The Americanisation of Anti-racism? Global Power and Hegemony in Ethnic Equity

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Abstract

Following recent debate on US influence on anti-racism around the world, this article offers a critical assessment of how anti-racism is being shaped and disseminated. It is argued that the US-Americanisation of anti-racism is autonomous of US political will or action and has a complex and contingent relationship with neo-liberal globalisation. After considering how these themes suggest a revision in Gramscian perspectives on hegemony, the paper illustrates them by reference to the World Bank’s advocacy of cultural pluralism in Latin America. It is argued that this ethnic equity project is articulated and ‘sold’ as a form of counter-authority, a form that employs and deploys the USA as a paradigm of the modern nation.

Key words: Anti-racism; Racialization; Neo-liberalism; Transnationalism; US-Americanisation; World Bank
Introduction

‘The Hegemon of the World’. Izvestiya’s headline of the 6th December, 1921, announced a new geopolitical reality: the political, economic and military global dominance of the USA. In the course of the twentieth century assumptions of US pre-eminence were to become common place. By century’s end it was even imagined in some quarters that the story of the last one hundred years could be reduced to a narrative of US power (Slater and Taylor, 1999). However, it is only over the last decade that the implications of this power have managed to edge their way into English-language debates on how racism and ethnic discrimination are identified and challenged (Modood, 1996a; 1996b; Ferreira da Silva, 1998; Cohen, 1996; Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1999; Sansone, 2003; Laurie and Bonnett, 2002). One argument these diverse interventions share is that contemporary processes of racialisation and US-Americanisation in some way overlap. More specifically, that the cultural, economic and political power of the USA affects the formation and dissemination of race equity ideologies and movements.

The notion that anti-racism is a plural tradition, and a contested arena of political representation, is not novel intellectual terrain (Bonnett, 2000); nor is the idea that an interplay can exist between global power and ideologies of liberation and equality. The formation of ‘Western feminism’ within an imperial project of social emancipation has produced a rich theoretical and historical literature (Ware, 1994; Chaudhuri and Strobel, 1992). The development of multiculturalism has also occasioned critical commentary on its supposed relationship with the assumptions of world capitalism (for example, Mastustik, 1998; Hopenhayn, 1993). These approaches tend to concur that, whilst feminism or multiculturalism were first pushed onto the political agenda by popular
struggle, the meaning, direction and employment of these forces has been significantly influenced by the unequal nature of modern international economic and social relations. This point is also borne out in the following study. I shall not be exploring how US-Americanisation created anti-racism but how it is shaping it. I suggest that in order to grasp this phenomenon we need to both rethink the way hegemony works and move beyond accounts which conceive of ‘US-Americanisation’ as a reflection of the direct agency of the US-American state or its citizens. As we shall see, this argument arises, in part, from a dissatisfaction with the moralistic and nation-bound nature of the debate that has sprung up around Bourdieu and Waquant’s (1998) polemical attack on the ‘imposition’ of US-American racial categories in Latin America.

It is shown that US-Americanisation and neo-liberalism cannot be reduced to questions of either personal political ‘good will’ or direct US control. In summary, my analysis suggests that:

a) the US-Americanisation of anti-racism has occurred, in part, because the influence of the US appears, not as a form of dominant authority but of counter-authority, a challenge to traditional hierarchies. This is not the only, or even dominant, way the US-Americanisation of anti-racism has proceeded but it does help explain why the impact of US global supremacy on debates on anti-racism around the world has been hard to intellectually and politically explicate;

b) to understand US-Americanisation we must understand its relationship with transnational forces, notably neo-liberalism and the internationalisation of economic and social governance. These forces have a contingent and fraught relationship, which creates room for anomalies and contradictions. The situation is further complicated by virtue of the fact ‘the USA’ is being employed and deployed as a model of modernisation in ways that are beyond its control. Thus, for example, US-Americanisation and neo-liberal globalisation can be intertwined through the agency of a semi-autonomous institution
(such as the World Bank), at the same moment that the national politics of the USA are becoming more insular (i.e., less neo-liberal).

These themes are approached theoretically but also empirically. In order to exemplify them I have drawn on a number of specific, if unsystematic, illustrations from one of the principle institutions within the contemporary ‘world order’, the World Bank (more specifically, its work in Latin America). My choice of the World Bank to explore these themes reflects, in part, its considerable importance in promoting social, political and economic ideologies of ‘development’ and ‘progress’ around the world. The World Bank is the leading player within the ‘development community’, in whose wake many other agencies follow. For my purposes, the World Bank is also of particular interest because its activities and organisation have been shaped in some part by US-American global power yet it is not an organ of the US state. The World Bank disseminates a model of social change that does not require US consent or involvement – it may indeed, be at variance with US government priorities at any one time – yet it reflects a vision that melds US-Americanisation and neo-liberalisation. To a degree that has not yet become so explicit in other world regions, the World Bank’s vision for Latin America is today marked by a concern for the ‘social inclusion’ of ethnic minorities within the market economy. To this end it interprets and categorises a number of Latin American societies through the lens of ‘race relations’, whilst approaching racial and ethnic identities as forms of capital which racist ‘traditions’ conspire to waste.

This article focuses on what might be regarded as one of the ‘softest’ and most nuanced end of both US power and the neo-liberal ‘Washington Consensus’. It seeks to make a minor if specific intervention into a varied field of power. Contemporary international relations are, of course, also characterised by more direct and less consensual approaches, a fact that I return to in my conclusion.
Global Power in the Twenty-First Century

‘[T]he principal aspect of the past decade’ noted Anderson in 2000 (p10), is the ‘consolidation, and universal diffusion of neo-liberalism’. It may be assumed that if neo-liberal globalisation has a dominant cultural form and political ‘national base’ it may be found within the USA, the country which, in Friedman’s (2000, p367) terms, is the cosmopolitan, multicultural, democratic and, hence, ‘benign hegemon and reluctant enforcer’ of the world order (Antonio and Bananno, 2000). Yet the term ‘Americanization-globalization’, given to us by Friedman (2000), which implies an intermeshing of the world’s ‘lead society’ and the world’s ‘lead ideology’, is somewhat simplistic.

It may be true that, for many people around the world, ‘Globalisation … is conceived as Americanization’ (Xia, 2003, p709). Yet it is a conflation that flies in the face of a powerful tendency amongst scholars of global change to emphasize the increasing diversity of cultural formation. Indeed, Ritzer and Stillman (2003, p37) go so far as to announce that ‘globalisation theory tends to subscribe to an increasingly pluralistic view of the world’. This is an overstatement but it is true that an interest, not in the homogenisation, but in the increasing complexity of patterns of cultural exchange marks a range of contemporary interventions in the field. Thus, the political landscape is depicted in terms of ‘entanglement’ (Radcliffe, Laurie and Andolina, 2002), ‘glocalization’ (Robertson, 1995), as a field of ‘many globalizations’ (Berger and Huntingdon, 2003), or as witnessing ‘globalisation from above’ meeting ‘globalisation from below’ (Smith and Guarnizo, 1998; Portes, 1997; see also Walsh, 2002). Ritzer suggests that

There is a gulf between those who emphasise the increasing global [globally growing] influence of capitalistic, Americanized, and McDonaldized interests and those who see the world growing increasingly pluralistic and indeterminate. At the risk of being reductive, this divide amounts to a difference in vision between those who see a world that is becoming increasingly globalized – more
capitalistic, Americanized, rationalised, codified, and restricted – and those who view it as growing increasingly glocalized – more diverse, effervescent and free. (2004, p79-80)

Ritzer touches here upon the optimism that seems to encourage the alignment of globalisation with localisation. However, perceptions of the relationship between globalisation and the exercise of global power can shift rapidly. In 2005 Golub (2005, p1) announced that globalisation ‘appears exhausted’ (see also Freeman and Kagarlitsky, 2005). The emergence of a more aggressive US foreign policy since the events of September 11th 2001, has provoked a number of profound rethinks of earlier affirmations of the power of non-dominant groups to resist transnational capitalism and ‘US interests’. Thus, for example, whilst in 2000 Jan Nederveen Pieterse (see Venn, 2000) was depicting the category ‘American imperialism’ as ‘essentialist’, by 2004 we find him identifying the features of a US-American ‘neoliberal empire’. For Pieterse (2004) the latter is a hybrid and unwieldy creation that marks the ‘osmosis’ of neoliberalism and neoconservatism. A similar attempt to weld the international militancy of the USA with globalization theory is offered by Thornton (2004), who depicts what he calls ‘neoglobalism’ as ‘iron fist globalism’, marked by the extension of the free market through military and political imperialism.

The international politics of the first few years of the twenty-first century is making the consideration, not simply of ‘diversity’ and ‘entanglements’, but of the exercise of dominance increasingly unavoidable. This imperative is itself liable to change. Indeed, on the back of left-wing election victories in Latin America the erosion of international capitalism is, once again, being discussed (Panizza, 2005). Harris (2005) has recently aired the possibility of a ‘Beijing Consensus’ that could, perhaps, challenge the ‘Washington Consensus’ and produce a ‘Third World’ based cultural and economic template for globalisation. Yet, for Harris, this is a forecast of a (hoped for) possibility, something that may one day happen. Speculation aside, what confronts us today is something a crisis within narratives of pluralisation: ‘empire’ is, unavoidably, back on the
agenda. Of course, within much left-wing analysis it was never off the agenda. The recently resurgent anti-imperialist focus on the political will and agency of US ‘super imperialism’ (Hudson, 2003) is giving a new lease of life to neo-Marxist-Leninist explications of the ‘crises’ of capitalism (Harvey, 2003). Yet, as important as these formulations sometimes are, both to those freshly attuned to the idea that they are living in a era of empire, as well as to radicals who have never stopped describing the world in such terms, they rely, as Hardt and Negri (2004) have explained, on an out-dated conception of ‘big nations’ as the central actors and centres of global power.

Although what the USA does is of vital concern to everyone on the planet, the consequences of its influence, and the way the USA is employed and deployed as a symbol of modernity, have become increasingly transnational. The absorption and dissemination of neo-liberal ‘common sense’ is a case in point: this social and economic model may draw on the prestige of USA but it is not reducible to US agency. This also helps explain how we may find that, at one and the same time, the world’s global institutions are disseminating a neo-liberal and ‘Americanised’ version of ‘ethnic equity’ policies, whilst in the USA itself more socially conservative (for example, neo-conservativism) forces are at work.

In sum, what is required is not another attempt to track US imperial intent but, rather, an engagement with the international deployment of the US as a social and economic role model. The terrain we enter, then, is one of paradoxes. Those forms of racialised minority agency and resistance that have provoked anti-racist initiatives in so many countries, do so within and against an overarching (if always vulnerable) global system that is simultaneously ‘US-Americanising’ and truly international. Moreover, whilst the institutions within this system provide space for the voices of the marginalised, they also shape, interpret and give economic sanction to the ‘voices that are heard’ within non-dominant social movements and ideologies.
The need to think about how anti-racism may intersect with these diverse forces, and to free the debate from a reliance on accounts of national dominance and personalised invective has become stark in recent years. In part this is because of the absorption of anti-racist rhetoric by so many transnational institutions. But it also has a more particular cause, namely the intellectual debris that has been left from a short article that Livio Sasone (2002, p7) likens to a ‘bomb’.

How to Spot an Imperialist … Bourdieu and Wacquant and their Critics

Michel Wieviorka (1997) has depicted contemporary anti-racism as undergoing a creative phase of intellectual self-consciousness. In his essay ‘Is it so difficult to be an anti-racist?’ Wievioka calls for a reflexive anti-racism that permits the philosophical tensions within the anti-racist project (most notably, for Wieviorka, between relativism and universalism) to be acknowledged and, by extension, anti-racist ‘purism’ to be repudiated. And yet, although Wieviorka’s illustrations allude to a contrast between ‘Anglo-Saxon’ and French anti-racism, neither he nor those others seeking to theorise anti-racism’s limitations and potential (Tagueiff, 1995) place anti-racism within the choppier realms of geopolitical change or struggle. The challenges for anti-racism may appear easier to categorise when they are divorced from the charged atmosphere of global power politics. But the Western arena has never been a sufficient space for such debate; and, as its limits becomes visible, another form of reflexivity becomes necessary, a form that privileges geography and politics.

Bourdieu and Wacquant’s (1998) polemical broadside ‘Sur les ruses de la raison imperialiste’ (translated as ‘On the cunning of imperialist reason’, Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1999) provides the clearest example of what can happen when one descends from Wieviorka’s abstractions. For the themes Bourdieu and Wacquant explore do not concern the difficulties of a generic anti-racism. Bourdieu and Wacquant’s central concern is the tension between contemporary anti-imperial politics and the supposed bad
faith of those US anti-racists who are exporting their own cultural and political assumptions under the banners of human rights and respect for diversity. Part of Bourdieu and Wacquant’s case is that US-Americanisation leads to racialization. Thus they inveigh against the ‘quasi-universalisation of the US folk-concept of “race” as a result of the world-wide export of US scholarly categories’ (1999, p48). A particular source of irritation for Bourdieu and Wacquant is what they claim to be the attempt by US race scholars and philanthropic institutions to judge other societies on their ability or inability to recognise and affirm ‘race relations’ and binary black and white identities in a similar fashion to the way they are recognised and affirmed in the US. Thus the supposed export of US versions of ‘blackness’ and ‘whiteness’ becomes central to their argument. 

The work of scholarship they choose to highlight is Michael Hanchard’s (1994) study of the Movimento Negro in Rio de Janeiro and Sao Paulo, Orpheus and Power. It is an odd choice and immediately reveals that Bourdieu and Wacquant’s empirical evidence has been hastily compiled (see also Hanchard, 2003). Orpheus and Power certainly accounts for the differences between the Black Power influenced Americanistas and the anti-colonial and African inspired perspectives of the Africanistas amongst Afro-Brazilian activists, but it is hard to find much evidence in his book of a desire to privilege the former or, indeed, any other aspect of US experience. Unfortunately, it seems that the mere fact of Hanchard’s attention to Brazilian blackness was sufficient to excite Bourdieu and Wacquant’s ire. As Wade (2004, p357) observes ‘[s]uch an “anti-imperialist” approach runs the risk of portraying Brazilian race relations as benign’.

Reading between their lines, there is an underlying anxiety in Bourdieu and Wacquant’s intervention that traditional European intellectual influence in Latin America has given way so comprehensively to US dominance. However, for all its faults, their polemic has brought to the attention of a wide international audience concerns about the relationship between US-Americanisation and racialisation that have been articulated by some Western and, more especially, majority world area specialists for some years (for Brazilian examples see Camara, 1998; Sansone, 2003; Fry, 1996; Ferreira da Silva, 1998; also Hall and Livingstone, 2003; Bailey, 2002). Moreover, their article must be
understood as part of a wider conversation in the issue of *Actes de la Recherche en Sciences Sociales* where it first appeared. The issue in question contained a variety of articles critiquing the relationship between neo-colonialism, internationalisation and neo-liberalism. For example, preceding Bourdieu and Wacquant’s piece are two papers by Dezalay and Garth (1998a; 1998b), the first addressing the mobilisation and dissemination of the ‘the Washington Consensus’ through the popular media, the second addressing how ‘the international market of expertise’ (through philanthropic foundation and institutions) is dominated by and hence ‘favour[s] US ideas and institutions’.

Translated into English, Spanish and Portuguese, Bourdieu and Wacquant’s paper excited fierce controversy. Indeed, the editor of the issue of the Brazilian journal *Estudos Afro-Asiáticos* devoted to discussion of the paper (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 2002), Livio Sansone (2002, p5), called it ‘one of those articles that makes history’. However, history may also record that rarely has an article been so widely disseminated and yet so widely reviled. Sansone and the other Brazilian contributors to *Estudos Afro-Asiáticos* (Pinho and Figueiredo, 2002; Teles dos Santos, 2002), share an aggrieved sense that Bourdieu and Wacquant should ‘grant so little credit’ (Sansone, p7) to the ability of Brazilian academics and activists to maintain a distinct intellectual lineage within the field of racial studies. Sansone, whose edited issue includes three essays translated from English by US-American scholars, also argues that academic practice is more transnational and collaborative than Bourdieu and Wacquant imply, reminding us that ‘not all of [Americans] are the same’ (p11). John French makes a similar point when he points out that the last decade ‘has witnessed an exciting new phase of engagement, in both Brazil and the United States’, between intellectuals on the status of race in Brazil. This ‘dialogue’, French says, (2003, p384) ‘is far less unbalanced than in the past’.

Bourdieu and Wacquant’s essay appeared in English in *Theory, Culture and Society*, followed by eleven commentaries on the piece collected together in two issues of the journal (in 2000 and 2003). Only two pieces offered any support, one of these being a brief note from Bourdieu and Wacquant’s translator (Robbins, 2003; the other is
Friedman, 2000). The sheer volume of negative commentary on Bourdieu and Wacquant’s article is striking, as is its sometimes personalised and censorious language. Bourdieu and Wacquant’s enterprise is called ‘bizarre’ (Venn, 2003, p93), a form of ‘sociological terrorism’ (Wieviorka, 2000, p161). They are also accused of offering a provincially French view, ‘an embarrassing little field note’ (Lambert, 2000, p97) and of giving into the prejudices of the ill-informed ‘South’. In Pieterse’s terms

Globalisation evokes much anger and anxiety in the South and tends to be experienced as yet another round of northern hegemony, another round of concentration of power and wealth. The common metaphor for globalisation in the South, in the slipstream of 200 years of weary experience, is imperialism or neo-colonialism revisited. Analytically this is a mistake: imperialism was territorial, state driven, centrally orchestrated and marked by a clear division between coloniser and colonised; and none of these features apply to contemporary globalisation. (2000, p132)

Pieterse appears to suggest here that the ‘experience’ of imperialism is a kind of false consciousness, generated by an outdated and ‘analytically’ unsophisticated notion of Western domination. Rephrased in Venn’s terms, ‘essentialist notions of an authentic American imperialist discourse’ (2000, p92) are an anachronism. Werbner’s (2000) rebuttal of Bourdieu and Wacquant amplifies these themes by stressing how the two men have failed to grasp the cosmopolitanism of the US. Accusations of US imperialism in the field of anti-racism are misjudged, Werbner suggests, because US anti-racism and post-colonial debate is so diverse, so multiethnic, and so socially critical. Thus the increasing openness to diasporic and non-Western voices within academic debate is used to counter Bourdieu and Wacquant’s claims of US-American global power.

Yet, a paradox emerges. For most of the contributors to this discussion also assert that US-American ‘global hegemony’ (for example, French, 2004, p384) is a contemporary reality. Are we to believe that US hegemony exists but does not shape race equity praxis
and ideology? It is understandable that, having decided to site their argument on the terrain of academic and national conduct and individual political good faith, Bourdieu and Wacquant receive a rebuke in the same terms. Yet this narrative ensures that the concept ‘US-Americanisation’ becomes a marker of a crude anti-Americanism and, hence, a delusion favoured by those too ignorant to know that the ‘real situation’ is marked by interchange and diversity. Yet what this sequence of ideas also reflects is the limitations of the original questions posed by Bourdieu and Wacquant. To ask how have US-Americans wilfully misrepresented race in Brazil leads to an intellectual dead-end, a destination that their disputants have not escaped from. In order to move beyond a squabble over good intentions amongst intellectuals we need to accept that the analysis of hegemonic processes cannot be reduced to commentaries on political good will or on how big nations strong-arm weak ones.

The debate sparked by Bourdieu and Wacquant shows that any analysis of the interconnection between anti-racism and US or, Western, dominance, is a sensitive and complex task. It reinforces the need for an openness to the transnational and autonomous nature of contemporary patterns of dominance. It also suggests that the relationship between patterns of dominance and claims to counter-authority needs to be brought under scrutiny.

**Hegemony, Counter-authority and Anti-racism**

The need for US-Americanisation and neo-liberalism to be both taken seriously as transnational forces that are shaping ethnic equity initiatives emerges from Sasone’s (2003) important book on race in Brazil, *Blackness Without Ethnicity*. Sasone has clearly been intrigued and provoked by Bourdieu and Wacquant’s critique. He has sought to move on from it constructively, by connecting what he calls the globalisation of ‘black symbols’ from ‘English-speaking regions of the Black Atlantic’ (p154) with a neo-liberal forms of traditional racism. ‘[T]he globalised streams of symbols’ Sasone argues,
circulate a set of US-Americanised clichés of race that are employed and deployed by Brazilians as new, liberating claims of identity, yet which also enforce the ‘linking [of] young black people to leisure, physicality, sexual prowess, musicality, and naturality, whilst juxtaposing them to work, rationality, and modern technology’ (p162). Thus, Sansone’s stresses both the mediated, autonomous way US influence is experienced and also its links to counter-authority.

Sansone’s examples are indicative of the fact that one of the few sites where debates on US-Americanisation, globalisation and racialisation have so far combined is ‘youth culture’. The global adoption and adaptation of African-American hip-hop and rap musical and cultural forms appears to be occurring as part of a wider dissemination of generation and consumer based models of rebellion (Wood, 1997; Mitchell, 1996; 2001; Olavarria, 2002). Academic interest in these processes often evokes the paradox of voices of counter-authority being part and parcel of a project of cultural domination (a paradox captured by the simultaneously authoritarian and rebellious connotations of MTV’s slogan: ‘one world, one music’; see Harris, 2004). This paradox goes to the heart of our enquiry and may help to explain the evident difficulty scholars (from both the West and majority world) have had in addressing the relationship between anti-racism and US-Americanisation. For the experience of hegemony is widely associated with ideas and practices which make no claim on the emancipatory imagination. Hegemony has been caricatured as a force bearing the hallmarks of authority; a force which explicitly sustains the ruling class, whether national or transnational. Anti-racism is associated with the opposite social force: ipso facto the two appear to be mutually exclusive. It is striking that Bourdieu and Wacquant’s critics return repeatedly to the idea that US race scholarship cannot be imperialistic because it is socially critical; that it is part of a heritage of resistance. Yet, if our focus remains on the last forty years, it is apparent that US influence over how ideas of race and ethnicity are construed in other parts of the world is apparant in precisely this area; that is, within radical, counter-cultural and otherwise critical social moments. It follows that the nature of US authority can only be adequately explained by those prepared to examine its claims on counter-authority.
In his *Prison Notebooks*, written in the early 1930s, Gramsci takes a certain pleasure in the fact that ‘Americanism’ is a subversive force, that it is undermining the archaisms of European ruling class power. The industrial efficiency and social instrumentalism of ‘[w]hat today is called “Americanism”’, he writes

is to large extent an advance criticism of old strata which will in fact be crushed by any eventual new order and which are already in the grips of a wave of social panic, dissolution and despair. (1971, p317)

Gramsci contributed to the theory of hegemony a new sensitivity to the fluidity of class allegiances, and, more specifically, to the way processes of domination often require consensual forms of alliance. Hegemony implies the ability to achieve a position of leadership, a position which may necessitate reforms and compromise made with other class groups. One testament to the utility of such analyses may be found in neo-Gramscian analysis of the politics of the post-1945 welfare state (Centre for Contemporary Cultural Studies, 1981; 1982). Such studies are indicative of the tendency to ally Gramsci’s name to attempts to locate progressive moments produced within and against the dominant hegemonic order. This current has also led to a misinterpretation of Gramsci as basing his revolutionary optimism on the possibility of social movements as such, irrespective of their relationship to class politics (Sassoon, 2001). It must be emphasised, then, that, for Gramsci, political progress proceeds from a withdrawal from capitalist relations by subordinate groups (Badaloni, 1979).

The latter half of the last century witnessed leftist activists of various guises working towards and even heralding anti-hegemonic alliances. Employing another Gramscian term, the vision was to turn ‘passive revolution’ (the capitalist states response to crisis) into non-passive revolution. Anti-racism emerged as a hotly contested arena within this debate. Within British neo-Gramscian cultural studies, the ‘autonomy’ of ‘black struggle’ was vigorously asserted (Gilroy, 1982) and a keenly critical eye developed towards its
recuperation by the state (Gilroy, 1987; Troyna and Williams, 1986; Lentin, 2004). These critiques of anti-racism constructed popular racialised activism and state action to ameliorate racial conflict as antithetical sites of political action. Yet in so doing they were unable to give sufficient attention to the close relationship that can exist between ‘resistance’ and the ‘dominant or prevailing’ hegemony (see also Laclau and Mouffe, 1985). This lacuna has become more problematic the further we move towards ‘post-modern’ consumerism; a society in which rebellion, escape and liberation are integrated into capitalism’s ideological repertoire (Cohen and Taylor, 1992; Watkins, 1998; Lipsitz, 1997; Debord, 1977).

One reflection of the close relationship between counter-authority and neo-liberalism is found in the suspicion towards ideologies of multiculturalism that is maintained by many on the left. Zizek’s claim that multiculturalism is ‘the ideal form of ideology of this global capitalism’ (1997, p44) has found numerous echoes (Harvey, 1993; Friedman, 1992). It is a position that may also be exemplified by Hopenhayn’s (1993, p99) explanation of the relationship between postmodernism and neo-liberalism in Latin America: ‘Deregulation’, he notes, ‘is the correlative in the practical sphere of the theoretical celebration of diversity’. Such assertions rely on a claimed sympathy between commodification and a depoliticising cultural fragmentation. In a testament to how accepted hostility to multiculturalism has become, in Empire Hardt and Negri (2000, p192) feel able to simply note that ‘Imperial racist theory and modern anti-racist theory are really saying very much the same thing’.  

Divorced from an acknowledgement or understanding of either the development of equity initiatives as forms of counter-authority or of their diverse geo-politics, the contemporary leftist penchant for anti-anti-racism can appear tendentious. A more constructive approach does, however, appear to be emerging, one that stresses the recuperative power of capitalism. Mastustik, for example, usefully highlights the recuperative abilities of contemporary capitalism, more specifically the way ‘multicultural and Marxist lessons of recognition and redistribution [have been] relearned by flexibly multicultural...
corporations’ (Mastustik, 1998, p103). Mastustik’s remarks make it clear that the relationship between the ‘celebration of diversity’ and neo-liberal capitalism is a contingent not a necessary one. There is nothing within capitalism that inherently or inevitably favours multiculturalism. Capitalism is as an adaptive and constantly challenging social process. Under the right conditions its can shape and enable equity politics and, hence, become aligned with a challenge to traditional patterns of discrimination and social immobility. It is not enough to simply assert that a process of what Matustik calls ‘relearning’ (and why relearning?) has gone on: the attempt must be made to begin mapping a geopolitical landscape in which the relationship between counter-authority and hegemony can become explicable.

Selective Listening and Imagined Modernity: Ethnic Equity and the World Bank

I have offered a critique of the existing debate on the US-Americanisation of anti-racism. I have also argued that, in order to build constructively on this controversy, it is necessary to engage the transnational and autonomous nature of this process, as well as the relationship between hegemony and claims to counter-authority. It is now time to exemplify these themes. I do not claim more for my examples than that they are suggestive, that they open up lines of enquiry within a complex terrain. They are all drawn from one of the most important transnational institution operating across the arenas of economy and society, the World Bank.

The World Bank is a large organisation, with some 10,000 employees and offices in 109 countries. Like many of the major players within the ‘development community’ the World Bank asserts that its work is ‘guided’ by the Millennium Development Goals, agreed by the United Nations in 2000. These goals focus upon poverty reduction, primary education provision, gender equality, health improvements, environmental sustainability, and the need to ‘develop a global partnership for development’ (within which is included
‘expand market access’). Criticism of the Bank as ideologically driven is today often countered by reference to the human needs based nature of the Millennium Goals, as well as to the notion that opinion within the World Bank is characterised by ideological diversity and change (de Moura Castro, 2002). 6

Nevertheless, it remains the case that, along with its ‘sister’ institution, the IMF, the World Bank has shown a consistent commitment to a capitalist vision of modernisation and an often intimate relationship with the development and global priorities envisaged within the governments of the Western world. Indeed, for Mundy (2002, p488), the Bank notes is ‘more responsible than perhaps any other organisation for elaborating what has come to be called the Washington consensus’. In Stiglitz’s (2004, p15) words there is ‘a démarche, an agreement, whereby the [World Bank concedes that the] IMF is in charge of macroeconomic policy’. The ideological divisions within the Bank, signalled by the hiring of a critic of the unmoderated imposition of privatisation programmes in Russia 7, Joseph Stiglitz, as Chief Economist (1996-1999), have allowed those working within it to imagine the Bank’s interest in financial inclusion reflect an increasingly ‘mellow’ and ideologically heterogeneous institution (de Moura Castro, 2002). However, viewed from outside, and assessed alongside and within the context of wider attempts to expand and sustain the modern capitalist world-system, the Bank’s new emphasis on financial inclusion appears congruent with its established ideology of capitalist globalisation. As this implies, although the ‘tensions’ within the World Bank and between the World Bank and the IMF over the former's combination of ‘pro-poor’ policies, social liberalism and neo-liberal economic policy may have become increasingly noticeable to observers (Denny, 2002), they reflect as much an evolution as a crisis of economic liberalism in its constant attempts to enable ‘deeper markets’ (Ferranti et al, 2004).

It is within this context that the World Bank’s strong and significant support, over the past ten years, for ‘racial and ethnic inclusion in development’ and ‘ethno-development’ must be placed (Moore, 2001; forthcoming). The long-term future of these themes within the World Bank’s priorities is not certain: they feature neither within the Millennium
Goals nor, so far, in the vision of the World Bank’s role outlined by its new (as of 1\textsuperscript{st} June 2005) President, Paul Wolfowitz (Wolfowitz, 2005a; 2005b). Nevertheless, they provide an interesting and important illustration of how an semi-autonomous transnational institution can deploy discourses of counter-authority, discourses that draw together US-Americanisation, neo-liberalisation and anti-racism. 8

The World Bank does this by selectively listening to anti-racist social movements and interpreting their demands through and into three central discourses congruent with US-Americanized vision of neo-liberal modernity. These discourses are: a) that ethnic and racial identities are usefully thought of as forms of capital; b) that multi and inter-cultural social inclusion enables participation in the free market; c) that the development of racial self-identification, racial categories and, more broadly, ‘race relations’ provide an appropriate model for the development of anti-racism. None of these approaches is designed to disseminate or reproduce US-American models, and none can be said to have ‘successfully’ implanted anything approaching a replica US-American racial society in any ‘developing’ nation. Nevertheless, they all exhibit the use and universalisation of a recognisably US-American-identified model of good ‘race relations’ in a free market economy.

The World Bank’s recent statements on ‘racial inclusion’ acknowledge that privatisation can be ‘inequality augmenting’ (Ferranti et al, 2004, summary -14; also World Bank, 2003). However, having concluded that ethnic plurality can be an economic asset (Bates, 1999), they go onto assert a policy of capital racialisation, through which economically marginalised groups can enter the market place via the medium of their racial identities (more specifically and especially, through having group ownership rights granted to resources, such as land and water). Thus the Bank’s support for racialisation is designed to produce ‘deeper markets’ which can translate ethnicity into ‘social capital’.

the World Bank currently label[s] indigenous people as ‘social capital’, untapped human resources that need to be brought into the decision-making processes
associated with development planning. Conceptualisations of indigenous people as social capital places them firmly in the nexus between participatory development approaches (which planners are increasingly using to target poverty alleviation) and liberalisation policies. (Laurie, Andolina and Radcliffe, 2002, p253)

To exemplify how the World Bank selectively listens to ‘indigenous’ and other racialised movements we may turn to those many World Bank policy documents that give voice to a variety of grass roots calls for social and economic autonomy only to interpret them as evidence of the need for fuller incorporation of racialised groups within the free market (Ferranti et al, 2004, World Bank, 2003; Partridge, Equals and Johns, 1996). One of the key-note papers of the Annual World Bank Conference on Development in Latin America, held in Bogota in 1996, Including the Excluded (Partridge, Equals and Johns, 1996) provides a typical illustration. With itsprefacing citation from Maya Angelo (‘Lift up your faces, you have a piercing need/For this bright morning dawning for you’) and assertion that it is concerned to support a development ‘process … defined by and controlled by the indigenous peoples themselves’ (p7) the document boldly asserts its role as a mouthpiece for the interests of the ‘excluded’. However a gulf quickly opens up between those ‘ethnic’ voices reported and the authors’ policy recommendations. Quotes from ‘indigenous leaders’ are sprinkled throughout the text asserting, in very general terms, an attachment to culture, education and dignity. None of these voices calls for greater inclusion in the free market or the ethnicisation of capital. Yet the report’s authors’ principal conclusion is that the ‘exclusion of these people from the market economy represents a massive waste of human and non-human resources’ (p30). The report goes onto signal that

The Bank is making a shift from a by and large ‘protectionist’ orientation to an ‘ethnodevelopment’ orientation towards indigenous people. While the concern with the danger of cultural extinction of small groups still exists, at the present time our predominant strategy is to assist the great mass of indigenous peoples to
overcome poverty by strengthening their participation in the development process.

The fact that the abandonment of social protectionism goes hand in hand with the removal of economic protectionism was also spelled out by the former Vice President of Bolivia, Victor Hugo Cardenas (2004) during an Inter-Agency Consultation (which brought together the World Bank, Inter-American Development Bank, Inter-American Dialogue and other, private, agencies) in June 2001: ‘in multiethnic and multicultural societies like ours’ Cardenas noted, ‘market economies will be unsustainable if the exclusion of the minorities’ vision of development persist’ (see also World Bank, 2003; Davis, 2002).

These initiatives are presented as forms of counter-authority, as challenges that come from ‘the people themselves’ to entrenched orthodoxies and racist societies. The World Bank places itself on the side of a ‘bright morning dawning’ that will sweep away stagnate hierarchies. At the same time, it is acting to move the focus of equity politics away from structural and global processes and onto small scale interventions that raise the profile of racism in majority world countries as a key source of inequality and act to split national or class based alliances of the poor. In this way neo-liberal anti-racism is institutionalised by transnational capital, a form which acts to deepen hegemonic power relations. Such an analysis does not contradict the commonly heard assertion that, in particular, the ‘indigenous movement’ is ‘gaining ground’ in Latin America (cf. Hale, 1997). Nor should it lead to the assumption that counter-authority is ever perfectly functional to the needs of capital.

As noted earlier, in relation to anti-racism in Brazil, the notion that the racialization of poverty is a necessary concomitant of anti-racism or of popular attitudes towards race, is disputable. It is significant, then, that World Bank officials have explicitly identified ‘universalism’ as an ideological anachronism in Latin America. Shelton Davis, a sector manager of the World Bank’s Social Development Unit in the region, notes that
There is a need to change public attitudes and institutional obstacles that have held back more inclusive social policies for Afro-descendent peoples and communities. The idea throughout the region seems to be that social programs and policies need to be universalistic and there is no need to focus on specific groups such as Afro-descendants. Generalized social programs targeted at the rural and urban poor, it is often argued, will resolve the historic and current social deficits of these populations. (Davis, 2003, p9)

The World Bank’s anti-racist initiatives produce a need to identify and monitor the population along racial lines, whilst situating transnational development agencies as a necessary intervention into the majority world’s ‘failed’ traditions of governance. An inevitable corollary is the need to collect statistical data on ethnic groups. Thus, for example, although racial origin questions featured in the Peruvian national censuses of 1876 and 1940, a new set of pressures and expectations has arisen promoting the inclusion of racial classification in Peruvian social statistics. Two ‘Todos Contamos’ conferences (Cartagena, Columbia in 2000 and Lima, Peru in 2002) have brought together national statistical agencies, Afro-descendant and indigenous groups and World Bank officials in order to promote racial data collection (see La Ventana Newsletter, 2003). The enumeration of race is designed to raise the visibility of black and indigenous groups, whilst enabling their fuller representation and participation in the ethno-development programmes funded by transnational capital. A culture of racial accountancy is required to accompany the World Bank’s attempts to ‘capitalise’ and ‘marketise’ ethnic status.

This combination of forces results in the view that resistance to racial classification reflects ‘old-fashioned’ ideologies. It also produces a desire to find classification methods that increase the size of ‘racial groups’ (a phrase that has come to connote Afro-descendant and indigenous peoples across much of Latin America). In a revealing recent incident, also from Peru, World Bank representatives approached the National Institute of
Statistics (INEI) in 2001 with the request that it, not only begin counting Afro-Peruvians, but that it used phenotypic criteria to do so. The concern behind this approach was that self-identification would provide a low estimate of the number of Afro-Peruvians (registered as 0.47% in 1940), thus hampering attempts to make this group an effective force for ethno-development. In interview with me (1st January 2004) one official of the INEI connected this request to a wider US-Americanisation of race in Peru, a process that includes both direct and indirect forms of influence. In the former category this interviewee placed African-American lobbying in the US Congress for greater recognition of ‘Afro-Latins’, as well as the power of the US to export its ideological agendas through transnational organisations over which it has partial control. The World Bank’s attempt to persuade Peruvian INEI officials to mark external ‘racial’ features (such as curliness of hair and thickness of lips) on a 0-5 scale, was effectively resisted. In part this was done through a series of critical methodological analyses that drew on the authority of US anthropology and race studies to demonstrate that such procedures were unreliable and unscientific (Lloréns, n.d.; Lloréns, n.d.; Lloréns, n.d.). However, in the context of the continent-wide move towards racial classification, this incident reveals less about the power of national agencies to confine transnational influence than it does about the vulnerability of such agencies to transnational agendas. Powerful institutions, such as the World Bank, are able to represent themselves both as agents of counter-authority, acting on behalf of the victims of a racist status-quo and as the arbiters of national authority, tasked with enabling those forms of government capable of sustaining capitalist democracy.

The move towards a politics of racial identity and away from civic universalism is not a product of direct US manipulation but of the adoption, by transnational institutions and NGOs, of a vision of the relationship between social emancipation and economic progress that is both based on and implicitly refers back to the USA as the paradigmatic modern or ‘developed’ state. The US-Americanisation of anti-racism proceeds, at least in part, through the mobilisation of a discourse of counter-authority. By-passing the national and civic levels of identity and political change, it situates itself as reaching out to
previously marginalised groups and, hence, as the authentic voice of emancipation. This is not the only way neo-liberalism, anti-racism and US-Americanisation come together, but it does represent a vital axis of social change. Its importance lies both in its ability to shape anti-racism and also in the way it makes it difficult to discern the workings of hegemonic power.

Conclusions

Paul Kennedy’s (1987) prophesy of the decay of US power was too hasty. Indeed, the question that echoes across international relations debate today is, in Michael Cox’s (2001) terms ‘Whatever happened to American decline?’. A less quizzical tone prevails elsewhere: Why the West has Won (Hanson, 2001), The End of History (Fukuyama, 1992) and The Ideas that Conquered the World (Mandelbaum, 2002) are titles that capture a triumphalist zeitgeist; a mood that looks forward as well as back; for in Valladao’s (1996) terms The 21st Century Will be American. Behind this confidence is the belief that US-Americanisation and neo-liberal globalisation, do not rely on the politics of imposition. They have ‘won’, it is suggested, because people everywhere see them as forces of enrichment and counter-authority: they offer freedom, wealth and a better way of life. Buchanan frames this transition as a move away from resistance and towards a global consensus:

The repeated history of revolutionary movements and regular recourse to force on the part of the USA attest to the historical lack of majority consent to its ‘leadership’ south of the Rio Grande. But perhaps with the globalisation of the cultural discourse of democracy and markets, the process of securing consent to US-based notions of the proper social order will finally take hold in Latin American civil society. (Buchanan, 2000, p107)
Of course, the exercise of such enormous power inevitably leads to endless worries about how it will be maintained. Just as the height of white supremacism in Britain (1890-1930) was also the period of its gravest ‘crisis’ and racial panics (Bonnett, 2003), so the US’s dominance today is accompanied by musings on its collapse (for modern examples, see Todd, 2004; Soros, 2004). Such speculations may be of interest but, at least within the area of ethnic and racial studies, the more pressing task is to admit to the fact of US dominance. If we accept, along with Ikenberry (1999, p123) that many years after it ‘emerged hegemonic, the United States is still the dominant world power at the center of [an] … expanding democratic capitalist order’, then we need to think about how this dominant aspect of the world we live in has shaped the way race and racism are identified and challenged.

US-Americanisation is neither a uniform nor an inevitable process. In this article I have discussed some of the more subtle forms through which it has taken place, forms which imply neither US ‘bad faith’ nor that US-Americanisation is not, at some level and by some people, wanted or needed. These forms reflect the development of hegemony as a process whereby the ruling class and the ‘ruling nation’, does not itself build up consensus but, rather, is employed and deployed by semi-autonomous transnational institutions as a model of the modern state. This also implies that mismatches may open up between US-Americanisers and the USA. The example of neo-liberalism is one such possible mismatch. Although some commentators have pointed to a shift within the Bush presidency from neo-liberalism to neo-conservatism this shift is not (yet) apparent within the World Bank (cf. Reynolds, 2005)

Writing in 2005, I cannot avoid the reality that US-Americanisation also has more militant dimensions than the forging of consensus and hegemony. The invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq have illustrated the reach and boldness of US direct foreign control. As with earlier forms of imperial development, the ‘civilising mission’ and, hence, legitimacy of US intervention has, in part, relied on appeals to the idea that occupation of ‘failed states’ will enable ethnic harmony and equality. This logic has entailed an
ethnicisation of the social forces to be either defeated or assimilated into capitalist
democracy. Thus, for example, although Shia and Sunni Muslims in Iraq, as well as other
groups, such as the ‘Marsh Arabs’, were subject to process of ethnicisation well before
2003, the US administration inaugurated a new phase in this process, in which ethnicity
has been employed to explain the existence of conflict in Iraq, between Iraqis and the
occupying coalition forces (for example, the notion of a ‘Sunni triangle’ was used
extensively to locate resistance) and provide a means for the social and physical
management of Iraqi society. Although this model has provoked some resentment and
bewilderment amongst Iraqi’s who had not previously interpreted their religious
observance or regional location as implying ‘ethnic identities’, it has helped structure the
post-invasion governance of the country (Tarabieh, 2003). Unsurprisingly, it became
increasingly common in 2003-2004 for Iraqis to adopt and adapt the lexicon of ethnicity
to suit their political needs and in order to make deputations to officialdom.

The orchestration of US power in Iraq and Afghanistan remains too overt to be called
hegemonic. In Gill’s (1995; also Morton, 2003) terms, such disciplinary and coercive
force over fragmented opposition is better understood as ‘supremacy’. Following Gill
further, we may be tempted to posit supremacy as the ideal political form of neo-liberal
economics since neo-liberalism shows powerful tendencies towards the subversion of
democratic accountability (the market itself coming to be a substitute democracy) and the
erosion of political pluralism. However, this would be lose sight of the multiplicity of
authority. The attempt to see one, single, ideal form of power needs to be resisted. As we
have seen, the production of consent and the exercise of coercion can take place side-by-
side. Whether we shall see more of the latter or the former in the future is not, in my
opinion, predictable. What we can do, however, is investigate these different forms of
power as they exist today. And when we do the coercive content of consent also becomes
apparent. The kind of US-Americanisation of anti-racism we have explored in this article
is being enacted, in large part, through ‘acts of choice’ structured and given meaning by
forms of authority over which ordinary people have little power. This pattern of
domination is far from new: ‘how underdeveloped the underdeveloped world’s ideology
and culture must be’, Frank asked rhetorically in 1975 (p35), ‘that the developed world’s view of underdevelopment has widespread acceptance in the underdeveloped world itself’.

It has become increasingly clear that processes of global domination demand an attention to the way notions of resistance and social change are constructed, legitimised and disseminated. The history of anti-racism is commonly narrated as a story of valiant struggle, of the powerless against the powerful. Such accounts are no longer adequate. In the context of the development and diffusion of capitalist power, and its changing symbolic repertoires, anti-racists need to be more politically reflexive. For without such critical attention, anti-racism’s claims on the progressive imagination will become implausible.

I conclude that greater scrutiny needs to accompany the globalisation of ethnic equity initiatives. Anti-racist workers in many parts of the world tend to position themselves in positions of resistance, struggling for the interests of victims of racialisation and against a widespread failure to admit to the problem of racism. Although this self-image is largely accurate, once severed from a wider appreciation of how anti-racist counter-authority can be recuperated by broader processes of social and economic restructuring, it becomes inadequate.

Notes

1 One reflection of US hegemony is that the noun ‘America’ is often used as if it was synonymous with the USA. No common practice has yet emerged on how to replace the verb or the collective noun derived from this usage. ‘US-Americanisation’ and ‘US-Americans’ are the most straightforward solutions to these two difficulties.
2. This article adopts the broad definition of anti-racism as pertaining to ideologies and practices that affirm and seek to enable the equality of races and ethnic groups (an approach also seen in Bonnett, 2000).

3. For some commentators, both US-American and Brazilian, it appears that the assertion of ‘race relations’, more specifically Black and indigenous racial identity, is an inevitable and positive development for Brazilian society (Twine, 1998; Bowser, 1995; Warren, 2001; see also Hun, 2005). However, others, such as Livio Sasone (2004; see also Camara, 1998), are arguing that this logic absorbs Brazil into a US-American ‘race relations’ paradigm which denies the originality and potential of anti-racism in Brazil. Pointing to the widespread support in Brazil for anti-racism within and alongside a class-based analysis of life opportunities, Sasone calls for an ‘anti-racism without ethnicity’. For him Brazilians’ resistance ‘to notions of race delineated by sharp lines and clear borders, presents a challenge to those accustomed to undertaking and addressing racial issues on such a basis’ (see also Walker, 2002).

4. Critiques of the notion of ‘American imperialism’ as essentialist seems to have been made less tenable between the publication date of the first set of responses to Bourdieu and Wacquant in Theory, Culture and Society in 2000 and the second set in 2003. In the latter issue, the editor of both special issues, Couze Venn, points out that the events of September 11th 2001 have had the effect of ‘forcing us all to attend to the geopolitical dimension of Bourdieu and Wacquant’s original article’ (Venn, 2003, p1) and that it is only because the articles in the 2003 issue were submitted before ‘9/11’ (‘having been written so long ago’) that they do not engage with such ‘geopolitical’ issues. Although somewhat cryptically phrased, what Venn seems to have in mind here is that the existence of ‘American imperialism’ is today less doubtful than it was in 1999/2000. If my interpretation of Venn is correct, this is a striking admission. It immediately begs the question of why it took the ‘war on terrorism’ for Venn’s ‘us’ (i.e., ‘forcing us all’) to see US imperialism (note also the deluge of English-language book on the theme: for example, Harvey, 2003; Johnson, 2004; Blum, 2003) and not others, such as Bourdieu and Wacquant?

5. In interview Hardt and Negri (2004) elaborate:
propositions of hybrid identities or multiculturalism can seem like liberatory projects when one assumes that the power being confronted rests on pure notions of identity and stark oppositions of self and other. But when the sovereign power no longer resides on pure identities but rather works through hybridisation and multicultural formations, as we claim it does in Empire, then those projects lose any necessary relation to liberation or even contestation. They could, in fact, be complicit with imperial power itself. We do not mean to say because Empire works through multiculturalism and hybridity that we need to reject those strategies – rather we mean simply that they are not sufficient in themselves. In the face of the new forms of sovereignty, new strategies of contestation and new alternatives need to be invented.

6. A large organisation, like the World Bank, can easily be represented as ‘ideologically diverse’. Certainly, amongst World Bank researchers, there appears to be uneven faith in neo-liberal solutions. The two authors of a recent World Bank report showing ‘few gains in income poverty reduction’ amongst indigenous peoples in Latin America (Hall and Patrinos, 2005a), have provided an interesting reflection on this unevenness. Asked why, since neo-liberalism has failed indigenous peoples in Latin America, the World Bank does not abandon it, Hall and Patrinos (2005b) provide a slightly cryptic response:

indigenous peoples need to recognise the advantage of linking their goals with the MDGs (Millennium Development Goals), which would reinforce governments and donor’s attention to indigenous peoples, and force the strategies to become more inclusive.

What Hall and Patrinos seem to be saying here is that, yes neo-liberalism has failed, but that stated commitments to the Millennium Development Goals can be used by indigenous peoples to by-pass this dominant economic model.
7. The World Bank’s new President takes a different view of Russia’s capitalist crash course. Speaking in 2005 Wolfowitz noted that ‘as someone who has been following the Russian economy for 15 years and remembering the extremely pessimistic predictions of 15 years ago about what might happen to Russia, it’s actually very good to see Russia doing well, and I don’t think it’s only because of improved oil prices’ (Wolfowitz, 2005b).

8. The World Bank’s connections with the USA are most clearly seen through the Bank being based in Washington and through the convention that the US government chooses the Bank’s President. The US has the most powerful voice in both the IMF and World Bank, wielding in 2003 17.14% and 16.39% of voting rights in each institution respectively. This percentage effectively gives the US power of veto. Since the rest of voting power is allocated to, in large part, to allies of the US (OECD having 63.55% and 61.58% of the vote in the IMF and World Bank respectively, and the G8 nations 48.18% and 45.71% respectively (World Bank, worldbank.org)), US control is assured.

9. The ‘Afro-Latino Resolution’ (House Resolution 47), introduced by Congressional representative Charles Rangel and John Conyers in February 2003, asserts that ‘US funding to Latin American countries should come with a provision recognising the direct economic and social conditions of Afro-Latins’ (Carrillo, 2004). The assumptions that ‘Afro-Latin’ identity should become more racially conscious and US-Americanized and that the USA provides a more advanced, more fully evolved, model of ‘race relations’ than is apparent in Latin America, are made clear by Rangel and Mischa Thompson who drafted the resolution: ‘Identity movements take a long time … race politics take a long time’, notes Thompson (cited by Carrillo, 2004); ‘Countries like Brazil are just getting affirmative action’, says Rangel, adding ‘Globalisation and free trade are inevitably bringing our communities closer together’ (cited by Carrillo, 2004; see also Fitts, 2001, on the Mundo Afro Project).

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