Podemos: politics as a 'task of translation'

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Abstract: This article focuses on the central role that translation —understood in both a linguistic and a conceptual sense— plays within the emergence and evolution of the Spanish party Podemos, created in 2014 in response to the new social and political cycle opened with the 15M/indignados' movement of 2011. On the one hand, the translation of political concepts developed by Antonio Gramsci, Ernesto Laclau, and Chantal Mouffe has played a significant role in the construction of the political discourse mobilised by Podemos. On the other hand, an understanding of political communication in terms of translation has shaped Podemos’ discourse to a significant extent. Drawing on these analyses, the article argues that an important part of Podemos’ strengths and weaknesses are indebted to translation practices, and opens the door to a wider understanding of politics in terms of translation.

Keywords: Podemos; translation and politics; translation and social movements; translation of populism; indignados.

Translation in contemporary politics

Translation and interpreting currently play a central, yet frequently unacknowledged role in the wave of mobilisations, popular uprisings, and political transformations to have swept the world in recent years. Both voluntary and professional translators and interpreters have been paramount in the dissemination of information on these processes, either by providing linguistic and logistical support to foreign journalists covering the events (as in the case of 'fixers': Gunter 2011), or by raising international awareness to these causes and developments through the means of translation (Baker 2016a, 2016b; Emmerich 2015; Selim 2016). A variety of journals and collaborative sites —including but not limited to Open Democracy, Rebelión, Sin Permiso, Le Monde Diplomatique, Révolution Permanente, Paris-Luttes or Traducciones de la Revolución
Siria—have consistently used translation to provide context and coverage. Furthermore, translational processes have frequently been at play in the construction of these events, as concepts and names associated with specific protests—such as 'Occupy', 'Tahrir' or 'indignados'—have been displaced and relocated across linguistic and national borders. This has influenced the way in which new events are perceived while reinforcing the commonality of the various struggles, e.g. the Turkish hashtag #OccupyGezi, the street sign for 'Tahrir Square' used by protesters at Occupy London (Court 2011), or coinages like the 'Indignados de Lisboa' (Baumgarten 2013, 466) and the Greek *agnaktismenoi* ('indignants'; Douzinas 2013, 12).

In this article, I will further contribute to the understanding of the role of translation in current political processes of change by focusing on the Spanish party Podemos, created in 2014 in response to the new social and political cycle opened with the 15M/indignados' movement of 2011. Since its unexpected breakthrough at the European Parliament Election held in May 2014, in which it won five MEPs, increasing support has arisen for Podemos. The party has developed a network of regional and national alliances, contributing to platforms that achieved important local power in May 2015, and becoming the third biggest party in the Spanish parliament in December 2015, a position it preserved at the general election of June 2016 despite a substantial loss in votes. Although there is abundant literature available on both the 'indignados' movement and Podemos (Moreno-Caballud 2015; Flesher Fominaya 2015; Rivero 2015; Antentas 2016, to name but a few key references), the analysis of translational practices has been completely absent from both journalistic and scholarly pieces. However, this is far from surprising considering the general lack of studies on the role of translation and interpreting in this wave of mobilisations (Baker 2016a, 10-12).

My aim is to show that Podemos' political project is also translational, since translation—both as practice and as product—plays a pivotal role in their political praxis. In the context of this article, I will understand 'translation' in a wide-ranging sense, as required by the variety of materials and the fluid understanding of participants involved. To this end, more traditional definitions of 'translation' will be complemented with contemporary reconstructions of Antonio Gramsci's ideas on 'translatability' (Boothman 2010, Lacorte 2010). In this sense, 'translation' is defined as the process of replacing a set of source signs with another set of target signs 'on the strength of an interpretation'
(Venuti 1995, 18); this process of replacement can be undertaken within the same language or between different languages (Jakobson's 'intralingual' and 'interlingual' translation, respectively; 1959, 233), but also between theoretical systems and paradigms—for instance, between politics and economics, or between two different philosophical traditions (Boothman 2010, 110-114, 128-130; Lacorte 2010, 214-217).

Using Podemos as a case study, my article will combine contributions from sociology, politics, Spanish studies, and translation studies to emphasise the importance of translation in contemporary politics and the ways in which the two fields can be mutually illuminating. In doing so, I will argue that a number of approaches that have proved effective within Translation Studies—such as the disruptive and innovative potential of transfers (Even-Zohar 1990, 20-22), or the relationship between translation and capital (Bourdieu 2002)—could contribute to expanding our understanding of politics. At the same time, I suggest that the definitions and practices of translation mobilised by both politicians and political theorists can open up an important area for interdisciplinary debate, paving the way for an analysis of contemporary politics that acknowledges the decisive role played by translation.

**From 'Sí se puede' to 'Podemos': Spanish politics in crisis**

The 2008 international recession revealed the actual weaknesses of Spain's remarkable economic performance at the turn of the twenty-first century, exposing its heavy dependence on property development and aggressive banking practices (López and Rodríguez 2011, 5-6). Soaring unemployment, widespread corruption of the political elite, and the implementation of austerity policies firstly led to an economic crisis and then to a crisis of legitimacy, as citizens began to mistrust and challenge Spanish institutions (Simón 2012). This rejection of the status quo acquired a palpable expression in 2011 with the emergence of the indignados (outraged') movement or 15M, which galvanised the country through a series of mass demonstrations and occupations of squares in Madrid, Barcelona, and other important Spanish cities. These improvised camps would expand progressively, attracting citizens from various social strata who engaged in open discussions at popular assemblies and committees (Della Porta 2015, 1-2). Debates led to the agreement of a set of concrete demands to reduce politicians' privileges, fight unemployment, ensure citizens' rights to housing and
healthcare, and to improve the quality of the democratic system (Democracia Real Ya 2011).

Like many other 'left oppositions' (Watkins 2016) to the consequences of the global crisis, the 15M manifested a strong reluctance towards institutional politics, privileging a notion of 'direct democracy' (Sitriń and Azzellini 2014, 121-150; Della Porta 2015, 157-210) that seemed incompatible with parties and elections. As Watkins suggests, this was an understandable rejection within an international context of extended discredit of both labour movements and social-democratic parties (Watkins 2016: 5). However, the repression of uprisings by state apparatuses and the general inability of movements to become sustainable in the long term —what the Alexia collective (2016) has called the 'resaca' of the squares, playing on the multiple senses of the Spanish word ('undertow', but also 'hangover' and 'backlash')— placed protesters across the world 'at a critical juncture', creating 'a pressing need to engage with state power' and 'representative institutions' (Kioupkiolis and Katsambekis 2014, 9-10). The 15M was not an exception: although it quickly became a symbolic point of reference —polls have consistently shown a widespread support to its ideas and proposals (Urquizu 2016, 22-25)— certain social sectors felt increasingly frustrated with the limitations of popular protest (Rendueles and Sola 2015)ii.

Therefore, the emergence of Podemos in early 2014 needs to be understood within a changing context for the Western Left, in which 'the party form' is experiencing a 'new relevance' (Dean 2016: 22-29), characterised by greater engagement but also frequent tension between party and movements. From its inception, Podemos stood in a complex relationship with the 15M: although party leaders did not claim to represent such a 'heterogeneous movement' (Errejón and Mouffe 2015, 63), they acknowledged that the 15M was both an inspiration and the decisive event that made their political irruption possible (Guedán 2016, 21-33). In fact, future Secretary General Pablo Iglesias stated at Podemos' launching event that their goal was to turn the people's 'outrage' (indignación) into 'change' (EFE 2014), which could be interpreted as a direct criticism of the limits of protest. Even its name hinted at a combination of affinity and distance with the movement: Podemos ('We Can') is a direct reference to a well-known slogan of the 15M, 'Sí Se Puede' ('Yes, it's possible/ it can be done'), but encompassed a key grammatical change —from the impersonality of the 15M motto to the first person of
plural—that could also be read as a shift in political subjects—from the open, undefined multitude to an organisation with clearer boundaries.

**Translating the Latin American experience**

In spite of its late emergence, the project behind Podemos had been a long time in the making (Rivero 2015, 115-150), led by a core team of activists, political scientists, and academics with substantial experience as political advisors for left-wing organisations. Some of its most visible figures, like Pablo Iglesias, Íñigo Errejón, and Juan Carlos Monedero, are academics who share an understanding of their role as a politically-committed activity with ‘an undoubted vocation for [social] transformation’ (Guedán 2016, 35). Before launching Podemos, this core team had been working together for many years on a variety of projects, such as advising Latin American governments through the left-wing Spanish foundation CEPS (Rivero 2015, 73-76) or producing the political TV shows *La Tuerka* and *Fort Apache*.

Working in Latin America was a decisive experience for future Podemos leaders, acknowledged by Pablo Iglesias (Podemos' Secretary General since 2014) and Íñigo Errejón (Political Secretary until 2017) in particular. From Iglesias' and Errejón's writings and reflections, which provided the basis for Podemos' initial political strategy, it is evident that their exposure to Latin American movements and processes led them to consider the benefits and difficulties that would be involved in any potential transfer of political knowledge and practices. As I will show in this section, both have frequently conceptualised this experience in translational terms, which would have a decisive imprint on Podemos.

Although Iglesias had contributed actively to anti-globalisation protests before writing his PhD thesis on the Italian activist groups *Tute Bianche* and *Disobbedienti* (Iglesias 2008, 2011)iii, his time as an advisor in Bolivia and Venezuela made him realise the limitations of Western protest movements. Already in 2007, Iglesias would advocate an *indianización* (‘indianization’) of the European Left, that is, an unprejudiced opening up of the latter to the political processes taking place in numerous Latin American countries (Iglesias 2007, 279-281). In fact, in his study of the Italian anti-globalisation group *Tute Bianche* (‘White Overalls’), who were
inspired by the Mexican Zapatista Army of National Liberation (EZLN), Iglesias highlights their attempt to 'translate the symbols and political praxis of Neozapatism in a politically viable way to the European context' (Iglesias 2011, 365) as one of their main innovations. This process involved a reappraisal of communication as a key aspect of politics and the establishment of a strong leadership for the movement, based around spokespersons with a high degree of media exposure (365-366), which garnered criticism for the Tute Bianche from other leftist movements, but also allowed them to carve out their own space in mass media. Although Iglesias does not go on to discuss these aspects in further detail, the relationship between translation, communication, and leadership is presented as an important thread throughout his understanding of politics, one which would play a key role in the development of Podemos' media strategy.

Alongside Iglesias, the prime mover behind Podemos' political discourse and strategy would be Íñigo Errejón's experience in Bolivia, where he held a number of political roles for governmental institutions (Producciones Con Mano Izquierda 2017) before writing his PhD thesis on President Evo Morales' party Movimiento al Socialismo (Errejón 2011b, 2012). In his writings, Errejón analyses the political success of the MAS within a complex and variegated framework that owes much to translation and foregrounds the concept of 'hegemony'. Although this concept is generally associated with the Italian thinker Antonio Gramsci, the 'fragmentary and posthumous character' of Gramsci's writings means that his theoretical insights 'had to be actively constructed by his successors through a labour of assembly, rearrangement, annotation and (outside Italy) translation' (Forgacs 1989, 71). In fact, in his understanding of 'hegemony', Errejón follows the reading of Gramsci proposed by Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe, who retained a substantial part of Gramsci's conceptual structure but reworked it from a post-structuralist perspective. While Gramsci understood 'hegemony' as the moral and social leadership of one given class above the rest, insofar as this hegemonic class manages to achieve an equilibrium between its interests and those of the subordinated classes (Gramsci 1988, 189-221), Laclau and Mouffe went beyond the fixed category of class to understand hegemony as a type of political relationship based on 'discursive' and 'articulatory practices' (1985, 120) that produce partial and temporary political identities. In a post-industrial context where traditional political subjects (the working classes) lose centrality while others gain it
(such as groups advocating identity politics), Laclau and Mouffe's understanding of 'hegemony' as a process that is based on the articulation of identities paved the way for Laclau's defence of 'populist politics' (2005): going beyond traditional social and political categories, populism involves the 'construction of a people' by establishing a new division between 'those below' and 'those above', between 'the people' and 'the elites'. Errejón identified this strategy in MAS' successful 2005 campaign (2011b, 126-136), whereby the party managed to construct a populist political identity opposing the indigenous popular classes and 'the white elites' who had 'sold off the homeland (patria)' (130).

Errejón's experience in Bolivia, and the Gramscian-Laclauian framework he developed in response to it, provided him with a series of political categories that he would eventually start translating for the Spanish context. Indeed, he was well aware that these categories 'were only valid if they were translated', as he would explain in a documentary on the birth of Podemos (León de Aranoa 2016, 29'10"-29'30"). Although Errejón's frequent usage of his notion of 'translation' is not supported with a definition, his writings suggest an understanding of the phenomenon as a process that is both highly dependent on context and involves an element of struggle and creativity. Shortly after the 15M, Errejón claimed (2011a) that the Spanish crisis shared important traits with the neoliberal crises that had enabled the rise of populist governments in Latin America. These similarities opened up the possibility for a populist movement, which Errejón (2011a, 17) tentatively identifies with the 15M and its opposition to the elites by their reclaiming and resignifying central concepts like 'democracy' (democracia) and 'people' (pueblo). This similarity of factors between crises and their associated potential was made more explicit in Errejón's obituary for Laclau (2014), who died a few months after the launch of Podemos. According to Errejón, Laclau's reappraisal of populism had acquired a new relevance due to the 'latinamericanisation' (latinoamericanización) of Southern Europe, which involved an increasing power of 'the oligarchies' that dismissed the demands of the 'impoverished' popular groups. This levelling between contexts is perceived by Errejón in positive tones, as it gave the European Left a unique opportunity 'not to copy, but to translate [...] the wealth of concepts and examples' (Errejón 2014; my italics) generated in Latin America. Revealingly, Errejón's opposition between 'copy' and 'translation' not only challenges widespread popular understandings of translation
as a straightforward, mimetic activity, but also recalls a famous line by the Peruvian socialist José Carlos Mariátegui, who in 1928 claimed that Latin American socialism should be 'neither replica, nor copy' (*calco y copia*), but rather a 'heroic creation' (Mariátegui 1928, 2) of the masses. This conscious echo of Mariátegui (also elaborated in Errejón and Mouffe 2015, 77) reaffirms Errejón's awareness of political translation as an unpredictable, creative activity that cannot be dominated by a mimetic or reverential approach to its sources, but rather needs to take context into account to achieve its purposes.

A relevant example of this translational process was the introduction of 'casta' ('caste'), a concept denoting 'Spain’s political and economic establishment' (Iglesias 2015, 17) beyond the traditional categories of Left and Right. 'Casta', a product of translation between languages and political systems, is a highly effective coinage that contributed to Podemos' initial media success. While the term had its origin in Italian politics (Rivero 2014, 30), it aimed at providing a concept denoting 'the elites' against which a populist strategy could be constructed, translating Laclau's theoretical model into the Spanish context. With its hereditary and hierarchical overtones, 'casta' became a useful tool within Podemos' discourse: it depicted Spanish elites as a unified group that existed beyond political accountability. As Errejón explains in his prologue to the Spanish translation of the book that popularised the concept of 'casta' in Italy (Rizzo and Stella 2015), its success was down to its potential 'to make a complex situation intelligible' (Errejón 2015a, 7): the progressive reduction of differences between members of the political elite and its increasing distance from their voters.

However, not every translation strategy has been so successful. A key example of this is Errejón's proposal to translate Gramsci's notion of the *nazionale-popolare* or 'national-popular', which denotes the construction of a new national identity led by the popular masses in a progressive direction (Durante 2004). According to Errejón (2015b), this translation was notably complex: due to the particularities of the Spanish state — formed by multiple communities that claim their right to be considered 'nations', such as Catalonia or the Basque Country — the 'national-popular' has to be constructed as 'plurinational'. At the same time, this complexity implies that Spain lacks a set of shared popular 'symbols, myths, references, and leaderships' (Errejón 2015b) to support the construction of the 'national-popular'. In line with this reflection, for the
2015 and 2016 general elections, Podemos proposed an interpretation from below of the concept *patria* ('fatherland', 'homeland'): *La patria eres tú* ('you're the homeland') and *La patria es la gente* ('People are the homeland'). However, as sociologist and Podemos' regional MP Isidro López notes (2016), this strategy missed its target: in the Spanish context, *patria* is heavily charged with conservative and reactionary overtones that complicate its reappropriation and ultimately repeal the liberal voters it expected to attract. In this sense, it could be argued that this translation failed precisely because it neglected one of the key aspects of the translational process: the needs of its intended audience. In López's words (2016), 'it was an arbitrary signifier that [did] not answer to almost anyone's demands'vi.

Manifestly, Errejón's writings, which provided an initial framework for Podemos' strategy, constitute a highly complex translational space, in which processes of translation between languages (Gramsci, Laclau and Mouffe's texts translated into Spanish), theoretical paradigms (Gramsci's concepts translated into Laclau and Mouffe's theory), and political systems (the Latin American experiences translated to Spain) coexist. In this sense, it can be argued that an important part of Podemos' discourse and strategy emerged as the result of multiple translations; yet central aspects of its praxis are also based in its own generation and reuse of translations, as I will show in the next section.

**Political communication as translation**

From 2010 onwards, many future members of Podemos —such as Iglesias, Errejón, Monedero or future MEP Miguel Urbán— were working together in the production of the TV show *La Tuerka (The Screw* or, reflecting the Spanish punk-inspired spelling, *The Skrew*), aired by local stations within the province of Madrid; the success of *La Tuerka* allowed its move to a digital platform (PublicoTV) and the creation in 2012 of another show, *Fort Apache*, aired in Spain and Latin America by HispanTV.

Assuming that television is the 'fundamental terrain of ideological production' and a major producer of political arguments as well as 'social imaginaries' (Iglesias 2015, 14-16), this group of academics and activists understood their TV shows as a ‘counter-hegemonic’ project in which they could ‘spread the ideas of the Left in a language
geared toward the common sense of the social majority’ (Rendueles and Sola 2015). As Errejón would put it —in military terms that seem indebted to Gramsci’s definition of the quest for hegemony as a ‘war of position’ (Gramsci 1988, 222-230)— *La Tuerka* aimed at ‘distributing ammunition for those frequent and important daily battles that people fight at the workplace, on the bus, at the pub’ (La Tuerka 2012).

As the presenter of both shows, Pablo Iglesias acquired an important ‘media capital’ (Guedán 2016, 128), which gave him the opportunity of eventually becoming a well-known talk-show host for mainstream channels from 2013 onwards (Rivero 2014, 94-95). Iglesias’ successful ‘self-made pop persona’ (*personaje pop que él mismo ha creado*; Juliana 2015, 20) was a central asset for Podemos in its initial stages, as he deployed an extensive cultural capital (Bourdieu 1979) against conservative politicians and journalists while embodying ‘a kind of post-15-M everyman’ (Toscano 2015). As a well-trained young professional on a part-time university contract, Iglesias could claim to be, like Errejón and others (Juliana 2015, 13), the epitome of anti-austerity protesters (Della Porta 2015, 51-52) who felt frustrated by the dissonance between their high level of educational attainment and their lack of professional opportunities. In this sense, Iglesias’ media persona is largely constructed through a combination of cultural capital and political pedagogy in which translation, as both a product and a communicative principle, plays a central role.

Thanks to his experience as an activist and researcher of social movements, Iglesias places communication at the centre of political activity, which he understands as a process of translation. According to Iglesias, many left-wing academics and activists missed their opportunity to play a central role at the 15M protests due to their inability to communicate with ‘the common people’ (Iglesias and Nega 2013, 93-95), who were not familiar with technical jargon. In his view, this highlighted a traditional shortcoming of the European Left:

> Communication is a pivotal work of translation [un trabajo fundamental de traducción]: to transform your diagnosis into a discourse that people can understand, using words that are useful to explain things. This is one of the fundamental problems with the Left: producing diagnoses so obscure that people think you’re speaking a different language.

(Iglesias interviewed in Guedán 2016, 120)
In conjunction with this, Iglesias praised the 15M motto, 'It is not a crisis, it's a swindle' (*No es una crisis, es una estafa*), as an example of a successful translation: 'it is the political translation [of a complex reality] into a language people understand.

Translating *crisis* as *swindle* brings the key class dimension in: the rich are swindling us' (Iglesias and Nega 2013, 12). At the same time, this 'task of translation' (Iglesias and Monedero 2011, 99-100) started by the 15M should also be central for mutual understanding and the eventual construction of a wider front: only through translation will 'movements talk to each other, and movements talk to parties, and parties to each other' (Iglesias and Monedero 2011, 100).

Therefore, it can be claimed that Iglesias understands translation as a twofold instrument, which allows political actors the possibility of going beyond the limitations imposed by disciplines and political systems, while uncovering ideological nuances behind official messages. In using this approach, Iglesias has been often seconded by other members of the party, like Errejón and the philosopher Germán Cano. While Errejón claims that his own Bolivian experience made him understand that an intellectual 'is not a curmudgeon [*un tipo rancio*] who only reads unintelligible stuff, but eminently a translator', who 'has the duty and the ability to take abstract concepts and translate them, making them operational' (Errejón interviewed in Soto-Trillo 2015), Cano (2015, 196) sees Iglesias' translations in the media as a process of exposure. For Cano, Iglesias' ability to translate 'technocratic jargon' into 'a more simple' language that is accessible to everyone allows citizens to criticise the actual content of these proposals, while also showing how this 'elitist discourse' has aimed at creating an 'abyss' that isolates experts from the rest of society.

In spite of the important contribution that this political approach has brought to Spanish politics, this understanding of political communication as translation is not new; various philosophers and political theorists have proposed conceptualisations that bear explicit, although unacknowledged similarities with Podemos' usages. A central reference for this tradition would again be Antonio Gramsci, who devoted part of his prison writings to the historical misunderstandings caused by the incapacity of many philosophers and politicians to translate messages between different systems and disciplines (Boothman 2010, 108-114). At the same time, Gramsci emphasised the importance of translation for a Marxist praxis: since hegemony is achieved by consent, and not by imposition or
mere force, translation is essential in the construction of hegemony, as it allows the emergence of a new, shared political language that builds on the various different theories and models that exist within a given society (Lacorte 2010, 218-221).

More recently, Zygmunt Bauman (1987, 127-148) has claimed that Postmodernity brought with it a central change regarding the role of the intellectual, who is no longer conceived of as a 'legislator' but rather as an 'interpreter', as an specialist 'in translation between cultural traditions' (143) who needs to facilitate communication between different communities through a dialogue based on mutual respect. Similarly, Judith Butler has claimed —in a formulation that seems to be echoed by Iglesias and Monedero (2011, 100), quoted earlier— that a central task for the Left is one 'of establishing practices of translation [...] to see what basis of commonality there might be among existing movements' (Butler 2000, 143; italics in the original); in other words, contemporary political actors have the task of finding the common ground shared by multiple groups competing for universality within the political field.

Within this tradition of thought, Iglesias' novelty lies in his ability to make this notion of translation operational as part of his political practice, in which he aims at making technical information understandable with practical applications of various translated authors. This strategy of political pedagogy has a double function: firstly, it constitutes a source of counter-expertise (the 'ammunition' described earlier by Errejón), as his academic and political knowledge is used to deconstruct and criticise mainstream narratives; secondly, it also functions as an element of distinction or self-differentiation (one of the key characteristics of 'cultural capital', thanks to its 'scarcity'; Bourdieu 1979, 4) between Iglesias (and, by extension, Podemos) and other political agents.

This amalgamation of distinction and counter-expertise was central for Iglesias' introductory reflections to his TV shows, in which he briefly outlined the topic at hand from his political angle. For instance, when the Spanish conservative government started a campaign in 2012 to criminalise and repress popular protests (Zaldua 2012) by labelling them as 'anti-systemic', Iglesias introduced one of La Tuerka's debates (2012) by explaining Immanuel Wallerstein's theory of anti-systemic movements. Following Wallerstein, Iglesias highlighted that the movements traditionally considered 'anti-systemic' due to their opposition to the capitalist,
nation-state system —such as the workers' movement and national liberation movements— are precisely those that had brought key progressive measures, freedoms, and rights. In this way, with the help of both intra- and interlingual translation, Iglesias turns the derogatory, mainstream use of 'anti-systemic' on its head and reappraises it as a positive concept for his audience.

This use of translated authors as part of his media pedagogy had an important political potential, as it disrupted standard expectations on the uses of TV while benefitting from the 'destabilising' effect (Even-Zohar 1990, 20-22) of adding new content to a predictable repertoire. In fact, Iglesias and his colleagues were perfectly aware of the keen interest this had among viewers:

[...] after recommending a book on La Tuerka, some publishers and booksellers would ring to tell us we had increased their sales, things like 'you talked about Nanni Balestrini's Los invisibles [I invisibili] and plenty of youngsters have popped by to buy it, you quote I don't know which book by [David] Harvey and people ask for it'. That's fantastic.

(Guedán 2016, 124)

However, the line between pedagogy and self-distinction can be occasionally blurred. As Iglesias' popularity rose, so did his capacity for appropriating texts and influencing their potential reception, in a clear expression of what Bourdieu (2002, 4) called 'branding' (marquage; i.e. the process of inscribing new senses and meanings into the translated product within the field of reception). Shortly after the foundation of Podemos in 2014, Iglesias shot two clips for La Tuerka, in which he advertised the Spanish translations for an anthology of Antonio Gramsci (La Tuerka 2014a), and David Harvey's A Brief History of Neoliberalism (La Tuerka 2014b). His presentation of Gramsci is especially revealing, as Iglesias fully frames him within the context of Podemos:

Would you really like to understand what's behind La Tuerka? Would you like to know why Errejón says what he says? Would you like to understand Juan Carlos Monedero, or this humble presenter's intentions? [Iglesias turn the book in his hands to show its cover.] Here's the answer: Antonio Gramsci's Antología, edited and translated no less than by Manuel Sacristán, Spanish Marxism's best mind. [...] Our goal is to make the thought of this revolutionary, political, journalistic, and historic genius live forever.
This identification between party and thinker—along with the fact that Gramsci's publisher (Akal), who sponsored both advertisements, is also Iglesias'—reveals the tensions between dissemination and appropriation: while Iglesias actively acknowledges Podemos' influences and encourages viewers to expand the debate, he also contributes to an ongoing process of 'branding' (see for instance García 2016) that could eventually restrict Spanish readings of Gramsci. As a Madrid-based activist and writer told me during a personal interview (March 16, 2016), he would 'not even dare' to quote Gramsci now to avoid being squarely read within Podemos' parameters.

**Emancipating translation?**

As I have shown in this article, Podemos needs to be understood as a political entity based upon multiple processes of interlingual, intralingual, and intersystemic translation: while its discourse and conceptual framework are the result of a complex process of translation—largely based on Errejón's writings from a trans-Atlantic perspective—, its dissemination to citizens relies on practices of translation led by Iglesias in his TV appearances with the support of other party members. It could therefore be convincingly argued that many of Podemos' most significant contributions to Spanish politics have been achieved through translation: a new terminology with a strong Gramscian-Laclauian imprint, an openness of the political field to foreign traditions, and a conception of political thought that emphasises everyday usefulness.

However, it could also be claimed that some of Podemos' potential limitations are contained in their understanding of translation. As I have shown, leaders of Podemos frequently claim that intellectuals have a central role in politics, as theirs is the task of translating for the citizens. If pursued to its end, this conception could infer that the 'intellectuals' are the ones who *know*, the ones who *understand* the languages and systems at hand, which makes them the only ones who are able to translate between them, while a majority of citizens are presented as passive receptors that eventually react to these translations, but do not generate them. This controversial political division between 'intellectuals' and 'the people' was criticised by Ellen Meiksins Wood in the 1980s as one of the main characteristics of 'New "True" Socialism', a contemporary current of thought prominently represented by thinkers like Ernesto Laclau that:
ascribes to intellectuals a predominant role in the socialist project, insofar as it relies on them to carry out no less a task than the construction of 'social agents' by means of ideology or discourse. In that case, the inchoate mass that constitutes the bulk of the 'people' still remains without a collective identity, except what it receives from its intellectual leaders, the bearers of discourse.

(Meiksins Wood 1986, 6)

More specifically, the foregrounding of intellectuals within Podemos contradicts an important strand of thought within the 15M that favoured a more open, non-hierarchical, and collective understanding of knowledge (Anónimo 2012). As such, many radically democratic strands within the 15M claimed that 'non-experts' can also 'trust in their own abilities to collaboratively construct the knowledge they need in any given situation and to generate effective answers to the problems that confront them' (Moreno Caballud 2015, 3). Therefore, any political party looking to build upon the achievements of the 15M must be one that ensures an alliance between the forms of knowledge enjoyed by intellectuals as counter-experts as well as those constructed by ordinary citizens through cooperation based on their own experience. Such a party would then be in a position to enact the Butlerian understanding of translation that Iglesias and Monedero (2011, 100) briefly hinted at during the mass mobilisations of the 15M: an open party-movement where practices of translation were not restricted to a top-bottom direction, but instead took place in multiple directions, contributing to the articulation of the alliance between a variety of actors and collectives.

Ultimately, the role of intellectuals and the power to produce translations lead us to the central issue of equality in politics, and the opposition between horizontal and vertical structures. Analysing the production and transmission of knowledge, the French philosopher Jacques Rancière — an inspiring figure for many involved within the 15M — has claimed that 'an emancipated community is one of narrators and translators', where all participants 'take the role of active interpreters' and 'share the collective power' to generate their own translations 'on the basis of their own intellectual adventure' (Rancière 2009, 10-21, passim). Rancière’s emphasis on the importance of this 'collective power' of translation for an egalitarian community highlights precisely what is at stake: it seems unlikely that any political party in which the leadership alone carries out this fundamental task could fulfil a truly emancipating role. In fact, there are
signs that Podemos' electoral performance might have been affected by this doubt. Reflecting on the approximately one million votes lost by the alliance around Podemos between the general elections of December 2015 and June 2016, a number of politicians and activists have suggested that the hierarchies and inequalities at work within the party were a key factor. While Podemos’ regional MP Isidro López (2016) pointed to the end of 'the flux of information and power' between party and movement, which led to the demobilisation of the party base, activist Amador Fernández Savater claimed in a short ironic piece that potential Podemos voters are unpredictable and defy the leadership's expectations, because 'trust can only be given and taken, shown and proven, AMONG EQUALS' (Fernández Savater 2016, capitalisation in the original). It remains to be seen whether internal changes after Podemos' second congress in February 2017 — which greatly reduced Errejón's role while strengthening Iglesias, who had advocated for a rapprochement with Anticapitalistas, the horizontalist and anti-hierarchical sector of the party — might alter this unequal structure of power, or will simply bring about a different political strategy without fundamentally altering its structures.

From the perspective of Translation Studies as a discipline, the analysis of the rich and complex translation practices that are deployed and theorised by political agents opens the door to an engagement with great future potential. As Nergaard and Arduini have argued in their defence of 'post-translation studies' (2011, 8-9), 'new and enriching thinking on translation' frequently takes place 'outside the traditional discipline of translation studies'. This is precisely the case with contemporary politics: translation — as a product and a practice— is at the heart of its most recent developments, hence why movements like Podemos or Occupy, and thinkers like Butler, Rancière, Boaventura de Sousa Santos (2006, 131-147), or Antonio Negri and Michael Hardt (2009, 340-351), are proposing a multiplicity of innovative political approaches that involve an ongoing reflection on translation beyond fixed categories. In turn, the study of translation — comparative by nature and well-placed to explain events beyond the linguistic and cultural limits of the nation-state — could become a pivotal element for our understanding of political praxis and thought, emphasising the commonality between transnational struggles, tracing the heritage and afterlife of movements, questioning the communicative processes that shape political communities, or exploring the transfer and appropriation of concepts, symbols, and ideologies.
NOTES

i Although the designation 'indignados' became worldwide known through the media, the name 15M—a reference to the date 15th May 2011, in which the movement started—is preferred by activists and more widely used in Spain (Flesher Fominaya 2015, 160). I will subsequently use the latter denomination throughout the article.

ii Xavier Domènech, activist and national MP for En Comú (Podemos’ ally in Catalonia) since 2015, remembers how he was confronted at a meeting in 2013 by two activists of the anti-eviction movement Plataforma de Afectados por la Hipoteca (PAH), who claimed they were no longer interested in the creation of new extra-parliamentary movements: "[...] we have gathered a million signatures [for a new anti-eviction law] and they [the Government] have peed on us. So now we need to launch a political party and pee on them" (Domènech 2016, 55; unless otherwise noted, all translations from Spanish and Catalan are mine).

iii Within this field, Iglesias has also shown an interest in the practice of translation and interpreting, volunteering as an interpreter during the First European Social Forum in Florence (Iglesias 2008, 397) and translating a chapter of Balestrini and Moroni's book (2006, 361-394) on revolutionary movements in 1960-70's Italy.

iv A detailed analysis of the Bolivian case and Laclau's populism would by far exceed the remit of this article; from a post-15M perspective, however, insightful pieces have been written on the conceptual slippage between 'hegemony' and 'populism' in Laclau's work (Castro 2013; Baker 2016), or the potential risks of a populist strategy without a solid institutional foundation (Villacañas 2015).

v A measure of its success has been its rapid acceptance within political jargon: for instance, the Spanish translation of Owen Jones' book on the British establishment (2015) bore the subtitle 'La casta al desnudo' ('Caste stripped bare').

vi In spite of this mismatch, the national question represents an ongoing preoccupation for Podemos' leaders that is likely to lead to further proposals along these lines. During a 2017 TV interview with pro-independence Catalan politician Anna Gabriel, Pablo Iglesias claimed that the lack of a 'homeland (patria)' was 'one of the traditional contradictions of the Spanish Left', and acknowledged Podemos' long-time interest in the political processes taking place in Catalonia and the Basque Country, as Podemos' leaders had always wanted 'to try and translate those elements into a different national reality' (La Tuerka 2017).

vii From a different, yet related approach to intralingual and intersystemic translation, activist Mark Bray claims that Occupy Wall Street was 'a vehicle for translating anarchy to a society that was generally receptive to many anarchist ideas but wary of its ideological trappings' (Bray 2013, 5).

viii Although Gramsci is not quoted in Podemos' references to translation, Germán Cano acknowledged his influence on this specific approach during a personal interview (March 15, 2016).
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