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‘Sword and plough’: settling Nazi stormtroopers in Eastern Europe, 1936-1943

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Abstract

Most histories of the National Socialist SA come to a close with the Night of the Long Knives in the summer of 1934. For the remaining eleven years of National Socialist rule, the stormtroopers are usually regarded as a peripheral ‘nostalgic drinking companionship’ of early Nazi activists that, apart from their involvement in the persecution of the Jews, did not wield much influence. In contrast to such views, this article argues that the SA remained an important mass organisation in the Third Reich that not only helped to stabilize the Nazi regime within the boundaries of the German heartlands but also contributed importantly to the German expansionist policies from 1935 onwards. My argument is developed in three stages: First, I assess the SA’s contribution to the German settlement movement in the 1930s that was originally concerned with the ‘inner colonialism’, the population transfer within the existing borders of the German Reich in order to stimulate agriculture and economy in disadvantaged German regions, in particular in the northern and eastern provinces. Second, I concentrate on the analysis of the plans and initiatives of the so-called ‘commissioner of the SA Chief of Staff for the placement of new farmers and matters of ethnicity’ between 1938 and 1942. In a third and final part, I discuss these plans and the actual developments in the light of the expansionist Nazi policies of de- and reterritorialization during the war years, advanced in particular by the SS. Although the SA’s extensive pre-war ambitions in ‘Germanization’ suffered a serious backlash with the outbreak of the war, it still contributed in important ways to the formation of the *Volksgemeinschaft* in the occupied territories.

Introduction

The historiography on the SA, the Nazi stormtroopers, so far concentrated on the years 1921-1934 with the movement's 'years of struggle' in the late Weimar Republic and the brownshirts' violent contribution to the implementation of the Nazi dictatorship in 1933 and 1934.¹ By contrast, historians have explored only few aspects of the SA's history for the remaining eleven years of the Third Reich.² This is all the more true with regard to the extensive and often excellent research literature on the German expansionist policies in Central and Eastern Europe. In these studies, Himmler and the SS take centre stage, whereas the SA is passed over in silence.³ In a way, historians of National Socialism thereby remain loyal to a narrative that many former stormtroopers after the Second World War shaped for their own de-Nazification purposes and that was also given credibility by the trial of the major war criminals before the International Military Tribunal (IMT) in Nuremberg in 1945/46. According to this narrative, the SA was without a doubt a leading Nazi organisation that had decisively contributed to the increase in political violence in the late Weimar Republic and had also exercised massive terror in the wake of the Nazi takeover of power in 1933 and 1934. By contrast, for the years that followed the stormtroopers are usually regarded as peripheral 'old fighters' who formed hardly more than a nostalgic drinking companionship.⁴

However, from the perspective of someone who aims at contributing to a comprehensive *Gesellschaftsgeschichte* of National Socialism,⁵ the SA is an important organisation worth studying also for the years of consolidated Nazi rule. Despite the executions of Ernst Röhm and a considerable number of high-ranking SA leaders in the 'Night(s) of the Long Knives' between 30 June and 2 July 1934, to be followed by a wave of internal cleansing within the higher ranks of the stormtroopers, the SA remained an important National Socialist mass organisation with more than one million members in 1939. Under Röhm's successor Viktor Lutze, who remained at the helm of the SA until his death in 1943, the organisation consolidated and by the late 1930s even grew in importance again, not least a consequence of the ever more expansionist German

foreign policy and the radicalisation of the regime's antisemitic persecution. Whereas the relationship between the SA and the SS never recovered from the latter's 'stab in the back' in July 1934, a situation that only became worse with Himmler's SS taking control of the regular German police forces, the relationship with the Wehrmacht improved, culminating in the agreement from 19 January 1939 that attributed the SA sole responsibility in paramilitary affairs. The SA was to organise the regular pre- and post-military trainings that, according to the regime's ambitions, were to play an integral part in German men's lives. Among NSDAP functionaries, support for the SA likewise remained strong—not only out of nostalgia, but increasingly also as a means to hold the ambitious SS in check.⁶

In what follows, I will argue that the SA not only helped to stabilize the Nazi regime within the boundaries of the Reich, but that it also contributed to the German expansionist policies from the mid-1930s onwards. During these years, a major goal of the regime was to create new *Lebensraum*, or 'living space', for Germanic people, by engaging in vast geopolitical expansionist policies of de- and reterritorialization, that is the violent removing or enslavement of Jews and Slavs in the occupied territories of Eastern Europe and the following 'repopulation' of this allegedly empty space with people of Germanic origin.⁷ A particular effort was made to win over Germans living abroad and to make these people, after the incorporation and annexation of borderland territories they partly inhabited, a genuine part of the nation. In this respect, a semantic shift is telling: Whereas Germans abroad until the early twentieth century were called *Auslandsdeutsche*, literally 'Germans living in foreign countries', the Nazis during the 1930s turned them into *Volksdeutsche*, or 'ethnic Germans'.⁸ The SA felt called to actively engage in this process, not least because it seemed an opportunity to regain lost power within the patchwork of competing National Socialist organisations. From the second half of the 1930s onwards, the stormtroopers put forward their own ideas for the 'Germanization' of the European east—first with the aim to stimulate the settlement of SA men from the Old Reich into the newly occupied and annexed territories, above all in the Warthegau and in the General Government,

and then by the establishing of new SA units there that were to consist predominantly of those ‘ethnic Germans’ who had previously settled beyond the borders of the Reich.

The following article is based on the available secondary literature as well as on printed primary and unpublished archival sources, in particular the extensive collection of SA files in the German Federal Archives. It is divided into four parts. Against the background of the recent historiographical debate about the nature and scope of the German *Volksgemeinschaft*, or ‘people’s community’, I begin with outlining the fields of activities for SA stormtroopers and assess their importance for consolidating and upholding Nazi rule after 1934.⁹ One political domain in which the SA was determined to play an important role was the National Socialist settlement movement. I will evaluate the SA’s contribution to this movement in the 1930s that was originally concerned with the construction of new villages and city districts for the Party faithful. Such activities were part of ‘inner colonialism’, the population transfer within the existing borders of the German Reich in order to stimulate agriculture and economy in disadvantaged German regions, in particular in the northern and eastern provinces.¹⁰

The second part concentrates on the radicalised plans and initiatives of the so-called *Beauftragter des Stabschefs [der SA] für Neubauernsiedlung und Volkstumsfragen*, literally the ‘commissioner of the SA Chief of Staff for the placement of new farmers and matters of ethnicity’. Preliminary results as well as the SA’s ultimate failure will be critically assessed in the third section. In a fourth and final part, I will discuss my findings against the background of the current state of research on the German settlement policies shortly before and during World War II. I will argue that, although its initial ambitions in ‘Germanization’ policies ultimately failed—due to the rise of Himmler’s SS and the shortage of qualified SA men who were in very high numbers drafted into the Wehrmacht beginning in the fall of 1939—the SA still contributed in important ways to the ideological as well as pragmatic formation of the *Volksgemeinschaft* in the annexed territories.

The SA and early settlement initiatives in the Third Reich

It was no coincidence that the SA's interest in the German settlement movement intensified in the middle of the 1930s, shortly after the 'Röhm purge'. In its attempts to open up new fields of action that would keep the SA men busy and could help its leadership corps to claim important positions in the consolidated Third Reich, the SA started to get involved in the settlement movement. As early as June 1933, the Nazi government had declared a national priority with the 'Law on the New Formation of German Peasantry'.¹¹ Already some years before, by the late 1920s, the NSDAP and its auxiliary organisations—most prominently the SA—had started to systematically reach out to the people in rural Germany. Against the background of the 'agrarian crisis' of the 1920s that aggravated inner-migration to the big cities, the NSDAP in many parts of Germany successfully exploited the high level of discontent among the rural population, presenting itself as the political party determined to preserve the habits, values and historical merits of the German provinces that were even glorified as the 'blood spring of the German people' [*Blutquelle des deutschen Volkes*].¹²

Initially, the involvement of the SA in the settlement movement was limited to attempts at population transfer within the German Reich. For example, it encouraged rank-and-file stormtroopers from Lower Saxony to move as so-called 'West-East settlers' to more thinly populated areas in Mecklenburg and Pomerania.¹³ In 1937, at least one larger SA settlement project was set forth in every territory of a particular SA group—which is roughly comparable to the size of the actual German *Länder*, the federal states. Financed by the so-called *Dankopfer der Nation*, an annual national collection organised by the SA on the occasion of Hitler's birthday on 20 April, such SA settlements were designed to help deserving SA men, disabled ex-servicemen and particularly large families to be able to live on their 'own soil'.¹⁴ The Supreme SA Command (OSAF) supported such settlements of SA men with 225,000 Reichsmark in total. Widely varying in size, these settlements were located in Osterholz near Bremen, in the Pfalzdorf swamp next to the East Frisian city of Aurich and in nearby Petkum, in the north of

Braunschweig, in Wittstock/Neumark, in the Bavarian city of Rosenheim, in Jena in Thuringia and in the Upper-Silesian Eichenkamp near Gleiwitz (today's Gliwice).¹⁵ The later settlement, soon re-baptised 'SA-Dankopfersiedlung Glaubenstatt', meaning 'Place of Faith', became the SA's model settlement, build not least to 'create a *völkisch* dam' in order to fight back the 'Polish appetite for expansionism', at least symbolically. Although the outbreak of war prevented the original plans from being fully realised, most buildings of this settlement, which was to provide a home for up to 2000 people, could be completed.

Glaubenstatt had two centres: the stadium with a tower that was to serve as a youth hostel, and a market square that was surrounded by an assembly hall, a school building and a home for the HJ. Yet, there was also a shooting range and an air-raid shelter. A track and field arena for paramilitary sports was planned, but probably never completed.¹⁶ The conception of the Glaubenstatt complex exemplarily demonstrates that the SA's Germanization policies have to be seen in the context of its pre-military training of German males, to be carried out in close cooperation with the Wehrmacht and the Hitler Youth. This paramilitary education comprised both practical exercises with physical training and shooting lessons, but also 'political education' [*politische Erziehungsarbeit*].¹⁷ It did not only target men in the Old Reich, whom the Nazi propaganda continuously exposed to the idea that racially homogenous settlements had to be regarded as 'prerequisite for the fulfilment of the regime's economical, domestic and racial objectives',¹⁸ but would later also reach out to ethnic Germans organised in the SA in the occupied territories.¹⁹

Regional plans from 1937 aimed at the construction of not more than 2,500 settler's holdings nationwide, predominantly carried out as single-family homes.²⁰ Every house should consist of three or four rooms, covering at least sixty square meters, to be complemented by a large garden of 1000-1500 square meters at the inhabitant's disposal and intended mainly for the cultivation of vegetables and the breeding of small domestic animals. Unlike 'Glaubensstatt', which was built on former woodland, most of these modest settlements were so-called

Stadtrandsiedlungen or ‘suburban settlements’, located in immediate vicinity to existing developments. Their parcels of land were much too small to allow for self-dependent agriculture.²¹ Within these settlements, however, and contrary to the omnipresent ramblings of ‘building a people’s community’, the authorities deliberately fostered social inequalities, for example by granting different sizes of land. The rationale of this unequal treatment was to intensify the competition among the new settlers, and to honour political and economic leadership.²² According to a regulation from 1934, only male candidates who were either married or at least engaged were to be considered for such settlers’ colonies, provided that they possessed the ‘necessary good hereditary factors’. When the authorities realised that the comparatively small size of the houses did not correspond with the regime’s propaganda for sexual reproduction, it slightly increased the housing space in these settlements so that families with many children could also be accommodated.²³

Overall, the authorities imagined the Nazi society in these settlements as competitive, racially pure and devoted to the Nazi project. The NSDAP heralded its settlement projects as proof of the fact that the party kept its social promises dating back to the years of the Great Depression. In reality, however, the number of 2,500 SA settlers’ holdings was minimal, compared to the overall 22,000 settlements put in place between 1933 and 1939 and even more so to the 57,457 settlements that were created during the years of the Weimar Republic (1919-1933), among them 7,500 east of the river Elbe.²⁴ As early as 1931, the German Reich had started an ambitious small-settlement programme that attempted to provide new homes for workers on the outskirts of the larger towns. As politicians, social reformers and wealthy industrialists alike hoped, these settlements would provide the German worker with a renewed sense for the ‘soil’ [*Scholle*] and prepare at least some of them for farm work in the years to come.²⁵ The Nazis built on such earlier plans and initiatives, while at the same time claiming sole authorship for them.²⁶

Despite the limited extent of the Nazis' 'inner colonisation' attempts, they quickly turned into a 'preliminary stage' for much more ambitious colonisation projects abroad.²⁷ In contrast to the social realities, in particular the widening gap between the income of farmers and industrial workers in the Third Reich that did not help the popularity of agricultural labour,²⁸ the official discourse on settlements was soaked in blood and soil: the SA, together with the *Reichsnährstand*, the statutory corporation of farmers in the Third Reich, was allegedly predestined to stop the rural flight and to preserve the peasantry. Because of their willingness, their ideological training and their combat strength, the SA men were allegedly ideally suited to serve as 'innovators of the German peasantry'. Already early in the Third Reich, the regime regarded the population transfer of loyal party activists as one tool to achieve a politically coherent national community. Even if this population transfer was initially limited to Germans in the Old Reich and only put in practise on a modest scale, it demonstrated that the ideology of creating and re-organising existing *Lebensraum* long before the beginning of World War II informed the course of Nazi politics. What Nazi propagandists usually did not openly address was that that German agriculture suffered from a severe lack of workforce in the late 1930s. The often low-qualified SA men were therefore talked into farming jobs also for purely practical reasons.²⁹ Instead, high ranking Nazi officials like the Reichsminister of Food and Agriculture Richard Walther Darré in a guest article for the magazine *Der SA-Führer* in 1938 emphasized that peasantry and (political) soldiers were to join hands in order to victoriously fight the 'Germanic-Teutonic people's struggle for survival.'³⁰

Such statements did not only constitute a remarkable departure from the common image of the SA man as urban street fighter, still omnipresent in the Nazi propaganda during these years. Whereas the quintessential stormtrooper of the *Kampfzeit* had been an aggressive and determined young man and 'comrade',³¹ disciplined at the party's command but more than willing to react with his fists at all provocations when let loose, the SA peasant was presented as a man in his prime, still physically strong, but in the first place a responsible family man and as

such a defender of the German race. The former hotheads of the urban jungle had matured into hardworking and self-reliant individuals, exemplary German men who valued and cultivated the German soil, held firm to the regime's values and ideas, and were at the same time actively involved in fighting what the Nazis perceived as white-collar effeminacy. This new rhetoric also build a bridge to the idea that fascinated at least parts of the Supreme SA High Command from 1936: reintroducing the SA back into the political game by promoting the settlement of individual SA men as farmers and agricultural labourers in the European East, perceived as *Lebensraum*, or 'space to live' for battle-tested National Socialists.

Historical research so far has stressed that the inner colonisation movement in Nazi Germany lost its importance with the establishment of the Wehrmacht in 1935. Not farmers, but soldiers were now called to protect the German borders.³² However, I will demonstrate that these early NS settlement plans and projects remained politically important throughout the second half of the 1930s: as a preliminary stage for the soon-to-be captured *Lebensraum*. A closer look at the plans of the 'commissioner of the SA Chief of Staff for the placement of new farmers' and his successors between 1938 and 1943 will demonstrate that the SA expanded its spectrum of tasks by drafting settlement plans for the occupied and occupied territories beyond the actual borders of the Reich.

Siegfried Kasche and the SA's intensified settlement plans in the first years of World War II

The man of central importance for the SA's 'Germanization' plans during this period was SA-*Obergruppenführer* Siegfried Kasche.³³ Born on 18 June 1903, he belonged to the so-called 'war youth generation', like so many committed Nazi activists. He was trained at the prestigious cadet school in Berlin-Lichterfelde during the First World War and subsequently—still a very young man—fought with Freikorps units in Berlin and in the Baltic area. In the early 1920s, Kasche joined a 'joint work service' [*Arbeitsgemeinschaftsdienst*] in Pomerania and later also worked in

the banking sector, the glass industry and the textile trade. He became a member of the NSDAP in 1926 and made a stellar career in the SA. In 1928, at the age of only twenty-five, he was already appointed to the position of deputy *Gauleiter* of the Ostmark, based in Frankfurt/Oder. Two years later he sat in the Reichstag. Kasche survived the Night of the Long Knives and was promoted to SA-*Gruppenführer* in Lower Saxony on 9 November 1936. One year later, SA-*Stabschef* [Chief of Staff] Lutze, appointed him leader of the SA group Hansa, headquartered in Hamburg. Finally, Kasche became the first German envoy in Agram/Zagreb, Croatia, on 17 April 1941.³⁴

According to his own account, Kasche had started talks with Darré about the possible deployment of stormtroopers as farmers as early as 1936. Two years later, in September 1938, Lutze officially appointed Kasche to the position of ‘commissioner of the SA Chief of Staff for the placement of new farmers and matters of ethnicity’ [*Beauftragter des Stabschefs [der SA] für Neubauernsiedlung und Volkstumsfragen*]. Kasche thereby followed in the steps of SA-*Gruppenführer* Georg Mappes, who as ‘SA Reich treasurer’ [SA-*Reichskassenverwalter*] had been previously responsible for settlement affairs in the SA.³⁵ The new commissioner took his new task very seriously, as several lengthy and detailed guidelines and reports by him make clear. The first of these important documents was the ‘Guidelines for the SA’s participation at the new formation of the German peasantry’ from 8 September 1938. They stated that the potential farmers for the new settlements in the Third Reich, to be located above all in Silesia, Pomerania and Eastern Prussia, had to be chosen not only by their qualification alone, but also by their ‘hereditary value’ [*blutsmäßigem Wert*]. It is important to emphasize, however, that these guidelines were still intended to apply exclusively to settlements within the existing borders of the Reich. The SA should furnish up to thirty per cent of all new peasant settlers in order to guarantee the ‘political-ideological firmness’ within the new rural communities.

Kasche requested the then sixteen SA groups in the Reich to maintain close contacts with the ‘settlement agencies’ [*Siedlungsunternehmen*] operating in their respective regions and to

name potential settlers from within the ranks. The groups were asked to keep lists in special ‘red books’ of all those interested in the settlement projects.³⁶ However, only those SA men could be considered who possessed the *Neubauernschein*, a certificate handed out by Darré’s *Reichsnährstand* intended to attest the potential settler’s (and his family’s) racial, mental and physiological qualities. Only men who were at least twenty-five years of age, married and of ‘Aryan descent’ were permitted to apply.³⁷ Next to these criteria to be verified by the *Reichsnährstand*, the *SA-Standarten* in charge were also requested to provide a judgement on the applicant’s political and personal suitability. It was to be based on his service in the SA, his personal and professional circumstances, but also his physical fitness, his character, intellectual capacities and accomplishments. In the end, an overall mark had to be attributed, ranging from grade one (very well suited for placement) to four (little qualified).³⁸ Surviving lists from the year 1941 show that a very good mark was very rarely given. Most often the applicants were ranked in category two (well suited) or three (suited). For the acquisition of a new farm, Kasche estimated that every new settler from the SA would need about 9,000 Reichsmarks—with up to 5,000 Reichsmarks financed by subventions from the *Dankopfer der Nation*.³⁹

Such plans stood in the tradition of the modern Prussian respectively German borderland settlements established at the beginning of the second half of the nineteenth century. Such settlements were planned as German bulwarks against the Slavic neighbouring peoples who allegedly were at a lower cultural stage, or so many German borderland ideologues claimed.⁴⁰ Shortly before the German attack on Poland, *SA-Oberführer* Udo von Alvensleben, who dealt with settlement questions for the SA Supreme Command on Kasche’s behalf, claimed that since the time of the military conquests of the Teutonic Knights in the Middle Ages, a ‘peasantry on guard’ [*wehrhaftes Bauerntum*] had always been the guarantor to secure the German influence in Eastern Europe. He concluded: ‘What we have won by the sword needs to be defended and secured by the plough’.⁴¹ Such arguments were by no means an invention of the National Socialists. As historian Christoph Dieckmann has convincingly demonstrated, expansionist

German plans developed during the First World War already urged for the expulsion of the Polish, Russian and Jewish populations in Lithuania and demanded the establishment of German *Wehrbauern*, peasants who would serve as a human defensive bulwark, throughout the Baltic states.⁴² For German experts in spatial planning, parts of Eastern Europe during World War One served as a field for experimentation in which they could apply their increasingly radical settlement plans and colonial phantasies. Just two decades later, National Socialist politicians and experts happily built on such exploratory work.⁴³

However, the SA settlement plans from 1938 also contained a disciplinary part that was supposed to have an internal effect. The high proportion of SA men within these new German settlements was aimed at ensuring political homogeneity, or more precisely, at guaranteeing the preeminence of the NSDAP and its ideology within these new settlements. The active recruitment for the SA settlement programme for the border regions of the Reich began by a number of talks Kasche and his assistants held in front of SA leaders in March 1939. These activities culminated in a four-day long working session in Berlin and Frankfurt/Oder with a field trip to the Upper-Silesian village of Schlochau in early May 1939. In addition to representatives of the SA High Command, participants included the regional representatives for 'peasantry settlements' [*Neubauernsiedlung*] of every SA group.⁴⁴

Intensified SA settlement initiatives in the early stages of World War II

SA settlement initiatives enjoyed a new lease of life with the Wehrmacht's military victory over Poland in the autumn of 1939, even if the recruitment of potential settlers suffered from the fact that many of the previous SA recruiters were now drafted into the military. Despite such practical difficulties, Kasche regarded the war as a most-welcome opportunity to expand the SA settlement plans eastwards. As early as 8 November 1938, he informed his boss Lutze and the leaders of the SA groups in a confidential letter that the placing of new SA farmers had gained greater importance because of the newly acquired territories. In defiance of Heinrich Himmler

being appointed 'Reich commissioner for the strengthening of Germandom' on 7 October 1939,⁴⁵ Kasche insisted that an 'extensive involvement' on the part of the SA was by no means excluded and in fact highly desirable. Therefore, he urged his fellow-SA leaders to register even more potential farmers from the ranks of the SA with the aim of placing them in these new territories, despite 'all possible inhibitions and ties to their homelands'.⁴⁶ A circular from 8 December 1939 specified the next steps, indicating that the new SA settlements would initially be concentrated in those areas of Upper Silesia that were now integrated into the German *Gau* Silesia. Unlike the Warthegau and Danzig district, for that no detailed planning with regard to rural settlements existed yet, farmland in Silesia was released for 'immediate settlements', in cooperation with the governor of Silesia and the *Schlesische Landgesellschaft* based in Breslau. Previously Polish owned farms, usually of the size of twenty acres, were to be expropriated. Several of these small Polish estates should then be merged to create between 3,000 and 4,000 bigger farms with at least eighty acres, the circular stated. If these figures were correct, this means that the number of farms in the previously Polish parts of Upper Silesia that the Germans expropriated after their military victory amounted to approximately 15,000. In contrast to the year 1938, the SA leadership now informed potential settlers that personal capital resources were no longer needed for the move eastwards: 'The farms will be handed over with inventory'.⁴⁷ However, a two-year-long probationary period during that the new German peasant had to demonstrate that he was in fact able to run such a farm should precede the final transfer of ownership.⁴⁸ As the majority of stormtroopers were meanwhile drafted into the Wehrmacht, the SA leadership repeatedly stressed that its men under arms would, in no way, suffer disadvantages because of their inability to obtain a placement immediately. The entire settlement area in Poland would be large enough to host all aspirants, during and also after the war.⁴⁹

Despite such assurances, isolated farmers from the ranks of the SA started to contact the *Reichsnährstand* directly to be considered as administrators on former Polish estates with the beginning of the war. That the SA was bypassed in these cases frustrated Kasche. He warned his

fellow stormtroopers that such incidents were exploited by the enemies of the SA as a proof of its organisational weakness.⁵⁰ Nevertheless, such problems continued. Two years later, in 1941, Kasche claimed to have contacted the *Volksdeutsche Mittelstelle* in order to care for the approximately 700 SA men working for it. In the previous two years, the OSFA had no direct influence on these stormtroopers.⁵¹ Despite these shortcomings, the surviving archival documents demonstrate that the SA persistently tried to secure a decisive influence in settlement matters, not the least in order to create a reliable powerbase for the SA's future growth. This was all the more important as the build-up of regular SA units in the newly occupied territories beginning in the autumn of 1939 took place in a chaotic way (if it happened at all). These new units were initially neither to be incorporated into the Reich SA, nor did the OSAF supply the SA groups bordering these new regions, in other words Ostmark, Ostland, Silesia and Sudeten, with additional financial means in order to expand their areas of operation.⁵²

In practical terms, the SA intended to be fully operational with at least 5,000 new SA settlers ready to move east immediately at the end of the war. In the meantime, the candidates were to be selected according to political and racial criteria in a joint effort of the SA with Darré's *Reichsnährstand*. They were to be educated in three specially designed SA settlement schools [*Siedlerschulen*], located on SA estates that were to be established within the 'incorporated Eastern territories'.⁵³ In 1941, Kasche claimed that he had met with Himmler and his representatives several times to discuss the necessary transfer of ownership of suitable estates. He also asserted that he had held talks with the office of the 'General Authority for Public Land Management within the Incorporated Eastern Territories' [*Generalverwalter für die öffentliche Landbewirtschaftung in den eingegliederten Ostgebieten*], based in Litzmannstadt (Łódź).⁵⁴ The provisional outcome of his talks, Kasche noted, consisted of the agreement that the SA was promised to receive the estate Krośniewice on lease for an initial fifteen-year period by the end of the war. Gauleiter Arthur Greiser had decided this accordingly in the summer of 1940 or even earlier, but he had also informed the SA that the final transfer of property into the hands

of the NSDAP could only happen after the war, allegedly for legal reasons [sic!].⁵⁵ Located near the city of Kutno in the Reichsgau Wartheland, some 100 kilometres west of Warsaw, Krośniewice was previously owned by a Polish noble family. In addition, the SA was to become the proprietor of Błonie castle, built on this estate.⁵⁶ In the new SA training schools to be established, the SA was to offer two-week courses for potential new settlers and for SA leaders in the new German territories that aimed at ‘preparing them for their particular ethnic tasks’ [*volkspolitische Aufgaben*]: ‘To fight foreign and inferior influences [in the new German eastern territories, D.S.], we have to inculcate every fellow German with the awareness of his hereditary value [*stolzes Blutbewußtsein*]. ... Even the individual man needs to know that this is not his private affair, but a matter that concerns vital question of his peoples’ survival. The SA is requested to attach absolute importance to the observation of such issues’, Kasche urged, conceiving the SA farmers in the new settlements not only as exemplary cultivators of land, but also as a kind of vice squad.⁵⁷

Despite his repeated claims that the new peasants from the ranks of the SA had to contribute to the historical challenge in ‘making the regained territories German again for all time’,⁵⁸ the actual figures of potential settlers willing to leave the German heartland for newly acquired territory in the European east were most disappointing. Instead of the (internally) estimated number of 50,000 potential settlers from the rank and file of the SA who disposed of the practical experience necessary for farming, only a fraction of the estimate, mere 1,045 men, had signed up by the test day 20 June 1940.⁵⁹ Admittedly, the number of registered aspirants doubled to 2,150 until 30 April 1941, but this figure still remained far below the expectations of the SA leadership.⁶⁰ Kasche, however, attributed this low number exclusively to practical, war-related problems. In 1941 he claimed that the SA would easily manage to furnish the 45,000 men then needed—and this without drawing on the ethnic German repatriates who had been moving to Reich territory in great numbers since the beginning of the war.⁶¹ This remark was a direct critique of Himmler, for whom Kasche had maintained a firm distaste ever since the Night of the

Long Knives and therefore well before the *Reichsführer SS* gained control over most of the settlement and migration processes in German occupied Eastern Europe. Himmler likewise held similar thoughts about his rival. The relationship of the two men remained poisoned even after Kasche had been appointed to the position of German envoy to Croatia and had left the field of ‘applied’ SA settlement policies.⁶²

A closer examination of the geographical distribution of potential SA settlers, as passed on in Kasche’s report and several monthly registers from the second half of 1941, indicates that the vast majority of those interested in such a transfer lived in the north and east of the German Reich, in borderland regions where the idea of a ‘defensive peasantry’ built on a certain tradition, going back to the nineteenth century and even further. The SA groups Pomerania and Silesia were the best recruiting SA groups with more than 300 aspirants each, followed by the SA group Nordmark (Schleswig-Holstein) with 240 candidates. At the bottom ranged the SA groups of Hesse, Bayrische Ostmark and Alpenland, having reported only twelve, seven and three men, respectively.⁶³ When faced with these numbers, it is hard not to qualify Kasche’s assertive remarks as calculated optimism—an optimism that was out of touch with the realities of German society at war. However, one should also be careful to see the SA recruitment figures as a complete failure, as will be explained further down with reference to comparable figures of the SS.

Despite all practical problems as well as Kasche’s overemphasis of his own achievements, his reports demonstrate that the SA pursued her own ‘Germanization’ policies since the mid-1930s. The reports also underline that the SA Supreme Command intensified the planning with the outbreak of World War Two, despite Hitler’s appointment of Himmler as ‘Reich Commissar for the strengthening of Germandom’ in October 1939. Hitler’s decree explicitly stated that the new Reich commissar would be responsible for the ‘configuration of new German settlement zones by relocation, in particular through the settlement of Germans and ethnic Germans returning home from abroad’.⁶⁴ Theoretically, the competences within the

‘Germanization’ policies were thus neatly divided: while the SS was responsible for the settlement of *Volksdeutsche* returning home,⁶⁵ the SA could claim that it was entitled to keep on taking care of the resettlement of German peasants originating from the Old Reich. As late as January 1941, Kasche insisted on this division of responsibilities between the SA and SS. He stated not only that stormtroopers would not be employed in settlements ‘where the SS is providing the National Socialist core,’ but also pointed out that ‘it needs to be emphasised that the safeguarding of the German east depends on the German peasant taking roots with the soil by the work of his own hands. A German master class [*Herrenschicht*—here Kasche critically alludes to the tradition of the influential Prussian *Junkers*] overseeing soil-rooted masses of foreign peoples would not accomplish the task’.⁶⁶ Such a distinction elucidates how in the SA older ideals of *Werkstolz* – the pride in work from one’s own hands —were closely related to new geopolitical concepts of racial and cultural superiority. The new German master class was to be a class of nationally conscious (male) workers, Kasche postulated, and it would be characterized, as Ernst Jünger had written as early as 1932, by voluntary discipline, the contempt for pleasure, and a war-minded spirit.⁶⁷

In reality, however, Himmler—who in the context of plans for a creation of a Greater Germany since 1936 had taken a deep interest in questions of ethnicity and race—tuned into a direct rival of Kasche and Darré in settlements questions immediately with his appointment in 1939.⁶⁸ The powers were extremely unevenly distributed among them. By the late 1930s, Himmler as *Reichsführer SS* and Chief of the German Police Forces had become one of the most powerful men in the Third Reich. His strong position among Nazi leaders had further increased by the multitudinous crimes his SS had committed since the German attack on Poland in September 1939.⁶⁹ Kasche, on the contrary, could only count on the substantially weaker SA and on a small number of supportive influential National Socialists like the Reich Minister Alfred Rosenberg and Martin Luther, the string-puller in the Foreign Office.⁷⁰ Kasche certainly lacked the power to challenge Himmler when it came to the implementation of competing political

concepts. When Himmler advocated the creation of larger farms and country estates in the occupied east with the argument that these larger farms would be necessary for German families of particular racial value—a plan that was directly opposed to Kasche’s more egalitarian vision, as outlined above—the SA-*Obergruppenführer* could only insist that some of these new large landowners be recruited from within the ranks of the SA.⁷¹ This is just one example that demonstrates that between late 1939 and early 1941, Himmler successfully marginalised the SA in the field of practical ‘Germanization’ policies. Next to the internal problems of SA recruitment, this was another important reason why its settlement plans developed during World War Two concentrated more and more on the immediate post-war period. Questions of the allocation of powers in peacetime could thus be left undecided.⁷²

Max Luyken and the SA’s retreat from active settlement initiatives

After Kasche had taken over the position of German envoy to the Independent State of Croatia (NDH) in April 1941, SA Chief of Staff Lutze did not appoint a formal successor for nearly a year, thereby indirectly admitting defeat in the trial of strength with Himmler. Finally, from February 1942 until February 1943, SA-*Obergruppenführer* Max Luyken served as ‘Chief of Staff for New Peasant Settlements and Matters of Ethnicity in the SA and the SA-*Wehrmannschaften*’ [*Inspekteur für Neubauerntum und Volkstumspflege in der SA und den SA-Wehrmannschaften*]. Unlike the young and energetic Kasche, Luyken who was eighteen years his senior and aged fifty-six in early 1942, was more of an SA bureaucrat who did not feel any need to confront Himmler.⁷³ The SA over the year 1942 nevertheless continued to register potential SA farmers—with numbers rising from 1,196 to 2,555 between 1 April 1942 and 1 January 1943. In the remaining archival documents there is no explanation given as to why Luyken started with slightly more than 1,000 enrollees on 1 April 1942, whereas Kasche had specified 2,150 as the overall number of applicants on 30 April 1941 (see above). It is likely that some of the original applicants had successfully been placed in the meantime, while an unclear

percentage had died on the battlefields between 1939 and 1942.⁷⁴ Furthermore Luyken's new numbers comprised all possible settlers, those who were interested in a transfer within the boundaries of the Old Reich and those who longed for the new 'German East'. The total of the latter group was just 1304, or fifty-one per cent of all those registered on 1 January 1943.⁷⁵

These numbers, at least from the perspective of Luyken, reflected the intensified propaganda campaigns that the SA organised in close collaboration with the *Reichsnährstand* over the year 1942, intended to whet the Germans' appetite for farming and rural life. Topics at information events included 'SA settlers tell about their lives', 'SA comradeship in the settlements: help from the neighbours', but also, adopting the vocabulary of the life reform movement and clearly reaching out to women as well: 'The happiness of our children: breathing freely and growing up in close touch to nature'.⁷⁶ One can thus assume that at that point, settlers from the ranks of the SA had actually made their way into east European farmhouses. However, in August of the same year, Lutze prohibited all future transfers of new farmers from the Old Reich into the 'German east'. Only war veterans and ethnic Germans from abroad were still to be settled there for the rest of the war years.⁷⁷ According to an internal statistic from January 1943, the SA had, by then, transferred a total number of only 422 registered applicants. However, it is not clear whether this number designated all stormtroopers deployed between 1939 and late 1942, or just those resettled since Luyken had taken office. It is likewise unclear whether this number comprised also the inner-migration settlements or only those to the new German territories. But even with no reliable statistics at hand, it seems likely that the total of SA peasants settled in the east did not exceed a three-digit number, considering the few registered candidates. Finally, on 16 February 1943, two weeks after Germany's defeat at the battle of Stalingrad, Lutze eliminated Luyken's post of 'Chief of Staff for New Peasant Settlements and Matters of Ethnicity in the SA and the SA-*Wehrmannschaften*' without substitution.⁷⁸

Reluctant peasants and persistent ideologues

Despite all ideological and practical difficulties, the SA's relevance for the Nazi settlement policies was not peripheral, mainly for two reasons: Firstly, even after Kasche had reported for duty as envoy in Croatia, he was still Hitler's first choice for the new position of 'Reich commissar for Moscovy' in the summer and fall of 1941, a position to be created after the (allegedly imminent) German victory over the Soviet Union.⁷⁹ Alfred Rosenberg as Reich Minister for the Occupied Eastern Territories requested an absolutely 'ruthless personality' for this job—and he recommended Kasche.⁸⁰ In this capacity, Kasche's main task would initially have been to sharply suppress all forms of possible Russian and Communist resistance. Provided that the Wehrmacht had successfully defeated and occupied the Soviet Union, it seems likely that Kasche as the SA's expert in questions of settlements and ethnicity would have played an active and much more influential role in the practical 'Germanization' policies in Eastern Europe, and maybe even beyond.

As late as June 1941, the Hamburg professor of education Gustaf Deuchler, a fanatical stormtrooper himself, produced at Kasche's request a draft report on the 'necessity and the tasks of an SA colonial storm (K-Sturm). According to Deuchler, such an SA 'K-Sturm' should bring together older Germans with colonial experience in Africa and a new generation of brownshirts who aspired to 'go into the colonies'. The K-Sturm's instructions would provide these younger men with the 'spirit of German colonial policies', a political attitude that according to Deuchler would be required for 'proper judgement in colonial affairs' and for at least 'some basic skills in the treatment of the natives [*Eingeborene*]'.⁸¹ Deuchler's draft never won any political significance, not least because of Kasche's new position as German envoy in Croatia and the course of the war. Yet, even in 1944 Kasche held on to the view that the SA was well prepared to furnish the necessary 'human material' [*Menschmaterial*] for the required German settlements in the post-war period. He was convinced that the Third Reich's social and political order, and in particular the SA as an organisation that could mobilize millions of men, would then serve as role model in post-war Europe as a whole.

Kasche was by no means the only SA leader who was considered for or appointed to prominent positions in the German occupied east. SA-*Obergruppenführer* [general] Karl-Siegmund Litzmann was made General commissioner for Estonia in late 1941, and SA-*Obergruppenführer* Heinrich Schoene, the longtime SA leader in Schleswig-Holstein, was appointed the General commissioner for Volhynia-Podolia. Furthermore, no less than five SA generals were sent as German envoys to south-eastern Europe between 1940 and 1941—next to Kasche these were Manfred von Killinger, Gottfried von Jagow, Hanns Elard Ludin and Adolf-Heinz Beckerle. These appointments make it clear that the SA, despite suffering from the fact that most of its men were drafted into the military from 1940 onward, continued to provide Nazi top officials well into the middle of the Second World War. For this reason alone, the SA remained an organisation its competitors had to reckon on. In any case, Kasche, as designated Reich commissar for Moscovy, could rely on a web of like-minded fellow-SA generals in various positions in Eastern Europe. We know that the course of history took a different direction, but the network of SA leaders in the region seemed reasonably strong to help him implement at least some of his plans in the post-war period, provided that the war would be won.

The SA's settlement plans and activities merit recognition, secondly, as a comparison with the later SS settlements policies reveal striking continuities. Although the extent of the required German settlements increased substantially with the Nazis' territorial gains between 1939 and 1942, the SS's discourse on the transfer of Germans from the Old Reich closely resembled the previous statements of the SA. Furthermore, the SS suffered from the same problems: In its preliminary work on the *Generalplan Ost* in the spring of 1941, the *Reichsführer* SS's Main Planning Office in Berlin noted that roughly 200,000 families would be needed for the formation of a German peasantry in the newly occupied and annexed territories in Eastern Europe.⁸² In order to accomplish the goal that thirty-five per cent of the whole population in these areas should work in agriculture, the planners calculated that in these new territories—so far inhabited by up to eighty per cent ethnic Poles—a total of 1,46 million agricultural workers

of German origin would be needed.⁸³ The new farmers were expected to be ‘the origin and the foundation of the entire ethnic German builtup’ [*Volksaufbau*]. Unlike many farmers of the Old Reich, whom the SS characterised as politically conservative and narrow-minded, these new farmers were supposed to represent a new kind of peasantry, fully conscious of its national and racial task. The SS claimed that the German farmer in the newly conquered Eastern territories had to regard himself as a true political fighter ‘on the attack’.⁸⁴

Such formulations hardly reflected the realities of the German occupation, initially characterised by largely uncoordinated settlement actions of ethnic Germans from Galicia, Volhynia, Bessarabia and the Baltic region.⁸⁵ Germans who were living within the borders of the German Reich of 1937, however, did not show much enthusiasm for a permanent migration eastwards. Himmler acknowledged that by June 1942 the SS had only received 4,500 settler applications from the German heartlands. Two thirds of the applications had been submitted in the course of the previous year, after the German attack on the Soviet Union that summer.⁸⁶ The attempt to increase the number of ‘Germanic’ *Wehrbauern* with the help of farmers from the Netherlands, who were targeted by German and Dutch propaganda since 1941 and whom Himmler praised as ‘racially incredibly valuable’ [*blutsmäßig unerhört wertvoll*], was likewise hardly a success. Many of the 5,000 settlers from the Netherlands who moved to the ‘German East’ between 1941 and 1944 only remained for a short while. A report from the Dutch *Commissie tot Uitzending van Landbouwers naar Oost-Europa*, literally the ‘commission for the secondment of farmers to eastern Europe’, in ‘February 1942 lamented the regularly very low level of education of the Dutch peasants in the east and contemptuously called them a ‘bunch of adventurers’ with very little professional knowledge and insufficient leadership skills.’⁸⁷

Such numbers and remarks put the aforementioned failure of the SA’s recruitment attempts within their own rank-and-file in perspective. It was apparently not only the SA’s inadequate organisation that was to blame for the relatively low numbers of applicants, but a much more deeply rooted problem: Despite the intense Nazi settlement propaganda prior to and

during World War Two, just very few Germans living in the Old Reich warmed up to the idea of leaving their home towns and villages for good in order to build a new existence as ‘defensive peasants’ in Eastern Europe – in areas that everyone with a grain of historical and political knowledge knew were fervently contested among different national groups and where excessive violence prevailed in the 1940s.⁸⁸ In a certain way, one might say that the relative failure of earlier ‘inner colonialization’ attempts repeated itself on a larger scale. Theory and practice did not match. Undoubtedly, millions of German men and women as soldiers, policemen, officials, teachers, nurses and auxiliaries actively participated in the racially motivated conquering expedition of large parts of Eastern Europe. They looted, robbed and murdered.⁸⁹ However, this did not imply that they were committed to implementing the National Socialist vision of a post-war ‘German East’ with a will of their own and presumably far-reaching personal consequences. This holds true in particular for peasants, who were usually closely attached to their family’s soil. Whereas many of those who actually moved east were young and unmarried, thus relatively open for change and excitement, the SA men targeted in the National Socialist propaganda were middle-aged husbands and family fathers, a group whose members in many cases had already decided on where to live, with whom, and how to sustain a living. For these men, the economic risk of possible failure loomed large, especially as many lacked the necessary financial and social capital to recover quickly in the event of losing their income and home.

This observation qualifies the assumption that the Nazi regime attempted to satisfy the expectations and demands of the German peasants by the acquisition of new ‘living space’ and new settlements there in the first place.⁹⁰ If one takes the actual behaviour of the German peasantry as a benchmark, it is obvious that only a small minority of farmers were willing to support the National Socialist settlement plans by indicating their willingness to permanently move into these areas. The actual implementation of the far-reaching SS settlements plans that, in 1942, provided for the migration of up to 220,000 peasant families from the Old Reich would have required massive state force.⁹¹ Yet, World War I veterans like Hitler by all means wanted to

avoid protests at the ‘homefront’, their lasting trauma. The contemporary catchword of *Ostrausch*, meaning a ‘frenzy for the east’, thus described a phenomenon that in reality remained largely confined to a limited number of people, in particular planning experts and young and unmarried men and women who desired to make their own contribution to the ‘German mission’ in the east. German peasants from the Old Reich, by contrast, drawn from the tasks of the ‘battle of agricultural production’ [*Erzeugungsschlacht*], and furthermore suffering from the shortage of available labour in rural Germany, reacted far less enthusiastically. Against this backdrop the regular assurances of SA and SS leaders that ‘no German soldier fighting at the front’ would return too late to benefit from the new settlement projects had little significance in practice.⁹²

Conclusion: the SA und its contribution to the formation of a ‘people’s community’ in Eastern Europe

Farming in the occupied east seemed attractive only for a minority of Germans. As a consequence, resettlement experts like SS brigade leader Herbert Backe soon had to acknowledge that the ‘new formation of German peasantry in occupied Europe’ should be seen as a long-term project that would probably come to a close no earlier than long after the war.⁹³ Nevertheless, the SA Germanization policies mean more than a somehow obscure footnote in the history of National Socialism expansionism, mainly for two reasons:

Firstly, the SA’s plans constituted—spatially and temporally—the connecting link between the *Reichsnährstand*’s earlier ‘inner colonization’ projects and the later radical Germanization projects of the SS. They contributed to the ‘racial mobilisation’ (Michael Wildt)⁹⁴ in the Third Reich especially by inculcating the individual SA man with convictions of ‘racial consciousness’ [*Blutsbewusstsein*] and ‘bonds to the soil’ [*Bodenverbundenheit*] on the occasion of the German resettlement of the east in the late 1930s and early 1940s.⁹⁵ Thereby, they merged the traditional discourse of the German ‘defensive settlements’ [*Wehrsiedlungen*] with the National Socialists’ new racial categories.

Secondly, the SA's Germanization plans remained important with regard to the organisation's later activities in the final years of the war. Despite the fact that the original plans were hardly put to a practical test and thus largely remained 'utopian imaginations', its inherent principles continued to have effect on the SA's conception of itself until the end of the Third Reich.⁹⁶ They serve as a paradigmatic example that the initiatives and activities of the late SA continued to revolve around the poles of discipline and integration and as such contributed to the formation of the *Volksgemeinschaft* structured along racial lines. Consequently, Siegfried Kasche ranked the bringing into line and the 'steering' [*Führung*] of his fellow Germans among the most important aspects of the SA's settlement commitment.⁹⁷ The concrete plans for the resettlement of SA men into conquered Eastern Europe, developed since 1938, thus have to be seen as one element of a larger process of transforming the *Erwartungsraum*, or 'space of expectations' of a racially and politically homogeneous 'people's community' into an *Erfahrungsraum*, or 'space of experience' in the near future.⁹⁸ That the SA hardly possessed any kind of practical experience in ethnical settlement questions [*Volkstumsarbeit*], as Kasche himself freely acknowledged in 1941,⁹⁹ somehow paradoxically contributed to the fact that it was able to keep up its expectations for the future, despite being ousted by Himmler's SS.

With regard to the history of the stormtroopers, one can draw a line from the 1920s to the 1940s. Already in the early years after the First World War, the idea that the nascent SA in line with other *Wehrverbände* was called to defend the legitimate interest of the German people living in the borderland regions of the German Reich was prominent. Ten years later, this idea radicalised with the German settlement movement in the 1930s that attempted to intensify the German 'inner colonization' along racial and political lines. By the late 1930s, the emphasis had shifted from inner to outer colonization, the conquest of new German territories in the European East. The *Volksgemeinschaft* was meanwhile understood as a *Wehrgemeinschaft*, with actual settlement initiatives postponed for peacetime.¹⁰⁰ Yet the concepts of racial superiority and the SA's alleged settlement mission continued to inspire its 'defence activities' against increasing

‘partisan attacks’ until the last phase of the Second World War. In the General Government, SA units were from 1944 onward regularly used for police tasks; ‘completely armed’ by the Nazi regime.¹⁰¹ Similar to the development in the General Government, the SA-*Gruppe* Südmark in Slovenia since 1942 played a vital role in the ‘securing’ of Southern Styria and Carniola, an effort that included the persecution of both alleged and real partisans. In the annexed or occupied parts of the Greater German Reich, regional policing there went hand in hand with attempts to ‘Germanise’ those parts of the local populations deemed racially sufficient.¹⁰² Whereas the actual settlement of stormtroopers in Eastern Europe failed with few exceptions, its concepts of race, discipline and the ability to self-defence on the occasion of its settlement initiatives contributed to the radicalisation of the people’s community in the occupied territories.

Endnotes

¹ Sven Reichardt, *Faschistische Kampfbünde: Gewalt und Gemeinschaft im italienischen Squadristismus und in der deutschen SA*, 2nd ed. (Cologne et al.: Böhlau, 2009); Mitchell, Otis C., *Hitler’s stormtroopers and the attack on the German Republic, 1919-1933* (Jefferson, North Carolina and London: McFarland & Company, 2008); Thomas D. Grant, *Stormtroopers and crisis in the Nazi movement: activism, ideology and dissolution* (London and New York: Routledge, 2004); Peter Longerich, *Die braunen Bataillone: Geschichte der SA* (Munich: Beck, 1989); Richard Bessel, *Political violence and the rise of Nazism: the storm troopers in eastern Germany 1925-1934* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1984).

² Exceptions: Ives Müller, ‘Wilhelm Schepmann—der letzte SA-Stabschef und die Rolle der SA im Zweiten Weltkrieg’, *Zeitschrift für Geschichtswissenschaft*, Vol. 63, No. 6, 2015, pp. 513-532; Daniel Siemens, ‘Dem SA-Mann auf der Spur: Nationalsozialistische Erinnerungspolitik im Berlin der 1930er Jahre’, in Stefan Hördler (ed.), *SA-Terror als Herrschaftssicherung: ‘Köpenicker Blutwoche’ und öffentliche Gewalt im Nationalsozialismus* (Berlin: Metropol, 2013), pp. 147-163; Bruce Campbell, ‘The SA after the Röhm purge’, *Journal of Contemporary*

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³ Rolf-Dieter Müller, *Hitlers Ostkrieg und die deutsche Siedlungspolitik: Die Zusammenarbeit von Wehrmacht, Wirtschaft und SS* (Frankfurt am Main: Fischer, 1991); Czesław Madajczyk (ed.), *Vom Generalplan Ost zum Generalsiedlungsplan* (Munich: K. G. Saur, 1994); Mechthild Rössler and Sabine Schleiermacher (eds.), *Der 'Generalplan Ost': Hauptlinien der nationalsozialistischen Planungs- und Vernichtungspolitik* (Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 1993); Valdis O. Lumans, *Himmler's auxiliaries: the Volksdeutsche Mittelstelle and the German national minorities of Europe 1933-45* (Chapel Hill and London: University of North Carolina Press, 1993); Michael Wildt, *Generation des Unbedingten: Das Führungskorps des Reichssicherheitshauptamtes* (Hamburg: Hamburger Edition, 2002); Michael A. Hartenstein, *Neue Dorflandschaften: Nationalsozialistische Siedlungsplanung in den 'eingegliederten Ostgebieten' 1939 bis 1944* (Berlin: Dr. Köster, 1998); Isabel Heinemann, 'Rasse, Siedlung, deutsches Blut': *Das Rasse- und Siedlungshauptamt der SS und die rassenpolitische Neuordnung Europas* (Göttingen: Wallstein, 2003); Isabel Heinemann and Patrick Wagner (eds.), *Wissenschaft—Planung—Vertreibung: Neuordnungskonzepte und Umsiedlungspolitik im 20. Jahrhundert* (Stuttgart: Steiner, 2006); Markus Leniger, *Nationalsozialistische 'Volkstumsarbeit' und Umsiedlungspolitik 1933-1945: Von der Minderheitenbetreuung zur Siedlerauslese* (Berlin: Frank & Timme, 2006); Gerhard Wolf, *Ideologie und Herrschaftsrationalität: Nationalsozialistische Germanisierungspolitik in Polen* (Hamburg: Hamburger Edition, 2012).

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⁴ This argument is advanced more fully in Daniel Siemens, ‘Writing the history of the SA at the International Military Tribunal: legal strategies and long-term historiographical consequences,’ *Journal of Modern European History*, Vol. 14, No. 4, 2016, pp. 548-567.

⁵ This approach is carefully discussed in Martina Steber and Bernhard Gotto, ‘Writing the social history of the Nazi regime’, in Martina Steber and Bernhard Gotto (eds.), *Visions of community in Nazi Germany: social engineering & private lives* (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 2014), pp. 1-25.

⁶ For comprehensive overview of the SA’s development after 1934, see my forthcoming book, tentatively intitled *Hitler’s brownshirts: the triumph of violence. A history of the National Socialist SA, 1921-1945*, New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 2017.

⁷ The geopolitical terminology of de- and reterritorialisation is based on Trevor J. Barnes and Claudio Minca, ‘Nazi spatial theory: the dark geographies of Carl Schmitt and Walter Christaller’, *Annals of the Association of American Geographers*, Vol. 103, No. 3, 2013, pp. 669-687.

⁸ See Armin Nolzen’s contribution to this issue of the *Journal of Genocide Research*.

⁹ *Volksgemeinschaft*, as understood here, does not describe any form of ‘static’ social reality. Rather, following Reinhart Koselleck, it is a term to describe and summarize expectations, thus focussing on ‘dynamics’. Reinhart Koselleck, “‘Erfahrungsraum’ und ‘Erwartungshorizont’ — zwei historische Kategorien”, in Reinhart Koselleck, *Vergangene Zukunft. Zur Semantik geschichtlicher Zeiten* (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1989), pp. 349-375.

¹⁰ Ute Peltz-Dreckmann, *Nationalsozialistischer Siedlungsbau. Versuch einer Analyse der die Siedlungspolitik bestimmenden Faktoren am Beispiel des Nationalsozialismus* (Munich: Minerva, 1978). On the SA settlements as a sub-category of the *Kleinsiedlung* [small scale settlements]: Jörn Düwel and Niels Gutschow, *Städtebau in Deutschland im 20. Jahrhundert. Ideen – Projekte – Akteure* (Stuttgart: Teubner, 2001), pp. 96-105.

¹¹ ‘Gesetz über die Neubildung deutschen Bauerntums’, 14 Juni 1933, in: *Reichsgesetzblatt 1933 I*, p. 517.

¹² Heinz Franz, *Der Mensch in der Siedlungsbewegung*, Ph.D. dissertation Ruprecht-Karls-Universität zu Heidelberg (Mühlacker: Elser, 1937), p. 40. On the NSDAP’s strategies in rural Germany: Wolfram Pyta, *Dorfgemeinschaft und Parteipolitik 1918-1933. Die Verschränkung von Milieu und Parteien in den protestantischen Landgebieten Deutschlands in der Weimarer Republik* (Düsseldorf: Droste, 1996); Mechthild Hempe, *Ländliche Gesellschaft in der Krise: Mecklenburg in der Weimarer Republik*, (Cologne: Böhlau, 2002); Alexander Otto-Morris, *Rebellion in the province: the Landvolkbewegung and the rise of National Socialism in Schleswig-Holstein* (Frankfurt am Main: Lang, 2013).

¹³ ‘Im Kampf gegen die Landflucht: SA schafft neues Bauerntum’, *NSK*, Series 164, 15 July 1939, p. 1, in Bundesarchiv Berlin-Lichterfelde, NS 23/222; Uwe Mai, ‘Rasse und Raum’: *Agrarpolitik, Sozial- und Raumplanung im NS-Staat* (Paderborn: Schöningh, 2002); Gustavo Corni and Horst Gies, ‘Blut und Boden’: *Rassenideologie und Agrarpolitik im Staat Hitlers* (Idstein: Schulz-Kirchner, 1994); Roland Baier, *Der deutsche Osten als soziale Frage: Eine Studie zur preußischen und deutschen Siedlungs- und Polenpolitik in den Ostprovinzen während des Kaiserreichs und der Weimarer Republik* (Cologne: Böhlau, 1980).

¹⁴ At this time, earlier dissonances between the Supreme SA Command and the *Reichsnährstand* had been overcome. Letter of the SA’s Führungsamt to Darré from 24 May 1934, in Bundesarchiv Berlin-Lichterfelde, R 43 II, Vol. 207, p. 118 f., as quoted in Corni and Gies, ‘Blut und Boden’, p. 121. From 1935 the guidelines of the Reich labour minister specified that

‘combat veterans and fighters of the national revolution’ had to be given preferences by the distribution of state-allocated settlement patches (Peltz-Dreckmann, *Nationalsozialistischer Siedlungsbau*, pp. 139—140). Consequently, it is safe to assume that SA men already prior to 1937 benefitted disproportionately from the state-sponsored construction of small housing estates [*Kleinsiedlungsbau*].

¹⁵ ‘Sturmabteilungsmänner packen an’, *Bremer Zeitung*, 27 November 1939, in Bundesarchiv Berlin-Lichterfelde, NS 23/222; Kasche, ‘Bericht über die Arbeiten in der SA hinsichtlich ihrer Beteiligung bei der Neubildung deutschen Bauerntums’, in: Politisches Archiv des Auswärtigen Amtes, Personal Papers of Siegfried Kasche, No. 41, pp. 59-77, here p. 70 (the document is likewise included in Bundesarchiv Berlin-Lichterfelde, NS 23/688).

¹⁶ SA-Oberführer Holtz, ‘SA-Dankopfersiedlung “Glaubensstatt”’, *Die SA*, Vol. 2, No. 17, 1941, pp. 14-16.

¹⁷ On the close cooperation between the SA and the German shooting associations: Henning Borggräfe, *Schützenvereine im Nationalsozialismus: Pflege der ‘Volksgemeinschaft’ und Vorbereitung auf den Krieg* (Münster: Ardey, 2010).

¹⁸ Barbara Wolf, ‘Wohnungs- und Siedlungsbau’, in Michael Cramer-Fürtig and Bernhard Gotto (eds.), *‘Machtergreifung’ in Augsburg. Anfänge der NS-Diktatur 1933-1937* (Augsburg: Wißner, 2008), pp. 179-188 (quotation on p. 180).

¹⁹ More research is needed to explore the importance of *Volksdeutsche* within the SA, in particular with regard to SA formations in the General Government. Governor Hans Frank, who at the same time held the title of SA-*Obergruppenführer*, had initially interdicted the SA’s expansion in ‘his’ territory in late 1939, but he changed his mind when faced with increasing Polish resistance activities in early 1942. From April 1942 onwards, the General Government had its own SA formations, built in part by incorporating the previously established ‘defensive border guards’ [*Wehrschützenbereitschaften*]. ‘Die SA als Vorbild im Generalgouvernement’, *Krakauer Zeitung*, Vol. 4, No. 93 from 21 April 1942; Typescript ‘Die Aufstellung der SA-

Einheit General-Gouvernement'; both in Bundesarchiv Berlin-Lichterfelde, NS 23/501, pp. 173-175, 179.

²⁰ 'Zinsfrei und kapitallos', *NSK*, Series 77, 5 April 1937, p. 1, in Bundesarchiv Berlin-Lichterfelde, NS 23/222.

²¹ 'Zinsfrei und kapitallos', p. 2.

²² Jan (Johannes) G. Smit, *Neubildung deutschen Bauerntums: Innere Kolonisation im Dritten Reich. Fallstudien in Schleswig-Holstein* (Kassel: Gesamthochschul-Bibliothek, 1983), p. 184.

²³ Holtz, 'SA-Dankopfersiedlung "Glaubensstatt"', p. 14.

²⁴ Pyta, 'Menschenökonomie', p. 39; Franz, *Der Mensch in der Siedlungsbewegung*, p. 30; Müller, *Hitlers Ostkrieg*, pp. 11-12. For an early condemnation of Nazi settlement policies: *Deutschland-Berichte der Sozialdemokratischen Partei Deutschlands (Sopade)*, Vol. 2 (1935) (reprint: Salzhause: Nettelbeck, 1980), pp. 1497-1511.

²⁵ Jürgen Finger, Sven Keller and Andreas Wirsching (eds.), *Dr. Oetker und der Nationalsozialismus: Geschichte eines Familienunternehmens 1933-1945* (Munich: Beck, 2013), pp. 137-138.

²⁶ In reality, however, German companies like the Bielefeld-based Dr. Oetker food processing conglomerate continued to provide substantial sums for small-scale settlement projects, in continuity to their activities in the 1920s. Finger/Keller/Wirsching, *Dr. Oetker und der Nationalsozialismus*, pp. 138-150.

²⁷ Smit, *Neubildung deutschen Bauerntums*, p. 186.

²⁸ Klaus Kiran Patel, 'The paradox of planning: German agricultural policy in a European perspective, 1920s to 1970s', *Past and Present*, Vol. 212, No. 1, 2011, pp. 239-269, here p. 245.

²⁹ On the actual mood of the German peasants at the end of the 1930s: Timothy W. Mason, *Arbeiterklasse und Volksgemeinschaft: Dokumente und Materialien 1936-1939* (Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag, 1975), pp. 865-867; J. E. Farquharson, 'The agrarian policy of National

Socialist Germany’, in Robert G. Moeller (ed.), *Peasants and Lords in Modern Germany* (Boston: Allen & Unwin, 1986), pp. 233-259.

³⁰ R. Walther Darré, ‘Bauern und Soldaten’, in *Der SA-Führer*, No. 8, 1938, as reprinted in R. Walther Darré, *Um Blut und Boden: Reden und Aufsätze* (Munich: Eher, 1942), pp. 158-161.

³¹ On the importance of ‘male comradeship’ in the National Socialist movement as well in the Third Reich: Thomas Kühne, *Belonging and genocide: Hitler’s community, 1918-1945* (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 2010).

³² Smit, *Neubildung deutschen Bauerntums*, p. 185. Darré in October 1939 argued very similarly: Peter Longerich, *Heinrich Himmler: Biographie* (Munich: Siedler, 2010), p. 450.

³³ Historical research so far has paid attention to Kasche only with regard to his role as German envoy in Croatia (1941-1945). Recently: Alexander Korb, *Im Schatten des Weltkriegs: Massengewalt der Ustaša gegen Serben, Juden und Roma in Kroatien 1941-1945* (Hamburg; Hamburger Edition, 2013).

³⁴ On Kasche’s biography see his detailed statements given when interned and questioned by the Yugoslav authorities on 7 March 1947, in: Croatian State Archives (Zagreb), HR-HDR-1561, Sg 013.0.47 (Slavko Kvaternik), III DIO, pp. 280-281. On Kasche’s relevance as German envoy in south-eastern Europe: Eckart Conze et al. (eds.), *Das Amt und die Vergangenheit: Deutsche Diplomaten im Dritten Reich und in der Bundesrepublik* (Munich: Blessing, 2010) pp. 165-166; ‘Der deutsche Gesandte in Agram/Kroatien: SA-Obergruppenführer Kasche’, *Illustrierter Beobachter*, 14 August 1941, in: BAB, R 9354/601.

³⁵ ‘Zinsfrei und kapitallos’, *NSK*, Series 77, 5 April 1937, p. 1, in Bundesarchiv Berlin-Lichterfelde, NS 23/222.

³⁶ Siegfried Kasche, ‘Richtlinien für die Beteiligung der SA bei der Neubildung deutschen Bauerntums, 8 September 1938’, in Bundesarchiv Berlin-Lichterfelde, NS 23/688; Kasche, ‘Bericht über die Arbeiten in der SA hinsichtlich ihrer Beteiligung bei der Neubildung deutschen Bauerntums’, pp. 59-60.

³⁷ ‘Merkblatt betreffend den Erwerb des Neubauernscheins’ [1938], in Bundesarchiv Berlin-Lichterfelde, NS 23/688.

³⁸ Siegfried Kasche, ‘Besondere Anordnung Nr. 1’, 4 November 1940, in Bundesarchiv Berlin-Lichterfelde, NS 23/688.

³⁹ Kasche, ‘Richtlinien für die Beteiligung der SA bei der Neubildung deutschen Bauerntums’.

⁴⁰ Alexander Prusin, “‘Make this land German again!’: the Nazi population policies in the Wartheland, 1939-1941’, in Aleksandr Dyukov and Olesya Orlenko (eds.), *Divided eastern Europe: border and population transfer, 1938-1947* (Newcastle upon Tyne: Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2012), pp. 74-91, here pp. 75-77; Smit, *Neubildung deutschen Bauerntums*, pp. 30-60.

⁴¹ SA-Oberführer Udo von Alvensleben, ‘Die Bedeutung der Grenzlandsiedlung. Vortrag vor den Neubauernsiedlungsreferenten und der Obersten SA Führung am 12. Mai 1939 in Schlochau’, in Politisches Archiv des Auswärtigen Amtes, Personal Papers Siegfried Kasche, No. 34. Alvensleben, born on 4 May 1895, was one of the East Elbian aristocrats who already prior to 1933 were attracted by National Socialism. After the First World War, he had initially joined the Stahlhelm, but in September 1930 became a member of the NSDAP and soon also the leader of the local SA Standarte. In 1933, he was appointed head of the district authority in Schlochau, Pomerania, and in the following years tried to reconcile local customs and religious traditions with the National Socialist ideology. On his biography and political views, see the documents in his SA personal file, in Bundesarchiv Berlin-Lichterfelde, SA 4000000027.

⁴² Christoph Dieckmann, ‘Plan und Praxis’, p. 94.

⁴³ Prusin, “‘Make this land German again!’”, pp. 75-76; Vejas Gabriel Liulevicius, *War land on the eastern front: culture, national identity and German occupation in World War I*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001. Regarding the important literature on the influence of colonial phantasies and experiences on Nazi rule: Patrick Bernhard, ‘Hitler’s Africa in the east: Italian colonialism as a model for German planning in eastern Europe’, *Journal of Contemporary*

History, Vol. 51, No. 1, 2016, pp. 61-90; Benjamin Madley, 'From Africa to Auschwitz: how German South West Africa incubated ideas and methods adopted and developed by the Nazis in eastern Europe', *European History Quarterly*, Vol. 35, No. 3, 2005, pp. 429-464; Jürgen Zimmerer, 'Die Geburt des "Ostlandes" aus dem Geist des Kolonialismus. Die nationalsozialistische Eroberungs- und Beherrschungspolitik in (post-)kolonialer Perspektive', *Sozial.Geschichte*, Vol. 19, No. 1, 2004, pp. 10-43.

⁴⁴ Kasche, 'Bericht über die Arbeiten in der SA hinsichtlich ihrer Beteiligung bei der Neubildung deutschen Bauerntums', pp. 62-64.

⁴⁵ Longerich, *Heinrich Himmler*, pp. 449-451; Robert L. Koehl, *RKFVD: German resettlement and population policy 1939-1945: A history of the Reich commission for the strengthening of Germandom* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1957), pp. 49-70.

⁴⁶ Siegfried Kasche, 'Schreiben betr. der Beteiligung der SA bei der Neubildung deutschen Bauerntums, 8 November 1939', in Bundesarchiv Berlin-Lichterfelde, NS 23/688.

⁴⁷ SA-Obersturnführer Prestin, 'Zusammenfassung aller wichtigen Fragen für die Neubauernsiedlung im ehemals polnischen Raum, 8 December 1939', in Bundesarchiv Berlin-Lichterfelde, NS 23/688.

⁴⁸ Prestin, 'Zusammenfassung aller wichtigen Fragen'.

⁴⁹ Circular of the leader of SA-Gruppe Hessen, 4 December 1939, in Bundesarchiv Berlin-Lichterfelde, NS 23/688.

⁵⁰ Siegfried Kasche, 'Schreiben betr. der Beteiligung der SA bei der Neubildung deutschen Bauerntums'.

⁵¹ Siegfried Kasche, 'Besondere Anordnung', 20 January 1941, in Bundesarchiv Berlin-Lichterfelde, NS 23/688; Kasche, 'Bericht über die Arbeiten in der SA hinsichtlich ihrer Beteiligung bei der Neubildung deutschen Bauerntums', p. 73. Remarkably, there is no mention of Kasche in the pertinent book of Lumans, *Himmler's auxiliaries*. From the multitude of studies on the ethnic Germans and their experiences: Doris L. Bergen, 'The "Volksdeutschen" of eastern

Europe, World War II and the Holocaust: constructed ethnicity, real genocide', in Keith Bullivant et al. (eds.), *Germany and eastern Europe: cultural identities and cultural differences* (Amsterdam and Atlanta: Rodopi, 1999), pp. 70-93; Doris L. Bergen, 'Die Volksdeutschen in German Propaganda', *German Studies Review* Vol. 31, No. 3, 2008, pp. 447-470.

⁵² Oberste SA-Führung (Jüttner), Urgent letter [*Schnellbrief*] on the setup of the SA in the German areas of the previous Polish state, 30 October 1939, in Bundesarchiv Berlin-Lichterfelde, NS 23/510.

⁵³ Kasche, 'Bericht über die Arbeiten in der SA hinsichtlich ihrer Beteiligung bei der Neubildung deutschen Bauerntums', pp. 61, 75.

⁵⁴ Kasche, 'Bericht über die Arbeiten in der SA hinsichtlich ihrer Beteiligung bei der Neubildung deutschen Bauerntums', p. 75.

⁵⁵ Remarks in the file memorandum on the speech of the 'SA Reich treasurer' from 13 September 1940, in Bundesarchiv Berlin-Lichterfelde, NS 23/98.

⁵⁶ Kasche, 'Bericht über die Arbeiten in der SA hinsichtlich ihrer Beteiligung bei der Neubildung deutschen Bauerntums', p. 75.

⁵⁷ Siegfried Kasche, 'Besondere Anordnung Nr. 3', 8 January 1941, in Bundesarchiv Berlin-Lichterfelde, NS 23/688.

⁵⁸ Beauftragter des Stabschef für die Beteiligung der SA bei der Neubauernsiedlung, 'Merkblatt 1', 2 January 1940, in Bundesarchiv Berlin-Lichterfelde, NS 23/688.

⁵⁹ 'Zahlenmäßige Aufstellung über die Neubauernbewerber in den Gruppen nach dem Stand vom 20. Juni 1940', in Bundesarchiv Berlin-Lichterfelde, NS 23/688.

⁶⁰ Kasche, 'Bericht über die Arbeiten in der SA hinsichtlich ihrer Beteiligung bei der Neubildung deutschen Bauerntums', p. 67.

⁶¹ Kasche, 'Bericht über die Arbeiten in der SA hinsichtlich ihrer Beteiligung bei der Neubildung deutschen Bauerntums', p. 68.

⁶² On Kasche's tainted relations with Himmler: Edmund Glaise von Horstenau, *Ein General im Zwielicht: Die Erinnerungen Edmund Glaises von Horstenau. Bevollmächtigter General in Kroatien und Zeuge des Untergangs des Tausendjährigen Reiches*, Vol. 3, edited by Peter Broucek (Vienna: Böhlau, 1988), pp. 188-189.

⁶³ Kasche, 'Bericht über die Arbeiten in der SA hinsichtlich ihrer Beteiligung bei der Neubildung deutschen Bauerntums', p. 68.

⁶⁴ Joachim Wolschke-Bulmahn, 'Gewalt als Grundlage nationalsozialistischer Stadt- und Landschaftsplanung in den "eingegliederten Ostgebieten"', in Rössler and Schleiermacher, *Der 'Generalplan Ost'*, pp. 328-338, here p. 330.

⁶⁵ Heinemann, *'Rasse, Siedlung, deutsches Blut'* as well as the ongoing project on the SS by Jan Erik Schulte.

⁶⁶ Siegfried Kasche, 'Besondere Anordnung Nr. 3', 8 January 1941.

⁶⁷ Ernst Jünger, *Der Arbeiter: Herrschaft und Gestalt* (Cotta: Stuttgart, 1981 [1932]), p. 246

⁶⁸ Longerich, *Heinrich Himmler*, pp. 401-411, 427-432.

⁶⁹ On the German conduct of war that did not respect the standards of international warfare: Wolf, *Ideologie und Herrschaftsrationalität*, pp. 76-90.

⁷⁰ Christopher R. Browning, 'Unterstaatssekretär Martin Luther and the Ribbentrop Foreign Office', *Journal of Contemporary History*, Vol. 12, No. 2, 1977, pp. 313-344.

⁷¹ Siegfried Kasche, 'Besondere Anordnung Nr. 3', 8 January 1941.

⁷² This shows a remarkable parallel to the settlement practice of former members of the German Wehrmacht in the newly conquered European east. Actual settlements here likewise remained the exception. The majority of the 'Wehrbauern to be' was supposed to be provided with land only after the final military victory. Nevertheless, many members of the military already during the war behaved as colonisers. For details: Müller, *Hitlers Ostkrieg*, pp. 25-48.

⁷³ On Luyken's biography: Joachim Lilla, 'Luyken, Max', in Joachim Lilla, *Staatsminister, leitende Verwaltungsbeamte und (NS-)Funktionsträger in Bayern 1918 bis 1945*, available at:

<http://verwaltungshandbuch.bayerische-landesbibliothek-online.de/luyken-max> (05. Oktober 2012). Retrieved 3 September 2015.

⁷⁴ According to the statistics provided by Rüdiger Overmans, slightly more than one million Wehrmacht soldiers died between the beginning of the Second World War until the end of the year 1942. With the attack of the Soviet Union, the number of German casualties rose quickly; it amounted to more than 300,000 in the second half of 1942 and started to impact on German settlement policies in the east. One can assume that some of those registered as future settlers with the SA were among these deaths, but reliable data to clarify this is not available. Rüdiger Overmans, *Deutsche militärische Verluste im Zweiten Weltkrieg* (Munich: Oldenbourg, 1999), pp. 237-243.

⁷⁵ ‘Führungsbefehl der Obersten SA-Führung, Bestandsübersicht über Neubauernbewerber’, 20 February 1943, in Bundesarchiv Berlin-Lichterfelde, NS 23/688.

⁷⁶ Circular of the leader of the SA-Gruppe Hessen on ‘Neubauerntum. Mitarbeit in der Propaganda’, 1 April 1942, in Bundesarchiv Berlin-Lichterfelde, NS 23/688. Such recruitment strategies built on earlier campaigns of the national right to elevate the role of farm women into ‘preservers of the nation’: Elisabeth B. Jones, *Gender and Rural Modernity: Farm Women and the Politics of Labor in Germany, 1871-1933* (Farnham: Ashgate, 2009), pp. 161-197.

⁷⁷ ‘Führungsbefehl der Obersten SA-Führung’, 15 August 1942, in Bundesarchiv Berlin-Lichterfelde, NS 23/688.

⁷⁸ Der Oberste SA-Führer, ‘Schnellbrief betr. Stilllegung der Inspektion für Neubauerntum und Volkstumspflege’, 16 February 1943, in Bundesarchiv Berlin-Lichterfelde, NS 23/688.

⁷⁹ Adolf-Heinz Beckerle, *Persönliche Aufzeichnungen*, Entry from 4 October 1941, in: Politisches Archiv des Auswärtigen Amtes, ‘Persönliche Aufzeichnungen des Gesandten Beckerle’ (Gesandtschaft Sofia), Vol. 59/2 (20 July 1941-16 February 1943), p. 69; ‘Memorandum of a meeting of Hitler, Rosenberg, Göring and Field Marshal Keitel in the Führer’s Headquarters on 16 July 1941’, in United States Government Printing Office (eds.),

Documents on German foreign policy 1918-1945. Series D (1937-1945), vol. XIII: The War Years, June 23-December 11, 1941 (Washington DC: United States Government Printing Office, 1954), pp. 149-156, here p. 154; Alex J. Kay, *Exploitation, resettlement, mass Murder: political and economical planning for German occupation policy in the Soviet Union, 1940-1941* (New York und Oxford: Berghahn, 2006), p. 182.

⁸⁰ Kay, *Exploitation, resettlement, mass murder*, p. 85.

⁸¹ Gustaf Deuchler, 'Denkschrift-Entwurf: Über die Notwendigkeit und die Aufgabe eines Kolonialsturmes (K.-Sturmes)', in: Institut für Zeitgeschichte, Archive, ED 149, vol. 2, pp. 10-13. A few weeks later, Deuchler even fantasised about a new 'Kolonialpädagogisches Institut,' an 'Institute for Colonial Pedagogy,' that was allegedly planned at Hamburg University (Letter from Gustaf Deuchler to Siegfried Kasche, 26 July 1941, in: Institut für Zeitgeschichte, Archive, ED 149, vol. 2, pp. 14-15).

⁸² 'Planungsgrundlagen der SS für den Aufbau der Ostgebiete (April-Mai 1940)', in Madajczyk, *Vom Generalplan Ost zum Generalsiedlungsplan*, pp. 3-14, here p. 5.

⁸³ Madajczyk, *Vom Generalplan Ost zum Generalsiedlungsplan*, pp. 3-5.

⁸⁴ Madajczyk, *Vom Generalplan Ost zum Generalsiedlungsplan*, pp. 6-7.

⁸⁵ Note from Alexander Dolezalek from the planning department of the *SS-Ansiedlungsstab* Litzmannstadt on the *Generalsiedlungsplan*, 19 August 1941, in Madajczyk, *Vom Generalplan Ost zum Generalsiedlungsplan*, pp. 19-20, here p. 19; Prusin, 'Make this land German again!'; Birthe Kundrus, 'Regime der Differenz. Volkstumspolitische Inklusionen und Exklusionen im Warthegau und im Generalgouvernement 1939-1944', in Bajohr and Wildt, *Volksgemeinschaft*, pp. 105-123. On the generally limited excitement for the 'German East': Mai, '*Rasse und Raum*', pp. 319-331.

⁸⁶ Mai, '*Rasse und Raum*', p. 320.

⁸⁷ Geraldine von Frijtag Drabbe Künzel, 'Die niederländische Ostkolonisation (1941-1944)', in Friso Wielenga and Loek Geeraedts (eds.), *Jahrbuch des Zentrums für Niederlande Studien*, Vol.

22 (Münster: Aschendorff, 2011), pp. 81-101 (quotation p. 89). See also her contribution to this special issue as well as her comprehensive analysis in *Hitler's Brudervolk: the Dutch and the colonization of occupied Eastern Europe, 1939-1945* (New York and London: Routledge, 2015).

⁸⁸ In this respect, it is telling that by the fall of 1941—at a time of unchallenged German optimism with regard to an imminent military success against the Soviet Union—peasants from the western parts of the Old Reich, if they were willing to move at all, still preferred to settle in the west, in German-occupied and administered Lorraine, than to move to the German occupied east. Astrid Gehrig, *Im Dienste der nationalsozialistischen Volkstumspolitik in Lothringen: Auf den Spuren meines Großvaters* (Essen: Westfälisches Dampfboot, 2014), p. 150.

⁸⁹ Elizabeth Harvey, *Women and the Nazi east: agents and witnesses of Germanization* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2003); Götz Aly, *Hitlers Volksstaat. Raub, Rassenkrieg und nationaler Sozialismus* (Frankfurt am Main: Fischer, 2005); Sönke Neitzel and Harald Welzer, *Soldaten: Protokolle vom Kämpfen, Töten und Sterben* (Frankfurt am Main: Fischer, 2011).

⁹⁰ Patel, 'The Paradox of planning', p. 245; Müller, *Hitlers Ostkrieg*, p. 8

⁹¹ Pyta, 'Menscheneinsatz', pp. 46-52. In contrast to Pyta, who emphasizes that this planning was ready for implementation by 1943, I would argue that by then there was no longer any chance to push such measures through against the growing discontent at the 'home front'.

⁹² Sven Oliver Müller, 'Nationalismus in der deutschen Kriegsgesellschaft', in: Militärgeschichtliches Forschungsamt/Jörg Echternkamp (ed.), *Die Deutsche Kriegsgesellschaft 1939 bis 1945. Zweiter Halbband: Ausbeutung, Deutungen, Ausgrenzung* (Munich: DVA, 2005), pp. 9-92, here pp. 67-69; Harvey, *Women and the Nazi east*; Helmut Heiber, 'Dokumentation: Der Generalplan Ost', *Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte*, Vol. 6, No. 3, 1958, pp. 281-325, here pp. 288-289.

⁹³ Herbert Backe, 'Die Neubildung des deutschen Bauerntums im eroberten Europa', *NS-Landpost*, 7 July 1942, as quoted in Corni and Gies, *Blut und Boden*, p. 207.

⁹⁴ Michael Wildt, *The individual and the community: new research on the history of National Socialism*. Lecture at the German Historical Institute, London, 25 May 2014.

⁹⁵ Both terms are used in Kasche, 'Bericht über die Arbeiten in der SA hinsichtlich ihrer Beteiligung bei der Neubildung deutschen Bauerntums', p. 72.

⁹⁶ The term 'utopian imaginations' is taken from Caroline Mezger, who – on the subject of the Nazi mobilization of Ethnic Germans in the Batschka in the 1930s and 1940s – has demonstrated the considerable degree to which even largely unaccomplished plans and visions had lasting effects on a young generation of "believers". Caroline Mezger, 'Entangled utopias: the Nazi mobilization of ethnic German youths in the Batschka, 1930s-1944', *The Journal of the History of Childhood and Youth*, Vol. 9, No. 1, 2016, pp. 87-117.

⁹⁷ Kasche, 'Bericht über die Arbeiten in der SA hinsichtlich ihrer Beteiligung bei der Neubildung deutschen Bauerntums', p. 77.

⁹⁸ Koselleck, "'Erfahrungsraum" und "Erwartungshorizont" – zwei historische Kategorien'.

⁹⁹ Kasche, 'Bericht über die Arbeiten in der SA hinsichtlich ihrer Beteiligung bei der Neubildung deutschen Bauerntums', p. 72.

¹⁰⁰ A similar point is made by Christoph Rass, "'Volksgemeinschaft" und "Wehrgemeinschaft"', in Dietmar von Reeken and Malte Thießen (eds.), *Volksgemeinschaft als soziale Praxis': Neue Forschungen zur NS-Gesellschaft vor Ort* (Paderborn: Schöningh, 2013), pp. 309-322.

¹⁰¹ Report of Hauptsturmführer Behrenbrock about his 'Journey to Vienna, Kracow and other places' in August 1944, in Bundesarchiv Berlin-Lichterfelde, NS 23/501, pp. 176-178, here p. 177.

¹⁰² Schm[idt], 'Grenzwacht gegen Banditen,' *Illustrierter Beobachter* (Feldpostausgabe), No. 31 (1942); Lorenz Ohrt, 'Grundsätzliche Weisung Nr. 1 der SA-Gruppe Südmark für die Organisation und Ausbildung der Wehrmannschaften in den besetzten slowenischen Gebieten,' 25 June 1941, in Tone Ferenc (ed.), *Quellen zur nationalsozialistischen Entnationalisierungspolitik in Slowenien 1941-1945/ Viri o nacistični raznarodovalni politiki v*

Sloveniji 1941-1945 (Maribor: Založba Obzorja, 1980), document no. 94. For the situation in the Alsace: Lothar Kettenacker, *Nationalsozialistische Volkstumspolitik im Elsaß* (Stuttgart: DVA, 1973), pp. 163-184.