McGahern U.

[Protesting at the crossroads: Framing 'in-between places' in spatial analyses of contention.](#)

***Political Geography* 2017, 59, 92-102.**

Copyright:

© 2017. This manuscript version is made available under the [CC-BY-NC-ND 4.0 license](#)

DOI link to article:

<http://doi.org/10.1016/j.polgeo.2017.04.006>

Date deposited:

12/04/2017

Embargo release date:

19 April 2019

This work is licensed under a
[Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International licence](#)

Protesting at the crossroads: framing 'in-between places' in spatial analyses of contention

Acknowledgements: I would like to thank Professor Salman Abu Sitta of the Palestine Land Society for providing base layer data for the maps showing road networks in Israel before and after 1948. My thanks also to the reviewers at Political Geography as well as several colleagues for comments and feedback on various drafts.

Una McGahern (Newcastle Politics)

una.mcgahern@ncl.ac.uk

School of Geography, Politics and Sociology, Newcastle University, 40-42 Great North Road

Newcastle NE1 7RU, Tel: +44 (0)191-222 3644.

Protesting at the crossroads: framing ‘in-between places’ in spatial analyses of contention

Bridging anthropological understandings of “non-place” (Augé, 1995) with insights on the “in-between city” (Sieverts, 2003), this paper advances the concept of *in-between place* as a useful heuristic device through which to examine spaces of contention outside the city. Focusing on a single protest organised by youth activists in Wadi Ara in the summer of 2013, it uses frame analysis to interrogate the power of roads, particularly the nodal power of inter-urban crossroads, in enabling Palestinian protest in Israel. In so doing, this paper seeks not only to address the creative efforts to be seen and heard on the margins of an ethnocratic regime, but to contribute to a wider decentring research agenda that would move beyond the city in concrete and analytical terms.

Keywords: roads, in-between places, protest, frames, Palestinians in Israel

Abbreviated title: Protesting at the Crossroads

All street protests operate according to a set of generalizable logics. Della Porta and Diani (2009, pp. 170-8) list three: the “logic of numbers”, the “logic of damage” and the “logic of bearing witness”. While this typology provides a useful starting point from which to examine the importance of place in protest, it fails to grapple with the spatial conditions that enable, or interrupt, the satisfaction of these logics of protest in practice. If, for example, it is intuitive that the logic of numbers serves to signal the worthiness, unity, numbers and commitment (Tilly, 2008, p. 71) of a cause, then it is equally intuitive that the absence of an easily accessible space to display and communicate that force of numbers represents a

fundamental challenge to satisfying the logics of protest in practice. Similarly, the distance of political claimants from major political and economic centres frustrates the capacity of protestors to disrupt prevailing power dynamics and effect political change. Ultimately, the lack of easily available, accessible as well as sufficiently sizable and central public spaces to protest not only limits the possibilities of capturing and transmitting opposing narratives and “moral messages” (Della Porta & Diani, 2009, p.176) to multiple audiences, but also reduces the very visibility of claims and claimants in the first place.

Spatial analyses of protest, however, continue to assume a city-centred bias. The uprisings which spread across the Middle East from January 2011 captured international attention and ignited political imaginations in large part because these protests were clearly embedded at key symbolic sites in major cities which (for a time at least) became endowed by association with an almost talismanic quality of revolutionary significance (Fregonese, 2013; Ramadan, 2013). The spatial order of so-called “rebel cities” (Harvey, 2012), which centre on a typical cityscape of squares, boulevards and roundabouts, rendered these sites “iconic” (Wallach, 2013) and made the protest events taking place within them both familiar and accessible, legible and intelligible to multiple audiences around the world.

Yet, many communities have limited access to these symbolic sites as well as to many of the spatial signifiers which help to visually anchor and “index” (Spencer, 2011, p. 18) protest in the eyes of external audiences and connect it to the “global street” (Sassen, 2011). Socially, politically and geographically marginalised in a growing number of “spaces apart” (Moulin, 2010) such as borderland areas, urban slums, rural peripheries, refugee camps as well as a whole range of other ethnic and socio-economic enclaves outside the city, access to the city for a vast number of people today is often heavily circumscribed if not precluded altogether

by uneven patterns of distribution, connectivity, mobility and wealth. Nonetheless, as the events of the Arab uprisings have shown, protest events taking place on the margins are not only common but are often very effective. Thus, scholars have increasingly recognised the need to “move beyond the city” in concrete and analytical terms to engage with the complex ways in which political contention “stretches outwards” from the city (Uitermark, Nicholls & Loopmans 2012, p.2546).

Spatial analyses of protest in an ethnocratic regime – that is, in “a non-democratic regime which attempts to extend or preserve disproportional ethnic control over a contested multi-ethnic territory” (Yiftachel, 1999, pp. 367-8) – requires going a step further. The “nixing” (King-Irani, 2007) of Arab cities in Israel through processes of land confiscation and enclosure as well as through uneven and unequal planning processes (Gradus, 1984; Yiftachel, 1999; Khamaisi, 2006; Yacobi, 2009), ethnically-differentiated regimes of (im)mobility (Handel, 2014; Kotef, 2015; Blatman-Thomas, 2017) and (in)visibility (Hatuka, 2016) has not only underscored the importance of politics on the margins, it has decentred the (Arab) city in processes of Palestinian contention, creating new geographies of protest in the process.

A small, but growing, body of work exists which examines “spatial alternatives” – that is, “different ways of relating to, analyzing, using and organizing space” (Gazit & Latham, 2014, p.64) – in Israel-Palestine. Protest events at The Wall, checkpoints, at the edges of divided cities as well as at destroyed villages (Baylouny, 2009; Gazit, 2009; Pallister-Wilkins, 2011; Tawil-Swouri, 2011 & 2016; Hatuka 2012; Dibiasi, 2015) reveal a long-standing pattern of contention outside the city. This paper contributes to this scholarship by drawing attention to the importance of inter-urban crossroads as another alternative site of protest outside

the city in Israel-Palestine. More broadly, however, it seeks to contribute to the wider scholarship by using this case study to illustrate the importance of *in-between places* in spatial analyses of protest and political contention.

Building on a critique of Marc Augé's (1995) concept of "non-place", the concept of *in-between place* proposed here incorporates insights from urban studies, particularly work on the "in-between city" (Sieverts, 2003), to show how urban infrastructure and the circuitry of roads produces meaningful spaces of contention outside the city. Focusing on a single protest event which took place in the summer of 2013 at an inter-urban crossroads in the Wadi Ara region, it examines two different framing techniques – of "enframing" space (Mitchell, 1988) as well as of "collective action framing" (Benford and Snow, 2000) – through which this in-between place was transformed into a meaningful and politically significant space of contention.

The paper proceeds as follows: Beginning with a theoretical elaboration of the concept of in-between place, the paper outlines its methodological approach to frame analysis.

Attention then turns to the case study. Following a discussion of the politics of roads in enframing space in Israel, it examines the strategic choices and collective action frames used by the activists to frame their protest at Wadi Ara. The paper concludes with a discussion of the broader significance of in-between places within spatial analyses of urban politics and collective action.

IN-BETWEEN PLACES

Focusing on the urban conditions which restrict or facilitate individual and collective liberties as well as possibilities for political change in practice, scholarship examining the right to the city has tended to focus on struggles to (re)shape the city (Lefebvre, 1996;

Harvey, 2003; Marcuse, 2009) from within it, whether through protest, participatory planning processes or the politics of everyday life. The city, however, is not synonymous with the urban. It represents just one part of a broader urban “totality” that shapes and influences social interactions and relations (Lefebvre, 2003). To speak of the urban, therefore, requires not only that we move “beyond the square” (Sharp & Panetta, 2016) in spatial analyses of contention but that we look beyond the city as well in order to recognise a wider range of spatial alternatives and possibilities for contention.

Doing so in practical terms represents a challenge. If the urban is everywhere, there is a tendency for differences between types of places to collapse, and for those places where urban conditions are less recognisable or visible to disappear under the weight of larger, more recognisable and familiar ones. With a few notable exceptions, efforts to move beyond the city in analyses of urban politics have struggled to do more than extend their analytical scope of enquiry to the suburbs, banlieues, *ashwiyyat*, *favelas*, refugee camps and other enclaves on the city’s edges (Garreau, 1991; Soja, 1996; Li, 2009; Young & Keil, 2010; Addie, 2016). While these studies effectively demonstrate the negative effects of “peri-urbanization” (Coward, 2009) or “splintering urbanism” (Graham & Marvin, 2001) upon the communities who reside there, they nonetheless perpetuate a city-centred or metropolitan view of urban life which does not adequately reflect or represent the distribution of population groups as well as respective struggles for social and political justice today.

Studies examining the effects of ethnocratic governance on Palestinians in Israel have also struggled to break with this city-centred view. A focus on “mixed cities” (Yiftachel & Yacobi, 2003; Yacobi, 2009; Gazit & Latham, 2014) – those large Jewish cities (such as Jerusalem, Haifa, Jaffa or Lod) with a significant Palestinian minority population “most of which were,

before 1948, grand Arab cities that were defeated and whose original Arab majority populations were displaced” (King Irani 2007: 180) – remains popular. With their particular demographic make-up and patterns of concentration, mixed cities are useful case studies for the study of ethnic expansionism and control as well as of conflict urbanism (Misselwitz, 2006). Nevertheless, only ten per cent of Israel’s 1.8 million Palestinian citizens live in “mixed” cities (Jabareen, 2014). Subject to a process of “urbanization without cities” (Khamaisi, 2004) and denied the right to live in 942 Jewish localities (Jabareen, 2015, p.20), the vast majority of Palestinians in Israel (90 per cent) live in approximately 78 Arab-only urban localities of varying size that are distinctive not only in terms of their lower socio-economic standing, underdeveloped urban infrastructure and public services vis-à-vis Jewish localities but by patterns of regional fragmentation (in northern, central and southern enclaves or pockets of settlement), as well as physical and geographic separation from Jewish symbols and centres of power (McGahern, 2016).

A more radical “relational reading of place” (Amin, 2004, p.34) is, therefore, required; one that does not assume traditional dialectics of centre and periphery (Young & Keil, 2010) with the (expanded) city at its centre. Bridging two related concepts – the concept of “non-place” and that of the “in-between city” – this paper advances the concept of *in-between place* as a means of doing this. Building on anthropological understandings of place, Marc Augé’s (1995) concept of non-place has proven a popular reference point for the study of a wide range of interstitial spaces such as motorways and highways, but also airports, supermarkets and hotel lobbies. Worthy of examination, we are told, because they are “the real measure of our time” (Augé, 1995, p. 64), a non-place is understood to be a consequence, function and a condition of “supermodernity” because of the way in which they produce a uniquely individuated, dislocated and solitary experience of travel. This

experience of travel, Augé explains, results in a detached and simplified way of being and seeing in time and place; a “distinctive optic” (Scott, 1999, p. 11) which creates a certain type of tunnel vision which detaches both the traveller and the experience of place from the ordering and rationalising processes which have produced it. The geometric line of the road, the limited presence of signage, the even arrangement of light fixtures, as well as uniform height and width restrictions on road-side fencing, ditches, verges and vegetation, create envelopes of wide, flat, open spaces which not only facilitate high-capacity, high-speed travel but produce a distanced, dislocated and depoliticised view of a blurred and anaesthetic landscape.

Augé nonetheless exaggerates the difference between places and non-places. As Peter Merriman notes, “[p]lace and non-place are always relational, contingent and continually folded into one another” (2004, p.149). By emphasising a particular experience of travel, Augé reifies certain types of landscape, traveller, speeds of travel and particular parts of the journey which conform to his theorisation – in this case, the mobile vantage point of the middle class (and usually male) individual traveller as he travels at high speed through it – while downplaying other types of road user as well as the points at which traffic slows, intersections appear, views come into sharper focus and interactions between people become possible. Similarly, his characterisation of the entirety of the motorway or highway as a singular, standardised interstitial space, not only reinforces the notion of place “as a territorially bounded residential district” (Martin, 2003 p.732) but blurs into insignificance the large number of interstitial points which exist along it and which, because of their different material arrangements and space-time configurations, possess or can be generative of place-making possibilities.

Merriman provides a useful starting point from which to redress these issues. Using mobility as a lens through which to re-examine the dynamic, contingent, topological assemblages that have led to the “placing” of motorways in the United Kingdom in particular ways, he builds on Kevin Hetherington’s view of places as “mobile effects” (Hetherington, 1997, p.184) to point out the more “complex habitations, practices of dwelling, embodied relations, material presences, placings and hybrid subjectivities associated with movement through such spaces” (Merriman, 2004, p.154). Yet, Merriman’s important work on the relational power of roads remains focused on the “spaces of the car-driver” (2004, p.158) rather than other types of experiences and spaces which are folded into road-spaces and which road-spaces, in turn, feed into.

The concept of the “in-between city”, or *Zwischenstadt*, provides a useful way of drawing out the broader socio-spatial and political significance of roads. First outlined by Tom Sieverts (2003) and subsequently developed by others (Young & Keil, 2010 & 2014; Addie, 2016), the concept of the in-between city emerged out of an effort “to grasp the novel urban form that has emerged beyond the traditional, more compact, uni-centred European city” (Young & Keil, 2010, p.89). Tracing the effect of outward urban sprawl in shaping new and uneven geographies of power, it emphasised the key role played by (the uneven distribution of) infrastructure provision, connectivity, use, availability and mobility (Addie, 2016) in creating new nodal formations.

Shifting its focus from the city-centre to the edges of an expanded metropolitan area, particularly certain types of spaces within it (airports, transport thoroughfares, landfills as well as retail and industrial zones), its emphasis on “functionally specialised nodes” (Sieverts, 2003), “technoburbs” (Fishman, 1987), “ethnoburbs” (Li, 2009) in creating

patterns of “connectivity and disconnectivity and resulting vulnerabilities for the populations there” (Young & Keil, 2014, p. 1594) has usefully stressed the importance of a polycentric approach to the study of urban politics. Nonetheless, the concept of the in-between city retains a narrow reading of place based on the criteria of propinquity, traditional forms of community and permanent forms of dwelling. It has also resulted in an overly pessimistic reading of the possibilities for socio-spatial interaction and contention which arise as a direct result of the material make-up, socio-spatial configuration and placement of interstitial points, or nodes, on a wider network.

“While the in-between city is the playground of all kinds of state-sponsored strategies of planning and politics, it is no destination of such activities, but merely a container and recipient of higher order restructurings. The in-between city, in fact, is an “anaesthetic” environment, which has no memory and does not lend itself to be remembered as distinct. It is produced to be transgressed at high speed to reach other points in the urban region.” (Young & Keil, 2010, p. 92)

This description of the in-between city as an anaesthetic environment is reminiscent of Augé’s conceptualisation of non-place. So too does Augé adopt a narrow set of criteria against which to categorise motorways and highways as non-places. For him, a place should, as Merriman points out, be “localized, familiar, known, organic, occupied and meaningful” (2004, p. 146) and “associated with a sense of history, home and dwelling” (2004, p.148). Both a non-place and the in-between city are understood to lack these associations and necessary conditions to be considered a place in a meaningful sense.

The concept of in-between place proposed here challenges this view. Unlike traditional bounded notions of place, an in-between place does not represent a single community or sense of history. Nor does it require a territorial boundary or dwelling to be considered meaningful. Shaped by its material configuration as much as by the people who move through it for different reasons and purposes, an in-between place possesses its own temporary constellation (Massey, 2005) of power based on the different trajectories and relationalities which together make it meaningful. A mobile effect, it is its nodal power and placement outside the city on a wider road network that allows a distinctive kind of spatial politics to emerge there. This provides the basis from which to “place” inter-urban crossroads as a particular type of in-between place and interrogate its deeper significance within a spatial analysis of collective action.

FRAMING PLACE: A METHODOLOGICAL APPROACH

This paper uses frame analysis to illustrate the significance of one in-between place in processes of political contention. Typically understood as a bounded “field of vision” (Ingram, 2009; Williams, 2014) and associated with symbolic-interactionist and constructivist approaches to the study of how individuals and groups both represent reality and organise, perceive and communicate meanings and experiences (Goffman, 1974), a frame “implies both the construction of a world and of a way of seeing ourselves in it” (Dovey, 1999, p.1).

It is the discursive *and* spatial dimensions of framing to both shape and represent reality that makes them worthy of analysis. While much of the prevailing scholarship engaging frame analysis has tended to emphasise the discursive basis of framing processes, this paper also wishes to emphasise the spatial dimensions of frames as well as the grounded

materialities which underpin them and give frames their meaning. In order to do this, it examines two different types of framing techniques which together illustrate the power of roads alongside the nodal power of crossroads.

Examining the emergence of modern infrastructures of roads, railways, schools and police stations in Egypt in the late nineteenth century, Timothy Mitchell outlined the notion of “enframing” as a modern technique used to reorder space. Defined as “a method of dividing up and containing, as in the construction of barracks or the rebuilding of villages”, enframing “operates by conjuring up a neutral surface or volume called ‘space’” (1988, p. 44). Premised upon a neutral representation of space to the “observing eye” (1988, p.9), this technique of enframing usefully illustrates distinctions not only between representation and reality, but between the observer and world represented inside its “frame”. While Mitchell’s concept of enframing remains sadly neglected within scholarship today, the perspective of control which underpins it represents the dominant frame in thinking about the power and politics of roads in Israel-Palestine.

The study of “collective action frames” (Benford & Snow, 1998, 2000), by contrast, allows us not only to understand how Palestinian activists “make sense of events in ways that highlight a collective set of values, beliefs and goals for some sort of change” (Martin, 2003, p.733), but the ways in which they use place to communicate and increase the resonance of their claim or grievance to wider audiences. It does this by allowing us to understand how these local actors identify problems (“diagnostic framing”), propose solutions to these problems (“prognostic framing”) and make calls for collective action (“motivational framing”). The “resonance” of these collective action frames amongst audiences is, in turn, dependent upon, and determined by, the credibility and familiarity of the frames used.

While the prevailing literature on framing processes has tended to focus on the relationship between values, cultures, collective identities and ideologies in shaping the content and resonance of framing processes, it has tended to downplay both the spatial significance of collective action frames and the impact which the material configuration of place has in shaping framing processes. To redress this acknowledged imbalance in the literature (Benford & Snow, 2000) and to place collective action frames within their local context, the paper combines a strategic approach to the study of collective action (Jasper, 2004) with an understanding of enframing to draw out the more complex interplay which exists between roads and contentious politics in practice.

The ethnographic material presented here was gathered over a seven-month period from July to September 2013 and from February to May 2016. Methods used included participation observation of the protest event itself which took place on 1 August 2013 as well as 12 semi-structured interviews with youth activists who both organised and attended the protest. More than thirty additional interviews were also undertaken with a range of local planners, NGO representatives, political figures, photojournalists and local residents from the Wadi Ara region who are knowledgeable about various aspects relating to the protest, surrounding roads and local planning in Wadi Ara.

The activists interviewed were aged between 18 and 23 at the time of the protest. Half were women. Most the semi-structured interviews took place in person in the city of Haifa in 2016 while a smaller number took place in the cities of Umm el Fahem, Jerusalem and Beer-Sheva. One took place via Skype. Follow-up interviews were also conducted with three activists and incorporated an additional ethnographic dimension, whereby I would accompany the activists on foot or by car to revisit the protest site. This “go-along”

approach (Kusenbach, 2003) is inspired by ethnographic methods of “talking whilst walking” (Anderson, 2004), where walking – and moving more generally – in a place not only serves as “an active trigger to prompt knowledge recollection” (2004, p. 254) but helps to unearth the meanings, values and significance attached to these places by those who used them to disrupt the Israeli Jewish majority and challenge the state. Visual material – photographs, posters and videos – were also shared both as a means of triggering memories and illustrating the significance of the site. To protect the identities of the youth activists interviewed for this study all quotes used here have been fully anonymised.

FRAMING THE POWER OF ROADS IN ISRAEL-PALESTINE

“As mechanisms of control, roads are ideal. They are permanent structures. They flow through long stretches of territory, inducing a feeling of natural connectedness, yet they effectively claim and monopolize land by their very routes. Roads are banal. They can be made to look inoffensive and even benign and attractive – or, if need be, they can be made to look like imposing and intimidating barriers. They can be opened or closed, and used as a means to separate, unite or channel populations, instruments of control and development.” (Halper, 2000, p. 18)

A study of Israel’s occupation “reveals an array of controlling devices that have aimed to naturalize and render the occupation invisible, concealing the political violence and exploitation that have upheld it” (Gordon, 2008, p. 7). The construction and expansion of major cross-regional, inter-urban highways connecting settler colonies in the West Bank to Jerusalem and, beyond that, Tel Aviv while deliberately bypassing local Palestinian towns and communities it once served have gone alongside, and in front of, settlement-building

and –expansion processes (Weizman, 2007; Gordon, 2008; Selwyn, 2001; Pullan et al., 2007; Handel, 2014; Salamanca, 2015; Bishara, 2015).

The power of roads to contain and enframe Palestinian communities is, however, not limited to the occupation. During the *Nakba* (or disaster) of 1948, over 750,000 Palestinians were displaced over 400 Arab villages depopulated inside the territory that was to become the state of Israel. As Figure 1 below shows, the proximity of Palestinian communities to key roads and strategic junctions – particularly along the Tel-Aviv Jerusalem corridor and at the mouth of the Jezreel valley along today's Highway 66 (Kadman, 2015, p. 15) – increased the likelihood of depopulation, destruction and confiscation (Morris, 2004; Khalidi, 2006; Abbasi, 2010; Kadman, 2015).

Figure 1: Road networks and Palestinian localities in northern Israel in 1948. Source: author 2016.

The events of 1948 marked only the beginning of a radical process of territorial and socio-political reordering which sought to “fill” in the vacuum left by the destruction and depopulation of Arab neighbourhoods with new Jewish settlements (Falah, 1991). It also instituted a new regime of movement (Handel, 2014; Kotef, 2015) that was facilitated by eighteen years of military rule (1948-1966), “emergency regulations” (including the introduction of curfews, “closed areas” and an extensive permit systems) which served not only to confiscate additional land, prevent the return of “infiltrators” (Palestinian refugees

and internally displaced persons) and surveille Palestinian political activity but to restrict patterns of movement of the remnant Palestinian community outside of their towns and villages (Jiryis, 1968; Sa'di, 2013; Robinson, 2013).

New settlement blocs were established (Falah, 1991, p.76) around “development towns” built on confiscated land which acted as strategic buffers and counter-weights to the future outward expansion of remaining Arab localities (Emmett, 1995; Rabinowitz, 1997; Forman, 2006; McGahern, 2016). As Figure 2 below illustrates, a network of roads and communication linkages spun out to connect these (Jewish) development towns with Jewish centres, bypassing or ignoring larger Arab settlements on the way. Highway route 77, for example, which was once the main west-to-east road connecting Haifa to Tiberias, was rerouted to bypass the Arab city of Nazareth (Emmett, 1995: 30; McGahern, 2016), while a similar fate awaited other highways which connected or lay adjacent to other major Arab towns, containing and immobilising their Palestinian residents even further.

Figure 2: Road networks and Palestinian localities in northern Israel today. Source: author 2016.

New regional master plans introduced a zoning system through which the development of Arab localities could be more tightly controlled and limited. Major roads now came to delineate the boundaries of Arab localities, and the extent of (Arab) municipal authority, as well as areas or zones earmarked for residential, commercial or industrial development. Increasing privatisation of the economy acted as a major “driving force” (Rabinowitz & Vardi, 2010) in new road construction, extension and widening projects. Two main highways connecting Nazareth with its hinterland and other major urban centres – routes 60 and 75 – now bypassed most of the city, running along the municipal boundaries of the city itself (McGahern, 2016) which reduced local municipal involvement in infrastructural decision-

making processes, as well as related investment funds and opportunities. Meanwhile, neighbouring Jewish towns, which were directly connected to major roads, were earmarked for the creation of new industrial zones, received heavy investment in terms of government spending and infrastructural development.

The strategic underdevelopment of, and underinvestment in, Arab towns and cities served not only to stunt internal development of social and economic spaces in Arab localities but to entrench uneven patterns of mobility further. A distinctive pattern of daily outward Palestinian labour migration to Jewish towns and cities developed and remains one of its most recognisable and familiar legacies today (Blatman-Thomas, 2017). An equally distinctive pattern of territorial distribution emerged. Most Arab-only localities in Israel are effectively concentrated inland in an area roughly encircled by highways. With few exceptions, the densely populated coastal strip and borderland areas to the north and east are almost entirely Jewish-only. The majority of Palestinian towns and villages, by contrast, are set back from main roads and are only indirectly connected to the highways via a system of minor, spur roads, which are, in turn, often accessible only by car.

Thus, Israel's road network reveals a distinctive territorial pattern of ethnically-defined "privileged communities" as well as "privileged points" of access (Handel, 2014) along Israel's road network. The circuitry of roads not only produces two separate, ethnically-defined spaces of mobility – one a "contiguous, rapid, tightly knit Jewish space" and the other, a "fragmented, slow, uncertain Palestinian space" (Handel, 2014, p. 505) – but it has created a collection of concentrated, land-locked, disconnected and invisible islands of Palestinian settlement that are surrounded, contained and enframed by roads.

As Achille Mbembe points out, however, the purported functionality of roads is often subject to a process of doubling, where “systems and practices operate in variance with their purported objective” (cited in Larkin, 2013, p. 334). If “infrastructures are the means by which a state proffers... representations to its citizens and asks them to take those representations as social facts” (Larkin, 2013, p. 335), the degree to which such representations are successfully internalised, or not, depends upon the political subjectivities, positionalities and imaginaries of those who encounter and use them.

For Israeli Jewish road users, Palestinian towns and villages are often “[v]iewed as if through an impenetrable glass wall” (Benvenisti, 2000, p. 56). This optical illusion is made possible by the physical destruction and erasure of the landscape in combination with the circuitry of roads. In the process of “getting rid of ruins” – those visible signs and reminders of the indigenous inhabitants’ claims to the land – priority was often given to “areas exposed to the public eye, such as the centre of Jewish communities, in sight of major transport routes and in tourist sites” (Kadman, 2015, p. 27), resulting in a systematic public works programme to “beautify” the roads and surrounding landscape by planting European trees and engaging in a range of other landscaping techniques designed to block or redirect the eye of the traveller (Leshem, 2013).

The view of roads is, however, very different for Palestinians living on the other side of this glass wall. As sites of direct and indirect barriers to movement which can create a physically as well as mentally embodied “politics of disorientation” (Bishara, 2015, p. 34), roads serve as concrete reminders of prevailing asymmetries of power. By having to recalculate the quickest, easiest and safest way to travel, the experience of road travel can also, however, produce valuable socio-political knowledge as well as alternative forms of sociality. In

response to the strategy of erasure of Palestinian place-names from road signage and maps (a strategy which is well discussed in the literature (Benvenisti, 2000; Azaryahu & Kook, 2002; Bigon & Dahamshe, 2014)), Amahl Bishara observes on a car journey from Bethlehem (in the West Bank) to a Land Day protest in the Bedouin village of Al-Araqueeb (in southern Israel) that “asking directions was part of a Palestinian sociality that built connections and trust among Palestinians across differences of class and urban-rural difference, a practice that resisted a politics of disorientation and cooperatively reconstituted the landscape” (2015, p. 41).

These different collective experiences of roads reveal not only a distinctive type of “double vision” but the power of roads in (en)framing the other. While, in the eyes of Israeli Jewish travellers, the road may represent a natural, neutral or even anaesthetic “in-between” space devoid of people as well as of much social or political significance, this view depends upon a fluid, uninterrupted and uneventful transit through space. By contrast, roads, for Palestinians, are loaded with political significance and serve as concrete reminders as well as symbols of enclosure, expropriation, opportunity and violence. These experiences and representations of roads are, nonetheless, fluid and malleable. As sites of individual and collective autonomy, sociality and, as the next section will show, collective action, the strategy of using, occupying and protesting at the crossroads seeks not only to reframe roads but to create alternative optics and political imaginaries for Palestinians living in Israel.

“PRAWER WILL NOT PASS”

In 2011, the *Knesset* (Israeli parliament) proposed a bill, referred to as the Prawer-Begin Plan, which set out to forcibly displace and resettle 70,000 Bedouin, demolish 35

“unrecognised villages”ⁱ in the southern Negev region, and confiscate up to 800,000 *dunams* (200,000 acres) of Palestinian land (Adalah, 2013; Sweitat, 2015; Meir, Roded & Ben-Israel, 2016). When the bill was approved in 2013, the leadership of the High Follow-Up Committee for Arab Affairs (an extra-parliamentary umbrella organisation formed in the 1980s to represent the interests of the Palestinian minority in Israel on a national level) declared a day of strike action to take place on the 15th of July which was to involve a series of small demonstrations in twelve to fifteen Arab towns and villages across Israel.

This strategy of strike action was a familiar one in the repertoire of Palestinian contention. Typically associated with annual commemorative events such as Land Day (first organised in 1976 to protest government decision to expropriate thousands of *dunams* of Palestinian land), plans to mirror it to protest the Praver-Begin Plan caused consternation amongst many local activists who viewed this as a weak and mostly symbolic display against what many called a “second Nakba”. As one female student-activist observed:

“We were very frustrated by these plans for demonstrations. They were very traditional and would be invisible, mostly inside [Arab] villages and cities... The ability of strikes to raise awareness, even among our society, usually didn’t work. People got used to striking. It became normal. It didn’t even raise questions anymore about why we were striking.”

The need to do something different, to “raise the roof” of protest, as another female activist put it, and confront both the Praver-Begin Plan and the Israeli Jewish public in a direct and meaningful way was clearly articulated from the start. Working in a non-governmental organisation at the time, one local activist observed:

“The atmosphere was that something had to be done that was not traditional, not the same type of protest that we always do [which] is basically demonstrations inside the villages, it’s having the slogans, and standing in small numbers inside the villages, and not having any protest outside, not having any kind of clash or confrontation with the police, or with the public sphere outside the village.”

Instead of organising tens of protests at one time which few would see and care about, an alternative strategy was formulated which would focus instead on organising a series of large, consecutively-held protest events on major roads. With little time, few resources and limited experience of independently organising nation-wide protests, they sought to make use of what was already available to them. As one female activist recalled:

“We said, why not use the available one they are doing and try to take it to another level of visibility in terms of the discourse, and the locations, the people involved, the audience.”

Three committees were set up: a field committee, responsible for coordinating action on the ground during the protest event itself; a media committee, responsible for framing the protest as well as coordinating outreach activities with local and international audiences; and a location committee, tasked with identifying suitable sites to protest. The decision of where exactly to protest was, however, not a straightforward one. Three criteria were identified against which the suitability of each potential site was to be measured. These were that the protest site be as significant, central and safe as possible.

To satisfy the first criteria of significance it was determined that the protest site be located on a major road that was significant for Israeli (Jewish) travellers and for the state. As one female activist put it:

“When you want to say something, you should go outside of your city because in your village no one will care. You could demonstrate every day for three years and no one would care because it’s out of sight. It’s like a black hole. No one would see it. There are no Jews in the village.”

Reflecting on the route usually taken by the annual Land Day demonstration in the north, which involved a march between the Arab towns of Sakhnin and Arrabeh, one of the location committee members commented:

“It should be an important place because we want to annoy the state... It’s not like [using] the street between Arrabeh and Sakhnin, where I will only annoy the people from Arrabeh who want to travel to Sakhnin. It’s not the point. It should be connected to an Israeli city, to an Israeli settlement, it should be a very vital road for the state or for some place.”

The decision to protest at the crossroads of a major highway represented, as one local writer observed, an “escalation decision”. “We have to cancel this project; we have to cancel this bill. And to do that, you have to make steps in the places that Israelis care for.” This perspective was clearly rooted in an understanding of roads as “Jewish roads”. As a young female student activist elaborated:

“The roads here in Israel are one of the tools of the government to make borders around the village. So, the roads are not ours. We own our lands but our

villages are limited with so many roads, green areas and Jewish [settlements].

So, for us, these government tools are something which limit us. This is the place we are fighting for. The road for us is a Jewish road. It's not our road. If we had demonstrations inside the village, nobody would care. We will make our tour of the village; we will have some thousand people in the village. Nobody would care. When the demonstration goes out of the town or the village, the real thing would happen, because there are Jewish cars on the road. It's like demonstrating our [right] to own this place and go outside the borders that they want for us."

Targeting main roads, therefore, reflected a clear and deliberate strategy to be seen and heard - of capturing the gaze of Jewish audiences, "annoying" the state as well as pulling the veil of neutrality from Jewish eyes with regards to the role of roads in processes of land confiscation and territorial control. As one of member of the media committee observed, it represents "a way of expressing yourself that is very powerful here, because it's very easy, especially for the Jewish Israelis, to live in a bubble... so it's like you enter [burst] this kind of bubble in a very strong way."

For others, the strategy of protesting at the crossroads went further still. As one male activist put it:

"You need to know where your limits are and where your border is, and the minute you think of breaking that... What we were saying is that we know our borders and we are crossing these borders. (...) The Israeli authorities deal and they think of our towns as a private space, as you do of someone's house. So, it's their private space. Israeli public space, by contrast, is not an Arab space. So, for

me, it's a clash over the public space. We want to control the street. This is the point. We know that."

Moving outside their villages to occupy main roads, therefore, not only satisfies the logics of protest, it becomes the essence of political mobilisation and transformation.

Figure 3: The Wadi Ara section of Route 65. Source: author 2016.

At the outset, Route 65 was identified as an obvious road to target. A major cross-country highway, it spans one hundred kilometres from the Mediterranean coast to the north-eastern reaches of the Galilee. As Figure 3 shows, this stretch of road not only links important Jewish centres but is one of the few major roads which intersects with an area of large Palestinian settlement in Israel. Approximately 20 kilometres of this route – from the Iron interchange to Megiddo junction (highlighted above) – passes tens of Arab towns and villages as well as Israel's second largest Arab city (Umm el Fahem).ⁱⁱ

It is in this regard that the importance of the second main criteria – that of centrality – becomes evident. As one of the location committee members observed, Palestinian protest in Israel had historically remained a local affair:

“People from the Triangle area would not come to the north... We need to give people good reasons to come and not to bring them to protests which are two hours away. Because then only the hard-core activists will come.”

The capacity of the site to attract large numbers of Palestinians was continuously emphasised. As one of the media committee members put it: “we don’t want to be the generation that saw it happen and didn’t do anything about it”. To ensure a high turn-out, the framing strategy they employed tapped into widespread feelings of anger (the protests were widely referred to as “day of rage” protests) as well as of feelings of collective responsibility and duty. “People needed to understand that if they didn’t protest, they will be remembered in history as a people who betrayed a generation,” explained one local Palestinian writer and activist.

Recognising a deep apathy for traditional party politics among Palestinian youth, the activists also made extensive use of social media. An intense online and local media campaign was launched which served as an important platform for raising awareness about Praver and the planned protests. A wide array of posters, videos and online material was produced which reinforced the immediate need for collective action, the power of the youth, and the symbolism of the roads. The slogan of the protest, “Praver will not pass”, was graffitied on the walls of Arab towns and villages up and down the country. This slogan framed the protest and satisfied each of the three core framing tasks by identifying the root of the problem (land confiscation), the solution (blocking the streets) as well as its motivational content (collective responsibility),

On the ground, however, the organisers faced a more pressing, practical challenge: how to get protesters to the site? Fostering a national campaign required going beyond mobilising

slogans to one of tackling uneven patterns of mobility, access and regional distribution. As Figure 3 above shows, the clear majority of Palestinians are concentrated in three separate regions: the northern Galilee region, the central Triangle region and the southern Negev region. Wadi Ara lies in the middle of the Triangle region, an area with a high concentration of Arab towns and villages that lies adjacent to the Green Line separating the West Bank from the state of Israel. Fragmented and poorly connected by roads and public transport, getting protesters from different parts of the country to Wadi Ara – and getting there on time – represented one of the biggest challenges the organisers faced. To ensure that people could come, free transportation was arranged and tens of busses were organised to take people from major Arab towns and cities in the region to the protest site.

Before this could be arranged, however, the location committee had to determine a site that could be accessible to many busses. Along the 20-kilometre stretch of road, several junctions and crossroads of varying size and significance intersect with Highway 65. Most, however, are small and poorly paved roads which connect surrounding Arab villages. Only those junctions shown in Figure 3 represented viable options for the activists, providing wider entrances and better paved roads to channel and contain larger numbers of protesters.

Figure 4: The protest site located at crossroads between Route 65 and the village of Ar'ara.
Source: author 2016.

Here, the third criteria of safety emerges. The chosen site needed to be as safe and as easy to control by the protesters as possible. In many ways, the open, flat plan of highways made the highway a safe (or safer) place to protest than areas which are overlooked and, thereby, vulnerable to police surveillance and sniper fire. Set back from centres of power, and away from the built environment of the city, highways avoid many of the vulnerabilities usually associated with manifestations of urban verticality (Weizman 2007; Rosen and Charney, 2016). They also, however, pose risks. The lack of resources, shelter and places to hide or regroup make protest actions on highways easier to break-down and dissolve. Similarly, poorly paved access roads, the presence and size of roadside barriers, motorway railings and ditches, indirectly limit the capacity of protesters to assemble, and remain unified, for long periods of time.

While traditional protest sites inside Arab villages are often located far from (Jewish) centres of power, they benefit from being more difficult to access by the coercive apparatus of the state, and the police in particular (McGahern, 2016). This is not the case with major roads and highways. In fact, two police stations are located along the 20-kilometre stretch of Route 65 which the activists were targeting. The largest of these is Iron station, which is located directly across from the village of Ar'ara. The strategy of protesting at the crossroads allowed the police stationed there a more direct line of access, increasing the potential for the protest to be dispersed. This risk was, however, knowingly considered by the protesters who saw police violence as an inevitable consequence of their strategy of protesting on major roads. Nonetheless, certain junctions were considered too dangerous to consider. As one female activist involved in organising the protest observed:

“We are not crazy. We do not go to Kvish Shesh [Highway 6]. We go to places that we can control. It's not Meidan at-Tahrir [Tahrir Square] in Egypt. We know that we are maximum two thousand, three thousand people. So, we do not go to huge places that we know that they are going to react in a very crazy way, I mean the police. So, we choose places that we can control somehow.”

Open spaces were also considered too unsafe and difficult to secure. As one of the location committee members put it:

“An open space allows the police to divide the protest into many parts that can be controlled. Because what gave the people the motivation, the brave attitude, is the feeling that they are between mass, there are people, you have support, there are thousands of people... but when there are 15 people, 20 people, you just get slapped around by the police...”

As a result, crossroads were considered to offer the best possibility for staging a significant, central and safe protest. However, not all crossroads could be used. The junction to the east of the village of Deir al-Hanun, for example, was discounted. Although it was large, it was surrounded by forest. Moreover, the road running next to it serviced mainly residents of the Jewish town of Katzir, as well as Jewish settlements in the OPTs. Within their calculations, a clear connection was made between the perceived suitability of a protest site and the relative proximity of the protest site to a Jewish or Arab village or town. Reflecting on the violent fragmentation of previous protests, one female activist and committee member explained:

“If you go to a crossroads, you need to have an [Arab] village behind you. If they attack you, you need to have a place to run. When they attacked us [in Sakhnin], we didn’t know where to go. Some people went inside a field where there are some trees, others went... It’s in the middle of nowhere, of roads, of so many roads... so you don’t have somewhere to run. If you run for maybe 15 minutes, you get to Sakhnin... it’s far from Sakhnin. And it’s a very good place for the police, not for us. As someone who organised it, I saw what they did to the people... people strayed all over. So, if you choose a place, you should choose a place that if they attack you, you can go to the village. And they won’t go to the village.”

Here, the nodal power of crossroads was activated by the protesters. The proximity of the crossroads to an Arab town or village was used to temper the vulnerability of exposure to the police. The location committee also took lessons learned from previous protests into account. As one of their committee members recounted:

“We needed someone to go ahead and check the location, see where we can run away when the operation starts... because we didn’t want people to run away to a place that is very open, where there would be a lot of injuries and arrests, [but] to be running towards houses that can protect them, or inside a village that would be harder [for the police] to enter.”

Due to the historical depopulation and destruction of Palestinian villages located next to major roads, few crossroads could satisfy this criterion of proximity to an Arab village. There was a further complication. They needed to find a local village council that would not only be sympathetic to the goals of the protest but be willing to take the risk of supporting the protest in the face of likely sanctions by the state. This, however, was not a foregone conclusion. Some local councils refused to take the activists seriously, dismissing them, as one committee member recounted, as “a small bunch of impulsive teenagers”. Others refused out of fear or concern for potential repercussions. In this vein, the protest organisers were also accused, she continued, of “just bringing violence and destroying our local economy”.

Given the real and perceived risks involved, local resistance was not unanticipated or unreasonable. As one male activist put it: “You can’t just impose it on the people.” While they debated amongst themselves at length whether local agreement should be secured, particularly if it was not forthcoming, the need for a cooperative local committee was considered too great to ignore.

Ultimately, only one local village council – that of Ar’ara – proved receptive to the aims of the protesters at the time. Circumstances prevailed in their favour. Two months previously, the police had shut down the highway to the village at one o’clock in the morning and

bulldozed the house of one of their residents which created both a useful precedent and a sense of legitimacy for the protesters as they approached the local village council. The destroyed house was located next to a crossroads leading onto Route 65. Built on privately-owned land in 1962, local planning and zoning laws had not yet come into effect which would retrospectively designate this type of construction activity “illegal”. It was its location next to the main road which made the house a target for demolition and increased the nodal power of the nearby crossroads.

From tens of junctions along this stretch of highway known for Palestinian protest in Israel, therefore, the search for a site to protest ultimately found just one crossroads which satisfied all their criteria: the crossroads with Ar’ara, pictured in Figure 4 above. Discussing at length whether other junctions or crossroads might have been possible or made better choices, one female member of the location committee paused and after a moment’s hesitation reflected that, in the end, “we didn’t have a plan B.”

CONCLUSION

The protest at Wadi Ara was one of a series of protests organised at major junctions and crossroads up and down the country over a three-month period in 2013. Thousands attended these protests, the majority travelling by bus from towns and cities across Israel’s northern and central regions. While the protesters at Wadi Ara failed in breaking through the police barricades which blocked the entrances to Highway 65, their strategy of protesting at the crossroads did succeed in stopping traffic for several hours. This, together with the large number of protesters who attended, generated an unprecedented level of press coverage and attention. Local and international photojournalists embedded at each of the protest sites captured the efforts of the protesters to break through the police lines and

occupy the highway, as well as the violent police response to these efforts. The powerful imagery of protesters attempting to break the police cordon onto a major highway went viral. Therefore, even though the protesters at Wadi Ara failed in occupying Highway 65 itself, their physical presence, force of numbers and increased visibility at a major crossroads ultimately helped transmit the “moral message” of the protest. Their strategy of protesting at the crossroads gave the protest the frame it needed to reach multiple local and international audiences and ultimately pressure the government to suspend the Bill at the end of 2013.

The strategy of protesting at the crossroads discussed here shows the careful, deliberate and creative efforts by Palestinian protesters to be seen and heard. It also shows their awareness of, and willingness to harness, the nodal power of the crossroads. To stop the Praver Begin Plan, they developed an alternative protest strategy that involved moving out of Arab towns and cities to occupy major roads and highways and, both literally and figuratively, stop the plan in its tracks. Their collective action frame satisfied each of their core framing tasks – the diagnostic, prognostic and motivational framing of their protest – and responded to the contested material significance and symbolic power of these roads. Their framing strategy resonated clearly with Palestinian activists who were cognisant of the power of roads as “Jewish roads” and had grown increasingly disillusioned with traditional patterns of protest. Notwithstanding the dangers and risks involved, its success in persuading and motivating Palestinians to mobilise in their thousands reveals the conscious efforts of the activists to pull the veil of neutrality associated with highways and harness the nodal power of the crossroads as part of an active strategy of place-making on the margins of an ethnocratic regime.

While it is beyond the purview of this paper to examine the protest event in detail or to provide an historic overview of the broader significance of inter-urban crossroads in Palestinian patterns of protest, what this paper has sought to do is to contribute to scholarship on spatial alternatives in Israel-Palestine in a manner that recognises and addresses the distinctive nodal power of these sites. Typically treated as local, unique or exceptional spaces apart – as “non-places” – the concept of in-between place proposed here provides a useful heuristic device through which to study both the significance of these places as well as identify a broader spatialisation of protest at in-between places in Israel-Palestine.

Proposing a new relational political of place that would also contribute to a broader decentring agenda within spatial analyses of contention, this paper’s analysis provides an opportunity to rethink the place-ness of so-called “non-places” and bring, on that basis, a range of different in-between places together which do not neatly fit within city-centred frameworks of analysis. Laying the tentative groundwork for a new direction of research from which to study the politics of in-between places, its emphasis on the power of roads – and, particularly, the nodal power of crossroads – provides an opportunity not only to decentre the city from analyses of contention but to bring together and compare spatial alternatives at a range of comparable sites. In Israel-Palestine, the importance of inter-urban crossroads can therefore be relocated alongside more familiar sites such the Wall and checkpoints as well as other spaces apart such as at unrecognised villages and refugee camps. It also offers a possibility for considering similar spatial dynamics of contention at other spaces apart which increasingly make up the global map of contemporary political life, such as borderland areas, rural peripheries, refugee camps and other ethnic and socio-economic enclaves outside the city. The political significance of these sites, and their

placement outside the city, ultimately demands a more focused and concerted effort to bring these in-between places to the centre of spatial analyses of contention.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Abbasi, M. (2010). The Fall of Acre in the 1948 Palestine War. *Journal of Palestine Studies*, 39(4), 6-27.

Adalah. (2013). *The Praver Plan and the Forced Displacement of the Bedouin*. Adalah Legal Center for Arab Minority Rights in Israel. Available online at:
<http://www.adalah.org/uploads/oldfiles/Public/files/English/Publications/Articles/2013/Praver-Begin-Plan-Background-Adalah.pdf> (accessed 12 June 2013).

Addie, J.P. (2016). On the Road to the In-Between City: Excavating Peripheral Urbanisation in Chicago's 'Crosstown Corridor'. *Environment and Planning A*, 48 (5): 825-843.

Amin, A. (2004). Regions Unbound: Towards a New Politics of Place. *Geografiska Annaler*, 86 (1): 33-44.

Anderson, J. (2004). Talking whilst walking: a geographical archaeology of knowledge. *Area*, 36(3), 254-261.

Augé, M. (1995). *Non-Places: An Introduction to Supermodernity*. London: Verso.

Azaryahu, M. & Kook, R. (2002). Mapping the Nation: Street Names and Arab-Palestinian Identity: Three Case Studies. *Nations and Nationalism*, 8(2), 195-213.

Baylouny, A. (2009). Fragmented Space and Violence in Palestine. *International Journal on World Peace*, 26 (3): 39-68.

- Benford, R. & Snow, D. (2000). Framing Processes and Social Movements: An Overview and Assessment. *Annual Review of Sociology*, 26, 611-639.
- Benvenisti, M. (2000). *Sacred Landscape: The Buried History of the Holy Land Since 1948*. London: University of California Press.
- Bigon, L. & Dahamshe, A. (2014). An Anatomy of Symbolic Power: Israel Road-Sign Policy and the Palestinian Minority. *Environment and Planning D: Society and Space*, 32(4), 606-621.
- Bishara, A. (2015). Driving While Palestinian in Israel and the West Bank: The Politics of Disorientation and the Routes of a Subaltern Knowledge. *American Ethnologist*, 42(1), 33-54.
- Blatman-Thomas, N. (2017). Commuting for Rights: Circular Mobilities and Regional Identities of Palestinians in a Jewish-Israeli Town. *Geoforum*, 78: 22-32.
- Coward, M. (2009). Network-Centric Violence, Critical Infrastructure and the Urbanization of Security. *Security Dialogue*, 40 (4-5): 399-418.
- Della Porta, D. & Diani, M. (2009). *Social Movements: An Introduction*. Second Edition. Oxford: Blackwell.
- Dibiasi, C.M. (2015). Changing Trends in Palestinian Political Activism: The Second Intifada, the Wall Protests, and the Human Rights Turn. *Geopolitics*, 20(3), 669-695.
- Dovey, K. (1999). *Framing Places: Mediating Power in Built Form*. London: Routledge.
- Emmett, C. (1995). *Beyond the Basilica: Christians and Muslims in Nazareth*. University of Chicago.

- Falah, G. (1991). Israeli 'Judaization' Policy in the Galilee. *Journal of Palestine Studies*, 20(4), 69-85.
- Fishman, R. (1987). *Bourgeois Utopias: The Rise and Fall of Suburbia*. New York: Basic Books.
- Forman, G. (2006). Military Rule, Political Manipulation, and Jewish Settlement: Israeli Mechanisms for Controlling Nazareth in the 1950s. *Journal of Israeli History*, 25(2), 335-59.
- Fregonese, S. (2013). Mediterranean Geographies of Protest. *European Urban and Regional Studies*, 20(1), 109-114.
- Garreau, J. (1991). *Edge City: Life on the New Frontier*. Anchor Books.
- Gazit, N. (2009). Social agency, spatial practices, and power: the micro-foundations of fragmented sovereignty in the occupied territories. *International Journal of Politics Culture and Society*, 22(1), 83-103.
- Gazit, N. & Latham, R. (2014). Spatial Alternatives and Counter-Sovereignities in Israel/Palestine. *International Political Sociology*, 8(1), 63-81.
- Goffman, E. (1974). *Frame Analysis: An Essay on the Organisation of Experience*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
- Gordon, N. (2008). *Israel's Occupation*. London: University of California Press.
- Gradus, Y. (1984). The Emergence of Regionalism in a Centralised System: The Case of Israel. *Environment and Planning D: Society and Space*, 2(1), 87-100.
- Graham, S. & Marvin. (2001). *Splintering Urbanism: Networked Infrastructures, Technological Mobilities and the Urban Condition*. New York: Routledge.

Halper, J. (2012). The Road to Apartheid. *The Israeli Committee against House Demolitions*.

Available online at: <http://icahd.org/2012/07/25/the-road-to-apartheid/> (accessed 13/11/2013).

Handel, A. (2014). Gated/Gating Community: The settlement complex in the West Bank.

Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers, 39(4), 504-517.

Harvey, D. (2003). The Right to the City. *International Journal of Urban and Regional*

Research, 27(4), 939-941.

Harvey, D. (2012). *Rebel Cities: From the Right to the City to the Urban Revolution*. London:

Verso.

Hatuka, T. (2012). Civilian consciousness of the mutable nature of power: Dissent practices

along a fragmented border in Israel/Palestine. *Political Geography*, 31(6), 347-357.

Hatuka, T. (2016). Being visible in public space: The normalisation of asymmetrical visibility.

Urban Studies, 1-15.

Hetherington, K. (1997). In Place of Geometry: The Materiality of Place. In: K. Hetherington

& R. Munro (Eds.) *Ideas of Difference: Social Spaces and the Labour of Division*.

Oxford: Blackwell Publishers (pp.183-199).

Ingram, A. (2009). Art and the Geopolitical: Remapping Security at Green Zone/Red Zone. In

A. Ingram & K. Dodds (Eds.) *Spaces of Security and Insecurity: Geographies of the*

War on Terror (pp. 257-277). Farnham: Ashgate.

Jabareen, Y. (2014). "The Right to the City" Revisited: Assessing Urban Rights – The Case of

Arab Cities in Israel. *Habitat International*, 41, 135-141.

- Jabareen, Y. (2015). Territoriality of Negation: Co-Production of 'Creative Destruction' in Israel. *Geoforum*, 66: 11-25.
- Jasper, J. (2004). A Strategic Approach to Collective Action: Looking for Agency in Social-Movement Choices. *Mobilization*, 9(1), 1-16.
- Jiryis, S. (1968). *The Arabs in Israel, 1948-1966*. Beirut: Institute for Palestine Studies.
- Kadman, N. (2015) *Erased from Space and Consciousness: Israel and the Depopulated Villages of 1948*. Indiana University Press.
- Kamel, L. & Huber, D. (2015). Arab Spring: A Decentring Research Agenda. *Mediterranean Politics*, 20 (2): 273-280.
- Khalidi, R. (2006). *All That Remains: The Palestinian Villages Occupied and Depopulated by Israel in 1948*. Institute for Palestine Studies.
- Khamaisi, R. (2004). Urbanization without Cities: The Urban Phenomena among the Arabs in Israel. *Horizons in Geography*, 60/61: 41-50.
- Khamaisi, R. (2006). Environmental Policies and Spatial Control: The Case of Arab Localities Development in Israel. *Arab Studies Quarterly*, 28(1), 33-54.
- King-Irani, L. (2007). A Nixed, not Mixed, City: Mapping Obstacles to Democracy in the Nazareth/Natzeret Illit Conurbation. In: Monterescu, D. & Rabinowitz, D. (eds.) *Mixed Towns, Trapped Communities: Historical Narratives, Spatial Dynamics, Gender Relations and Cultural Encounters in Palestinian-Israeli Towns*. Routledge.
- Kotef, H. (2015). *Movement and the Ordering of Freedom: On Liberal Governances of Mobility*. Duke University Press.

- Kusenbach, M. (2003). Street Phenomenology: The go-along as ethnographic research tool. *Ethnography*, 4(3): 455-485.
- Larkin, B. (2013). The Politics and Poetics of Infrastructure. *Annual Review of Anthropology*, 42, 327-43.
- Lefebvre, H. (1996). *Writings on Cities*. Wiley-Blackwell.
- Lefebvre, H. (2003). *The Urban Revolution*. University of Minnesota Press.
- Leshem, N. (2013). Repopulating the Emptiness: A spatial critique of ruination in Israel/Palestine. *Environment and Planning D: Society and Space*, 31(3), 522-537
- Li, W. (2009). *Ethnoburb: The New Ethnic Community in Urban America*. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press.
- Marcuse, P. (2009) From Critical Urban Theory to the Right to the City, *City*, 13 (2-3): 185-196.
- Martin, D. (2003). 'Place-Framing' as Place-Making: Constituting a Neighbourhood for Organizing and Activism. *Annals of the Association of American Geographers*, 93 (3): 730-750.
- Massey, D. 2005. *For Space*. London: Sage Publications.
- McGahern, U. (2016). Spatial Regimes of Power: Combined Municipal Policing in Nazareth. *International Political Sociology*, 10 (3): 206-222.
- Meir, A., Roded, B. & Ben-Israel, R. (2016). Indigenous Rights, Grey Spacing and Roads: The Israeli Negev Bedouin and Planning in Road 31. In: Tidwell, A. & Zellen, B. (eds.) *Land, Indigenous Peoples and Conflict*. Routledge.

- Merriman, P. (2004). Driving Places: Marc Augé, Non-Places and the Geographies of England's M1 Motorway. *Theory, Culture & Society*, 21 (4-5): 145-167.
- Misselwitz, P. (2006). *City of Collision: Jerusalem and the Principles of Conflict Urbanism*. Birkhauser GmbH.
- Mitchell, T. (1988). *Colonising Egypt*. University of California Press.
- Morris, B. (2004). *The Birth of the Palestine Refugee Problem Revisited*. Cambridge University Press.
- Moulin, C. (2010). Border Languages: Rumors and (Dis)Placements of (Inter)National Politics. *Alternatives*, 35 (4): 347-371.
- Pallister-Wilkins, P. (2011). The Separation Wall: A Symbol of Power and a Site of Resistance? *Antipode*, 43(5), 1851-1882.
- Pullan, W., Misselwitz, P., Nasrallah, R. & Yacobi, H. (2007). Jerusalem's Road 1. *City*, 11(2), 176-198.
- Rabinowitz, D. (1997). *Overlooking Nazareth: The Ethnography of Exclusion in Galilee*. Cambridge University Press.
- Rabinowitz, D. & Vardi, I. (2010). *Driving Forces: Trans-Israel Highway and the Privatization of Civil Infrastructures in Israel*. Jerusalem: The Van Leer Institute. (In Hebrew.)
- Ramadan, A. (2013). From Tahrir to the World: The Camp as a Political Public Space. *European Urban and Regional Studies*, 20(1), 145-149.
- Robinson, S. (2013). *Citizen Strangers: Palestinians and the Birth of Israel's Liberal Settler Society*. Stanford University Press.

- Rosen, G. & Charney, I. (2016). Divided We Rise: Politics, Architecture and Vertical Cityscapes at opposite ends of Jerusalem. *Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers*, 41(2), 163-174.
- Sa'di, A.H. (2013). *Thorough Surveillance: The genesis of Israeli policies of population management, surveillance and political control towards the Palestinian minority*. Manchester University Press.
- Salamanca, O.J. (2015). Road 443: Cementing Dispossession, Normalizing Segregation and Disrupting Everyday Life in Palestine. In: Graham, S. & McFarlane, C. (eds.) *Infrastructural Lives: Urban Infrastructure in Context*. Routledge.
- Sassen, S. (2011). The Global Street: Making the Political. *Globalizations*, 8(5), 573-9.
- Scott, J. (1999). *Seeing Like A State: How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human Condition Have Failed*. Yale University Press.
- Selwyn, T. (2001). Landscapes of Separation: Towards an Anthropology of By-Pass Roads in Israel/Palestine. In: Bender, B. & Weiner, M. (eds.) *Contested Landscapes: Movement, Exile and Place*. Berg 3PL.
- Sharp, D. & Panetta, C. Eds. (2016) *Beyond the Square: Urbanism and the Arab Uprisings*. Terreform UR.
- Sieverts, T. (2003). *Cities without Cities: An Investigation of the Zwischenstadt*. London: Spon Press.
- Soja, E. (1996) *Thirdspace: Journeys to Los Angeles and Other Real and Imagined Places*. Malden, MA: Blackwell.

- Spencer, S. (2011). *Visual Research Methods in the Social Sciences: Awakening Visions*. Routledge.
- Sweitat, O. (2015). *Planning among indigenous peoples and the role of civil society: The case of unrecognised villages in Negev region in Israel*. MA Thesis.
- Tawil-Swouri, H. (2011). Qalandia Checkpoint as Space and Nonplace. *Space and Culture*, 14(1), 4-26.
- Tawil-Swouri, H. (2016). Exopolis: Between Ramallah and Jerusalem. In D. Sharp & C. Panetta (Eds.) *Beyond the Square: Urbanism and the Arab Uprisings*. Terreform UR
- Tilly, C. (2008). *Contentious Performances*. Cambridge University Press.
- Uitermark, J., Nicholls, W. & Loopmans, M. (2012.) Cities and Social Movements: Theorizing Beyond the Right to the City. *Environment and Planning A*, 44: 2546-2554.
- Wallach, Y. (2013). The Politics of Non-Iconic Space: Sushi, Shisha and a Civic Promise in the 2011 Summer Protests in Israel. *European Urban and Regional Studies*, 20(1), 150-4
- Weizman, E. (2007). *Hollow Land: Israel's Architecture of Occupation*. London: Verso.
- Williams, A. (2014). Disrupting Air Power: Performativity and the Unsettling of Geopolitical Frames through Artworks. *Political Geography*, 42: 12-22.
- Yacobi, H. (2009). *The Jewish-Arab City: Spatio-Politics in a Mixed Community*. Routledge.
- Yiftachel, O. (1999) 'Ethnocracy': The Politics of Judaizing Israel/Palestine. *Constellations*, 6(3), 364-390.

Yiftachel, O. & Yacobi, H. (2003). Urban Ethnocracy: Ethnicization and the Production of Space in an Israeli Mixed City. *Environment and Planning D: Society and Space*, 21: 673-693.

Young, D. & Keil, R. (2010). Reconnecting the Disconnected: The Politics of Infrastructure in the In-Between City. *Cities*, 27: 87-95.

Young, D. & Keil, R. (2014). Locating the Urban In-Between: Tracking the Urban Politics of Infrastructure in Toronto. *International Journal of Urban and Regional Research*, 38 (5): 1589-1608.

ⁱ There are approximately 46 “unrecognised villages” in Israel’s southern region which are home to tens of thousands of Bedouin. Most predate the establishment of the state of Israel but are denied legal recognition by the state. While residents are entitled to vote, and expected to pay taxes as citizens of the state, their communities are not connected to public road networks, water and electricity grids, sewage facilities, as well as public education and health care systems.

ⁱⁱ While subject to many of the same processes of territorial confiscation and municipal neglect as other areas, most, if not all, of the villages along this stretch of road in Wadi Ara remained mostly intact after 1948. This was due to the area falling under temporary Jordanian control until the 1949 armistice agreement when the area was subject to a land swap agreement between the two countries.