Santangelo F.

Caesar's Aims in Northeast Italy.

Papers of the British School at Rome 2016, 2016(84), 101-129.

Copyright:

This is the author’s accepted manuscript of an article that has been published in its final definitive form by Cambridge University Press, 2016.

DOI link to article:

http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S0068246216000039

Date deposited:

28/10/2016
Caesar’s Aims in North-East Italy *

ABSTRACT: This paper provides a new assessment of Caesar’s activity in north-east Italy, both in the 50s BC and in the aftermath of the Civil War, and discusses it against the background of the earlier Roman presence in the region and of the developments that intervened in the following generation. Its main contention is that Caesar carried out a number of important political and administrative interventions, both in Histria (chiefly through the foundation of the colony of Pola) and in the Alpine and pre-Alpine regions, marking a fundamental shift in the quality of the Roman presence in the area. The discussion falls under five headings: the value of the evidence of Caesar’s Commentarii for his activity in north-east Italy; an overview of the problems for which inadequate documentation survives (such as the early history and legal status of Tergeste); the date and background of the colonisation of Pola; the changes in the administrative and agrarian setup of Histria and north-east Italy in the late Republican period; and the resulting economic and social developments in the region. The conclusions summarise the main insights emerging from a very fragmentary field of evidence, and seek to explain the inclusion of Histria in the Augustan discriptio of Italy with the exceptional prosperity of the region, which Caesar’s interest had contributed to chart and exploit more effectively.

It is well known that Julius Caesar had a major impact on Northern Italy, not merely because of the citizenship grant he bestowed on Transpadana in 49 BC, but more widely through the activity he carried out during his provincial command over the preceding decade. However, his work in the north-eastern fringes of the region has received comparatively less attention. A treatment of Caesar’s impact on north-east Italy entails at least two preliminary problems. Much of what will be discussed in what follows will pertain to the last few years of Caesar’s life, and will involve reconsidering one of the most intensely debated and least satisfactorily documented issues in ancient history: the ambitions that Caesar entertained and the objectives that he pursued, especially after his victory in the Civil War, as well as the factors that informed his strategy on a number of fronts. Moreover, the notion of north-east Italy requires some qualification. It retains its validity, of course, as a ‘geographischer Ausdruck’, a ‘geographical expression’, to borrow Prince Metternich’s famous dictum, in the study of any historical period. However, it is far from apparent that in Caesar’s time the territory on which this study will predominantly focus was regarded as part of Italia.

The analysis developed in this paper reflects the highly fragmentary nature of the surviving body of evidence, and falls under five headings. It will open with a survey of the evidence for Caesar’s activity in north-east Italy during his governorship (58-50 BC), and
will then engage with some important, if woefully under-documented, aspects of the history of region at this time: the coexistence between Romans and Carni, the juridical status of some communities (especially Tergeste), and the evidence for the redrawing of the north-eastern boundary of Italy in the late Republican period. The latter issue will entail the need to focus the attention on Histria, and will prompt further scrutiny of Caesar’s actions in the peninsula, for which relatively better evidence survives than is the case for the rest of north-east Italy. The analysis will then turn to the problem of the foundation of the colony of Pola, its legal and agrarian background, and economic and social implications. The conclusion will set the developments in the region in their wider late Republican context. The redefinition of the north-eastern boundaries of Italia was a development of the triumviral period, or indeed an outcome of the Augustan settlement, but must be understood against the background of Caesar’s activity in the area. That point, in turn, will take us back to the problem of Caesar’s own strategy and vision, which was itself a matter of bitter controversy among his contemporaries, notably his immediate political heirs.¹

I. CAESAR’S PROVINCES

The beginnings of Caesar’s involvement in north-east Italy date to the assumption of his provincial command in early 58 BC, which included Illyricum, along with Gaul (first Cisalpine, later Transalpine too).² As the readers of the Commentarii know, that region had a peripheral role in Caesar’s concerns for the best part of his tenure. This was probably not in keeping with the plans that he had devised before taking office. Caesar’s initial intention may well have been to devote the early phase of his command to the campaigns in Illyricum, with

---

¹ Cf. App. BCiv. 5.3, who states that Caesar had been planning to abolish the provincial status of Cisalpine Gaul and that Octavian merely followed his plans (cautiously accepted by Gabba (1970: 10)). The argument, however, was contested in Antonian quarters as a pretext to justify the removal of Antony’s troops from Northern Italy: cf. Manius’s speech in BCiv. 5.22. See also Bandelli (1986: 63–4) and Zaccaria (1986: 66). For a classic, and inspiringly speculative, discussion of Caesar’s ‘aims’ cf. Ehrenberg 1964 (= 1974: 127–42).

² Suet. DJ 22.2; App. Illyr. 15.44; Cass. Dio 38.8.5.
a view to addressing the threat presented by the attack led by the Getan chief Burebista. Whatever plans Caesar may have had for north-east Italy at the beginning of his provincial tenure, the irruption of the Helvetii into Transalpine Gaul changed the picture, and led him to divert three legions that had been quartered in the vicinity of Aquileia (originally a Latin colony, since 90 BC a municipium) to the Gallic front. Caesar made time for regular visits to the region, during the winter breaks of the Gallic campaign. In the winter of 57/56 he embarked on a journey to ‘Italy and Illyricum’, which he apparently had to cut short to address a military crisis in Transalpine Gaul. The choice of words is significant: its clear implication is that Caesar viewed Cisalpine Gaul as part of Italia, regardless of its provincial status.

That was a time of fluid definitions of complex territorial and regional entities. It is not quite clear, for example, how Illyricum should be understood at this point in time, and what its territorial limits may have been. As R. Syme pointed out, there is no evidence for the status of Illyricum as a free-standing province before Caesar’s governorship, and it is not apparent that it had a clearly defined position vis-à-vis Cisalpine Gaul either. Most of the ancient sources stress that Illyricum was part of the brief that Caesar received under the lex Vatinia of 59 BC, and that is hard to dispute. Seeking a clear definition of the boundaries of the province, however, is not just difficult, but utterly unhelpful. For much of the Republican period, provincial commands were tasks that had a loose territorial connotation, and did not necessarily map out on precisely defined boundaries, nor did they entail that a given territory

---


4 Caes. BG 1.10.3.

5 Caes. BG 2.35.2 (quod in Italian Illyricumque properabat, ‘because he was hurrying to Italy and Illyricum’); cf. 3.7.1 (inita hieme in Illyricum profectus esset quod eas quoque nationes adire et regiones cognoscere uolebat, ’at the beginning of winter he left for Illyricum, because he intended to visit those peoples and get to the know those regions ’). Cf. Sisani (in press: 137) for the attractive view that this was the moment at which Caesar took an active interest in the region.

6 Syme (1999: esp. 167). See also Sisani (in press: 123) for the view that there was no such thing as a formula provinciae Illyrici in the late Republican period, contra Desanges (2004: 1188) and Vitelli Casella (2012: 268-71).

7 Cf. Dzino (2010: 82). The reference to an Aquileiense portorium in a textually problematic passage of Cicero’s pro Fonteio (1.2) does not prove that the boundary of the province was in the vicinity of the city: the aim of that tax was to exact transit dues from traders who operated in the north of the Adriatic at what used to be one of the most important and busiest entry points into the province. The presence of the slave Agato at Prepotto near S. Pelagio does not entail that the border of the province was in that area either (CIL 5.703 = ILS 1851); contra Degrassi (1954: 17). One should envisage a system involving a number of different stations (Zaccaria (2010)), according to a broadly comparable model to that attested by the customs law of the province of Asia, where a number of customs posts on the coast are listed, but there is no corresponding list for the interior of the province (ll. 22-26, §9, with Mitchell (2008: 183-4)).
had been annexed to the Roman dominions. On the basis of the surviving evidence, it is not far-fetched to argue that the addition of Illyricum to Cisalpina had an essentially preventive nature, and gave Caesar scope to carry out military operations beyond north-east Italy. It also afforded him the chance to take a stronger interest in the predicament of the conuentus of Roman citizens on the coast of Dalmatia in what was not a fully stable context.

Many of the most valuable modern treatments of the problem, from A. Degrassi’s great book on Italy’s confines orientale to M. Šašel Kos’ studies of Appian’s Illyrian Wars focus either on boundaries or annexations; the following discussion shall largely steer clear of those issues. Caesar’s Illyrian province no doubt changed focus over the years. From the prospect of a military campaign in those parts a shift occurred towards a less ambitious operation. A Greek inscription from Salona in Dalmatia records the visit of a mission of envoys of the neighbouring community of Tragurium to Aquileia, where they met Caesar on 3 March 56. In early 54, after carrying out some administrative work in the conuentus of Cisalpine Gaul, he carried out a mission into Illyricum, because he had been receiving reports of a military attack of the Pirustae on the region. The way in which his intervention unfolded indicates that the Roman military presence in that territory was negligible: Caesar’s first step was to organise a levy among the Illyrian communities that had demanded his intervention. This was sufficient to prompt reassurances from the Pirustae, who firmly committed to withdrawing and a full redress, and secured an appeasement that Caesar oversaw before setting out back to Cisalpine Gaul. Caesar compresses the accounts of these proceedings within the opening chapter of book V, and does not make clear where they took place. The reference to his move back into Cisalpine Gaul suggests that they did not occur at Aquileia, and that he used a base somewhere further east. That the problem found a temporary solution is confirmed by Caesar’s apparent decision not to come back to the region in the following year.

In early 52 he carried out his routine journey to Cisalpine Gaul, where he also had to face a situation that was anything but routine: news of Clodius’ death and of the senatus

---

10 Degrassi (1954); Šašel Kos (2005).
13 A different view in Sisani (in press: 137 n. 181).
consultum that provided for mass recruitment across Italy reached him, and he conducted a
general dilectus in his province, before going back to Transalpine Gaul to face the final stint
of the campaign.  

Those were exceptional times, and required exceptional choices. In 50 he
broke the usual pattern of his tenure and came to Italy during the spring, at the end of the
winter quarters, which he had presided over in Transalpine Gaul, and devoted his time to an
important task: a tour of the municipia and colonies (both categories of settlements are duly
mentioned) in which he sponsored the candidacy of his quaestor M. Antonius for the
augurate.  

The author of BG 8 candidly states that blocking Antony’s election would have
afforded Caesar’s enemies the opportunity to undermine his standing in Rome. Caesar’s
direct intervention also suggests that there was a sufficiently high number of Roman citizens
in those parts to make that canvassing effort worthwhile, regardless of the provincial status of
Cisalpine Gaul. Caesar decided to embark on his tour even after he heard that Antony had
actually been elected. The source expands on the range of honours and support that he
received across the province, where he was hailed as the victor of the campaign uniuersae Galliae: the celebration united adults and children, the rich and the poor, and was
foreshadowing the joy of a triumph that was fully within the range of reasonable expectation
(exspectatissimi triumphi laetitia praecipi posset: ‘so as to anticipate, if possible, the joy of
the triumph, so long expected’). Its relevance in a political context in which Caesar’s victory
was being contested in Rome is obvious.

There is just no room for the Illyrian front in this framework. We should not assume,
of course, that the diffuse account of the Commentarii is either comprehensive or reliable.
Omissions and oddities in the narrative occasionally emerge. Nowhere in the Commentarii
do we find a reference to the military operations carried out at Castellum Larignum, a fortress
in the Carnic region, between Aquileia and Virunum, which Caesar besieged when the
inhabitants refused to provide him with supplies. We know about this episode from Vitruvius, who singled it out in his account of building materials. When Caesar gave orders
to set fire to a watchtower, he marvelled at the endurance of the material of which it was
built: larchwood. The fortress was eventually conquered, but that moment marked the

14 Caes. BG 7.1.1: ibi cognoscit de Clodii caede <de> senatusque consulto certior factus, ut omnes iuniores
Italae coniararent, delectum tota provincia habere instituit (‘There he heard of the assassination of Clodius;
and having been informed of the Senate’s decree that the younger men of military age in Italy should be sworn
in, he decided to hold a levy throughout his province’).


16 This issue has received important discussions from a variety of different standpoints: Rambaud (1953: 204-8);

beginning of a trade in larchwood from that Alpine site to the Po Valley and the Adriatic coast. J. Šašel tentatively dated this episode to the early stages of Caesar’s provincial command, since that was the time at which Caesar could rely on the largest contingent of troops in Northern Italy, but the argument, as he conceded, is merely conjectural.  

Developments at Tergeste (Trieste) are another instructive case in point. At BG 8.24 we are told that in the winter of 52/51 Caesar sent the XVth legion, led by T. Labienus, from Transalpine Gaul into Cisalpina, in order to protect ‘the colonies of Roman citizens’ (coloniae ciuium Romanorum) and avoid the attacks of the ‘barbarians’ of the sort that had befallen the inhabitants of Tergeste in the previous summer. There is no mention of this episode in book VII, and no evidence for any response by Caesar or his associates to the attack in 52; we are told, in fact, how the people of Tergeste managed to overcome that threat. We are presented with a fragmentary reference to the predicament of a community in a lengthy and complex account that has an altogether different focus.

This cursory, somewhat clumsy reference happens to be the earliest mention of Tergeste in the literary tradition. In several respects it is a problematic one. On the one hand, it shows that Tergeste was already in existence by 52 BC; on the other, it does not make clear what its legal status was. The author of BG 8.24 states that Caesar sent off troops in order to defend the coloniae ciuium Romanorum in the province. This does not show beyond reasonable doubt that Tergeste had colonial status. There is the distinct possibility that the writer may not be quite accurate here: he was well aware of the distinction between municipia and coloniae, as we have seen, but there is no apparent reason why the colonies would have been at greater risk, or would have been more worth protecting, than the municipia. One may even see an opposition being drawn here between the predicament of

---

19 BG 8.24.3: Titum Labienum ad se euocat; legionem autem XV, quae cum eo fuerat in hibernis, in togatam Galliam mittit ad colonias ciuium Romanorum tuendas, ne quod simile incommodum accideret decursione barbarorum ac superiore aestate Tergestinis acciderat, qui repentinio latrocinio atque impetu illorum erant oppressi (‘He summoned Titus Labienus to join him; he sent the Fifteenth Legion, however, which had been with Labienus in the winter quarters, to Gallia togata to protect the colonies of Roman citizens and to prevent the occurrence of a disaster, through a raid of barbarians, similar to that which had occurred the summer before to the people of Tergeste, who had been overwhelmed by their sudden attack and robbery.’). For a detailed discussion of this passage and its wider historical implications see Sisani (in press). The expression Gallia togata does not occur in the rest of the corpus Caesarianum, except for two more instances in BG 8: ch. 52.1-2. Rossi (2008: 160-64) proposes to print aestate Tergestinis acciderat qui repentinio latrocinio with aestate Tergestinis Aegidianique cum repentinio latrocinio; the emendation would yield the earliest literary attestation of Aegida, but is far from compelling.
20 On this author see Gaertner and Hausburg (2013: 169-84), who revisit and restate the case for his identification with A. Hirtius (cos. 43).
21 Cf. Sisani (in press: 111-14) on the ‘non technical’ meaning of the word in this context and the suggestion that the author of BG 8 may be referring to loosely organised communities of Roman citizens in a provincial context;
Tergeste and that of the *coloniae*. On the other hand, Appian refers to Tergeste as a Ρωμαίων Ἰπτίκον, an expression behind which one may reasonably read a reference to a Roman colony, and Strabo as a φρούριον, which must translate *castellum*. Both labels seem to encourage the view that Tergeste was a settlement with a distinctive military function, possibly related to its control over the stretch of sea that is now known as the Gulf of Trieste. Elsewhere in his geographical work, however, Strabo refers to Tergeste as a κόμη Καρνική: a settlement that does not even appear to have the status of a city, and was linked to the Carni, a community of Celtic descent that hailed from the inland area, and indeed from the Alps, and had been expanding its presence towards the coastal region between the second and the first centuries BC. As is elsewhere the case, Strabo appears to be recording conflicting traditions on the same issue at different stages of his discussion. The contradiction on the status of Tergeste may be explained with a gradual political and urban development: the κόμη he mentions in book 7 was no doubt a part of the territory of Aquileia that later acquired an autonomous status. This specific problem reminds us of the perils posed by the necessity to work on late and derivative evidence. The caveat also applies, in a different way, to the evidence of the Elder Pliny that we shall discuss below. On the other hand, contemporary evidence is not necessarily a better source of information. The *Commentarii* are close in time to the events they deal with, but, as we have just seen, are not immune from bias and omissions. While they give an overall sense of what place north-east Italy had in Caesar’s concerns, they are no more than a starting point to the understanding of what he may have set out to achieve in the area. More evidence and different standpoints must be brought into the picture.

II. POLITICAL CHOICES, BOUNDARIES, AND KNOWLEDGE GAPS

only four colonies (*Mutina, Parma, Dertona, and Eporedia*) are safely attested in Cisalpine Gaul in this period (*ibid.*, 109). See Fraschetti (1975: 329), Bandelli (1986: 55) and Matijašić (2015: 309) for the view that Tergeste was a colony by 52 BC; Zaccaria (1991: 58) states that it was founded by Caesar; Dzino (2010: 85) envisages a *municipium*. Rossi (2008: 116-19, 207) offers more balanced assessments of the problem, which is in my view unsolvable on the basis of the available evidence.

23 App. *Ilyr.* 18; Strabo 5.1.9. See Rossi (2008: 241-50). Sisani (in press: 121-3) argues that Ἰπτίκον and φρούριον may well refer to the same kind of settlement (i.e. a community of Roman citizens without colonial status) and suggests that both Appian and Strabo based their information on Asinius Pollio’s work.

24 Strab. 7.5.2.

The uncertainty about the early history and status of Tergeste is a symptom of a broader pattern: a number of important aspects of the history of north-east Italy in the first century BC are very poorly attested. A brief inventory may be helpful, before we turn to areas for which better evidence survives.

Strabo’s reference to Tergeste as a ‘Carnic village’ has the merit of reminding us of the enduring significance of non-Roman elements in the region well into the late Republican period: an issue that is under-documented as it is important. Rome’s dealings with the Carni date back (at the latest) to the 170s BC, the time of the campaigns that were carried out against the Histri and the Iapydes, who sought to establish ties with Rome during the mission of C. Cassius Longinus.26 There is no reason to think that the presence of the Carni at Tergeste attested by Strabo was determined by a strong and carefully planned military offensive; there are instances, notably in Southern Italy, of colonies that gradually attracted robust contingents of inhabitants from neighbouring indigenous communities.27 The fundamental historical question – when Tergeste was founded, and by whom – is bound to remain unanswered on the available evidence. The suggestion of R. F. Rossi, who argued for the creation of a settlement of Carni promoted by the Romans after their campaign against the Histri of 178-177 BC, is plausible, but strongly conjectural.28

That Tergeste was in a significant strategic position is confirmed by a brief reference in Velleius, who mentions a confunium, a line of defence joining Tergeste and the uicus of Nauportus (modern Vrhnika, in Slovenia, on the river Ljubljanica), in the account of a planned migration of Pannonian rebels into Italy in AD 6.29 The importance of the area around Tergeste was also made apparent by recent military developments. Appian speaks of two attacks of the Iapydes on the region, twenty years apart, which both had grave consequences for the Romans.30 One is probably the attack of 52 BC that is briefly mentioned

---

26 Livy 43.1 and 5. On Rome’s earlier contacts and accommodation with the Galli Transalpini that had crossed into this area in 186 BC cf. Livy 39.22.6, 45.6, 54.5, with Paterson (1978: 455-8).
29 Vell. 2.110.4. See Vedaldi Iasbez (1994: 408-9); Šašel Kos (2014: 161-2). On Nauportus see Strabo 4.6.10 and 7.5.2, who mentions a road linking it to Aquileia and defines it as a settlement of the Taurisci; cf. also Plin. Nat. 3.128. See Šašel Kos (2000: 294-5). On the road linking Aquileia and Nauportus, via Tergeste, Mount Nanos/Monte Re, and the outpost at the pass of Razdrto, see Horvat and Bavdek (2009: 144-5), Zanier (2013: 591) and Magnani (2014: 243). On the road network around Tergeste see Degrassi (2014). The similarity with Tergeste’s early status as κώμη (Strab. 7.5.2) is noteworthy; the uicus is an institutional framework that is also attested in Dalmatia in this period, notably at Narona: Paci (2007: 28-30). On the links between Aquileia and the region to the east cf. the statue base of C. Sempronius Tuditanus at Aquileia, which celebrated his military success in Histria in 129 BC: ab Aquileia ad Titum flumen stadia M<M> (> from Aquileia to the river Titius [modern Krka], 1,000 stadia’); see Plin. Nat. 3.129, with Purcell (1990: 13-14) and Chiabà (2013: 120 n. 39).
30 App. Illyr. 4.18: Ἰάποδες δὲ οἱ πέραν Ἄλπεων, ἐθνὸς ισχυρόν τε καὶ ἄγριον, δὶς μὲν ἀπεώσαντο Ῥωμαίους, ἐπέδραν αὐτοὶ ἐσκύλευσαν (‘The
in *BG* 8, and the second is that of the campaign that Octavian undertook in 35. Recent findings at Grad near Reka, Gradišče in Cerkno, and Vrh gradu near Pečine (western Slovenia) have shown evidence for military activity in the late Republican period, which is probably to be linked to Octavian’s mission.\(^{31}\) However, the geographical remit of the attack that was launched on Tergeste in 52 BC is not quite clear. The wording of the passage of Appian that appears to allude to it does not rule out the possibility that Aquileia was also attacked in 52. That would have made Caesar’s military response even more urgent, but would also make the silence of *BG* 8 harder to account for.

There are other significant gaps in our knowledge of the developments in north-east Italy in this period. The narrative of Appian in the *Illyrian Wars* has of course a different viewpoint from that of the *Commentarii* and covers different material. Like Caesar’s account, it lacks precision and detail in a number of important respects. Appian also discusses the situation in Liburnia, an area corresponding to the region of the Kvarner Gulf, and records a request for help to Caesar from the city of Promona (near modern Drniš), which was attacked by the Illyrians and the Dalmatians; in 50 BC he sent a contingent that was comprehensively defeated by the Illyrians.\(^{32}\) The outbreak of the Civil War dissuaded him from taking the matter any further. The region had already played a part in the history of the late Republican civil wars, and Caesar’s interest in its stability becomes somewhat less surprising against that background. In the winter of 85/84 Cinna and Carbo established a military base in Liburnia, where they were hoping to concentrate a large amount of the troops that they had been recruiting across Italy with a view to launching an offensive against Sulla.\(^{33}\) The plan was drawn to a sudden close by the mutiny in which Cinna was killed. Caesar’s attempt to restore some order in that area at the eve of a civil conflict may have borne some relationship (surely not just circumstantial) with that precedent. The strategic important of Liburnia to the control of the North Adriatic must have been apparent to Caesar, and the precedent of Cinna’s failed plan is likely to have further alerted him to the potential significance to the wider development of the war. Had that area fallen in the hands of his enemies, it would have considerably complicated his strategy in Italy.

---


Another important gap in the surviving evidence is made apparent by a fragmentary inscription from Elleri/Jelerje, in north-west Histria (unfortunately without a meaningful archaeological context), in which the word *municipi*[---] appears.\(^{34}\) There has been intense debate on which community this inscription pertains to: whether Tergeste (the legal status of which is however uncertain, as we have seen) or the town of Agida, which is attested exclusively by a passage of Pliny the Elder as an *oppidum ciuium Romanorum*, ‘town of Roman citizens’, and the location of which is unknown.\(^{35}\) The lettering of the inscription points to a late Republican dating.\(^{36}\) A. Fraschetti argued that the inscription from Elleri refers to the *municipium* of Agida, presumably created in the age of Caesar, or shortly before.\(^{37}\) Others have attributed the inscription (with varying degrees of conviction) to the *pertica* of Aquileia.\(^{38}\) According to V. Vedaldi Iasbez, Pliny’s passage does not prove that Agida had municipal status; moreover, in her view the account of Histria at *Nat*. 3.129 does not follow the Augustan *discriptio Italiae* (‘subdivision of Italy’), but is based on an earlier treatment, possibly by Varro.\(^{39}\)

This argument requires a certain leap of faith, and it is doubtful that a safe conclusion may be reached on the sources of this section of the *Natural History*. At any rate, Pliny mentions Agida at the beginning of a list of cities of Histria. It is followed by Parentium, Pola, Nesactium, and the sequence ends with the Arsia (modern Arsa/Rasa), which Pliny

\(^{34}\) *Supplementa Italica* 10, p. 240-243, no. 1: [---][n quisq[---][---] de peq[---][---]sumat e[---][---] municipi[---][---]; cf. Crawford (1998: 46) on its similarities with the *lex coloniae Genetiuae*. Elleri/Jelerje was certainly on the road that led from Tergeste into Histria, and eventually down to Pola: Degrassi (2014: 135-6).

\(^{35}\) Plin. *Nat*. 3.129: *oppida Histriae civium Romanorum* Agida. Parentium, colonia Pola, quae nunc Pietas Iulia, *quondam a Colchis condita* (‘the communities of Roman citizens in Histria are Agida, Parentium, the colony of Pola, which is now Pietas Iulia, once founded by the Colchians’). Sisani (in press: 117) argues that this labels covers a ‘peculiare categoria di centri a carattere vicano, privi di una compiuta autonomia amministrativa e sottoposti al pieno controllo politico dei *conventus* di cittadini romani insediati in loco’. In his discussion of Pliny’s evidence for North Africa Shaw (1981: 449-53) points out that in that context the expression *oppida ciuium Romanorum* does not refer to *municipia*, but to ‘towns in which a large number of Roman citizens happened to reside’ (450); Tarpin (2002: 291-2) discusses cases of *oppida* that are not *municipia*. Chilver (1941: 65-6) is very sceptical on the value of Pliny’s information about Histria, and tentatively suggests that the addition of *ciuium Romanorum* is an indication that the city was originally outside the borders of Italy.

\(^{36}\) Elleri has yielded another late Republican inscription that raises even more vexing interpretative issues: the fragment mentioning a *lex lata... Fersimo*: cf. the discussion by C. Zaccaria in Panciera (1991: 427-9) and *SupplIt* 10, p. 241-243, no. 2, dating it to the first quarter of the first century BC. Suspension of judgment seems the best option (Crawford 1996: 4).

\(^{37}\) Fraschetti (1975).


singles out as the boundary of Italy in his own day (\textit{nunc}). Boundaries, as was briefly recalled earlier, have often been the focus of modern discussion and speculation. That is unsurprising in light of the history of the region in the 20th century, and to some extent warranted by the ancient evidence for a change of boundaries in north-east Italy at the very end of the Republican period. In Pliny’s overview Histria is included in the official \textit{discriptio} of Italy. The list is likely to derive from an Augustan source, and it is conceivable that the boundary was moved eastwards to the Arsia in that period. At any rate, Pliny also records the existence of an earlier boundary of Italy, the river Formio, which he places six miles east of Tergeste: he defines it \textit{anticus [sic] auctae Italiae terminus, nunc uero Histriae}. The Formio may be identified either with the Risano/Rizana, or with the Rio Ospo, which are both rivers about 10 km east of Tergeste. The exact location of the boundary is a matter of relative significance: what is abundantly clear is that at some point in the late Republican period the end of Italy was set in the hinterland of Tergeste, and was moved at a later time. Vedaldi Iasbez has noted that the river Arsia marked a much more obvious natural boundary than the Formio: immediately to the East the Mounts Caldiera (Ćićarija/Ciceria and Učka/Monte Maggiore) divide Histria from Liburnia. After the inclusion of Histria into \textit{Italia}, the Formio retained its significance as the north-western boundary of the region. However, there is no evidence that Histria had a clear territorial definition back in the day when it was assigned as a province to a Roman promagistrate in the Republican period.

The emphasis on fluvial boundaries stands out as a distinctive aspect of this dossier. This is revealing of a fundamental bias of our evidence: it reflects the viewpoint of outsiders who reach and gain control of that region from the coast, and gradually make their way

\begin{footnotes}
\footnote{Plin. \textit{Nat.} 3.129: \textit{nunc finis Italiae}; see also 3.44-5. On the use of \textit{nunc} in several passages of Pliny’s discussion of Histria see Sisani (in press: 123-4).}
\footnote{See Plin. \textit{Nat.} 3.46. On Pliny’s use of the \textit{discriptio} in his account of Histria see Sisani (in press: 116-7, 124 n. 101), with a full doxography.}
\footnote{Plin. \textit{Nat.} 3.127: ‘the ancient boundary of the enlarged Italy, now indeed of Histria’.}
\footnote{Sisani (in press: 134) lists the relevant bibliography and expresses a preference for the Rio Ospo; Zaccaria (2012: 115) and Degrassi (2014: 136 n. 55) favour the Risano/Rizana. An implication of Pliny’s passage is worth noting, as an aside: the ancient boundaries of Histria did not coincide with those of the peninsula that is now commonly referred to as Histria (Istria/Istra). On the territorial definition of the region in the medieval and early modern periods cf. Ivetic (2010: 15-32).}
\footnote{Vedaldi Iasbez (1994: 125).}
\footnote{The territory of Tergeste was extended beyond the Formio, probably all the way to the Ningus, in the Augustan period, and the local elite had strong economic interests in that area: Tassaux (2003: 99-100); Zaccaria (2012: 115-8).}
\footnote{Cf. Šašel Kos (2000: 288); Matijašić (2015: 305-8). The risk of a conflict between two provincial governors operating in that region was non-existent, and the need to carefully delimit the geographical remit of the power of a governor was therefore negligible.}
\end{footnotes}
inland, while retaining a strong focus on the coastal area. Much as the bora – the ghastly NE wind that often blows in the upper Adriatic – could present a significant challenge to navigation, a substantial part of the contacts between Histria and north-east Italy took place by sea, whether on long-distance routes, especially from Aquileia, or by coasting navigation, the safer piccolo cabotaggio method that is widely attested throughout the history of Histria. In the setting provided by an ‘especially hospitable’ coast such as that of that of West Histria, rich in natural ports, the development of a coastal site such as the one for which dim attestations of material culture have emerged from the rescue excavations at Sermin, near Koper/Capodistria, becomes explainable in the second century BC. It is not necessary to envisage a clearly defined legal status for a settlement of this kind, which may have just served the purpose of a commercial outpost. At any rate, no archaeological evidence has been identified for its political centre of the settlement, or indeed for any of its ‘structural remains’.  

We are therefore presented with several areas of uncertainty and indeed, in some respects, sheer ignorance: the relations between Romans and indigenous communities; the early history of Tergeste; the location and status of Agida; and the background of the redefinition of the boundaries of Italy. Recognising their existence and stressing their significance is an important part of the historical reconstruction of the developments in north-east Italy in this period. We should now turn to areas for which better evidence survives.

III. CAESAR AND HISTRIA

While a firm solution is not at hand on the problem of boundaries, there is some margin for progress if one chooses to focus instead on whatever little evidence survives for the communities that were enclosed within those very boundaries. Parentium and the colony of Pola are the cities that are mentioned after Agida in Pliny’s list (Nat. 3.129). Pliny’s passage is the earliest evidence for the existence of Parentium (Poreč/Parenzo), on the west coast of

---


Histria. There is some inscriptive and archaeological evidence from that site, but positive information on the date of its foundation and early legal status is lacking.

Pola (modern Pula/Pola, on the southern tip of the Histrian peninsula) is a more promising case. Pliny labels it as a *colonia*, hence giving some welcome clarity on its juridical status; he also records the official names of the community, *Pietas Iulia*. The city is in a felicitous position, at the head of a natural harbour. Strabo probably misunderstands a passage of Callimachus in linking its foundation to the arrival of the Colchians in Illyricum, after the failure of their pursuit of Jason and Medea, and frames that account within a flattering description of the site where the city lies – a gulf with islands that provided good mooring places and fertile land. At the outset of book 5, he also singles Pola out as the terminal point of Italy, hence giving it the same function as the river Varus in Liguria. Elsewhere he points out that the Histrians are the first people on the Illyrian coast and that their country is a continuation of Italy; for that reason ‘the present rulers’ have decided to expand the boundaries of Italy as far as Pola. He provides no information, however, on the recent history of the city, nor does he shed light on the circumstances that led to the bestowal of the colonial status. The use of the plural (*οἱ νῦν ἡγεμόνες*) has led scholars, from Mommsen to Pais and Degrassi, to produce a range of chronological hypotheses: the triumviral period, an intervention of Augustus and Agrippa, and a joint measure of Augustus and Tiberius.

The date of the foundation of the colony has also received much discussion. Degrassi identified the battle of Philippi as a terminus *post quem*; on his reading, the name *Pietas Julia* was a pointed reference to the revenge upon the assassins of Octavian’s adoptive father. A. Fraschetti persuasively pointed out that nothing in those epithets excludes a Caesarian dating: *pietas* is a powerful catchword in the age of the Dictator, as the coinage of the period illustrates. In fact, the case for viewing Pola as a Caesarian colony is compelling, and has found widespread acceptance over the last three decades. The inscription from the arch of Porta Ercole (or *Herculea*) records the names of two *duouiri*: L. Cassius Longinus and L.

---

51 Plin. *Nat.* 3.129. The colonial status is also attested by Mela 2.57.
52 Strabo 5.1.9. Call. *Aet.* F. 11.5-6 and Lykophr. 1021-6 mention the foundation of a different site called Πόλις, which should be located further south, in the region of the Encheleans (roughly corresponding to modern Montenegro); see Vedaldi Iasbez (1994: 49, 385-6); Harders (2012: 169); Hornblower (2015: 375).
54 Strabo 7.5.3.
56 Degrassi (1954: 62-4). Sisani (in print: 125-7) has taken up this suggestion and argued for a second foundation of the colony by Octavian.
58 Bibliography in Letzner (2005: 104 n. 73); Zecchini (2014: 553-4).
Calpurnius Piso.\textsuperscript{59} Both men were worthy political players: Cassius was the brother of the Caesaricide, and Calpurnius had been consul in 58 BC and was the father-in-law of Caesar himself.\textsuperscript{60} The presence of two prominent figures was explained by Degrassi with their decision to settle in Histria, respectively to withdraw to private life after the amnesty and in order to enjoy a quiet retirement in pleasant surroundings. However, the relatively high standing of these two characters prompts a different reconstruction, as suggested independently both by Fraschetti and L. Keppie: they are likely to have been directly involved with the foundation of the colony.\textsuperscript{61}

Calpurnius Piso had been \textit{duovir} at Capua in 58 BC, in the aftermath of the passing of the \textit{lex Julia agraria}.\textsuperscript{62} He had therefore played an important part in the implementation of agrarian plans devised by Caesar: a precedent that must have carried some weight. He was by then a man of considerable experience: Cicero points out that he was ‘a grown boy’ (\textit{grandis iam puer}) at the time of the Social War.\textsuperscript{63} Nothing in whatever little is known about the career of L. Cassius Longinus proves that he was in favour with Antony or Octavian after the Ides, even though he could have benefitted from the amnesty. His \textit{cursus honorum} did not go beyond the tribunate of the \textit{plebs}, which he held in 44 BC, in the same year in which his brother Gaius held the praetorship. He was by then – like his brother – under the patronage of Caesar. In this scenario, the most plausible solution is a foundation promoted by Caesar, and carried out by the \textit{duoviri} Calpurnius Piso and Cassius Longinus. One of them was a distinguished \textit{consularis}, who already had direct experience of land assignments; the other one had been a legate of Caesar in the Pharsalus campaign. He also happened to be a descendant of that C. Cassius Longinus who had ravaged the territory of the Carni, Iapydes and Histri in 171 BC.\textsuperscript{64} It is possible that this precedent might have played a part in steering Caesar’s choice to recruit him. It is also apparent that Cassii Longini retained a connection with the region in the decades following the foundation of Pola: a L. Cassius Longinus, possibly the consul of AD 11, is mentioned as the patron of the freedman L. Cassius Phoebus on a tombstone from Tergeste.\textsuperscript{65}

At any rate, the presence of Calpurnius Piso and Cassius Longinus at Pola must be narrowed down quite specifically to the period between 47 and 45, between Pharsalus and the

\textsuperscript{59} \textit{CIL} 5.54. On this gate see Letzner (2005: 21-22).
\textsuperscript{60} See respectively \textit{RE} III.2, col. 1739, no. 65 and III.1, col. 1387-1390, no. 90.
\textsuperscript{61} Fraschetti (1983: 90-102); Keppie (1983: 204).
\textsuperscript{62} Cic. \textit{Sest.} 19.
\textsuperscript{63} Cic. \textit{In Pis.} 36.
\textsuperscript{64} Livy 43.1.4-12, 5.2-5. See Rocco (2016: 88 n. 21).
\textsuperscript{65} \textit{Ilt} 10.4.100.
election of Longinus to the tribunate; Calpurnius Piso’s involvement with Roman politics after the Ides of March is also well documented. The choice of these two prominent individuals may thus be read as a clear symptom of Caesar’s intention to secure the success and prominence of the foundation of Pola. We are not in a position to state how exceptional it was, since the names of the duouiri that carried out comparable foundations are unknown.

The choice to display the image of Hercules on the city gate might also point to a connection with Caesar, who is linked with Hercules in part of the literary tradition, although evidence for the cult of Heracles is well attested at Pola, Tergeste, Salona, and more widely across Dalmatia, and appears to predate the Roman conquest.

The question must be asked as to what factors made that foundation so attractive. Unlike Tergeste or Aquileia, Pola is a site of relatively minor significance to the land defence of north-east Italy, although it plays, of course, an important strategic role in the control of the Upper Adriatic. Strabo notes that the fertility of the countryside near Pola was a distinctive feature of the region (5.1.9), and it is unsurprising to find impressive evidence for centuriation across the ager of the colony, and beyond (we shall come back to that point in the following section). The foundation of Pola, therefore, is likely to have addressed two needs: providing a cohort of settlers with fertile land in an attractive location, and consolidating the Roman presence in the north Adriatic. In the shorter term, it may have also played a strategic function during the war against Pompey: control over a naval base in the northern part of the Adriatic, at a reasonably close range from the Italian coast, might have proved helpful, as the episode from the age of Cinna mentioned above suggests.

Unfortunately, evidence for the allegiances of the communities in Histria, Liburnia and Dalmatia during the Civil War is also lacking. One isolated exception is worth noting. Lucan depicts the tragic end that a cohort of Caesarian supporters from Opitergium met after the defeat of Caesar’s fleet at the island of Curicta (Krk/Veglia) in the Kvarner Gulf: when they realised that there was no hope of a successful counterattack, they decided to commit suicide en masse (4.474-520). This episode suggests that the loyalty of the communities in Histria during the war may have tended to side with the Pompeian camp, but it would be

---

66 Fraschetti (1983: 92-9). Maiuro (2012: 342-3) plausibly argues, on epigraphical grounds, that Calpurnius owned land in the ager of Pola, and that the Calpurnii Frugi that are later attested in the region were related to him.
unwise to draw general conclusions from a single incident for which the only source is an epic poem.\textsuperscript{72}

IV. ADMINISTRATIVE AND AGRARIAN CHANGE

It is doubtful that Caesar had any interest in promoting the foundation of the colony of Pola as a way to expand the boundaries of Cisalpine Gaul, or that the settlement of the colony is proof that Histria belonged within the province. The keen interest of much of modern scholarship in establishing whether the foundation of Pola was carried out in Cisalpine Gaul or in Illyricum is arguably misplaced.\textsuperscript{73} Wider considerations of Caesar’s desire to Romanise an area that had until then been on the fringes of the Roman dominions, or the opposite view that the foundation of a colony presupposes a high level of Romanisation or acculturation in the region are best left out of account.\textsuperscript{74} It is preferable to understand the foundation of the colony against the backdrop of whatever little evidence survives for other contemporary developments in the region. As we have seen, the history of Parentium in this period is unknown, and there is no compelling reason to envisage the creation of a municipium by Caesar on that site.\textsuperscript{75} The epitaph of the veteran L. Vinusius of the legio VIII Triumphalis from Vižinada/Visinada, about ten miles north-east of Poreč/Parenzo, suggests the possibility that some soldiers that had fought under Caesar and taken part in his triumph were eventually settled in that area.\textsuperscript{76} The surviving record does not get much more instructive if one moves further north. There is no evidence for Caesar’s dealings with Tergeste, and the view that it was one of his colonial foundations is baseless.\textsuperscript{77}

Caesar, however, took a direct interest in other parts of north-east Italy. At least two foundations may be safely attributed to him, both in connection with the presence of the Carni in the region: Forum Iulii (Cividale del Friuli) and Iulium Carnicum (Zuglio). On these

\textsuperscript{72} See Rossi (2008: 16-17) and Bandelli (2004: 119); Dzino (2010: 91-2) draws attention to the support that Caesar received from some communities of Liburnia.


\textsuperscript{75} Contra Vedaldi Iasbez (1994: 370-1); Šašel Kos (2000: 297); Carre, Kovačič and Tassaux (2011: 223).

\textsuperscript{76} CIL 5.397; see Keppie (1983: 202-3); cf. Todisco (1999: 133-4). Marchiori (2010: 80) argues that Vinusius had Histrian origins.

\textsuperscript{77} There is inscriptional evidence for public works promoted by Octavian in 33/32 BC (CIL 5.525 and 526), which should not be read as evidence for a Triumviral foundation either. Contra see Chilver (194: 23) and (independently) Sisani (in print: 125).
settlements, however, we also lack important details.\textsuperscript{78} Forum Iulium had evidently the status of a small settlement, a \textit{forum}. It is likely, but far from certain that it was established as such by Caesar; it may have been granted municipal status in 49 BC.\textsuperscript{79} Iulium Carnicum probably had a more specific military function. The neuter gender of the toponym suggests that the settlement was originally a \textit{forum}, or rather a \textit{castellum}, but by the mid-first century BC it certainly was a \textit{uicus}.\textsuperscript{80} The epigraphical evidence shows that the territory of the community encompassed a large geographical remit.\textsuperscript{81} Several sites in the neighbouring area show the presence of military outposts that date to the first century BC, and may be linked with Caesar or the Augustan period, and mostly developed further in the imperial period: at Amaro-Maleit, Monte Sorantri, and especially Verzegnis.\textsuperscript{82} At the same time, the site of Iulium Carnicum itself enabled control over a route leading up to Noricum, notably via the Passo di Monte Croce Carnico – a mountain pass that was also accessible from Forum Iulii and, indirectly, from Aquileia.\textsuperscript{83}

Other factors, however, made Histria an even more rewarding focus of interest to Caesar. There is valuable evidence for the agrarian setup of the peninsula, and especially of the territory of Pola, in this context, if which important historical implications may be drawn. That the territory around Pola clearly bears the traces of a centuriation grid, which displays a remarkable extent of continuity from the Roman period, was elegantly proved in the pioneering work of the great Triestine antiquarian Pietro Kandler, who drew up a detailed map of the \textit{pertica} of Pola.\textsuperscript{84} It is tempting, and indeed reasonable, to link the creation of this centuriation grid with the foundation of the colony and, therefore, with Caesar’s impact on

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{78} On Friuli before the coming of Rome see the useful overview in Bourdin (2012: 661-3).
\item \textsuperscript{80} \textit{CIL} 5.1829 and 1830. See Tarpin (2002: 350, X.2.1 and 2) and Mainardis (2008: 85-8, 93-6). Mainardis in \textit{SupplIt} 12, p. 78 and Šašel Kos (2000: 289-90, 294) stress that in this period both Iulium Carnicum and Naupontus had \textit{magistri uici} of libertine status.
\item \textsuperscript{81} Rossi (2008: 86-8). In general on Iulium Carnicum see Vedaldi Iasbez (1994: 339-51) and Mainardis (2008); on the pre-Roman occupation of the site see Vitri, Corazza and Petrucci (2013: 96-7).
\item \textsuperscript{82} On these sites see respectively Vitri, Corazza and Petrucci (2013: 108); Donat and Petrucci (2013: 119-24); Vannacci Lunacci (2013: 81). On early Imperial developments in the area cf. Donat and Petrucci (2013).
\item \textsuperscript{83} Rossi (2008: 267-8); De Franceschini (1998: 426). On the links between Aquileia, the rest of north-east Italy, and the Adriatic coastline see Magnani (2014). Buora and Magnani (2011) provide a valuable overview of the cluster of kilns that are attested immediately to the north of Aquileia, along the road leading up to Noricum. Horvat and Bavdek (2009: 141-7) offer the fullest discussion of road networks in the region in antiquity.
\item \textsuperscript{84} Published in Ramilli (1973).
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
Histria. The agrarian landscape of Pola is one of the best-known instances of centuriation in the whole of Roman Italy, powerfully illustrated in the map of centuriation in Roman Italy that P. Fraccaro drew up for the Mostra Augustea della Romanità of 1937, now on display at the Museo della Civiltà Romana in Rome. The study that J. Bradford conducted on the aerial photographs taken by the RAF enabled an even more comprehensive appreciation of the historic landscape of the Histrian peninsula, which integrated the study of the agrarian features with that of road networks.85 From the outcome of that project and from the studies of R. Chevallier it became apparent that the pattern of centuriation is not confined to the territory of Pola, but reaches far into that of Parentium.86 According to Chevallier’s estimate, about 750 centuriae of 20 actus each are safely attested in the ager of Pola, while about 100 are still extant in that of Parentium.

Much of the recent debate has concentrated on the relationship between the centuriation grids in the territories of both communities. G. Chouquer has argued, on the basis of evidence drawn from Google Earth, that the grid in the territory of Parentium is aligned along a different frame from that of Pola, and has inferred that the two grids relate to two different efforts.87 However, the recent full-scale reconsideration of the agrarian landscape of Histria by A. Marchiori has sketched a more reliable and considerably different picture, in which there is abundant evidence for continuity of centuriation between Pola and Parentium.88 The grid encompasses the whole range of the territories between the two agri, notably between the Leme Canal and the river Quieto, without being confined to the more obviously rewarding portions of the territory, such as the coast; a firm separation between colonists and indigenous population should not be readily assumed.89 In an unpublished paper, D. Bulić has recently developed Marchiori’s insight to its further logical development: the centuriations of the territories of the two communities are likely to have been carried out at the same time.90

These conclusions raise in turn significant questions. First, if the territories of two communities were given the same centurial setup, it is worth asking what relationship this had with the foundation of the colony of Pola, and what implications this has for the juridical status and the early history of Parentium. Pliny’s testimony, which differentiates between the

86 Chevallier (1961).
87 Chouquer (2007).
89 Ando (2016 : 282) makes valuable reading on the incorporation and integration of indigenous populations into colonial foundations under the Republic, in Cisalpine and beyond.
status of Pola as *colonia* and that of Parentium as *oppidum*, remains a hurdle to the hypothesis of a contemporaneous foundation. A possibility is worth entertaining: the *ager* around Parentium may have been centuriated along with that of Pola without a new administrative centre, whether of municipal or colonial status, being founded at the site of Parentium, which may have remained home for some time to a loosely organised settlement of Roman citizens included within the territory of Pola.91

Moreover, the different extents to which the centurial grid persisted around Pola and around Parentium respectively tell a different story. As Marchiori points out, the use of the rural territory in Parentium followed very different lines to that of Pola, leading to a far less noticeable extent of continuity of the Roman structures.92 This issue would take us well beyond the period to which this discussion is devoted and to the historical developments in Histria between the Middle Ages and the early modern period, and cannot be pursued here. A third problem remains unresolved: the relationship between Pola, where the traces of a Roman foundation are clearly attested, and the neighbouring site of Nesactium, which is usually associated with the history of the Histrian peninsula before the coming of Rome, and whose juridical status remains unclear. R. Matijašić, for instance, has suggested that Nesactium was a *municipium* without *ager*, virtually an enclave within the territory of Pola.93 The uncertainties on the status of Nesactium reflect a wider problem, which, like the centuriation of the territory of the city, has long been closely related to thorny political and historical controversies: that of the relationship and the power balance between the Roman conquerors and the indigenous population. The evidence is on the whole too scanty to enable safe conclusions, and much of the debate tends to unhelpfully confuse the Roman military and political presence with the category of ‘Romanization’.94 The apparent dearth of indigenous names in the scarce epigraphical evidence for the early history of the colony of Pola has prompted the leading authority on the history of Roman Histria to argue that the colonial foundation was accompanied by an ‘ethnic cleansing’ strategy by the Romans, which caused the removal of the indigenous element from the territory of the city and its marginalisation into peripheral and less fertile areas.95 The minimal survival rate of the

91 Cf. Keppie (1983: 203) for the suggestion that Parentium may have been a ‘non-colonial enclave of veterans’ before the foundation of an Augustan colony.
93 Matijašić (2010: 390-1); see also Rossi (2008: 311-35) and Sisani (in print: 130-1). Cf. Chilver (1941: 65): ‘there is room for another territorium beside that of Pola’.
94 Matijašić (2015: 317-8) offers some useful qualifications on this point.
evidence for Pola – which is partly matched by the evidence at Parentium – should warn against drawing rash conclusions. It is crucial not to transpose the developments of the mid-1940s to the Forties of the first century BC.

V. ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL DEVELOPMENTS IN HISTRIA

Advocating a more cautious approach to the impact of the colony of Pola on the indigenous population does not of course amount to denying that it had significant repercussions on the territorial and agrarian structures of the peninsula. The sheer scale of centuriation is a strong warning against that approach, and is not the only major shift that occurred at the time. Histria had long been a land of castellieri, notably of sites that were organised around hilltops: the most recent overview has counted 423 sites.\(^96\) The coming of Rome led to a shift from hilltop settlements to lowland ones, and to a gradual crisis of that model of settlement: the pace and intensity of that crisis, however, remains to be fully explored, and scope must be allowed for a degree of local differentiation.\(^97\) The colonisation of Pola and its rural hinterland introduced a framework that shifted the balance from the hilltops to the plain, and paved the way for a pattern of widely distributed land ownership. The potential that this new framework afforded was not fully grasped: within a couple of generations Histria became home to a considerable number of large estates, many of which were part of the imperial patrimonium.\(^98\) If there was a serious attempt to create sizeable clusters of small land ownership in order to provide for the settlers of Caesar’s colony (whether veterans or civilians) it does not appear to have lasted much beyond the space of a generation. In a way, this is a function of the attractiveness of the location at which the colony was created. However, the presence of two levels of elites – an exceptionally wealthy imperial aristocracy that dwarfed the decurional elite – is a distinctive feature of the social history of the region throughout the imperial period.\(^99\)

The agricultural landscape of Histria has some original characters that make it stand out from comparable regions in the Mediterranean context. It is not just exceptionally fertile, with a strong presence, in the central and southern sectors, of highly productive terra rossa, a reddish sticky clay that enables a remarkable range of cultivations, especially vineyards and

---

\(^{96}\) Buršic-Matijašić and Matijašić (2013: 182-3). On the typical archaeological facies of castellieri see Bernardini et al. (2013: 2153-6).


\(^{98}\) Maiuro (2012: 342-5).

olive trees, sustaining a thriving long-distance trade circuit with which the emperors are directly involved.\(^{100}\) The coastline was also home to salt-making and fish-salting plants, and structures for the production of purple, typically based on extensive villa sites.\(^ {101}\) As we have seen above, the western coast of Histria presents a number of natural ports, which play an important role in the trade within the peninsula, in the circulation of goods from site to site, from villa to villa, in a system that had its centre in the port of Pola, as a hub for long-distance trade.\(^ {102}\) Communications between the coastal areas and the inland regions were secured by rivers, first and foremost the Ningus (Mirna/Quieto), in the north of the peninsula.\(^ {103}\) It is not surprising to find evidence for such a strong effort of organisation of the rural territory around the colony – the extension of which, in relation with the urban site, is considerable and virtually unparalleled in the context of the Eastern Adriatic, except at Parentium.\(^ {104}\)

Unfortunately, the site of the colony itself provides hardly any evidence from the age of Caesar: except for the Porta Herculea, with its inscription of the first *duouiri*, the earliest features of the monumental landscape of the city date to the last quarter of the first century BC.\(^ {105}\) That is also the case with the temple recently excavated at the site of San Teodoro in Pula, probably dedicated to Hercules. The large amounts of oil and wine amphorae that have been discovered in the immediate vicinity of the temple, in the foundations of a portico and a courtyard, however, yield a clue as to the scale of the production and trade activity in the immediate aftermath of the foundation of Pola.\(^ {106}\) Charting the social rise of the local notables in the generations immediately following the creation of the colony is an equally hard operation. A notable case is that of the Laecanii Bassi, whose involvement with large-scale amphorae production in the early Principate has rightly received considerable attention.\(^ {107}\) C. Laecanius Bassus became urban praetor in AD 32 and consul in 40; his land

\(^{100}\) Marchiori (2010: 36-8); Carre, Kovačić and Tassaux (2011: 29). Matijašić (1993: 248) counted fifty sites in the territory of Pola with ‘known or possible remains of oil-processing facilities’.

\(^{101}\) Marzano (2013: 106-7); Macheboeuf-Bolšec Ferri-Hanry-Katunarić (2013).

\(^{102}\) Carre, Kovačić and Tassaux (2011: 58-9).

\(^{103}\) See Carre, Kovačić and Tassaux (2011: 125-7).

\(^{104}\) Matijašić (1994: 11).

\(^{105}\) Cf. Sisani (in press: 126), who argues that the colony was refounded in the Augustan period. However, Pliny’s *nunc Pietas Iulia* is no conclusive evidence for that scenario (cf. esp. 126 n. 113: the analogy between *Nat.* 3.129 and 4.110 is very loose).

\(^{106}\) Matijašić (2012: 446-7), with further bibliography: the amphorae (in excess of 2,000) were placed vertically and upside down; this technique was intended to secure the structural stability of a building on damp and unstable ground. For an earlier instance on a smaller scale (55 amphorae) cf. the discovery of a hoard of 55 amphorae in via Campo Marzio in Pula, which may date as early as the late second century BC: Starac-Matijašić (1991). On the evidence for the use of amphorae for drainage and reclamation purposes at Aquileia cf. Broadhead (2000: 148-9).

\(^{107}\) Tassaux (1982); Bezeczky (1995).
ownership in the ager of Pola is attested epigraphically (CIL 5.698), and an inscription shows that the tribal affiliation of his son is that of Pola, the Velina, but nothing is known about his ancestors.\(^{108}\) The trajectory that F. Tassaux constructed, postulating an interval of four generations between the foundation of the colony and Laecanius’ acceptance into the ordo, is merely the elegant application of an ideal type.\(^{109}\) The background of Sex. Palpellius Hister (cos. AD 43) is equally elusive.

If one takes into account the extent of centuriation in much of the peninsula of Histria, the rewards of agricultural production, and the development of the region in the following generation, Caesar’s choice to establish a colony at Pola seems best explained by economic considerations than by military ones. The relevance of the city to the control of the north-eastern frontier of Italy, in fact, is far from obvious. It is worth stressing that the evidence for the road from Pola to Tergeste, which was later refurbished and named as via Flavia, is hardly at all there for this period.\(^{110}\) Caesar’s preoccupation with the defence of the north-eastern frontier is also proven only by circumstantial evidence: there is no direct attestation of a connection with Tergeste, where there is no evidence whatsoever for centuriation.\(^{111}\) However, there is evidence for new developments further north. A road was certainly in existence between Aquileia and the Magdalensberg, where the presence of Roman traders is attested from the fifties.\(^{112}\) The notice in Vitruvius about the emergence of trade in larchwood from the region of Castellum Larignum to the Po Valley presupposes the existence of a reliable network of road infrastructure.\(^{113}\) The settlements of Iulium Carnicum and Forum Iulii are associated with the development of road networks to and from Aquileia, and the freedmen of families from Aquileia and Concordia are attested at Iulium Carnicum in this very period, no doubt in a commercial capacity.\(^{114}\) Conversely, Nauportus appears to have gone through a phase of decline.\(^{115}\) That may be linked with the development of neighbouring

---

\(^{108}\) The Velina is the tribal affiliation of Pola and Aquileia: see Linderski in Taylor (2013: 378) and Sisani (in press: 137 n. 181).

\(^{109}\) Tassaux (1982: 245-6).

\(^{110}\) Gramaticopolo (2004); Zanier (2013: 591). Cf. Salmon (1967: 133) on Caesar’s preference for colonial ‘settlements which could be reached only by crossing the sea’.


\(^{112}\) On this road see Faleschini (2013); on the presence of Italian traders at Magdalensberg see Tassaux (2004: 174), with further bibliography, and Gregoratti (2015: 240-3).

\(^{113}\) See Faleschini (2013: 263-4).

\(^{114}\) On this pattern of mobility see Tassaux (2004: 172-4).

\(^{115}\) Tassaux (2004: 176); Gregoratti (2012: 59-60).
Emona (modern Ljubljana), which a recent inscription from Bevke, probably dating to the Augustan period, places right on the north-eastern border of Aquileia’s territory.\textsuperscript{116}

\section*{VI. CONCLUSION: HISTRIA IN LATE REPUBLICAN ITALY}

This set of considerations lead us to a final problem, and a useful negative conclusion. There is no evidence whatsoever that Caesar was interested in firmly defining the boundaries of \textit{Italia}, or indeed that he envisaged the inclusion of Histria in Italy. Establishing whether he carried out his intervention in the Histrian peninsula as part of his activity in Cisalpine Gaul or in Illyricum is immaterial. Speaking of a master plan for north-east Italy on Caesar’s part is an over-interpretation of a limited field of evidence. On the other hand, the region was not a mere afterthought to Caesar. Some aspects of his involvement do repay close attention, and suggest that there was an earnest attempt on his part to put the Roman presence on a stronger footing, notably through two fundamental areas of intervention: the foundation of the colony of Pola, which was accompanied by the creation of a comprehensive centuriation grid across Histria, and the creation of new settlements north of Aquileia, Forum Iulii and Iulium Carnicum, on the road leading up to the Magdalensberg and Noricum. Economic considerations are likely to have prevailed at Pola, while they coexisted with strategic concerns in the establishment of the settlements in the Alpine and pre-Alpine area. Rather than envisaging the fulfilment of a bold and abstract master plan, one should think of Caesar’s involvement in this region in terms of the gradual accumulation and deployment of an increasingly precise local knowledge, in which different aims and concerns coexisted and interacted.

The nature and extent of Augustus’ debt to Caesar’s actions in the region remain unclear, but at least one issue may be singled out. As we have seen, Histria was included in the Augustan \textit{discriptio} of Italy: that decision is not explained as such in any of the literary sources. It is possible, though, that it had a direct link with Caesar’s action, and for a very pragmatic reason. The question should be asked of what a \textit{discriptio} was for. As M. H. Crawford has suggested, the likeliest explanation is that the \textit{regiones} were intended to be

\textsuperscript{116} \textit{AE} 2002, 532; cf. \textit{Plin. Nat.} 3.147. See \textit{Šašel Kos} (2002), (2012) and (2014); \textit{Dzino} (2010: 124), who view the inscription as evidence that Emona was part of Italy; the objections of \textit{Sisani} (in press: 105 n. 2) and \textit{Cortés Bárcena} (2015) to this hypothesis are compelling. No evidence links Caesar with Emona.
used for the purposes of military recruitment, and were not an Augustan creation.\(^{117}\) If that is indeed the case, the inclusion of Histria in the *regio* X has hardly anything to do with the ambition to encompass a (far from obvious) natural boundary, to define a more or less abstract notion of *Italia*, or to reward the good people of Histria with the Roman citizenship. It was arguably driven by the intention to include that territory in the area where the levy could be carried out. This was a symptom – and a recognition on Rome’s part – of the prosperity and stability that the region had reached, in which the Caesarian foundation of Pola no doubt played a major role. The notion that this complex and controversial development in the concept of *Italia* was rooted in logistical considerations and, ultimately, in material factors is certainly worth entertaining, and appears to carry stronger explanatory power than other lines of enquiry. The discussion of the elusive and rather unambitious aims of Julius Caesar in a part of Italy of which he had modest direct experience has to come to terms with a highly fragmentary field of evidence, but may offer some insights in the long-running dynamics of the Roman conquest.

FEDERICO SANTANGELO

*Newcastle University*

federico.santangelo@ncl.ac.uk

\(^{117}\) Crawford (2002: 1132-3).

---

**Bibliography**


