understood is central to how they are read, and how a Ciceronian theological position might be extracted from them.

(i) A Mitigated Scepticism

In the early Enlightenment there was an influential drive towards an understanding of Ciceronian scepticism which can be identified with the mitigated scepticism of the Philonian tradition. While the denial of ‘truth’ by Cicero was accepted, there was an emphasis on the principle of the probabile in how certain writers interacted with Ciceronian scepticism. They recognised the process by which Cicero was able to conclude which argument or philosophical principle was closest to the truth, or most
probable, and determined that this conclusion could then be adopted as the ‘Ciceronian’ view. This is perhaps best demonstrated in the work by eminent Cambridge Platonist Ralph Cudworth, entitled *The True Intellectual System of the Universe*, and published in 1678. See this exposition of Cicero’s Academic philosophy:

However, in his philosophick writings it is certain, that he affected to follow the way of the new academy, set on foot by Carneades; that is, to write sceptically, partly upon prudential accounts, and partly for other reasons intimated by himself in these words; *Qui requirunt quid quaque de re ipsi sentiamus, curiosus id faciunt quam necesse est. Non enim tam authoritatis in disputando quam rationis momenta quaerenda sunt. Quinetiam obest plerumque iis, qui discere volunt, auctoritas eorum, qui se docere profitentur. Desinunt enim suum judicium adhibere, idque habent ratum, quod ab eo, quem probant, judicatum vident: They, who woulds need know, what we ourselves think concerning every thing, are more curious than they ought, because philosophy is not so much a matter of authority as of reason; and the authority of those, who profess to teach, is oftentimes an hindrance to the learners, they neglecting by that means to use their own judgment, securely taking that for granted, which is judged by another whom they value. Nevertheless, Cicero in the close of this discourse *De natura deorum* (as St. Austin also observeth) plainly declares himself to be more propense and inclinable to the doctrine of Balbus, than either that of Velleius or Cotta; that is, though he did not assent to the Stoical doctrine or theology in every point, (himself being rather a Platonist than a Stoick) yet he did much prefer it before, not only the Epicurean of Velleius, but also the scepticism of Cotta.23

Cudworth’s understanding of *De Natura Deorum* characterises it as an example of Ciceronian scepticism in action: having weighed up the merits of the theologies of the differing schools, Cicero determines at the conclusion of the dialogue that the Stoic view is the most probable.

This reading of *De Natura Deorum* as an example of Cicero’s mitigated scepticism was further perpetuated in scholarship on that work. In 1718 John Davies, President of Queen’s College, Cambridge, produced an edition of *De Natura Deorum* as part of his series of editions of Cicero’s philosophical works. Davies added the following note to the conclusion of the dialogue, at the point at which Cicero expresses his support for the Stoic case: “at *De Divinazionee I.9* his brother Quintus says: for in the second book Lucilius has made an adequate defence of religion and his argument, as you yourself state at the end of the third book, seemed to you nearer the truth. Augustine also considers this in the *Civitate Dei* book V. chapter 3.”24 The method of mitigated scepticism is strongly implied by Davies’ citation here, both by the conclusion reached by Quintus that *De Natura Deorum* reveals Cicero employing that approach to decide in favour of the Stoics, and by the language used, with the phrase *ad veritatem...propensior* so evocative of the mitigated approach to scepticism. This reading is also apparent in the first English translation of *De Natura Deorum*, which was produced in 1683. The conclusion of the third book of *De Natura Deorum* is again identified as an expression of Cicero’s acceptance of the Stoic god as the most probable: “now, *He was of a Sect that profess’d to have nought at all Certain, as to Divine Matters especially; so that ’twere difficult absolutely to Affirm any thing concerning him: And yet so Strong is Truth; that it was able to Force even Him (we may see) to Pronounce (against his Fellow-Academique) in favour of the Stoique Lucilius.”25

In a meeting between scholarship and discourse, Richard Bentley, renowned classicist, made a provocative contribution to this debate. Responding to Antony Collins’ *Discourse of Free-thinking* in 1713, Bentley set himself the task of correcting Collins’ reading of the Ciceronian text, depicted by Bentley as comical in its ineptitude: “But how does this Scenical Commander, this Hero in Buskins perform? So wretchedly and sorrily; so exactly to the same Tune and his wonted Pitch; that he has not struck one right Stroke, either in Cicero’s general Character, or in any passage of His, that he quotes incidentally.”26 Among the many errors made by Collins, in Bentley’s view, was his reading of Cicero’s scepticism, particularly in the context of the theological dialogues:

When *Cicero* says above, that the Stoical Doctrine of Providence seem’d to him more PROBABLE: if we take it aright, it carries the same importance as when a Stoic says it’s CERTAIN and DEMONSTRABLE. For, as I remark’d before, the Law, the Badge, the Characteristic of his Sect allow’d him to affirm no stronger than that: he durst not have spoken more peremptorily about a Proposition of *Euclid*, or what he saw with his own Eyes. His *Probable* had the same
influence on his Belief, the same force on his Life and Conduct; as the Others Certain had on Theirs.  

Bentley openly affirms here what has been implied in the above texts: the determination of what was probable in Cicero’s philosophical dialogues could be interpreted as assent, and therefore deployed as firm expressions of ‘Ciceronian’ views.

This interpretation of Ciceronian scepticism acquired significance due to its endorsement of an understanding of Ciceronian theology which cohered with the essential principles of orthodoxy. Ralph Cudworth, for example, felt able to conclude that “beginning with M. Tull. Cicero; whom tho’ some would suspect to have been a Sceptick as to theism, because in his de natura deorum he brings in Cotta the Academick, as well as opposing Q. Lucil. Balbus the Stoick, as C. Velleius the Epicurean; yet from sundry other places of his writings, it sufficiently appears, that he was a dogmatick and hearty Theist.”

Cicero’s assessment of the Stoic theology articulated by Balbus in De Natura Deorum as the most probable allowed the principles of that theology to be wielded in discourse as Ciceronian, including the concept of a providential divine force, which was not subservient to necessity, nature, or fate. The question of how to read Ciceronian scepticism became inextricably entwined in early Enlightenment discourse with how Ciceronian theology might legitimately be characterised and hence utilised, as is confirmed by the response among the heterodox to this approach to Ciceronian scepticism.

(ii.) A Critical Scepticism

There was a reading of Ciceronian scepticism which was more overt, and focussed on the refutation of dogma in place of the selective assent to dogma characterised above. The most vocal exponent of this understanding of Ciceronian scepticism was Antony Collins, in the above mentioned Discourse of Free-thinking in 1713. In this work, Collins was keen to recruit Cicero into a canon of Freethinkers, and in pursuit of that goal provided the following explanation of Cicero’s philosophy:

Cicero’s Philosophical Works are mostly written in Dialogue, in which Philosophers of different Sects are introduc’d arguing for their Several Opinions...Now the modern Priests, whenever they meet with any Passage favourable to Superstition, which CICERO puts in the mouth of the Stoick, or any false Argument which he makes the Epicurean use, and which they have thought fit to sanctify (such for instance as the Epicurean Arguments from innate Ideas, and from the universal Consent of Mankind for the Existence of Gods in EPICURUS’ sense; that is, for Gods in human Shape, who took no care of the World or of human Affairs) they urge it as CICERO’s own, and would have the Reader believe CICERO look’d on it as conclusive. Whereas CICERO himself is so far from approving what he makes the Stoick and Epicurean speak, that he does in his Discourse of the Nature of the Gods endeavor to confute all their Arguments under the Person of an Academick (of which Sect he every where professes himself) and in his Discourse of Divination baffles all the Stoical Arguments for Superstition, openly under his own name. So that CICERO is as unfairly dealt with, whenever he is cited against Free-Thinking, as the Priests themselves would be, did any one cite as their Sentiments what they make Deists, Scepticks, and Socinians say, in the Dialogues they compose against those Sects.

Cicero must be identified with the character of the Academic Sceptic, according to Collins, the character who refuted the dogmatic assertions of the other schools, so Cotta with his critique of Stoic and Epicurean theology in De Natura Deorum, and Marcus Cicero with his rejection of Stoic arguments for divination in De Divinatione.

This was a reading of Ciceronian scepticism which Toland himself openly championed; in 1712, in a work of classical scholarship entitled Cicero Illustratus, Toland had expressed his case for the appropriate reading of Ciceronian scepticism. Cicero Illustratus outlined Toland’s proposal for a new edition of Cicero’s complete works; in the chapter articulating Toland’s plans for the synopses commonly employed as prefaces to Cicero’s works in order to guide the reader, Toland addressed the controversy surrounding how Ciceronian scepticism should be read in De Natura Deorum and De Divinatione. Toland declared of De Natura Deorum that “surely he himself is Cotta, in other words the Academic, in the books of De Natura Deorum?”. He supported this assertion with reference to De Divinatione, in which “I would like him to notice that Cicero openly removes the mask from himself in the books of De Divinatione.”

Toland exposes himself in this work as a firm believer in the
representation of Cicero’s own scepticism in the characters who profess the stance of the Academic Sceptic.

This reading of Ciceronian scepticism created a very different result from the cautious adoption of Stoic theology identified above. In its place there was the overt rejection of religious dogma, most notably the existence of divine providence governing all things, including nature. See Anthony Collins’ summation of his reading:

Two Treatises, one of the Nature of the Gods, and the other concerning Divination: in the former of which, he has endeavoured to show the Weakness of all the Arguments of the Stoicks (who were the great Theists of Antiquity) for the Being of the Gods; and in the latter has destroy’d the whole Reveal’d Religion of the Greeks and Romans, and show’d the Imposture of all their Miracles, and Weakness of the Reasons on which it pretended to be founded.33

This alternative approach to Ciceronian scepticism was employed to legitimise a very different understanding of Cicero’s theology, arguing that his true understanding of nature, the universe, and the divine could be located in the arguments put forth by Cotta and De Divinatione’s Cicero. It is this strategy which Toland employed when constructing Cicero the Pantheist.

A Sceptical View of the Universe

Pantheicon’s Formula was designed to remind the Pantheists of both their philosophy, and the consequences of that philosophy for how they lived their lives. The Ciceronian Scripture served both of these purposes, reiterating the philosophical canon underwriting the Pantheistic universe, and providing the explanations for why this view of God should liberate the Pantheists from attempts to infringe upon their reason and freedom. In examining how Toland selected which Ciceronian passages to employ to this end, and the message he intended to communicate with them, the importance of Toland’s understanding of Ciceronian scepticism becomes clear.

(i) The Pantheistic Universe

One consistent principle which results from the approach to Cicero’s texts enabled by Toland’s reading of Ciceronian scepticism is the basic rejection of the idea that the divine could act outside or beyond the laws of nature: in De Natura Deorum Cotta disputed the idea of a divine providence over-riding nature; in De Divinatione Marcus repeatedly challenged the notion that the divine acted outside the realm of reason and natural law. When in Cicero’s Academica, another dialogue, the character of Varro recounted the Academic view of the universe, a view which once more seemed to affirm the divine’s inability to act beyond nature, its coherence with the stances of Cotta and Marcus allowed Toland to deploy it as a further expression of Cicero’s theology.34 It was quoted in full in the second section of the Formula, recited by the Modiperator in the manner of a Lesson, and introduced as the canon philosophicus of the Pantheists.35 The passage is used to summarise the materialist view of the universe, and how that view establishes the unity of the divine element with the universe, in turn providing a conception of God acceptable to the Pantheist.

The fundamental starting point for the natural philosophy described in the Academica is the understanding that nature is based on two first principles: “their treatment of NATURE...led them to divide it into two things, with one active and the other lending itself to it and thus acted on in some manner.”36 While the precise terminology employed for these principles varied, the active principle can be termed Vis, or Force, and the passive principle can be termed Materia, or Matter. It is determined that Force and Matter cannot exist one without the other, each requiring the other for their existence; from this combination of Force and Matter, Bodies or Qualities are formed. Toland’s marginal note to this initial gambit in the natural philosophy presented here makes one vital point clear: “Force is indeed Motion: for as there is no Force without Motion, thus the whole Force of Matter Acts by Motion.”37 In this brief note, the coherence is immediately forged between the natural philosophy described by Cicero, and that Toland is seeking to propagate, by identifying Cicero’s Vis with the concept of Motus. Moreover, the understanding of the need for Matter and Force to exist together echoes neatly the concept of Matter imbued with Motion, or self-moving Matter, which Toland had been championing since the Letters to Serena.38 This strategy of making Matter self-moving had been a significant step in the elimination of God as a separate power in the universe; he was no longer needed to orchestrate the Motion which formed entities from Matter.
From this shared understanding of the basic constitution of the universe an understanding of the nature of that universe could arise. The Academica depicts Matter as sufficient to become the basis for everything in the universe; infinitely malleable and divisible, it is from Matter that all things are made. This permits the creation of a universe which is an infinite whole: “they think that matter as a whole is completely changed, producing what they call ‘qualified things’. From these a single world has been brought about in the totality of material nature when it coheres and is continuous in all its parts. No portion of matter, and no body, is outside this world.” In the margin, Toland expresses his reading of the passage: “the parts of the universe are either integrant or constituent, with no void in between, from whose motion and dispositions arises a truly divine harmony; which cannot be dissolved by any stronger cause, since none exists outside of the infinite whole.” The Ciceronian passage therefore becomes an expression of principles vital to Pantheism: the universe was an infinite whole, in which no void existed, and outside of which nothing else could exist. It is on this premise that the fundamental concept of Pantheism was based: “all things are from the whole, and the whole is from all things.” It is here that we begin to approach the crucial point: if the universe, formed solely from Matter and Motion, was an infinite whole outside which nothing existed, what role did God have in this universe?

This is where the Ciceronian passage reveals its particular worth to Toland and his Pantheistic philosophy. In the Academica, the active principle, or Force, which acted on all Matter, was an intelligent nature which governed the whole universe, and it was this immanent power which could be identified with God: “no portion of matter, and no body, is outside this world: everything in it is a part of the world, and all its parts are held together by a sentient nature possessed of perfect reason (which is eternal since there is nothing stronger to make it perish). This force is the mind of the world, they claim; it is also an intelligence, the perfect wisdom they call ‘god’.” This description of a sentient force administering the universe bears a striking resemblance to Toland’s concept of Universal Action. In the Letters to Serena, and earlier in the Pantheisticon, Toland elaborated on his differentiation between Universal Action and Motion: Motions were the simple, local movements of Matter, whereas Action was the Motion of the whole. This Action was rational, immanent in Matter, and ensured the perfect order of the universe; it, like Cicero’s rational providence, was God. The consequence of this natural philosophy was a God who could not act outside the realm of nature and reason. Toland’s final note to Cicero’s Academica expresses this: “the Force and Energy of the Whole is sometimes marked by the name Providence, which orders the celestial and terrestrial in such a way, that all things are arranged with the greatest reason; and there is not any place left for chance or fortune, but all and every thing acts by free will, nothing by compulsion.”

(ii) The Liberty of the Pantheists
Also consistent in Toland’s reading of Ciceronian scepticism is the application of reason and nature to test the validity of religious claims: Marcus in De Divinatione uses rational arguments to disprove the examples of divination provided by Quintus, while Cotta in De Natura Deorum directs natural law against both Epicurean and Stoic theology. Toland allows this elevation of ratio to direct his characterisation of Cicero, particularly in the third part of the Formula, in which Toland’s liturgy impresses upon his Fellows that by adopting the philosophy outlined above, they will be liberated from the yoke of irrational fears, the very fears which feed the power of the clergy. This manoeuvre immediately locates Toland’s Pantheism in the sphere of his war on priestcraft, the enduring obsession of his life. Throughout his works, whether they be philosophical, political, or scholarly, Toland had challenged the influence wielded by the clergy over the laity, arguing that it was based in the exploitation of irrationality and ignorance. In Pantheisticon, this anticlerical campaign continues as the consequences of the Pantheists’ natural philosophy for its followers are expounded: they are able to develop reason, and by adhering to that reason, they live freely. In forming this vision Toland’s Ciceronian Scripture once more proves its value.

First, the law according to which the Pantheists must pledge to live, the law of reason, is expressed using the words of Cicero. This rational law, presented again in the manner of a Lesson, is taken from Cicero’s De Republica; while in the original this was delivered as part of the debate between Philus and Laelius on the place of justice in the ideal state, for Toland it was available as a fragment by Lactantius, and described as the law of God. The Ciceronian definition of right reason determined that coherence with rational law meant obedience to the laws of nature, and universal accessibility: “TRUE LAW IS RIGHT REASON, consonant with nature, spread through all people. It is constant and eternal.”
according to this law, argues Toland, allows Pantheists liberty, as they are no longer compelled to live according to laws invented by men for the sole purpose of enhancing their own power. Inevitably, the men most guilty of inventing such laws prove to be the clergy. In the prefatory Diatribe, Toland had described the kind of irrational dictates that contravene the law of reason according to which the Pantheists live: “at certain times they comment on that most true and never deceiving thing the LAW OF NATURE, undoubtedly REASON (as shown in the final part of the FORMULA), with the light of whose rays they dispel every shadow, they take away inane worries, they reject most ably counterfeit Revelations (for who sane could doubt the truth?); and as they explode cobbled together Miracles, incongruous Mysteries, ambiguous Oracles: and they expose all pains, tricks, fallacies, frauds, finally womanish fables; by these a cloud obscures RELIGION, and the darkest night obscures TRUTH.” The liberty promised by Pantheism is revealed as primarily liberty from the false authority of the clergy of the established Church.

The sceptical Cicero of De Divinatione is then brought in to demonstrate how this re-elevation of reason functioned in the civic sphere. This passage, and Toland’s reading of it, emphasised by words set in different sizes, both capitals and small capitals, summarises the relationship between Pantheism and the clergy. Cicero here articulates an explicit rationalisation of religion: the true religion accords with the law of nature; this true religion must be defended against the incursions of superstition; superstitions are those beliefs which transgress reason, as shown here and throughout the second book. Pantheists, by living according to the law of reason, are not rejecting religion, simply the corruption of that true religion by superstition, in this case clerical authority. This is confirmed by the reply the congregation must make following the recitation of this passage: “RESP. The SUPERSTITIOUS MAN is tranquil neither awake nor asleep; he neither lives happily, nor dies fearlessly: alive and dead, he is made the prey of PRIESTS.” A life lived according to reason will eradicate superstition, and liberate men from the yoke of priestcraft.

Toland was able to locate much material in the Ciceronian corpus from which to construct his Pantheistic Scripture, but this material emanated from a variety of texts, expressed by different characters drawn by Cicero for his dialogues rather than from Cicero himself. For Toland’s Ciceronian Scripture to be convincing, he needed these disparate extracts to reflect a coherent ideology traceable to Cicero. Ciceronian scepticism provided the thread with which Toland could bind his Pantheistic Cicero: the identification of Cicero’s ‘voice’ with that of the Academic Sceptic in his dialogues, with the championing natural law and reason, allowed Toland to bring Marcus, Cotta, Varro, Philus, and more together as Cicero the Pantheist.

Ciceronian Scepticism: a Twofold Philosophy?
In the Dissertation which concludes Pantheisticon, appended to the Formula, one final facet of Toland’s Ciceronian scepticism is deployed in the service of Pantheism. Here Toland identifies a criticism which might be made of the Pantheists, stating that “perhaps it may be turned into a fault of the PANTHEISTS, that they have a twofold doctrine, one External or popular, accommodated to the prejudices of the crowd, or the dogmas publicly endorsed as true; the other Internal or Philosophical, inwardly conformed to the nature of things, and so to Truth itself.” This is a supposed dichotomy encapsulated in Toland himself: while he articulated a view of the world which seemingly veered close to atheism, and explicitly attacked the authority of the established Church, he also made public statements of support for that Church, celebrating the efforts of William III and George I to defend the Protestant faith. The assumption that Toland’s public and private statements are irreconcilable has affected scholarship on Pantheisticon and the question of Toland’s private beliefs, with his public statements being dismissed as the means of masking either his atheism or his radical and subversive views of religion and politics. Yet Toland himself in Pantheisticon explains that these stances are by no means irreconcilable, but in fact two manifestations of the same belief, a strategy which can be traced directly to Cicero.

In 1720, in an essay entitled Clidophorus, Toland provided a history of this exoteric and esoteric approach to philosophy, in which the ancient school of the Academic Sceptics was identified as a particularly prominent practitioner of this approach:

What CICERO has somewhere written about others, does not less appositely agree to the Academics. There are two sorts of books, says he; the one popularly written, which they call’d Exoteric; the other more perfectly written, namely the Esoteric, which they left in their
Commentaries, or finish’d Pieces. Hence he rightly concludes, that the same Philosophers do not always seem to say the same thing, tho they continu’d of the same opinion; which is as true as Truth it self, of many writers in our own time.  

Toland therefore understood Cicero’s Academic Scepticism to be practically minded, able to express the same idea in two ways, one for a private audience, one for a public audience. This is confirmed by his identification of Cicero’s true stance with the character bearing his name in De Divinatione. Throughout the second book of this dialogue a contradiction is apparent between Cicero’s decimation of the divinatory practices central to traditional Roman religion, and his own position as an Augur, and hence a priest of that religion and practitioner of divination.  

Cicero reconciles these positions by acknowledging that while he may privately doubt the validity of divination, this did not preclude the acceptance of traditional religious practices in the public sphere due to the importance of a state religion to the stability of the Republic. This idea that a philosophy could function both privately and publicly, without contradiction, simply adapted for different audiences and functions, was the same notion of a twofold philosophy employed by Toland in Pantheisticon.

Toland introduces this discussion of the twofold nature of the Pantheistic philosophy to encourage Pantheists to assume a public role; while in their private meetings the Pantheists might profess a radical philosophy, this did not necessitate a destructive attitude towards the state, nor preclude the ability to function within the existing structures of society. In fact, Pantheists were well-situated to be good citizens, as “carried away by neither hatred for those nor love for these, they pursue neither factions nor disputes, but the safety of the Republic and the common good of mankind.” Toland illuminates this with a passage from Cicero’s De Legibus, in which Cicero explains how one might become a vir optimus, a citizen who can employ their reason and wisdom to serve their community. Toland entreats the Pantheist, “Let Learned Men read, and form themselves according to this rule.” As Cicero assures his reader that to live according to the law will facilitate the achievement of virtue as described in this passage, Toland assures his reader that the same will result from following Pantheism:

What remains, should the SOCRATIC FELLOWSHIP apply itself to this entirely, so that, with the praise and reproach of others less esteemed, they may live content with their lot, according to their own will not that of another; so that they may furnish the mind with virtue, the character with learning: by which means they may more easily and better serve themselves, their friends, their fatherland, everyone.

Permitted by the twofold nature of their philosophy, as was Cicero himself, the Pantheists are able to become viri optimi, according to the guidance provided by Cicero.

First, a man must become aware of his capacity for reason. Annotated by Toland with Sui recognito, Animi facitates, Idee et notiones and Ethica, the text affirms that “when he has studied and made a complete examination of himself, he will understand how he came into life fitted out by nature, and what tools he has for getting and possessing WISDOM.” This established, Cicero then addresses the need for the wise man to be well-versed in natural philosophy, a need summarised in Toland’s notes with Religio and Physica. The understanding described here by Cicero, when supplemented by Toland’s annotations, seems to reflect the natural philosophy so far championed, as the wise man “has taken up the worship of the gods and pure religion, and has sharpened the gaze of his mind, like that of the eyes, for the selection of good things and the rejection of the opposite, the virtue which is called prudence from the capacity to see ahead, - what can be said or thought to be more blessed than he?” The final stage in this process is the realisation of man that he is a member of a civic community: And when he realizes that he is born for civil society, he will realize that he must use not just that refined type of argument [Politics and eloquence] but also a more expansive style of speaking, through which to guide peoples, to establish laws, to chastise the wicked and protect the good, to praise famous men [Administration of the Republic] and to issue instructions for safety and glory suited to persuading his fellow citizens, to exhort people to honor, to call them back from crime, to be able to comfort the afflicted, to enshrine in eternal memorials the deeds and opinions of brave and wise men together with the disgrace of the wicked [History].

The vir optimus achieves completion when he not only realises he is in possession of ratio, but uses that ratio to aid and guide the community in which he exists. This then is how Pantheists can function in the
public sphere; as champions of reason, the law according to which they live, they can attempt to serve the community by exercising that reason.

The question of why Toland should seek to construct Cicero into a Pantheist is therefore answered: where else might he find such an ideal model for his Pantheists? A religious sceptic, doubtful of traditional religion due to a refusal to accept that the divine could contravene natural law or reason, yet enabled by a twofold philosophy to be a virtuous citizen in spite of, or even because of, his private beliefs. This is precisely what Toland is attempting to encourage as the appropriate conduct for a Pantheist.

**Conclusion**

In *Pantheisticon* the Ciceronian text provided the words through which the natural philosophy of the Pantheists was expressed, the elevation of reason as their ultimate law was justified, the nature of their Society was defined, and the role of the Pantheist in the community beyond that Society was explained. Further, Toland deliberately elevated the authority of those Ciceronian words by presenting them as akin to a Scripture for the Pantheists. Imbued with such importance, Toland needed to ensure his characterisation of Cicero in *Pantheisticon* was convincing, a task made possible by his reading of Ciceronian scepticism. Identifying this scepticism with the stances of the Academic characters in Cicero’s dialogues, Toland claimed as ‘Ciceronian’ the arguments made for the rational governance of the universe and the consequent rationalisation of society and belief, irrespective of the character who voiced that argument or the context in which it appeared. By these means Cicero the Pantheist was created. Toland was motivated not solely by the Pantheistic material available in Cicero’s works, but by the precedent Cicero himself set, as a man whose twofold philosophy permitted him to doubt in private, and remain a virtuous citizen in public. Toland makes clear his desire for the Pantheists to adopt this practice themselves.

It was indicated at the beginning of this article that the role assumed by Cicero in *Pantheisticon* would be instructive, and so it has proved. Ciceronian scepticism, an intellectual tradition long omitted from the history of early modern ideas, is revealed as not only a point of fraught dispute within Enlightenment discourse, but also an active and formative influence on the creation of Toland’s *Pantheisticon*. Toland’s interaction with the Ciceronian tradition confirms that attempting to interpret *Pantheisticon* solely within the confines of the so-called Radical Enlightenment inhibits a complete understanding of the work. The rehabilitation of the Ciceronian contribution enforces efforts to situate *Pantheisticon* within the public, political context, as it demonstrates the lengths Toland’s conviction that the private philosophy of the Pantheists must and could be reconciled with public life. Moreover, it confirms movements in recent scholarship to demonstrate the depth, breadth, and continuity of intellectual influences acting on the early Enlightenment, challenging the linear view associated with the Radical Enlightenment narrative.

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**Notes**

1. Toland, *Pantheisticon*, 82-83: “cui tot ac tam egregia debet SODALITAS.”
2. Toland was described as such in a review of the *Pantheisticon* in *The History of the Works*, 297; cf. Hare, *Scripture Vindicated*, lxxv. On Toland’s career and reputation, particularly at this time, see Champion, *Republican Learning*, 141-164; Evans, *Pantheisticon*; Sullivan, *John Toland*, 1-50; Daniel, *John Toland*, 211-225; and Brown, *Political Biography*.
3. Toland discusses his choice of this term at *Pantheisticon*, 3-4. On the liturgical form of the Formula see des Maizeaux, “Memoirs,” lxxviii.
4. Toland, *Pantheisticon*, 8: “Vis denique & energia Totius, creatrix omnium & moderatrix, ac ad optimum finem semper tendens, DEUS est; quem Mentem dicas, si placet, & Animum UNIVERSI: unde SODALES SOCRATICI,
proprio ut dixi vocabulo, appellantur PANTHEISTÆ; cūm vis hece, secundum eos, non, nisi solā ratione, ab ipsomet UNIVERSO separateur.”

5. Toland, Pantheisticon, 22, quoting Cicero, De Republica, VI.18; Pantheisticon, 29-30, quoting Tusculan Disputations, III.69.
6. Toland, Pantheisticon, 49-50, quoting Cicero, De Senectute, 13; Pantheisticon, 52, quoting De Senectute, 14.
8. Toland, Pantheisticon, 58-61, quoting Cicero, Academica, I.24-29.
13. The influence of Giordano Bruno has also been emphasised by Jacob, “John Toland,” 328.
15. See, for example, Toland, Life of Milton, 63-64; Toland, Clito, frontispiece, 8-9; Toland, The Militia Reform’d, 64-66; and Toland, Cicero Illustratus, 16, 20-21.
16. See Jacob, The Radical Enlightenment, 183-222; and Israel, Radical Enlightenment, 610-613.
19. The neglect of Ciceronian scepticism has been in part due to the emphasis on Pyrrhonism, as in the work of Popkin, The History of Scepticism; and Floridi, Sextus Empiricus. Also, among Ciceronian scholars the focus has been on the Academica when considering Ciceronian scepticism, overlooking De Natura Deorum and De Divinatione as important sources. See Schmitt, Cicero Scepticus; and Hunt, A Textual History.
20. This debate centres around the possibility that Cicero changed affiliation to the Old Academy of Antiochus in the 50s. See Glucker, “Cicero’s philosophical affiliations”, 34-69; Görler, “Silencing the Troublemaker”, 85-113; and Thorsrud, “Radical and Mitigated Skepticism”, 133-151.
21. On the differing facets of Academic Scepticism in this period see Long, Hellenistic Philosophy, 75-108; and Thorsrud, Ancient Scepticism, 84-101. For the debate in modern scholarship concerning the nature of Cicero’s scepticism, particularly as represented in the theological dialogues, see Beard, “Cicero and Divination,” 33-46; Schofield, “For and Against Divination,” 47-65; Kroszenko, “Beyond (Dis)belief,” 353-391; Thorsrud, “Radical and Mitigated Skepticism,” 133-151; and Santangelo, Divination, 10-36.
22. For the parallel development of ‘eclecticism’ in the German Enlightenment see Mulsow, “Eclecticism or Skepticism?,” 465-477.
24. Davies, De Natura Deorum, 323, note to Cicero, De Natura Deorum, III.95: “apud nostrum de Divin. lib. I. cap. 5. ait Quintus frater: Satis enim defensa religio est in secundo libro à Lucilio: cujus disputatio tibi ipsi, ut in extremo tertio scribis, ad veritatem est visa propensi...larvam sibi aperte detrahere, ac eadem omnino suo ipsius nomine affirmare.”
26. Toland, Cicero Illustratus, 37: “nonne ipse Cotta ille est, seu Academicus, in libris de Natura Deorum?”
27. Ibid., 38: “is advertat velim, eum in libris de Divinatione...larvam sibi aperte detrareh, ac eadem omnino suo ipsius nomine affirmare.”
29. See, for example, Cudworth, True Intellectual System, 6, quoting De Natura Deorum, II.77.
31. Toland, Cicero Illustratus, 37: “nonne ipse Cotta ille est, seu Academicus, in libris de Natura Deorum?”
32. Ibid., 38: “is advertat velim, eum in libris de Divinatione...larvam sibi aperte detrareh, ac eadem omnino suo ipsius nomine affirmare.”
34. Toland, Pantheisticon, 58-61, quoting Cicero, Academica, I.24-29. In its original context this was a description of the natural philosophy of the Academic Antiochus.
35. It is worth noting that the passage from the Academica is Stoic in its essentials. It is only speculation, but it is possible that given the changing status of Stoic theology at this time from an orthodox resource to being associated
with atheism and Spinozism due to its Pantheistic materialism, the use of Cicero to express these principles might have been preferred due to the respectability Cicero engendered. On the changing perception of Stoicism, and the differing understandings of its theology and physics, see Brooke, “Stoics became Atheists,” 387-402. On the Stoicism evident in the Ciceronian passage, and the dispute over his sources see, Sedley, “Origins of Stoic God,” 41-83; and Brittain, On Academic Scepticism, 96.


37. Toland, Pantheisticon, 58: “Vis quidem Motus est: nam ut nulla est Vis sine Motu, sic Motu omnis Materiæ Vis sese exercit.” On his use of marginal notes to elucidate this philosophy see Toland, Pantheisticon, 45.

38. Toland, Letters to Serena, 163-239.


41. Toland, Pantheisticon, 60: “Universi partes vel integrantes sunt vel constituentes, nullo interjecto vacuo, e quorum motu & affectibus divina profecto exortur Harmonia; quae nullâ valentior causâ dissolvì possit, cúm nulla talis extra Totum existat infinitum.”

42. Ibid., 6: “Ex Toto quidem sunt omnia, & ex omnibus est Totum”; see also 6-7 for an extended explanation of this concept.

43. Toland, Pantheisticon, 60, quoting Cicero, Academica, trans. Brittain, I.28-29: “Partes autem esse Mundi omnia, quae insint in eo, qua natûr sentiente teneantur; in quâ RATIO perfecta insit, quì sit eadem semipterna: nihil enim valentius esse, à quo intereat; quam vim ANIMUM esse dicunt Mundi, eandemque esse MENTEM, SAPIENTIAMQUE perfectam, quem DEUM appellant.”

44. Toland, Pantheisticon, 7-8; and Toland, Letters to Serena, 140-141.

45. Toland, Pantheisticon, 61: “Vis et Energia Totius aliquando insignitur nomine Providentiae, quà coelestia quaeque terrestria ita ordinantur, ut omnia summâ ratione sint disposita; nec casui aut fortunae locus ullus reingruit [sic], sed quidlibet sponte, nihil agat coactè.” See also Toland, Pantheisticon, 22, quoting Cicero, De Republica, VI.18: Pantheisticon, 55, quoting De Divinatione, I.131.

46. For a broader examination of how Cicero is utilised by Toland in his war on priestcraft see, East, ”Religion” and the Modern Religious Discourse, 1-149.

47. Toland, Pantheisticon, 67-68, quoting a fragment preserved in Lactantius, Divine Institutes, VI.8, of Cicero’s De Republica, trans. Zetzel, III.33: “est quidem VERA LEX RECTA RATIO, naturæ congruens, diffusa in omnes, constans, sempiterna.” Toland also quotes this passage in Nazarenus, I.179-180.

48. Toland, Pantheisticon, 45-46: “commentantur statis temporibus in LEGEM NATURÆ verissimam illam & nunquam fallentem, RATIONEM scilicet (uti exhiberat in ultimâ FORMULÆ particulâ) cujus radiorum luce lvi possit, cùm...” see also 6, 18.

49. Toland, Pantheisticon, 69-70, quoting Cicero, De Divinatione, II.148-149.

50. Toland, Pantheisticon, 70: “RESP. Non vigilat SUPERSTITIOUS, Non dormitam tranquillus; Neque beatè vivit, Neque secûr moritur: Vivus & mortuus, Factus SACRIFICULORUM praedà.”


52. See Toland, Anglia Libera, 33-47, 94-106; Toland, Art of Governing, 11-31; and Toland, State-Anatomy, 20.

53. For the argument that Toland’s public statements were intended to obscure his atheism see Berman, “Disclaimers as Offence Mechanisms,” 255-271, esp. 263. For their dismissal as masks for a subversive radicalism see Jacob, The Radical Enlightenment, 49. For challenges made to this understanding of Toland’s public statements see Champion, “Politics of Pantheism,” 259-280; Wigelsworth, Deism in Enlightenment England, 146-147; and van Malsen, “Pantheism for the Unsuperstitious,” 274-290.


55. Cicero, De Divinatione, II.45-46, 54, 70, 140. Cicero also regularly invoked the authority of religion in his speeches. See Cicero, Pro Sesto, 98; De Domo Sua, 7; Pro Flacco, 47; De Haruspicum Responsis, 18-19. See also Goar, Cicero and the State Religion, 72-75, 96-104.

56. Cicero, De Divinatione, II.28, 70, 75.
57. Toland, *Pantheisticon*, 81: “qui, nec odio in hos nec amore in illos abrepti, saluti Reipublicae & humani generis communi bono, non partibus, non jurgiiis, student.”


60. Ibid., 82: “quod reliquum est, in hoc toti incumbunt SODALES SOCRATICI, ut, posthabitâ aliorum laude & opprobrio, vivant suâ sorte contenti, proprio non alieno arbitrio; ut animum virtute, ingenium doctrinâ exornent: quo facilìus meliusque sibi, amicis, patriae, omnibus inserviant.”

61. See Dyck, *De Legibus*, 221-235, for a full explication of this passage.


63. Toland, *Pantheisticon*, 84, quoting Cicero, *De Legibus*, I.60: “cultumque Deorum, & puram Religionem susceperit & exaceruerit illam, ut oculorum, sic ingenii aciem, ad bona deligenda & rejicenda contraria (que virtus ex providendo est appellata PRUDENTIA) quid eo dici aut excogitari poterit beatius?”

64. Toland, *Pantheisticon*, 85, quoting Cicero, *De Legibus*, I.62: “Cumque se ad civilem societatem natum senserit, non solum illa subtili disputatìone sibi utendum putabit [Politica et eloquentia]; sed etiam fusâ perpetuâ oratione, quâ regat populus, quâ stabiliat leges, quâ castiget improbos, quâ tueatur bonos, quâ laudet claros viros [Reipublicae procuratio]; quâ praecepta salutis, & laudes aptè ad persuasendum, edat suis civibus; quâ hortari ad decus, revocare à flagitio, consolari possit afflictos [Historia]; factaque & consulta fortium & sapientium, cum improborum ignominìa, sempiternis monumentis prodere” (square brackets are mine, to denote Toland’s marginal notations).

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