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Multiple Racialisations in a Multiply Modern World

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Abstract

In the context of increasing dissatisfaction with ‘Eurocentric’ models of racialisation, this paper draws on the idea of plural modernities to offer an alternative. It argues that diverse modernities and racialisations are ‘co-evolving’ and interwoven and that these processes have been profoundly shaped by, but cannot be reduced to merely a set of local reflections of, Western influence. After introducing and contextualising these themes, the paper sets out the main opportunities offered by, as well as the limitations of, a research focus on co-evolving racialised modernities.

Keywords

racialisations; interactionism; plural modernities; post-Eurocentrism; non-West; social theory

Introduction

This paper seeks to connect two new areas of study, namely the geographically diverse nature of racialisation and the plural nature of modernity. There is a growing body of scholarship on non-Western forms of racialisation.

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(Dikötter 1992, 1997a; Kowner and Demel 2014a; Law 2012, 2014; Mullaney 2011; Zakharov 2015; Berg and Wendt 2011; Weitz 2002, 2003; Myers 2011). Despite its heterogeneity this work has tended to offer a similar sociological and historical claim, namely that traditions of ethnic discrimination outside of the West were turned into modern practices of race and racism because of the impact of Western racialized modernity. This article argues, by contrast, that diverse racialisations can be explained in terms of diverse modernities and, hence, that the intertwined and multiple routes and roots of racialisation and modernity should be considered together.

There are three parts to this paper. In the first part I examine existing explanations of the global reach and multiplicity of racialisation. After outlining the context, novelty and some of the hesitancy that surrounds the topic I focus on the ‘interactionist’ model elaborated by Dikötter (2008). Rather than disputing the central tenet of interactionism (i.e., that Western ideas and practices of racialisation were adopted and adapted by non-Western societies) I suggest that this insight would be deepened by acknowledging the interplay of racialisations and modernities.

In the second part I reprise the relationship between modernity and racialisation, a link that has been repeatedly established across the field of ethnic and racial studies. It is noted how the two processes connect through the development of ideas and practices of essentialised hierarchy; ideas and practices that represent a rupture from tradition and a shift to instrumental and often (but not exclusively) technocratic forms of reason and action. I then introduce plural modernities as a non-Eurocentric approach to the study of modernity and offer Harootunian’s (2000) concept of co-evolving modernities as a model that usefully captures both connection and difference. Thus, rather than construing the planet as a mosaic of stand-alone and equally powerful modernities (with their paired racialisations), I suggest that a more accurate image is of a world of interwoven modernities and racialisations; a process that has been profoundly shaped by (but cannot be reduced to merely a set of local reflections of) Western influence.

Section three identifies and exemplifies three areas where a co-evolving modernities approach may bring new insights to the study of racialisation. First, it
facilitates the geographical and historical decentring of the study of racialisation. Second, it offers a more balanced and historically accurate model of interactionism. Third it opens up new vantage points on mobile and multicultural societies. This section then addresses potential criticisms of such an approach. It is noted that, whilst critiques of the way some ‘multiple modernities’ arguments reify and separate different modernities can be avoided by adopting a ‘co-evolving’ approach, other issues concerning the delimitation of modernities do need to be acknowledged. In the conclusion the implications of the ideas advanced here are discussed for ethnic and racial studies.

Models of racialisation beyond the West

Anthropological, sociological and historical studies of racialisation outside the West were written before the 1990s (Wagatsuma 1968; Gergen 1968; Herrenschmitt 1982; Lewis 1971). However, they were small in number and isolated interventions with little impact on the wider field of ethnic and racial studies. Referring to his own monograph on China (Dikötter, 1992), Dikötter (2008, 1492) notes that “[o]nly in 1992 was the first systematic historical analysis of a racist belief system outside Europe and America published”. Since then a series of studies have critiqued the idea that “Europeans were the sole inventors of race” (Shoemaker 1997, 625) and/or have depicted the inter-play of European and non-European traditions of racialisation. Nearly all the work in this area has been area based, with a notable focus on East Asia (Kowner and Demel 2014a; Dikötter 1997a), especially Japan (Siddle 1996; Weiner 1994, 2009; Dower 1998; Koshiro 2003) and, increasingly, China (Dikötter 1990, 1992; Mullaney 2011; Leibold 1997; Crossley 1999; Johnson 2011). There is a smaller body of work on North Africa and the Middle East (Lewis 1990; Hamel 2013; Esseissah 2016) and South Asia (Robb 1997; Baber 2004; McDuie-Ra 2015), the latter overlapping with an increasing willingness to address the connections between caste, religion and racialisation (Das 2014; Baber 2010).

This body of work is too disparate and its interests too particular to be called a school and its practitioners rarely attempt to offer interpretations of racialisation at a global or transnational scale. However, they tend to share the view that, although
Western ideas and practices provide the dominant and, perhaps, original form, of racial ideology and practice, nevertheless, an exclusive focus on race as a Western ‘invention’ is inadequate and parochial. Thus, introducing the edited volume Race and Racism in Modern East Asia Kownen and Demel (2014b, 10) set their endeavours against a backdrop of what they call “the general ‘classical’ Eurocentric bias”. Using similar language Berg and Wendt (2011, 2) argue that “the notion that Westerners simply imposed racism on the rest of the world in a top-down fashion may well reflect a Eurocentric interpretation of a Eurocentric ideology”. Law (2014, 3) goes further when he calls the idea “that racism is a purely European invention” an example of “supreme arrogance”. In part, the charge of Eurocentricism reflects another common assumption found across many of these interventions, namely that in an increasingly ‘multipolar’ world, a binary model of historical agency, in which Western power is pitted against ‘Third World’ powerlessness or resistance, has become anachronistic, even a “nostalgic fantasy” (Taylor 2011, 176). This critique is given political charge by numerous examples of the way that the geographical ‘othering’ of racism as a Western problem or disease is used by political elites to suppress the validity of protests against discrimination. Thus, for example, Deng Xiaoping was able to claim that “there has never been any ethnic discrimination in China” (cited by Zang 2015, xvii). Citing such denials in the case of China Dikötter (1997b, 2-3) notes that they constitute a “rhetorical strategy used to delay the introduction of clear definitions of racial discrimination into the country’s legal system”.

That explorations of racialisation outside Europe and the Americas remain somewhat indigestible in ethnic and racial studies is reflected in the hesitancy with which they are incorporated into many of the field’s attempts to produce international surveys of racism and anti-racism. The kinds of studies cited above are not mentioned at all in some edited collections (for example, Bowser 1995) whilst, in others, we find the inclusion of just one or two essays on non-Western forms of racialisation, essays that appear disconnected from the other chapters (for example, Bulmer and Solomos 1999; Cornwell and Stoddard 2001; Stone and Dennis 2003; for a more inclusive example see Reilly, Kaufman, and Bodino 2003). In his comparative overview of “racial conditions” Winant (1994) offers a brief but intriguing allusion to the possibility of a more inclusive approach. Although his focus is largely
on the USA and Brazil, Winant (111) writes that, “[w]hile perhaps more properly defined as ‘ethnic’, ferocious conflicts taking places at the fringes of the ‘developed’ world … exhibit at least ‘protoracial’ features”. This passage raises more question than it answers, not least why and how scholars establish where the “fringes” are and why we, “perhaps”, should expect to find “ethnicity” in such places whilst the Americas have race? The argument that group conflict in the ‘fringes’ may contain essentialising dynamics in a ‘proto’ form is not defended or developed by Winant. Yet the fact that he mentions it and, moreover, prefixes the term “‘protoracial’” with “at least”, suggests that he wants to leave the door open for the possibility of comparative work on “racial conditions” becoming more plural in both its cultural and geographical scope.

I will now set out the three models which have been applied to understand how racialisation has occurred beyond Euro-America. Adapting the approach to this question devised by Dikötter (2008), I label these models ‘universalist’, ‘disseminationist’ and ‘interactionist’. The universalist approach encompasses the idea that race is a real biological fact and, hence, racialisation is a universal tendency and/or the notion that the psycho-social process of group ‘othering’ is universal and, hence, we are likely to see racialisation in every culture. Although the former position has almost no traction today in ethnic and racial studies, the latter remains resilient in some fields in psychology. Thus, for example, Mallon (2013 79) adopts this perspective as a challenge to what he casts as the “historical emergence of racial essentialism hypothesis”. More distant echoes of universalism can also be heard in generalisations about the longevity of racism. Thus, for example, in his study of ancient ‘proto-racism’ Isaac notes that “[r]acism has been with us for a long time and in various cultures, adopting various different shapes” (2004, 3). In similar vein Shi-mei Shih (2008, 1355) suggests that “it is arguable that racism broadly defined … as heterophobia, has existed for millennia”.

As this last statement implies, the broader our definition the easier it is to depict racialisation as permanent and, by implication, innate and universal. Most versions of universalism tend to have flexible and wide definitions of the topic and, hence, suffer from a lack of geographical and historical specificity. These limitations, in part, explain the attractiveness of the more geographically and historically specific
accounts provided by ‘disseminationism’. This term is used here to refer to a combination of what Dikötter (2008) calls the “imposition” and “diffusion” models, the former referring to the direct export by Europeans of their own racist practices and ideas and the latter the replication of these practices and ideas when “prejudice is copied and assimilated locally” (1481). Both models lend themselves to the representation of racism as an alien ‘virus’ or contamination (for example, Dharampal-Frick and Gotzen 2011). Disseminationism has been important in shaping both academic and non-academic narratives of racialisation. The former may be exemplified by Banton’s definition of racialisation as a process “applied tentatively in European historical writing and then, more confidently, to the populations of the world” (1978, 18-19). The popular version of this argument can be illustrated by reference to the kind of transference of the problem and source of racism to the West noted earlier. The closely related notion that racism is ‘not our problem’ is further illustrated by Chakrabarty when he argues that Indian policy makers do not consider the topic to be a substantive domestic concern since “racism’ is thought of as something that white people do to Indians” (Chakrabarty 1994, 145).

In 1993 Miles argued that “debate about the nature and scope of racism” has moved on in response to increasing attention to the way that, “in part, the origins of racism can be traced to pre-capitalist social relations within and beyond Europe” (1993, 7). However, over two decades later the notion that racism is “a European invention” (van Dijk 2013) and a “European phenomenon” (Strauss 1998, 128) remains dominant. One of the most theoretically significant challenges to this approach is what Dikötter calls the “interactive model”. This model, he explains, “emphasizes the worldviews constructed by local historical agents, analysing the complex cognitive, social and political dimensions behind the indigenization and appropriation of racist belief systems” (Dikötter 2008, 1482). Dikötter (2011, 24) roots this approach in ‘reception studies’, a tradition described by Culler as addressing the “changing intelligibility” of different narratives by “identifying the codes and interpretative assumptions that give them meaning for different audiences at different periods” (1981, 13). For Dikötter an emphasis on the adaptation and adoption of interpretative traditions offers the possibility both of breaking free from “Eurocentric bias” and representations of racism as a “uniform phenomenon” (2008, 1482).
Although he has given a label to ‘interactionism’ Dikötter is not alone in adopting it. Nearly all of the authors cited earlier who critique a singular focus on Euro-American ideas and practices have also attempted to reorient the debate towards processes of exchange and non-Western agency (see also Müller 2011). However, whilst the concept of ‘interactionism’ is empirically fertile it is not theoretically sufficient. To put this critique more forcibly, whilst interactionism offers a plausible motif and focus, it is not sociologically innovative and has tended to reproduce a familiar model of global change in which the ‘old traditions’ of the non-European world adapt to the new ideas and practices coming from the West. Another way of framing this critique is to note that interactionists tend to accept that ‘racial logic’ is a child of modernity yet rarely challenge the notion that modernity is a creation of the West. Thus their vision of ‘interaction’ will always tend towards a focus on the meeting of tradition and modernity and the old with the new (though see Lei 2014; Leibold 1997).

Nevertheless, across the range of interactionist literature the notion that non-Western forms of modernity can be linked to non-Western forms of racism has a sub-textual life and is occasionally clearly discernible. This will become apparent in a later section where I exemplify the specific insights afforded by a co-evolving modernities approach to the study of racialisation. Another example is provided by Young (1997, 160) who, arguing against those who have “mistakenly assumed that Japanese race thinking was entirely derivative”, notes that it should, in part, be seen in the “context of the experiences of the Japanese themselves with colonialism”. Yet the implication that Japanese colonial modernity provided a key context for Japanese racism is not developed further by Young. Depicting the “new theory of polyracism” which, because of its focus on the interplay of interpretive traditions, I approach here as a variety of interactionism, Law (2014, 161; see also Milner 2015; Zakharov and Law 2017) offers a clearer sign-post towards joining-up modernities and racisms. He proposes the “conceptualization of the historical development of multiple origins of racism in different regions and forms” and pits this against “the monoracism arguments positing linear diffusion of Western racisms” (161). Crucially he also suggests a theoretical framework for this empirical broadening:
rather than racism being the product solely of Western modernity, polyracism theory argues that it is also pre-modern (proto-racism), non-Western, non-capitalist (Communist) and the product of other varieties of modernity. (Law 2014, 161)

This paper draws out the possibilities and implications of Law’s last phrase, those “other varieties of modernity”. My argument is that a plural modernities approach can help develop the interactionist (and ‘polyracist’) framework, providing it with a theoretical framework in which to examine how modernities interact with racialisations. The next step in this argument is to explain why racialisation is intertwined with modernities.

**Racialisations and modernities**

When Hesse (2007, 643) argues that “[m]odernity is racial” or Goldberg that race is “one of the central conceptions of modernity” (1993, 3) or Wieviorka (1994, 174) that “racism is inseparable from modernity” they are repeating one of the central sociological and historical claims of ethnic and racial studies (see also Silva 2007). But they are also implying a geographical argument: the West is the origin of racialisation. Thus having said that “[m]odernity is racial” Hesse’s next sentence elides both terms with a set of cultural and spatial ideas: “Whiteness, Christian, the West, Europeanness comprise a series of racial tropes intimately connected with organicist and universalist metaphors so frequently assumed in various canonical accounts of modernity” (Hesse 2007, 643-644). Thus modernity, the West and racialisation are run together, their history conflated into a single geo-historical and cultural phenomenon, to which capitalism is also often added (Balibar and Wallerstein 1991).

Although the geographical component of this argument is challenged in this paper, the idea that racial thinking is produced within and shaped by modernity remains compelling. The modernity of race does not rely on a denial of the importance of proto-racial forms in the pre-modern past. Indeed many historians of race insist both that race “emerged as an original and imaginative contribution to
modernity” and that pre-modern tropes were reworked within modern contexts (Hannaford 1996, 6). However, what Mallon (2013) calls the “paradigmatic break” thesis asserts that, beginning in the late seventeenth century and gaining considerable momentum from the late eighteenth century onwards, the modern idea of race was produced and characterised by the pursuit of classification-seeking and hierarchical perspectives on human group difference. The master trope of this process is essentialism which works together with universalism and reification to produce a “representational strategy designed to fix “difference” and thus secure it for ever” (Hall 1997, 245).

For those familiar with models of modernity as a disruptive and alienating process in which “all that is solid melts into air” (Marx and Engles 2016, 11), its identification with fixing difference and trying to “secure it for ever” presents a paradox. However, a more pressing question is what would happen if what we meant by ‘modernity’ could be geographically diversified and extended? If such a move is plausible and possible it would challenge the way racialisation is currently discussed.

Plural modernities is one of the most significant theoretical developments in global historical sociology and anthropology from the last thirty years and has quickly built up a variety of schools and traditions. Despite their somewhat different terminology and academic audiences, proponents of ‘multiple’, ‘entangled’ and ‘alternative’ modernities, are better understood as offering different points of emphasis within this field rather than as discrete projects. These forms have been interpreted as regional, civilisational, and/or national and as offering different, although interconnected, trajectories for modernity, both from the past and into the future (for example, Islamic modernities; see Al-Azmeh 1996; Arjomand 2011; communist modernities; see Arnason 2000; Latin American modernities, see Mignolo 2011; African modernities, see Deutsch, Probst, and Schmidt 2002; Gilroy 1993). The intersection with post-colonial studies has given plural modernities political impetus and come to frame it as a challenge both to what Quijano (2000, 543) calls “the European patent on modernity” and Chakrabarty (2009) describes as Europe’s attempt to universalise its own “provincial” history. The evocation and analysis of modernities as an anti-Eurocentric force is closely allied with the wider post-colonial ambition to challenge Western authority; or what Mercer, Mohan and Power call the
“welcome recentering of ‘local’ knowledges and practices” (2003, 430). Indeed, Arjomand (2014, 34) writes of the “convergence” of multiple modernities with post-colonial “challenges to metropolitan theory”. Extending her argument for the recognition of diverse urban modernities, Robinson even suggests there is a “right to be modern, for cities of all kinds” (2006, 76; see also Appadurai 1996). Thus plural modernities are rendered into a politically attractive narrative of resistance and autonomy.

Other voices are more alert to the way that modernity contains both regressive and progressive tendencies. “Neglecting, isolating or exceptionalising the ‘dark’ side of modernity/ies”, argues Doná (2012, 240), obscures its complex and wide-ranging connections with ethnic violence. In fact, an interest in modernities’ ‘dark sides’ was at the core of some of the earliest and most seminal statements in the plural modernities tradition. Thus, for example, Eisenstadt’s (1999, 2) work was focused on what he called “the Jacobin, totalistic, participatory, and later totalitarian” varieties of modernity. Eisenstadt’s global historical sociologies gave geographical range to Adorno and Horkheimer’s (1979) critique of the Enlightenment. He did this by arguing that authoritarianism and reification is a chronic but plural feature of the way that diverse modernities politicise identity and overturn traditional forms of knowledge. An equally impressive resource for thinking through the Janus-faced nature of modernities, and one that is particularly useful here, is Overcome by Modernity by Harootunian (2000). This book unpacks Japanese nationalist intellectuals’ engagements with modernity in the 1920 and 1930s. Harootunian is particularly critical of attempts to reduce plural modernities to a discourse of celebrating oppositional or alternative modernities (see also Bonnett 2005, 2006). He casts such attempts as the demotion of non-Western modernity to the status of mere resistance. “[N]ew, often outrageous classifications like ‘alternative modernities’”, he argues, are designed to “to safely situate societies like Japan in a historical trajectory derived from another’s development” (xvi). Harootunian offers “co-eval modernity” as a non-Eurocentric and non-parochial way of thinking about ‘interaction’. As the term suggests, ‘co-evalists’ insist on setting examples of modernity within a global and relational setting. This emphasis disrupts the focus on civilizational essences and religious roots that can be found in Eisenstadt. For Harootunian what “co-eval suggests is contemporaneity yet the possibility of difference”. At other times
Harootunian describes the “co-eval” as “a doubling” (xvii), albeit one that negotiates both difference and simultaneity.

Rather than trying to replicate Harootunian’s ideas here – ideas which are, in part, specific to Japan – I take them as a starting point. To clarify my framework I offer the following definition of ‘co-evolving modernities’. It refers to two things: 1) the emergence of modernity, defined as a post-traditional rupture with the past that reconstitutes and opens up existing social identities and relations and orients them towards instrumental, technocratic and/or political ends; and 2) the simultaneous development and interaction of different forms of modernity. The world of co-evolving modernities is a world of mutual and multiple destabilisations but not of equivalent power. It is clear that that the power of Western modernity (which is itself multiple) has been a dominating and defining force (a fact that helps explain why so many still construe ‘Western modernity’ as a tautology).

Understanding how co-eval modernities intersect with racialisation requires empirical investigation but three points flow from the above: 1) within modern societies traditions of human difference are likely to re-worked, challenged and opened to outside influence; 2) post-traditionalism can produce and become intertwined with the essentialisation of group identity; 3) co-eval modernities emerged in the context of Western global power (hence, one would expect Western forms of racialisation to help shape non-Western forms of racialisation). These three points suggest a fourth, namely that the association of modernity and racialisation is contingent and likely to be cross-cut with different ‘local’ concerns and cultural traditions.

Multiple racialisations: opportunities and challenges

This section identifies three research opportunities afforded by a co-evolving modernities perspective on racialisation. It then addresses the potential problems of such an approach. The three opportunities can be summarised as internationalisation, a more balanced view of interactionism and an awareness of the diversity of racialisations at work in mobile, multicultural societies. Each of the
depictions offered below is necessarily brief but is exemplified by reference to ongoing empirical studies, with a particular focus on research on the interplay of modernity and race in China and the USSR.

A co-evolving modernities approach encourages the internationalisation of ethnic and racial studies, in part by encouraging an engagement with new work scattered throughout so-called ‘area studies’ (‘so-called’ because this appellation is rarely given to the study of European or North American societies). Thus, for example, processes of social uprooting and the reification of models of human difference are to the fore in a number of recent histories of ethnicity and race in China. The destabilisation of traditional identities and the development of new, more rigid and exclusionary forms is emphasised both in the field of ‘critical Han studies’ (Mullaney 2011; Mullaney et al. 2012) and by Crossley (1999) and Dikötter (1992, 1997a). Dikötter (1992, 1) allies the claim that “successive periods of contact with frontier peoples fostered proto-nationalist feelings and generated consciousness of biological continuity” to the broader observation that “from an internal perspective, the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries were an age of profound transition for the Confucian world” (32). Although Crossley (1999) prefers to depict these processes in terms of the rise of ethnic consciousness, she also details how more rigid and formalised demarcations and hierarchies emerged over the same period that connected processes of physical and cultural ‘othering’. She roots these processes in the context of imperial expansion and “imperial disintegration” and suggests that were “a corollary of whatever we may understand as China’s ‘modernization’” (Crossley 1999, 27).

Such studies provide a valuable resource for expanding our understanding of the global diversity of racialisation. This can also be said of recent work on the ambivalent but important role of racialisation in the management of the USSR’s diverse population. For example, Law (2012, 18) writes that it was the “Soviet regime’s conception of modernity” that “facilitated both the reproduction and development of racist/antiracist, colonial/anticolonial forms of governance, and the construction/destruction of ethnicities” (see also Weitz 2003; Roman 2007; Zakharov 2015; Hirsch 2002). The ambition of many senior Soviet leaders was to create a categorisable and manageable population, in which ethnic groups could be
normalised and commence what Stalin (1942, 208) in 1930 called “fusion into a single, common, socialist (both in form and content) culture”. Weitz (2003, 96) elaborates on the racial consequences of this vision as well as its paradoxical momentum, in which the attempt to impose a “quintessential enlightenment utopia” saw entire ethno-racial groups identified as inherently suspect and punished *en masse*.

The geographical and historical expansion of the study of modern racialisations should not proceed through the transposition or translation of what happened in the West elsewhere but, rather, by engaging with the way that the relationship between modernity and racialisation has taken a variety of routes. A co-evolving approach suggests that this kind of engagement must be allied to the study of connections and overlaps as well as differences. As we have seen, existing versions of interactionism tend to posit a pre-modern non-West interacting with a modern West. This model has an in-built and teleological tendency to assume an outcome of Westernisation. By contrast the framework advanced in this paper draws attention to the interplay of both particular racialising practices as well as more general currents. An example of the former is the interaction of Soviet and Western eugenics. Rudling’s (2014) examination of the interchange of eugenic theories between the West and USSR in the 1920s shows how notions of race improvement appealed, albeit in different ways and for different political reasons, to both Soviet and Western intellectuals and policy makers. Evidencing what he calls the “strong interconnections between Russian racism and Western racisms” Law (2012, 33) also draws attention to how Soviet leaders use and encouragement of eugenic research adapted Western ideas, notably through the development of neo-Lamarckian and pro-Soviet notions of hereditary. Broader interconnections between racialised modernities can be exemplified by returning to the work of Dikötter (1992) and Crossley (1999) who evidence how an increasingly post-traditional Chinese society interacted with Social Darwinian and other racist discourses emanating from the West, discourses that began to be translated and circulate in China from the late nineteenth century. Thus, for example, the anti-imperial and pro-Han reformers active in the early twentieth century spliced and cross-fertilised what Crossley calls an existing “ideology of genealogical and archetypal identity” (1999, 338) with Western theories of race evolution and progress in order to undermine and attack
the country’s Manchu rulers. This complex confluence of social change and outside influence reworked existing ideas of human difference in ways that were simultaneously modern, Chinese and foreign.

The third of the insights that a co-evolving modernities approach suggests concerns those racialisations at work in mobile, multicultural societies. To conceptualise the contemporary city as a site of connection between diverse modernities and diverse racialisations offers a dynamic and complex vision of its present and possible futures. We may find echoes of a similarly multifaceted approach in recent work on post-secularism, in which the city is represented as sustaining a variety of modern religious and non-religious identities (Eade 2012; Beaumont and Butler 2011). It also has an interestingly problematical relationship with the representation of the multicultural city as a site of “cosmopolitization” (Beck and Grande, 2010). Beck and Grande (2010, 418) link cosmopolitan theory to the fact that “the global other is in our midst” allows an “open[ing] up to the existence of multiple modernities” (417; see also Appiah, 2006). However, if modernities and racialisations are plural and interconnected, then the chain of association which Beck and Grande assume, between more multiculturalism and more cosmopolitanism becomes uncertain. Indeed, it suggests that the diverse city is likely to witness multiple forms of racism, cosmopolitanism and modernity competing and connecting.

A range of critiques of plural views of modernity have emerged. Some turn on the charge that such ideas are wishful thinking and that there is not sufficient evidence to represent modernity as rooted outside of the West (Schmidt 2007). A related criticism is that such approaches are too celebratory. For example, Hart (2002, 817) claims that advocates offer “remarkably uncritical – at times even celebratory – visions of the novelty, variety and multiplicity of capitalist modernities”. Watts (2003, 443) sees in “the growing clamour to ‘provincialize Europe’” a cultural reflection of footloose and flexible capitalism. This “clamour”, Watts tells us, reflects a series of attempts to re-write the history of capitalism as a multi-sited but universal human story and thus echo what he calls the “neo-liberal ‘grand slam’” (443). One of the advantages of integrating the study of modernities with racialisation is that it allows us to move decisively away from a global vision that can be called
‘celebratory’. In stark contrast to Watt’s depiction, it also enables an acknowledgment of the politically diverse pathways taken by modernity and race.

However, other criticisms appear are more pertinent, notably the argument that theories of plural modernities are a “current meta-narrative” and “cannot obliterate the logical requirement of representing variation against something that is invariable” (Englund and Leach 2000, 228). In the words of Friedman, those “who adamantly claim modernity for the entire world are replicating that which they enthusiastically claim to escape” (2002, 309). A related objection turns on Dirlik’s (2011, 34) contention that “‘Chinese modernity’ itself is a meaningless term, as it conceals the many modernities that have historically vied for supremacy, each of them seeking to capture ‘Chineseness’ for its own cause”. A similar point could be made about the categories ‘the West’ and ‘Western modernity’, slippery terms which have been shown to have evolved across and between both Western and non-Western societies (Bonnett 2004).

These points need to taken seriously but, in defence, I would note that they could be applied to most discussions of modernity. The diversity of a form or process, or the fact that it is historically contingent and socially constructed, does not make it meaningless but in need to social scientific study and disaggregation (see Klein 2014). Dirlik’s further suggestion that we should “shift the location of modernity from nations, regions and civilizations … to institutions and ways of thinking” (2002, 24) offers a valuable corrective against the assumption that studies in this area need to be framed in territorial terms. However, rather than taking Dirlik’s comment to imply that geography is irrelevant, it would be more productive to bring the analysis of “institutions and ways of thinking” into conversation with spatially delimited as well as multiscalar and transnational practises and ideologies of racialised modernity.

Conclusions

Why restrict our deconstruction of racial logics to the operation of Western capitalist modernity? This arbitrary decision has serious consequences in
putting many polities and contexts out of critical sight and deeming them as unworthy of interrogation. (Law 2014, 161)

Dikötter echoes Law’s concerns when he describes racial and ethnic studies as “dangerously underdeveloped” because of its “excessively narrow frame of analysis which has reduced the formation of racialised identities in the contemporary world to a uniquely ‘Western’ phenomenon” (Dikötter 1997b, 11). Yet Law is wrong to suggest that the traditional Western focus of studies of “racial logics” was an “arbitrary decision”. It is an entirely explicable reflection of the imbalance of power between the West and the non-West. The global balance of power is not a fixed thing but mobile and multifaceted. Indeed, it has become increasing common to depict contemporary social change as what Pieterse (2006, 70) calls a “multicentric global process”. In 1995 Featherstone looked forward to this development and, in so doing, fleshed out the thesis that “the end of modernity” was leading, not to a condition beyond modernity (such as postmodernity), but to the pluralisation of modernity.

[The West has ‘peaked’ with an accompanying sense of exhaustion. But there is no sense of exhaustion in East Asia and other parts of the world which are pursuing their own national and civilisational blend of modernity. Hence it may be propitious to speak of modernities rather than modernity. (Featherstone 1995, 83-4)

Over the past twenty years the openness to the diversity of modernity that Featherstone offered as “propitious” has become increasingly necessary and inevitable. This process does not just open up the present but also the past: the routes and roots of today’s modernities demand a simultaneous turn towards both geography and history. In this paper I have sought to respond to this new mood by drawing together the debate on non-Western racialisation with the debate on plural modernities. Rather than construing the world in terms of discrete, ‘stand alone’, modernities with their paired racialisations, I have emphasised the interwoven nature of both modernities and racialisations. I have also sought to show that these processes have been influenced, shaped and provoked by, but cannot be reduced to being merely a local echo of, Western power and influence.
I have offered this approach as a contribution to ‘interactionist’ work on non-Western racialisations. Yet a shift towards ‘modernities rather than modernity’ would also have consequences for the wider sub-field, where theoretical and historical explanations of racialisation have, for the past four decades, centred on the mutual constitution of Western modernity and Western ‘racial logic’. To move beyond constructions of “racial thinking” as something that “circulated by boat in the European voyage of discovery” (Goldberg 2009, 1275) is to deepen the field’s critical capacity and extend its geo-cultural range.

This expansion of historical and geographical scope is daunting and inevitably suggests that the present paper should be read as an exploratory and provisional statement. There are other ways of interrogating plural racialised modernities and further complexities to consider. It would be useful to bring the present project into further conversation with work on the unsettling, paradoxical, nature of modernity; what Geschiere and Meyer (1998) call modernity’s “dialectics of flow and closure”. The way that modernity acts to both disintegrate and ‘fix’ identities should not be side-stepped by a fascination with its rationalist, categorizing and essentialist aspects (the present paper may be accused of doing precisely that).

Having taught a university course on ‘International and Historical Perspectives’ on race and racism since 1994, I have witnessed the academic literature become somewhat more internationalised. There are more resources and studies that concern the world beyond Europe and the Americas than there were twenty years ago. Yet, given the fast paced reorientations of global power that have occurred over the same period, this change has been slow, fitful and remains more akin to a supplementary development than a major shift. Twenty or so years ago I was told that, because my university course deals with topics such as racism in China and Russia that its contents were ‘exotic’ and not ‘mainstream’. I was told the same thing in 2016. Expectations about the range of places that might concern a course about racism remain geographically narrow. Moreover, despite the contributions of scholars such as Dikötter and Law, much of the new work cited in this paper remains particular in its geographical scope and generally has, at best, a residual location in the field’s main compilations and collections. It can sometimes
feel as if we are still to catch up with the implications of an increasingly ‘polycentric’ world and the wider social scientific shift from talking about modernity to modernities. But catch up we must: connecting racialisation to modernity was once a necessary advance; today connecting racialisations to modernities is equally important.
References


