Resistance and Marginalisation: Islamophobia and the Political Participation of Young Muslims in Scotland

Robin Finlay & Peter Hopkins

School of Geography, Politics and Sociology, Newcastle University, Newcastle upon Tyne, UK, NE1 7RU
(Received 22 January 2018; accepted 7 December 2018)

A growing body of work has examined the different forms of political participation engaged with by young Muslims in a variety of Muslim-minority contexts. However, the factors that shape the political participation of Muslims has been frequently overlooked, with the focus primarily on the varied types of participations. Given that the lived experiences of young Muslims frequently entail distinctive challenges, with a range of discriminations being negotiated, there is a need to examine how such factors shape political participation. In this paper, our focus is primarily on how Islamophobia intersects with, and shapes, the political participations of young Muslims in Scotland. We conceptualise Islamophobia as a form of governmentality and build on existing debates by highlighting how Islamophobic governmentality shapes political participation and how space is central to its operation.

We demonstrate that when Islamophobia intersects with political participation, it can discipline and marginalise political agency, but it can also engender political and activist resistance. When it works as a barrier to participation, it is pushing young Muslims into the marginal spaces of society. While political resistance is a process of spatial reorientation, aiming to move young Muslims into more public and visible spaces in order to challenge the marginalisation of Islamophobia.

Keywords: Political participation; Islamophobia; Young Muslims; Governmentality; Scotland.

*Corresponding author. Email: robin.finlay@newcastle.ac.uk
Introduction

A growing body of work has examined the political engagements of young Muslims in a variety of Muslim-minority contexts (Hopkins, 2007; O’Toole and Gale, 2013; Harris and Roose, 2014; Mustafa, 2015; Hamid, 2017; Finlay, Hopkins & Sanghera, 2017 a & b). Much of this scholarship has demonstrated that young Muslims are frequently engaged in a wide variety of political participations. This provides an important counter narrative to public discourses that represent young Muslims as either politically disengaged or potential political extremists (O’Toole and Gale, 2013). Critical for unearthing the political agency of young Muslims is the broader conceptualisation of what constitutes political participation. Rather than seeing participations solely through mainstream and institutionalised routes, there has been a shift to incorporate less conventional and ‘DIY’ forms of engagement. For example, O’Toole and Gale (2013) talk about ‘new grammars of action’ and Harris and Roose (2014) refer to ‘DIY citizenship’ to open out the less conventional forms of participations practiced by young Muslims in the UK and Australia. Therefore, similar to general understandings about young people and politics (Brookes and Hodkinson, 2008; Harris et al, 2010), there is a growing consensus that through both ‘new’ and traditional forms of participation, many young Muslims are actively engaging with a variety of socio-cultural and political issues.

However, as Nagel and Staeheli (2011) highlight, the existing scholarship tends to focus on the varied types of participations, overlooking the factors that shape, motivate and limit the political participations of Muslims. Given that the lived experiences of young Muslims frequently entail distinctive challenges, as they negotiate a range of prejudices and structural inequalities, we ask the following questions: are there distinct features of the lived experiences of young Muslims that motivate or limit participation in public life? What issues
are young Muslims politically mobilising around and what factors shape and motivate these mobilisations? These questions reorient the discussion of ethnic minority political participation toward a clear focus on the material, spatial and discursive factors that shape political participations or encourage disengagement.

In this paper, we focus on factors that shape and influence the political participation of young Muslims. We do this by drawing on a research project that examined the political participations of young Muslims (15-27 year olds) in contemporary Scotland. In this project, we unpacked a range of factors that shape the political participations of young Muslims, including distinct features of Scottish electoral politics, different global and local political matters and social class. However, one of the most salient factors that we identified for shaping political participation was the varied articulations of Islamophobia experienced by young Muslims. As many commentators point out, Islamophobia has proliferated since the 9/11 attacks in 2001, and is now a common feature of the lived experience of many Muslims (Elahi & Khan, 2017) as well as those who are mistaken for being Muslim (Hopkins, Botterill, Sanghera & Arshad, 2017).

Therefore, in this paper, our focus is on how Islamophobia intersects with, and shapes, the political participation of young Muslims in Scotland. We do this by partly drawing on Foucault’s (1995 [1975]; 1980; 1996) ideas on power, governmentality and resistance. Through conceptualizing Islamophobia as a form of governmentality (Birt, 2009; Nabi, 2011; Kaya, 2011, 2014), we demonstrate that when it intersects with political participation, it can discipline and marginalise political agency, but it can also engender political resistance. We argue that its impacts are varied and paradoxical, with some responding and challenging Islamophobia through active political participation; while for others, Islamophobia is a
significant barrier to participation that works to marginalise and limit young Muslim political agency. We demonstrate then, that as Foucault argued, hegemonic power exercises are not all determining and all disciplining, but can also engender powerful forms of resistance in marginalised subjects. This Foucauldian approach and lens on political participation allows the paper to open out key workings of Islamophobia, demonstrating its exercises of power, both institutional and non-institutional, and how these impact on the everyday lives of young Muslims.

We also demonstrate that Islamophobia as form of governmentality and its impacts on political participation are spatialised. When it works as a barrier to participation, it is pushing young Muslims into the marginal and more private spaces of society - a process of spatial marginalisation. While political resistance is a process of spatial reorientation, aiming to move young Muslims into more public and visible spaces in order to challenges the marginalisation of Islamophobia. Therefore, the spatial dynamics of Islamophobia and political resistance frequently revolves around a struggle over the public sphere and the inclusion and exclusion of certain people from it. Finally, Islamophobia does not function independently in shaping political participation. For example, the context of Scotland, specifically distinctive features of the Scottish political landscape, certain global and local affairs and social class are also pertinent in shaping the political participation of young Muslims. Our focus in this paper is primarily on examining the impacts of Islamophobia, but it should be understood that Islamophobia is part of a range of intersecting factors that shapes political engagement, albeit one of the most significant.

In what follows, we firstly provide a summary of research on Muslim youth political participation. Secondly, we give a brief overview of the study, the Scottish context and the
methods applied in the research. Finally, we discuss our empirical findings, examining how Islamophobia shapes the political participation of young Muslims in Scotland.

**Muslim Youth and Political Participations**

A growing scholarly interest into the political participations of young Muslims in Muslim-minority contexts has in part been a response to how young Muslims have been framed in public discourses since the 9/11 attacks in 2001. As scholars such as O’Toole and Gale (2013) and Hamid (2017) highlight, a crisis narrative about disengagement and potential political extremism has been the dominant framing of youthful Muslim identities and their political engagements. However, what much academic research demonstrates is that instead of disengagement or extremism, many young Muslims are highly engaged individuals, participating politically in a variety of ways. A broader conceptualisation of what constitutes political engagement is central for illustrating the political and active agency of young Muslims. Instead of seeing political participation solely through institutional and mainstream routes, there has been a shift to incorporate less conventional and less institutionalised forms of participation. This broadening of what constitutes political participation also incorporates a broadening of the spatiality of politics. For example, feminist political geographers study spaces that were traditionally not considered political, such as domestic, familial and informal spaces (Kofman, 2005), to destabilise the binary of the political and non-political, the private and public, and demonstrate the mutually constitutive nature of these spaces on politics and being political (Hyndman, 2004). This has resulted in politics being understood as more than a public spatial process, with political practices occurring in private, domestic and everyday spaces, which has also been important for unearthing the political participations of young Muslims. It is worth noting that understandings about the public nature of politics often incorporates discussions about public space and the public sphere, and the relationship
between these two public realms (Low, 2015). The public sphere is, in its most basic sense, areas in social life where people come together to discuss political and civic issues – it is an arena of dialogue and communication. As Low (2015) argues though, outside of geography, much discussion of the public sphere is de-spatialised, often abstracted away from its spatiality. In this paper, we use the term public sphere to refer to the different public contexts that Muslim youth engage with political matters. In addition, when we use the terms private and marginalised spaces, we do not necessarily mean a space that is completely outside public space. Rather, we are referring to spaces on the periphery of the public sphere, where people’s voices and participations are undervalued and silenced.

As noted earlier, O’Toole and Gale (2013) talk about ‘new grammars of action’ and Harris and Roose (2014) refer to ‘DIY citizenship’ in order to open out the varied forms of ‘new’ participations practiced by Muslim and ethnic minority young people in their respective studies. For example, social activism and engagement with social movements have been highlighted as a common and popular form of political participation by young Muslims (O’Toole & Gale, 2013; Finlay et al, 2017 a & b). Rather than memberships and participation with formal political institutions, there is a tendency to engage in forms of direct, personal action in informal networks or social movements, or ad hoc political initiatives. Media, social media and creative cultural activities are another way young Muslims express their opinions and engage with a range of political issues (O’Toole and Gale, 2013; Harris and Roose, 2014; Hamid, 2017). Facebook, Twitter and YouTube are a common way that young Muslims engage in political debate and campaign about a range of local and global issues (Harris and Roose, 2014). Other media and cultural activities used as forms of political participation include blogging (O’Toole and Gale, 2013; Harris and Roose, 2014), running radio stations/radio shows (Harris and Roose, 2014) and music such as hip-hop (Khabeer, 2016;
Hamid, 2017). Furthermore, another form of participation that a number of research studies highlight is volunteering and charity work (O’Toole & Gale, 2013; Finlay et al, 2017 a & b). Charity work is a core component of Islamic religious practice and results in a widespread ethos for this form of public participation from Muslim youths. For O’Toole and Gale (2013), charity work, volunteering and community groups can function as an alternative public sphere of political participation and contribute to ‘new’ patterns of young people’s political actions. They highlight that it can function as a form of Beck’s notion of 'subpolitical' activism, as it is a way to politically engage outside of the mainstream political institutions. Research also highlights that there are young Muslims who are not highly engaged in actual political action, but they remain interested, knowledgeable and aware about political issues (Harris and Roose, 2014). This is a more passive form of participation, not orientated around frequent activism or subcultural groups, but neither does it equate to political apathy or disengagement.

Engagement in less conventional forms of participations does not necessarily result in a disengagement with the more institutionalised and formal routes of participation. As highlighted in our research with young Muslims in Scotland (Finlay et al, 2017 a & b), many of the participants combined non-conventional participations such as social activism with moments of participating in institutional and mainstream politics.

A picture of Muslim youths as politically engaged has emerged in recent years. However, less has been said about the factors that shape and form political participations. As Nagel and Staeheli state “scholarly literature has shed light on civic participation among Muslims, it has sidelined the diversity of political identities and values that motivate them” (2011, p. 438). Existing research that examines political motivations mainly revolves around the role of religion and religious institutions in shaping Muslim political identities. Much of this work highlights that rather than religion playing a role in the withdrawal from political life, which
is a popular public discourse, mosques and the Islamic faith are often found to enhance and mobilise political participation (Hamid, 2011; Harris & Roose, 2014). Outside this research on the role of religion in shaping Muslim political identities, there is little understanding about the diversity of other influences that shape and possibly limit political participation. Moreover, there is a particular lack of understanding about what shapes and impacts the political identities of young Muslims. Our research seeks to respond to this, and although we found a variety of factors shape participation, our primary focus is on the impact of Islamophobia; this was identified as one of the most salient factors for shaping the political participation of young Muslims in our research. Furthermore, increasing Islamophobia in the UK and Europe (Elahi & Khan, 2017), make it a highly pertinent issue to examine in social research.

**The Study and Research Context**

We focus upon Muslim youth who are growing up in contemporary Scotland. The Muslim population of Scotland was 76,737 in the 2011 census which is 1.4% of the population, an increase of nearly 79% since 2001 (Hopkins, 2017). Around two-thirds of Scottish Muslims identify with a South Asian heritage and just over half of the Muslim population are aged under thirty (Ibid). Glasgow is home to 42% of Scotland’s Muslim population with smaller concentrations in Edinburgh and Dundee (Ibid). As Hopkins (2017) argues, much of the literature about ‘British Muslims’ generalises about the Muslim experience based on studies conducted in cities in England; our work contributes to work that is attentive to the uniqueness of the Scottish context in relation to the experiences of religious and ethnic minority groups (e.g. Bonino, 2017; Finlay et al, 2017 a & b; Hopkins, 2007, 2008, 2017).
Over the last 30 years, Scotland’s political landscape has been in a state of transformation, forging what many consider a politically and socially distinct identity to other parts of the UK (Mooney, 2013). The rise in popularity of the Scottish National Party (SNP) and the Scottish independence referendum in 2014 are considered to have politicised many young people in Scotland (Hopkins, 2015), and we found this to be the case for many of the Muslim youths in the research (see Finlay et al, 2017 a & b). Moreover, the distinctive politics in Scotland to the rest of the UK, which many consider more progressive and inclusive (Keating, 2010; Hepburn & Rosie, 2014), especially with respect to migration and multiculturalism (Hepburn & Rosie, 2014), also engendered political participations (Finlay et al, 2017 a & b). Thus, the distinct socio-political context of Scotland is another important factor that shapes political participations. National and devolved political cultures can play an important role in facilitating or limiting political participation of minorities, and in Scotland, it has been the former for many of the young Muslims in the research. As the focus of this paper is on the impacts of Islamophobia, this is a very brief discussion, but it nonetheless illustrates that the Scottish political context is a core-intersecting factor that also shapes the political participation of young Muslims (for a more detailed discussion on the role of the Scottish political context see Finlay et al, 2017 a & b).

We conducted qualitative research with 40 participants in 2016: we carried out 29 individual interviews and three focus groups that included a total of 11 people. 35 of the participants were young people (aged 15 to 27 years) and five were aged 28 + and were either politicians, local councillors and other Muslims who have significant roles in public and political life in Scotland. The sample includes 19 women and 21 men. 35 of those who participated lived in Glasgow/Paisley areas, three in Edinburgh and two in Dundee. 26 of the 40 were born in Scotland and around 65% of our participants identified as having a Pakistani heritage. Other
ethnic heritages included Somali, Indonesian, Lebanese, Azerbaijani, Iraqi, Moroccan, Iranian, Egyptian and Malaysian. Therefore, when we use the term “Muslim” in this paper, we are referring to a heterogeneous grouping of people who identify as Muslim.

In order to recruit young Muslims to participate in this study, we used a process of snowballing by contacting relevant organisations and asking them to signpost us to potential participants or other organisations that work with Muslim or ethnic minority young people. We worked with university groups, colleges, secondary schools, mosques and refugee organisations. The interviews and focus groups took place in a variety of public and private spaces, including cafes, schoolrooms, university-meeting rooms, offices, libraries and private homes. We also carried out phone interviews with four participants. Consent was obtained prior to the interviews and focus groups, and all names used throughout the paper are pseudonyms to protect confidentiality. The focus groups and interviews were transcribed and then analysed by theme in order to ensure rigor of analysis.

Young Muslims and Exposure to Islamophobia

In all of the interviews and focus groups, Islamophobia was a primary topic of conversation, with many talking about how and where they are exposed to Islamophobia and how it affects their lives and political participation. Before examining how Islamophobia shapes and influences political participation, we will discuss some of Islamophobia’s core characteristics, and then examine the ways young people in the research are exposed to, and experience anti-Muslim prejudice.

Islamophobia is a complex, multidimensional and contested phenomenon, (Dunn, Klocker & Salabay, 2007; Allen, 2010, 2017; Elahi & Khan, 2017; Mondon & Winter, 2017). Scholars
agree that Islamophobic attacks and sentiment have been on the rise in the Western world and are now a significant concern. Incidents such as the terrorist attacks in Paris in 2015 and the London Bridge attacks in 2017 have resulted in sharp spikes in reported Islamophobia (Tell MAMA, 2015; Travis, 2017). Although Islamophobia is difficult to define in its entirety, we believe there are core characteristics.

First, although Islamophobia revolves around prejudices against a religion and certain religious identities/practices, it should not only be seen through the prism of religion. Islamophobia incorporates religious, ethnic, cultural and racial prejudices (Dunn et al, 2007; Mondon & Winter, 2017). It is part of a “new racism” (Barker, 1981; Gilroy, 1987), which considers the culture of a person (or group) inferior, therefore not fitting in with the “majority” white culture. This “new racism” differs from “old racism” which was based on biologically essentialist arguments that justified colonialism (Dunn et al, 2007). However, researchers also point out that the line between “new racism” and “old racism” blurs in that “new racism” can also be associated with older forms of biological racism as Islam is frequently associated with certain skin colours and Islamophobic attacks are often based on physical and phenotypical features (Dunn et al, 2007; Alexander, 2013; Mondon & Winter, 2017). Therefore, religious and cultural attributes of Muslims are often racialized, made to seem as essentialist characteristics, which results in racist manifestations of Islamophobia. Islamophobia is also gendered (Hancock, 2015; Listerborn, 2015; Najib, 2017), and this is clearly highlighted by statistics that show that 56% of street based Islamophobic attacks in the UK in 2016 were perpetrated against women (Tell MAMA, 2017). Therefore, bundled into Islamophobia is misogyny, sexism and harmful gender stereotyping, which can have especially toxic effects for Muslim women.
Second, Islamophobia incorporates both institutional and non-institutional forms. The state/government and other powerful institutions in society engineer institutional Islamophobia. This is manifest in ways such as political policy, political rhetoric and through other societal institutions such as the media, schools and educational centres. Institutional Islamophobia can be seen as more professionalised manifestation of Islamophobia. While non-institutional Islamophobia pertains to less professionalised forms, such as everyday Islamophobia through verbal and physical attacks, online Islamophobia and forms of political activism. These two manifestations are not separate entities, but overlap and feed into each other. For example, public opinion about immigration feeds into government policy, but government policy also shapes public opinion.

To expand on the notion of institutional and non-institutional forms of Islamophobia, it is useful to draw on Foucault’s (1995 [1975]; 1978: 1980; 1996) ideas of governmentality, power and resistance. Islamophobia can be conceptualised as what Foucault would call a hegemonic exercise of power, as it aims to discipline, control and marginalise Muslim subjects. The hegemonic nature of Islamophobia is partly due to its structural articulation by governments and other powerful public institutions such as certain media outlets. Islamophobia then can be seen as a form of what Foucault would label as “governmentality” (Kaya, 2011). This conceptualisation is drawing on the work of a number of other scholars who utilise the idea of governmentality as a way to understand the workings of Islamophobia (Birt, 2009; Nabi, 2011; Kaya, 2011, 2014). In brief, governmentality functions at two separate but intersecting core levels (Huxley, 2008). First, it is the exercise of power by the state and powerful institutions in order to control and bring about certain subjectivities and behaviours in the populace (institutional Islamophobia). Second, governmentality refers to a more generalised type of power, which is the “conduct of conducts” (Foucault, 2002: p. 341).
by civil society and citizens. This more generalised form of power is essentially the practices of governing, controlling and subjugating the populace by citizens, organisations and non-governmental institutions (non-intuitional Islamophobia). This is the consolidation and exercise of government power in everyday culture and everyday practices. Therefore, it is important to understand Islamophobia as an exercise of power that “travels between state, civil society, and citizens”, with some of its techniques of power “only loosely associated with the bureaucracies of the formal organs of the state” (Kaya, 2011: p. 24). For examining Islamophobia then, governmentality is a concept that assists in seeing its varied and intersecting forms, and it opens out the power dynamics behind how it is propagated and experienced.

Governmentality and exercises of power are also spatial processes, with governments disciplining and organising subjects spatially. Moreover, everyday spatial routines and habits are permeated by government power, albeit in a more insidious and subtle way. As stated by Foucault “space is fundamental in any form of communal life; space is fundamental in any exercise of power” (2002b: p. 361). Therefore, as highlighted in this special issue and other research in social and cultural geography (Hancock, 2008, 2011; Teeple Hopkins, 2015; Listerborn, 2015; Najib, 2017), Islamophobia is a spatial process. The way it takes shape and the way it is articulated is contingent on space and its contextuality. Its power and ability to discipline and control is articulated in different ways, depending on where and when it takes place. We will now discuss different articulations of Islamophobia the research participants’ experience, which fit under the subheadings of institutional and everyday Islamophobia. These two articulations should not been seen as separate, but rather as intersecting and both encapsulating core workings of governmentality.
Institutional Forms of Islamophobia

First, governmental and institutional rhetoric and policies are a principal way young Muslims are exposed to Islamophobia. These are primarily manifest at two scales of power – global politics and UK government/politics. The majority of participants had a clear knowledge about global political matters and this was often a source of exposure to Islamophobic sentiment and political policy. For example, consider this quote from Fahad, who was discussing the forthcoming USA elections in 2016:

\begin{quote}
And obviously now Trump is coming, if Trump actually wins the election it is going to be about issues that especially impact Muslim communities. Because he supports Muslims not entering the US anymore, and I also fear that he is going to start moving out the Muslims inside of America as well, slowly. And that might influence our politicians as well. Communities might start acting up in our country against Muslim communities, after seeing Trump’s reaction. Because you never know what can happen. Fahad (Male, 16-18, Scottish-Pakistani, Glasgow)
\end{quote}

As this quote illustrates, young Muslims are exposed to Islamophobia though global politics, such as the rhetoric and policies about Muslims from the Trump camp prior to, and after, the US elections in 2016. Fahad, and other participants, were often anxious about how Muslims were represented and talked about by American politicians and the possible consequences for young Muslims in Scotland in terms of potentially legitimizing a political discourse that is hostile towards Muslims. This exemplifies how global forms of governmental Islamophobia intersects with the local lives of Muslims in Scotland, impacting on their sense of security in Scotland and the wider world.
Political rhetoric and policies at the UK government scale was another form of institutional Islamophobia experienced by young Muslims in Scotland. In UK politics, Islamophobic sentiment has been articulated by a range of political actors, and this has been intensified in recent years due to increasing debates about multiculturalism, migration, and Brexit (e.g. Burrell et al 2018; Finlay et al 2018). However, what epitomises UK governmental forms of Islamophobia are anti-radicalisation policies such as the Prevent strategy. Prevent is a UK government counter-terrorism strategy, which aims to prevent people from being drawn into terrorist related activities (Awan, 2012). For many young Muslims, the Prevent strategy has highly stigmatised their religious identity and put their behaviour and beliefs under a great deal of scrutiny and suspicion. In the following quote, Azam talks about the impacts of the Prevent strategy:

> So Prevent comes in, you will have heard a lot about it in the press? And that is sort of creates this toxic climate of fear, one where you can’t say certain things because they might be labelled as extremists. Azam (Male, 16-18, British-Pakistani, Edinburgh)

As the quote illustrates, the Prevent strategy can engender an environment of “fear” and insecurity in young Muslims, one where they feel stigmatised, securitised and under scrutiny. It is a process of regulating and disciplining young Muslim subjects, which is clearly working as process of disciplinary governmentality.

Media representations and narratives are widely recognised as a principal source of Islamophobia (Saeed, 2007; Poole, 2011). The way that media narratives represent Muslims was a pervasive concern articulated by many participants. Consider the following quote by Amira:
So much of the media portray Muslims in a negative and anti-Muslim way. We are always linked with terrorism, it is really discouraging. Amira (Female, 22-27, Scottish-Iraqi, Glasgow)

Most participants felt that the media in general represents Muslims in a negative light, and that this contributes to everyday Islamophobia and racism. Reporting about terrorism was often seen as one of the most problematic aspects of the media, as many felt that it perpetuates problematic stereotypes by making Islam synonymous with terrorism. The media then, is another pervasive form of institutional Islamophobia. However, it clearly intersects with less institutionalised forms, engendering and shaping everyday Islamophobia too.

Everyday Forms of Islamophobia

Social media – such as Facebook, Twitter and YouTube – are everyday spaces where Islamophobic sentiment is disseminated into the public sphere (Awan, 2014; Ekman, 2015). For the participants, social media was frequently cited as one of the most common places they experience and see overt Islamophobia and stereotyping. For instance, during a focus group, Fahad stated:

Yesterday I was watching a YouTube video and it was just a pretty harmless video of people trying Pakistani snacks. And obviously, I just randomly went to the comments section just to see what people wrote about. And loads of people were just kind of against Muslims and saying how Muslims should be thrown out of America, thrown out of UK, all kinds of racist comments that you just kind of feel... You just kind of feel
As Fahad illustrates, young Muslims frequently see and receive Islamophobic and racist comments on social media, which can engender a sense of insecurity and fear in their everyday lives. As Fahad states, “you just kind of feel scared knowing that people like that are out there”. This highlights how discrimination in online spaces affects the material lived spaces of young Muslims and can infiltrate everyday spaces through social media on their mobile phones or through their home computers. Social media can be considered a space where both institutional and non-institutional Islamophobia is articulated. For example, it is a space where state, media and general public narratives and opinions circulate and intersect.

Finally, a number of participants also experienced Islamophobia through racist, hostile and demeaning everyday encounters. For example, considerer the following quote from Fatima:

"...to be honest it is like I have been getting a lot of racist comments like ‘Aw you know, why do you wear a hijab? Why do you wear a scarf and that...?’ I wear it because it is part of my religion you know. There is a lot of racist comments coming through and just blaming us for stuff. Calling me a terrorist and that like, you know I am not a terrorist! I was like born here, so you know it is kind of like...ISIS and all that, they are not like, they are not like Muslims at all. Fatima (Female, 16-18, Scottish-Pakistani, Glasgow)
For Fatima, everyday encounters of Islamophobia incorporated hostile comments about her religious clothing and hurtful remarks that associated her with the actions of terrorists. With the focus on her headscarf, it illustrates the gendering of Islamophobia. Face-to-face encounters with Islamophobia can be highly detrimental to the lives of young Muslims, making them feel vulnerable and insecure in the public sphere and in Scotland in general. Again, this illustrates that global events have local consequences, with young Muslims experiencing localised Islamophobia because of events in different parts of the world. Face-to-face encounters are frequently manifest in a non-institutional way, but they are nonetheless highly shaped by institutional forms of Islamophobia. In a sense, they are the insidious workings of institutional Islamophobia, taking shape materially through the conduct and opinions of ‘ordinary’ people. For Foucault, a key component of governmentality is hegemonic power and disciplining become more generalised, with civil society governing and subjugating through everyday culture and practices.

In this section then, we have demonstrated that Islamophobia is an everyday feature of the lives of the young Muslims in Scotland and is articulated in a variety of ways, both institutional and non-institutional. This illustrates how Islamophobia is a form of governmentality, utilizing different levels and forms of power to regulate and discipline Muslim subjects. In the next section, we look at how these experiences of Islamophobia shape and influence the political participation of young Muslims.
I think the situation in my opinion is only going to get worse until we tackle you know Islamophobia and whatnot. I think now young people are maybe too scared to engage. But I think you might find a section which feels ‘you know I am not going to stand for it. And actually I am going to stand and participate I am going to set my own you know political agenda, and my own progressive agenda, and no one is going to stop me.’...And that is kind of the section that I am from as well. Because I am not going to let racist thugs tell me not to be involved in the political system. So I think there are maybe two wings in the BME [Black and Minority Ethnic] community. Eric (Male, 22-27, Scottish-Iranian, Glasgow).

For young Muslims, their exposure to and experience of Islamophobia can be seen as one of the most – if not the most - pervasive and significant influences for shaping their political participations. Eric’s comments reflected those of several young people that we interviewed, and they highlight the paradoxical impacts of Islamophobia, which both limit and motivate participations. In the quote above, Eric talks about “two wings”: the first one is “too scared to engage” as a result of Islamophobia and the second “wing” which he feels “you know I’m not going to stand for it. And actually I’m going to stand and participate…”. Although this dichotomy of “two wings” is not quite as clear as “participation” or “non-participation”, Islamophobia can result in political resistance and motivates participation, but it can also work to politically marginalise and limit participation.

Islamophobia as a form of governmentality is articulated clearly in how it intersects with the political participations of young Muslims. First, it partly works to marginalise and discipline
political participation. It creates a range of barriers and structural inequalities that make it difficult for Muslim youths to participate, which limits their role in structures of power and representation. It does this by creating barriers to certain spaces, such as the public sphere, which is a highly significant space for political participation. Islamophobia pushes young Muslims into the private and marginalised spaces of society as reflected in research about the impact of 9/11 (e.g. Hopkins and Smith, 2008; Kwan, 2008).

However, Foucault notably stated “power is everywhere” (1990, p. 93) and

where there is power, there is resistance, and yet, or rather consequentially, this resistance is never in a position of exteriority in relation to power (Foucault, 1978: p. 95-96).

For Foucault, power is not the exclusive property of hegemonic subjects, there is power from below. This is the power exercised by the less powerful, which Foucault frequently terms as “resistance”. Non-hegemonic subjects can exercise power and resistance to power regimes and governmentality can occur. Therefore, power exercises of governmentality are not all determining and do not have complete control over the populace. This resonates with hooks (1989) perspective of marginality as a space of resistance as well as deprivation. These ideas are clearly articulated with how Islamophobia interacts with political participation. For many in the research, Islamophobia also engenders forms of political resistance. Islamophobia’s domination and processes of marginalisation inadvertently produce and shape political participations of resistance. It results in a resistance to the political marginalisation it tries to achieve, with Muslim youths attempting to reorient themselves from the margins into more public and visible spaces through political participation. We now look more closely at how Islamophobia engenders resistance through participation. Subsequently, we provide a more
detailed examination of how it politically marginalises young Muslims and works as a barrier to participation.

Islamophobia and Politics of Resistance

You know the conditions we have at the moment, we absolutely have to...you know we have anti-immigrant, anti-Muslim...so like if there has ever been a time to get involved in politics, it's now! Azam (Male, 16-18, British-Pakistani, Edinburgh)

But really it's [politics] a platform to voice those frustrations and change needs to be politics, like needs to be political, to change stereotypes. You need to get involved in that. It's the only way we can make differences in this country. Anna (Female, 16-18, British-Pakistani, Glasgow)

As Solomos & Back highlight (1995), minorities in the UK have often politically mobilised around issues that negatively affect their lives, such a racism, discrimination and lack of inclusion in structures of representation. The inequalities are – in certain respects - a politicizing process and motivate forms of resistance and participation. This point resonates for a number of the participants in the research, with many being politically mobilised by the Islamophobia and racism they face. Political participation is seen as way to challenge and resist Islamophobic rhetoric, Islamophobic political policies and stereotypes about Muslims. As Azam and Anna argue in the quotes above, the current climate of increasing Islamophobia and pervasive negative stereotyping of Muslims makes political participation an urgent and important activity for young Muslims. As Anna states, it is a way to make “change”, to “change stereotypes” and “voice frustrations”.

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It is evident then that Islamophobia for many participants is a key factor that shapes their politics and works to motivate political participation. For some, it motivates a political participation that directly revolves around challenging Islamophobia and racism. This is exercised through varied forms of campaigning and activism, such as online campaigning, social movements like Stand up to Racism and university student societies. It also mobilises campaigns and strategies to mitigate insecurity and personal anxiety due to Islamophobia. For example, in the following quote, Linzi, from Glasgow, talks about a campaign she was involved in after the Paris attacks:

*Like in response to the Paris attacks our Muslim society at University set up a campaign called ‘I will Stand with YOU’, where it was almost like a buddying system where if you were too scared to come to campus or walk across campus, someone would come along and take you for example.* Linzi (Female, 16-18, Scottish-Arab, Glasgow)

As this quote alludes to, campaigns and activism that directly challenge and deal with the impacts of Islamophobia are - in many respects - a strategy to resist the socio-spatial marginalisation of anti-Muslim discrimination. It is partly a way for young Muslims to reclaim a public presence and to create safe spaces to be Muslim.

In addition, there are forms of participation that are not directly mobilising around Muslim issues or Islamophobia, but are nonetheless still shaped and partly motivated by anti-Muslim discrimination. For example, consider the following quote from Raza, a young Scottish-Pakistani Muslim from Glasgow:
One of the things that the present generation is trying to do is to get involved in media, to get involved in film, to get involved in politics, to get involved you know not just your usual science, technology, engineering and maths. To branch out, be more public. I think that is really important for Muslims and for how they are seen. Raza

(Male, 19-21, Scottish-Pakistani, Glasgow)

Raza highlights that the younger Muslim generation are trying to get involved in professions and areas of Scottish and British society that older Muslim generations do not so commonly occupy. He mentions “politics”, “media” and “film” as sectors that are attracting the interest of Muslim youths. A young Muslim engagement in “new” and innovative fields and industries is discussed in recent research that attempts to focus on less acknowledged aspects of being young, British and Muslim (Janmohamed, 2016; Hamid, 2017). This broadening of participations is – of course - partly motivated by personal desires to follow certain careers and pursue specific interests. However, Raza and other participants, highlight that this broadening of participation is also motivated by the way it can subvert and challenge Islamophobia. Participation in more publically visible positions and engagement with issues that are not “exclusively” Muslim concerns, is considered to be a way to challenge stereotypes, such as ones that construct young Muslims as disengaged and not participating in public life. Many young Muslims feel that being more visible, especially through politics, is important for how Muslims are viewed in society. It is a way for young Muslims to include themselves in structures of representation without the direct influence of media and political narratives which many find Islamophobic and biased. Although the participants engage in politics in a variety of ways, incorporating public and private spheres, what we have illustrated in this section, is that the public sphere, for a number of the young participants, is a
context for resistance, where they can subvert and challenge the powerful discourses of Islamophobia.

The importance of engaging with diverse political issues in different contexts is also seen as important. For example, consider the following quote from Aiza, a young Muslim woman who lives in Edinburgh:

*But the majority of us are well integrated and if we are politically active then we're normally politically active on a wide spectrum of issues, not just those that affect us, because we are integrated, if you know what I mean? It's not just a Muslim issue, it's a, you know, a human rights issue, it's a human issue. And I think that's really important for Muslims, to show we are engaged in lots of issues. Aiza (Female, 22-27, Scottish, Edinburgh)*

In the quote, Aiza further underlines the importance of young Muslims engaging in politics, but what she specifically highlights, is the importance of engaging in a wide variety of issues. First, for Aiza and many other participants, it is important because of a general interest in wide variety of affairs. Second, as alluded to by Aiza, it is seen as a way to challenge the common stereotype of Muslims only being concerned with Muslim matters and disengaged with wider societal issues. To be visibly engaged in public life and a wide variety of political issues is an important way to show that young Muslims are engaged in Scottish and UK life, which in turn, challenges Islamophobia and stereotypes. These participations are clearly shaped by Islamophobia, but are not necessarily a mobilisation around Muslim issues, rather it is political issues that impact all sorts of communities, but by having this engagement it can challenge certain stereotypes and discrimination. These participations in wider and
mainstream politics are also seen as a way to be included in structures of representation and re-represent Muslims and Islam. For example, when Barsha, a Muslim woman from Edinburgh was talking about her interest in mainstream Scottish politics, she stated:

*Sometimes the media make people be put off from engaging because of all the Islamophobia that is going around. But I think that actually makes me want to get more involved, to portray Islam in a better way.* Barsha (Female, 19-21, British-Bangladeshi, Edinburgh)

Representation can be seen as a key component of Islamophobia, and political participation can be considered as a counter representation, a way for young Muslims to circulate different images, identities and performances. Again, these strategies of resistance function spatially. They partly aim to reposition Muslim identities into the public sphere, which can result in greater agency and involvement for Muslim youths. Drawing on the work about the self-representations of American Muslims by Mansson McGinty (2012), we can see the resistance and participation discussed in this section is partly a “politics of belonging”. It is an attempt to become visible, to demonstrate an interest in and commitment to Scottish and British society, which overall is a struggle to have their citizenship recognised in the face of growing Islamophobia.

What this concern with representation also demonstrates, is a resistance to processes of subjectification that Islamophobic governmentality pursues. A core aspect of governmentality is it subjectifies people to certain identities (Foucault, 1982). This is clearly apparent in Islamophobia, with Muslim subjectivities frequently constructed in a range of negative ways,
such as disengaged, radicalised, non-progressive etc. Therefore, as Foucault argues, resistance is a struggle against power:

…which categorizes the individual, marks him by his own individuality, attaches him to his own identity, imposes a law of truth on him which he must recognise and which others have to recognise in him. It is a form of power which makes individuals subjects. (Foucault, 1982: p. 783).

Therefore, young Muslim political participation is a struggle to gain control of their identities and to undermine and resist how hegemonic powers seek to construct and control them.

The intersectional and heterogeneous nature of youthful Muslim identities is also important to consider when looking at political participation. Although we have not put gender at the forefront of this analysis, it is important to examine how the distinct experiences of Muslim women shape their participation in politics. We found that many young Muslim women have distinctive experiences and challenges compared to young men in their engagement with politics and public life. They frequently have to deal with multiple discriminations of Islamophobia, sexism and racism (Hancock, 2015; Listerborn, 2015), resulting in additional barriers to participation. Nonetheless, we also observed an active confidence in many of the young women, with a number of participants engaging in politics and civic life through variety of participations. Participation is partly motivated by the understanding that it is a way of countering and undermining stereotypes of “Muslim women” and the multiple discriminations they face. Therefore, the overlapping discourses and prejudices of Islamophobia and sexism that subjugate and discipline women and Muslims can engender a
politics of resistance in young Muslim women. For example, the following quote is from Anna, a young Muslim woman from Glasgow:

_The way I see it as being a Muslim woman, in this day and age, and in Britain in general, it is almost inherently political. Like everything ends up concerning you in some way or another and it is a whole new narrative from being just a Muslim in general. So I think it does involve Muslim women challenging the misconceptions about Muslim women, challenging it through being seen and heard._ Anna (Female, 16-18, British-Pakistani, Glasgow)

For Anna, Muslim women deal with distinct prejudices, which she thinks can be challenged through being “seen and heard”, and participating in politics is one of the ways to achieve this visibility. Anna believes participation and visibility is a way to challenge the “misconceptions” propagated about Muslim women in discriminatory narratives. The multiple prejudices felt by Muslim women can of course be a barrier to participation (as will be discussed in the next section), but there is also clear resistance and what appears to be a political confidence and active agency in young Muslim women in Scotland.

Although these participations provide positive signs of youth resistance to Islamophobia, it also highlights the way young Muslim identities are politicised and made to respond and perform in paradoxical ways. Young Muslims, for example, are highly scrutinised and their (non) participations are - in many respects – scrutinised more than other young people. This can put pressure on Muslim youth to act and respond in certain ways, and political participation, especially in mainstream roles and political issues, is partly the result of these pressures.
We have demonstrated that Islamophobia can produce diverse forms of political resistance. It is an example of how exercises of power, such as Islamophobia and sexism, do not simply dominate subjects, but also mobilise counter exercises of power that aim to resist and undermine the dominant forms of discrimination. The spatial nature of this resistance has also been demonstrated, with young Muslims re-orientating themselves into more public and visible spaces in order to challenge the spatial marginalisation processes of Islamophobia. What this illustrates is the public sphere of politics, for young Muslims, is perceived as a highly conducive space to resist and undermine Islamophobia.

*Islamophobia and Spatial and Political Marginalisation*

The impacts of Islamophobia on political participation are paradoxical, working also to spatially and politically marginalise and as a barrier to participation. Essentially, Islamophobia as a form of governmentality and an exercise of power will not constantly engender a politics of resistance, but rather it achieves what it sets out to do, disciplining and subjugating young Muslims. It does this through creating feelings of insecurity, vulnerability, fear, suspicion and reinforcing gender discriminations, making political participation challenging for some young Muslims.

For many participants, politics is frequently conceived as something that is performed in the public sphere. This understanding of politics as a public process is significant to how Islamophobia can politically marginalise, as the public sphere is a space where Muslims can be more open to Islamophobic hostility (Tell MAMA, 2017). Islamophobia can engender a fear of the public sphere, which results in a fear of political participation, at least in it is more conventional and public sense. Paradoxically then, the public sphere, for some, is a space of
resistance, whilst for others, it is a potential space of insecurity and vulnerability, which they seek to avoid. For instance, consider this focus group conversation:

Anna: I feel like you would probably get a lot of hate if you were a public Muslim figure. (Female, 16-18, British-Pakistani, Glasgow)

Salma: You would have to have a lot of confidence and you would have to be thick skinned. (Female, 16-18, Scottish-Moroccan, Glasgow)

Lara: I don’t think everyone is put off, but there is less Muslim people that are involved, because it is more difficult. Like a lot of Muslims don’t really get involved in politics and stuff like that, because they are scared in a way. (Female, 16-18, British-Lebanese, Glasgow)

The participants are articulating a number of discomforts about political participation. This discomfort is primarily based around a perception that engagement in politics is a public process that could leave them open to Islamophobia and racist hostility. There is an understanding that being political frequently requires a public spatial presence – both online and offline – and being in the public sphere can result in a sense of insecurity and vulnerability for young Muslims. This highlights that Islamophobia functions to push Muslims into more private and marginalised spaces and when it intersects with politics it can marginalise political agency and political confidence. Research has highlighted that young Muslims in Scotland and the UK have to negotiate everyday feelings of insecurity (Botterill, Hopkins, Sanghera & Arshad, 2016), and for some, political participation is seen as a space that could exacerbate such feelings. Therefore, because of increasing Islamophobia in contemporary society, the public realm of politics and civic engagement can become a
precarious and daunting space for young Muslims. If we consider the public sphere as an important space for one to be heard, to vocalise their opinions and make citizenship claims (Low, 2015), then the disciplining nature of Islamophobia works to silence the voices and agency of young Muslims.

Although both young women and men expressed barriers to participation, the different experiences and challenges faced by young Muslim women can result in distinct challenges. As previously highlighted, many of the young women have to negotiate intersecting discursive and material discriminations of Islamophobia, sexism and racism, and this can result in distinctive barriers to participation. For example, consider the following quote from Linzi:

*And you are seeing a lot of sexism happen, a lot of sexism for Muslim Women. And then there is the questions aimed at you like, ‘oh but why...why aren’t Muslim females involved in politics? And well, because this is what happens when they do get involved. They face all this, they face Islamophobia, sexism, they face...all these different issues that Muslim males perhaps wouldn’t face as much.* Linzi (Female, 16-18, Scottish-Arab, Glasgow)

The way Islamophobia intersects with sexism can result in even greater feelings of insecurity and vulnerability when engaging in politics. Again, this is partly because political participation is seen as a public spatial process, and the public sphere could leave young Muslim women open to discriminations and hostility. It is a space that is perceived as both racialized and gendered, more inclusive to non-Muslims and men. By not engaging in the public sphere of politics can be a strategy to mitigate further senses of insecurity in a world
where they already feel insecure. It could be argued then, that the regulating and disciplining processes of Islamophobia are more acutely felt by young women, pushing them into more marginal spaces, which results in greater barriers to political participation.

As Muslims are often constructed and perceived as communities “under-suspicion”, another key function of Islamophobia is to put Muslim subjects under heightened surveillance (Kaya, 2011; Awan, 2012). Governmentality is a process of regulating and disciplining subjects, and Islamophobia seeks to do this through its processes of securitisation and scrutiny. In the UK, the government’s Prevent strategy has been the primary institutional process of regulating and scrutinizing the behaviour of Muslims. Prevent is a counter-terrorism strategy, which aims to prevent people from being drawn into terrorist related activities. Much of the focus of this strategy has been on younger generations, with schools and universities monitoring Muslim students. Moreover, the scrutiny of Muslim youths has moved into wider society, with the media and general public frequently regulating, monitoring and judging young Muslim behaviours. With respect to political participation, this regulation and scrutiny is another major barrier to political participation. For example, the following quote is from Azam, a young Muslim man from Edinburgh:

Like being portrayed in a negative light or the media could pick up on this or that, you know young Muslims might feel they can’t open up, they can’t say anything, can’t be political. They can’t even talk about their own history of the religion, because they are going to be blamed for something. Azam (Male, 16-18, British-Pakistani, Edinburgh)

Azam highlights that the scrutiny and suspicion put on young Muslims can make some anxious about appearing political and voicing their opinions. By having political opinions, by
engaging in politics, there is an anxiety that the government or media may interpret it as political radicalism or potential extremism. Political participation is seen - by some - as precarious, leaving one open to negative stereotyping and misinterpretation. Processes of scrutiny and suspicion work to silence young Muslims and marginalise and discourage political expression and political participation. This illustrates again, how Islamophobia as a governmental form of surveillance restricts young Muslim voices and limits the inclusion of young Muslim identities in the public sphere of politics.

The spatial dynamics of Islamophobia that work to restrict political participation, incorporates both online and offline spaces. For example, during a focus group with students at a school in Glasgow, one participant stated about online participation:

… I don’t I feel like I can voice my opinion because I feel like I am too scared of the reaction I am going to get. Whereas like there will be things that I feel strongly but I won’t write anything because I know that there will be someone out there that has something to say…. Abida (Female, 16-18, Scottish –Pakistani, Glasgow)

Abida demonstrates that Islamophobia can marginalise and exclude young Muslims from politically participating in online spaces. The online sphere, where young people frequently mobilise political identities and share political opinions, is also a space where young Muslims can feel vulnerable and insecure, especially when discussing political matters. As the online sphere is often a public forum, where people can digitally share and discuss information, it is another example of Islamophobia engendering a fear of the public sphere, and fear of participating politically in such spaces. An important aspect of this is Islamophobic narratives frequently blame Muslims for not integrating and participating sufficiently (Hamid, 2017),
when what our research shows, is the hostile Islamophobic environment is a significant factor in why young Muslims may withdraw from participating in the public sphere. Therefore, Islamophobia as a form of governmentality is discursively contradictory in its demands and expectations of Muslims, and these contradictions are a powerful way to stigmatise and subjugate people. Islamophobia creates an environment that can make participation challenging, while at the same time demonising Muslims for not participating and integrating sufficiently.

In this section, we have demonstrated that Islamophobia is a significant barrier to participation, working to politically marginalise and limit young Muslim’s engagement. It is a pertinent example of how discriminatory exercises of power regulate and discipline marginalised and excluded subjects. It is a spatial process too, pushing young Muslims into marginalised contexts, which limits their political agency and political potential. The spatial nature of Islamophobia primarily revolves around public space and often excludes Muslims from such spaces. As we have illustrated, it does this by engendering a fear of participating in politics in the public sphere.

**Conclusion**

This paper has presented an analysis of how Islamophobia shapes and influences the political participations of young Muslims in Scotland. Following Nagel and Staeheli (2011) we have put factors that shape political participation at the center of the analysis, expanding on research that examines the forms of political participation mobilised by young Muslims. Through this focus, we have demonstrated that Islamophobia is a pertinent feature of the lives of young Muslims and is a central factor that shapes and influences their political
participations. We now make two final concluding remarks to highlight the contributions of this paper.

First, the paper contributes to research that illustrates the significant presence of Islamophobia in the lives of young Muslims in Muslim minority contexts. We have demonstrated that Islamophobia, for young Muslims in Scotland, has a pervasive presence, influencing and shaping many facets of their everyday lives. By looking at how Islamophobia shapes political participation, we have demonstrated that young Muslim’s citizenship, engagement and integration in Scottish society is significantly conditioned by experiences and processes of Islamophobia. Therefore, when examining everyday youthful Muslim experiences, Islamophobia is an important factor to consider. Through acknowledging Islamophobia as a significant spatial form of contemporary discrimination, social and cultural geographers need to develop existing work by scholars (e.g. Dunn et al, 2007, Nagel and Staeheli, 2011, Nagel, 2016), and consider Islamophobia and religious discrimination centrally within their research. This would expand the well-established racial and ethnic lens of analysis (Jackson & Penrose, 1993; Dwyer & Bressey, 2008) to better incorporate the religious dimension of contemporary discrimination. This is not to argue for a privileging of religion over other forms of identity such as race or gender, but to acknowledge that religion intersects with many other identities and can produce distinctive processes of Othering, discrimination and segregation.

Second, the paper contributes to understandings about how Islamophobia is a form of governmentality (Brit, 2008; Nabi, 2011; Kaya, 2011, 2014). The paper builds on existing debates by highlighting how Islamophobic governmentality shapes political participation and how space is central to its workings. A lens on political participation opens out the everyday workings of Islamophobia, demonstrating its exercises of power, both institutional and non-
institutional. What we have illustrated is the impacts of Islamophobia are paradoxical, working on one hand to politically marginalise and silence, but on the other, engendering resistance and participation. This illustrates how hegemonic power does not discipline and regulate unreservedly, it frequently encounters power from below, which can mobilise political participations of resistance. We have also demonstrated the centrality of space in the workings of Islamophobic governmentality and resistance to it. The disciplining nature of Islamophobia significantly revolves around creating a public sphere that young Muslims are fearful of, which works as a significant barrier to political participation. Exclusion from the public sphere is a process of silencing young Muslims, diminishing their citizenship claims and marginalising involvement in the structures of representation. Whilst political resistance is frequently a strategy to reclaim a presence in the public sphere, with young Muslims seeking to reorient themselves into more public and visible spaces in order to challenge Islamophobic marginalisation and include themselves in structures of representation. Therefore, Islamophobic governmentality and political resistance is very much a struggle over the public sphere and the inclusion and exclusion of certain people from it.

Acknowledgements

We would like to thank all the young participants who took their time to engage with the research. We would also like to thank the editors of Social and Cultural Geography and the anonymous reviewers for their helpful critique and guidance. In addition, thanks to Kawtar Najib and Carmen Teeple Hopkins for their helpful comments on the article.

Disclosure Statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the authors.
Funding
This work was supported by the Arts and Humanities Research Council (grant number AH/K000594/1) and the Institute for Social Renewal at Newcastle University

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*Women's Studies International Forum*, 48, 154-164. doi:
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.wsif.2014.09.002


**Notes**

i ‘DIY’ refers to the notion of ‘Do it Yourself’

ii Stand up to Racism is UK wide anti-racist and anti-fascist pressure group